# Gulf Cooperation Council Aff

## Notes

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## 1AC Material

### 1AC Gewirth Stuff

#### The 6 governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council ought to require all employers to pay a living wage to all workers, regardless of nationality, and ensure the enforcement of the minimum wage standards.

#### The plan is enforceable and avoids labor exploitation by equalizing bargaining power

HRW 14 [Human Rights Watch “Gulf Countries: Increase Migrant Worker Protection” NOVEMBER 23, 2014] AT

“The proposals made by GCC countries fall far short of the changes needed to protect domestic workers’ rights, safety, and dignity,” said Elizabeth Tang, general secretary of the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). “GCC countries should join the growing number of countries worldwide that are extending full protection of their labor laws to domestic workers, including a minimum wage, a weekly rest day, the right to organize, and social benefits.” The GCC has discussed a potential region-wide standard employment contract for domestic workers. Recent media reports suggest that the GCC is also considering establishing a body to coordinate policies on hiring domestic workers that would consist of recruitment agency and government representatives. These developments have lacked transparency and have suffered from inadequate consultation with migrant domestic workers, trade unions, and migrants’ rights organizations. Migrants’ countries of origin are also discussing their own standard contract through a separate process. “Standard contracts are not a substitute for labor law reform, and taken alone do not meet the standards in the ILO Domestic Workers Convention,” said Sharan Burrow, general secretary of the ITUC. “The GCC should work in closer coordination with – not separately from – countries of origin to develop labor migration policies that fully respect the human and labor rights of migrants.” Migrants in the Gulf make an important contribution both to the economies of their own countries and those of the countries where they work. In 2011, migrant workers in GCC countries sent home more than US$60 billion in remittances. Competition for jobs among the workers’ countries of origin, combined with their relative lack of bargaining power in relation to the labor-destination countries, means that the pressure they exert for better labor protections is weak. “The meetings over the next few days provide a key opportunity to promote regional minimum standards that would avoid a counterproductive race to the bottom in labor conditions,” said William Gois of Migrant Forum Asia. “The governments should develop a concrete action plan, in consultation with migrant workers themselves and the organizations that represent them, with benchmarks to monitor its progress.” Kuwait University Law School will host an event on November 23, 2014, at which panelists from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, IDWF, the ITUC, and Migrant Forum Asia will discuss the rights of migrant domestic workers. The groups recommend that the governments: Establish and enforce comprehensive labor law protections for migrant workers, including domestic workers; Reform the kafala (sponsorship) visa system to ensure that workers can change employers without being required to first obtain their consent; Remove the “exit permit” requirement in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; Strengthen regulation and monitoring of labor recruitment agencies, including eliminating recruitment fees for workers; Ensure that migrants have access to justice and support services; and Expand the Abu Dhabi Dialogue to include labor-origin countries from Africa, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, and participation by nongovernmental groups. Governments should ratify and implement international labor and human rights standards, the groups said. These include the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, the ILO Forced Labor Protocol, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

#### Lack of a minimum wage allows labor recruiters to break their contracts with laborers, which is a form of labor exploitation – a minimum wage standardizes expectations which solves

Koirala 13 [(Shashwat, Univ of Chicago Undergraduate Law Review) “THE FAILURES OF QATAR’S LABOR LAWS TO PROTECT MIGRANT WORKERS’ RIGHTS” March 3, 2013] AT

The first problem regarding the livelihood of the migrant workers is related to wages. In Qatar, these workers’ wages typically range from $8 to $11 per day, but sometimes this number can dip down to $6.75.[12] These wages are often less than what they were promised when they were recruited.[13] More importantly, these wages are often inadequate for the subsistence of the worker. Qatar’s wage determining mechanism is also flawed. Qatar’s Labor Ministry notes that a labor contract between the employer and the migrant worker may be signed either in the worker’s home country or when he enters Qatar. In either case, the representatives of both countries must approve the contract. However, no guidelines on possible minimum wage rates are made available to either party.[14] Moreover, even if a certain wage was promised to the workers, employers often make unexpected deductions to that promised wage by levying the burden of costs like bedding and health care on the workers, even though Qatari laws don’t allow such deductions.[15]

#### The workers travel to the Gulf and take up labor contracts there, in effect limiting their own freedom to pursue other goals in expectation of good pay. Not meeting this expectation violates their freedom to make plans for the future and decide for themselves.

#### It also violates the mutuality of rights required by the PGC

Gewirth 96 [(alan, philosopher) “The community of rights”] AT

A prime alleged basis of the power to dismiss is the doctrine of "employment at will," according to which all employers "may dismiss their employees at will... for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without thereby being guilty of legal wrong.\*87 This sweeping doctrine has undergone restrictions both through collective bargaining agree- ments whereby workers can be fired only for "just cause\* and through legal provisions which prohibit employers from firing workers on grounds of union membership or because of racial, religious, or sex discrimi- nation.88 But there persists the more general thesis that the unrestricted right to dismiss employees is justified because it reflects the "contract at will" which characterizes all market relations. Thus, although the restrictions previously noted have led American courts "to view the employment- at-will doctrine, strictly applied, as an anachronism,"89 the contractually thesis underlying it still merits attention. The general idea of the contract-at-will thesis is held to be "mutuality": each contractor voluntarily agrees that the other has certain rights against [her] him, and, because the contract is voluntary, each can terminate it at will, that is, by his or her unilateral decision. Thus, on the one hand, the employer has the right to receive specified work from the worker, and the worker has the right to receive specified pay from the employer. And, on the other hand, just as the worker has the right to terminate her employment temporarily by striking or permanently by quitting, so the employer has the right to terminate the workers employment by firing her. In this way, then, "the right of the employe to quit the service of the employer, for what- ever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the service of such employe. . . . In all such particulars the employer and the employe have equality of right."90 This purely formal conception of equality and mutuality ignores the substantive inequalities of need and power between the individual employer and the individual worker {5-2; 6.1). To secure his livelihood the worker needs this particular job far more than the employer needs this par- ticular worker. The employer usually has a far greater pool of willing workers to draw upon than the worker has of willing employers, so that the employer can replace this particular worker far more readily than the worker can replace this particular employer. It follows that the employer's right to dismiss at will any particular worker has far more deleterious con- sequences for the latter's freedom and well-being than does the worker's right to "dismiss\* his employer by quitting his job.91 The worker's right to quit his job for a better one is hence not parallel to the employer's right to fire a worker at will.92 The equality and mutuality of rights upheld by the PGC thus require a substantive as well as a formal consideration (see 3.1).93 The doctrine of employment\*at-wiII should be rejected because its formal equality of rights does not take account, as the principle of human rights requires, of the substantive inequalities between employers and workers with regard to effective freedom and consequences for well-being. Because of these in- equalities, special protection must be provided for the freedom and well- being of workers with regard to their retention of employment. This rejection of the unqualified thesis of "contract at will" does not, as such, remove the prerogatives of management. To reject that there are no limits on the employer's right of dismissal does not entail that the employer has no right either to set appropriate work standards whose violation might, after due process, justify dismissal94 or to react to market or technological develop- ments that may require reductions of the workforce.95

### 1AC Poverty Only

#### Status quo wage laws are manifestations of nativist and white supremacist attitudes towards migrant construction workers that trap those immigrants into an inescapable form of slavery – Eurocentric thought has always excluded this blemish on social progress. Goldthorpe in ’12:

Rebecca Goldthorpe, Mapping Global Racisms Project (2012- ). Young Researcher’s Working Papers Archive, "Racialisation in the United Arab Emirates", CERS Working Paper, 2012

A main area of concern in the UAE labour market, when considering the process of∂ racialisation, is the construction sector that is dominated by particular ethnic groups. The construction sector is stigmatised by the Emirati nationals and is therefore deemed more suitable for Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan and more recently Black African migrants. Thus, reinforcing the inferior position these races hold, consequently racial hierarchies begin to emerge. The influx of cheap labour from Asian and African countries has saturated the secondary labour market; leading to certain types of jobs that are dirty and dangerous, such as construction and domestic work been associated with foreign workers, therefore indicating racialisation. Employers in the UAE favour South Asians and Indians migrant workers to fulfil roles in the building sector because they are viewed as more compliant than other races (Wells 1996; HRW 2006). Construction workers are also considered easier to exploit because they migrate from poorer developing nations, unlike British expatriates for example. The UAE functions as a capitalist nation and therefore labour is positioned as a commodity (Bales 1999; Polanyi 2001; Daly 2001). Construction workers are viewed as disposable commodities that are easily replaceable due to the abundant labour pool, leading to exploitative practices (Polanyi 2001). Market liberalism that functions in capitalist societies, such as the UAE, supposedly promotes freedom and self-regulation, whereby workers perceive themselves as commodities to which they can sell their labour (Bales and Robbins 2001; Polanyi 2001). Yet in the UAE, this is not always the case in employment, as employers often have control over workers particularly in the racialised construction sector. ‘Contract slavery’ is extremely common in the building sector whereby contracts include false promises in order to attract migrants from developing nations into slavery through employment (Bales 1999; HRW 2006). In reality, these contracts restrict freedom and are used as a tool to ‘trap’ foreign migrant workers. An economic perspective suggests capitalism and globalisation has prohibited enslavement in wealthier countries such as the UAE, exploiting migrant workers from developing nations in order to make profits. This is similar to Marxist perspectives that understand race through the economic structure and argue racism is intrinsically connected with capitalism. However, solely economic arguments fail to recognise the racialised elements whereby race pre determines success. Examples of contract slavery that promote racialisation, in the constructions sector, are eminent in the ‘Kafala System’. Workers are required obtain sponsorship by employers in order to work and reside in the UAE (Al Tamimi & Co. 2012; HRW 2011). This system is applicable to all expatriates but does not affect Emirati nationals, thus demonstrating racialisation. Using contracts, employers control migrant labourers and the contracts incidentally favour the employer (HRW 2006). However unskilled worker, such as the South Asians who dominate the construction sector, are at a greater risk because they are already disadvantaged in comparison with other western expatriates who receive higher wages, an idea that will further be elaborated upon. For example if an Indian construction worker broke their contract, they would have to leave the UAE immediately and pay a substantial sum for the flight back home but as their wages are substantially low this would be extremely difficult to achieve. In addition, construction employers often obtain migrant workers wage in order to 5 repay recruitment loans and interest (Khalaf & Akobaisi 1999; HRW 2011), further illustrating racialisation towards South Asians. ‘Debt’ therefore emerges as a strategic method to maintain control for employers (Khalaf & Akobaisi 1999; Bales & Robbins 2001). Another way modern day slavery functions is through the restricted freedom of construction workers. Passports and personal documentation is often withheld by employers, constituting forced labour, which formulates modern day slavery (HRW 2006; Bales 1999; UN Special Rapporteur 2009). Although this is an illegal practice, it is also experienced by domestic workers, and expatriates employed in the professional sector (Meany 2012), which will be discussed accordingly. Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani labour migrants are treated as racialised commodities; subjected repeatedly to exploitative working conditions that typify modern day slavery. Practices that emulate contract slavery and racialisation of South Asian and African construction workers is further illustrated by the fraudulent contracts that they receive which are often written in English (Abdul-Ahad 2008). This provides difficulty for construction works that are often illiterate and therefore fail to understand the conditions they have committed towards, therefore increasing vulnerability (HRW 2006). Additionally contracts may differ between what they agreed to in their home country and the contract presented in the UAE, for example, a lower rate of pay (Khalaf & Alkobaisi 1999). However, they are forced to accept these conditions as they are financially trapped. This further demonstrates how ‘debt’ and contract slavery is used to racialise South Asian migrant workers. Construction workers are subjected to extreme exploitative working conditions that do not affect other ‘races’ in different fields of work (UN Special Rapporteur 2009; HRW 2006; Bales 1999). The treatment of foreign migrants in the construction sphere is reflective of the racial hierarchies evident in UAE society. Substantial anecdotal and journalistic evidence reveals poor working conditions are the ‘norm’. Ghaith Abdul- Ahad wrote an article for The Guardian 2008 revealing the living conditions for construction workers in Dubai. Within the piece he described the migrant workers as been ‘treated little better than cattle’, Abdul- Ahad emphasised despite economic progression in the UAE the labour and living conditions for migrant workers remains similar to previous practices. They reside in ‘worker camps’ that are isolated, dirty, overcrowded and often do not have a functioning sewage system (Khalaf & Alkobaisi 1999; Abdul- Ahad 2008; Atiyyah 1996). Despite preventative measures been actioned by the UAE government to eliminate poor housing conditions, such as improving sanitation, migration workers remain susceptible to inadequate housing and potential health hazards (UN Special Rapporteur 2009). Furthermore, interviews with Pakistani and Sri Lankan construction workers, report long working hours that exceed UAE labour laws (Abdul- Ahad 2008). Although it has been made illegal for construction employees to work outdoors during sunlight in the hottest months (UN Special Rapporteur 2009; Al Tamimi & Co 2012), observations from expatriate Nigel Meany suggest this still occurs. The exploitative working and living conditions discussed are not reflected for Emirati nationals or expatriates from Britain, USA or Europe who are largely invisible in construction work. Rather than living in worker camps they often habituate in westernised suburbs in Dubai such as Jumeirah, whereby high standards of living are vastly experienced. Thus demonstrating racialisation in relation to how Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani and other South Asian and black labour migrants are treated in comparison to western expatriates. Racial inferiority of the constructions workers is further exacerbated. Not only do labour migrants face poor working conditions because of their race, they also experience discrimination from the UAE government. Xenophobic, racist attitudes are apparent that stereotype unskilled workers from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and the Philippines. They are viewed as racialised commodities, rather than individuals with political or social rights, and therefore can be exploited as an implication of their race and inferior status (Bales 1999). Sassen (1988) identified oil-exporting countries such as the UAE treat labour as a commodity and “nationality is the criteria by which foreign workers are located 6 within national labour hierarchies” (p. 6). The work culture promotes an inferior sense of status for unskilled migrants and as a result, they accept discriminatory labour law such as the ‘Kafala system’ that consolidates nationality as criteria for recruitment (Khalaf & Alkobaisi 1999; Sassen 1988). Expatriates in general also face discrimination because of their race when seeking employment. Nationalizing policies are created by the UAE government to increase Emirati participation in the labour market by restricting the recruitment of expatriates in certain professions (Kapiszewski 2006; Abdul- Ahad 2008). In addition, labour market strategies promote Emirati participation in public employment to ensure favourable conditions of work. These are dramatically different from experiences of migrant construction labourers or domestic workers. Emirati nationals are offered high salaries in exchange for limited working hours (Malecki & Ewers 2007; Kapiszewski 2006), which is reflective of their superiority within racial hierarchies. Emirati nationals fundamentally control the means of production, despite the largely foreign workforce, because they have the exclusive right to land and must control over half of all companies (Degorge 2006). Therefore demonstrating racial discrimination, as expatriates are not able to receive equal opportunities (Degorge 2006). Race acts a marker of success in the UAE’s labour market and often determines the types of employment different foreign groups fulfil and the social status they receive consequently. Rates of pay in the UAE are based on race discrimination, whereby Emirati nationals and western expatriates receive the highest wages and workers from the Indian subcontinent receive the lowest (Atiyyah 1996; Sabban 2004). Thus, reflecting the UAE racial hierarchies. The wage differences at a skilled level, promotes white superiority as British expatriates usually earn a higher income than for example an Egyptian counterpart who is in the same role. This practice is evident in the company British expatriate Nigel Meany manages; he notes that it is widely recognised in the work environment employees with the same job role are paid according to their race. Therefore, migrant workers from developing nations, such as groups prevalent in the construction and domestic sphere, experience financial inequality and become vulnerable to economic exploitation due to their race. Therefore remaining disadvantaged in employment. Despite the wages of construction workers been higher than what they may receive in their home country, they are much lower in comparison to other UAE salaries and are not sufficient to meet living costs. Mohanty (1997) argues all labour and wages in the UAE is organised hierarchically according to perceived race. Furthermore, in relation to the racial hierarchies that are active in the employment sector, the employment process and advertising of jobs reflects the racial stereotypes linked to particular jobs. Malecki & Ewers (2007) claim attributes such as race or sex influence labour demand. Observations of job adverts by interviewee Nigel Meany revealed the race or ethnicity preferred for a role was often specified in accordance with the vacancy. This practice is evident on UAE recruitment websites such as ‘Emirate Ads’ whereby job candidates often state their race and some prospective employers stipulate race required. For example, a job posted as recently as 7th May 2012 advertises ‘Collection officer- Arab nationals only’. Additionally, construction work is heavily advertised toward potential employees from developing nations such as Bangladesh or Ethiopia. Thus indicating the racialisation of the recruitment process.

#### Lack of wages is a form of exploitation – a living wage is needed

Glazov 12 [(Frontpage Magazine's editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in Russian, U.S. and Canadian foreign policy) “The Exploitation of Immigrant Workers in the Middle East” FrontPage Magazine July 10, 2012] AT

Asian immigrants to the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, however, cannot escape inferior status and oppression in working conditions, health care, residency, and legal recourse for harm done to them. They effectively become slaves to employers who consider them unworthy of any degree of decent treatment as human beings – and, thus, totally disposable. It’s actually a racial discrimination of the worst kind. Native-born citizens of Kuwait, for example, receive so much money and other benefits from their oil-rich government that they have little or no need to work at all – particularly the women. But, since these wealthy Arab women consider staying home to tend to the house and take care of their children beneath their dignity, they require maids for such tasks. According to Arab news reports, 83 percent of Kuwaiti households have foreign maids working for them. There are more than three million foreign maids working in the GCC nations, mostly from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Nepal. They can well afford to pay these housemaids a living wage and provide decent working conditions, but in reality few do. Instead they force maids to work inhumanely exhausting hours; abuse them both verbally and physically to the point of torture; willfully delay, cut, or totally withhold their wages; and beat, rape, or even kill them. Stories about such tragedies appear in various regional news media daily, but they usually are very brief and express neither outrage nor remorse. The perpetrators – if prosecuted at all – mostly receive little more than a fine (which is hardly a deterrent to the rich) or a brief jail sentence that is likely to be commuted early. So the abuse goes on. FP: Don’t the countries these maids come from protest such treatment of their citizens? Johnson: Sometimes, but with little effect. Indonesia has been the most vocal, and has for periods of time banned women from seeking work as GCC Member State housemaids while trying to negotiate better employment terms and safety assurances for them. But as soon as the travel restrictions are relaxed, the problem recurs. Indeed, Indonesia has such a ban in place right now because of the torture and murder of a maid. In response, GCC Member State employers have begun recruitment of housemaids in fresh territory – Vietnam and Cambodia – where the people are unaware of the history of this issue. FP: What about the immigrant men? Johnson: The GCC Member States are now home to some of the most beautiful and architecturally advanced buildings in the world, including Dubai’s Burj Khalifa, now the tallest man-made structure on Earth. This magnificent multi-use showpiece was designed by an American architectural firm, but – like nearly everything else newly built in the region – was constructed mostly by South Asian immigrant workers. Though some of these men are young and single, many of them are married with wives and children back home that they are trying to support but will not see for months or even years. Their working conditions are so hazardous that injuries and deaths are common, but the local news media barely notice. They have to live in filthy, overcrowded labor camps and too often do not even receive the inexcusably low pay they are allotted. Certainly, they’ll never get to enjoy as visitors what they have worked so hard and risked their lives to build. The whole present employment system for both male and female immigrant workers in GCC Member States is deeply flawed, thereby enabling the unmitigated mistreatment these people endure. FP: Please explain. Johnson: In order to work in a GCC Member State, a prospect must be recruited in her or his home country and pay an exorbitant fee to the recruiter, who then becomes a “agent” that finds employment for this worker (and may receive a fee from the employer as well). The worker’s fee is often so high relative to anticipated wages that paying it back could take years. There is something called sponsorship. Essentially, you can only work for the employer that brought you into the country – no one else. If you want to seek a job elsewhere in the host country, you need to leave that country and return on a different visa. Also, while you are working for the employer that sponsored you, the employer confiscates your passport, and does not even pay your wages on time. There are thousands of examples where employers systematically abused employees. If you are a housemaid, your employer sponsors you and then sub-leases you among his friends and neighbors for a profit. For both men and women, eighty- to hundred-hour work weeks are fairly common. Next, it is common practice for either the recruiter/agent or the employer to confiscate the worker’s passport. Because leaving the country – including escape back home – is absolutely forbidden without a proper passport, and because holding ANY job requires that passport, immigrant workers are effectively trapped by their current employers – no matter how negligent or even intentionally cruel they may be. They are thus enslaved to uncaring masters whose control over them is total, and they can be discarded (or worse) at any time without recourse. There are no unions or other organizations to protect workers in GCC Member States. As a result, there have been many suicides among both housemaids and male workers besides the deaths from job hazards, disease, and brutal treatment. These tragedies receive only the briefest mention in the local news media unless they occur publicly enough to warrant a few extra paragraphs of coverage. Even then, the public response is essentially nil. FP: Can you point us to sources for this disturbing and heart-breaking information? Johnson: Yes. Seeing the suffering of Asian immigrant workers in GCC Member States disturbed me so much that I set up a website to gather news of these events from the whole region on a daily basis, and also present articles analyzing the issues and proposing solutions. That website is gcchumanrights.org and is dedicated to improving both working conditions for immigrants and rights of citizens in general in Gulf Cooperation Council nations. FP: Can you give us some examples of what we might see there? Johnson: Yes. There are about three million immigrant housemaids employed in the GCC Member States. Here are just a few stories my website collects daily from the many news media in both the GCC region and the countries these maids come from. You can go to my site to read the complete articles. An Indonesian housemaid was pushed out of a third-floor window by her employer. She was in a coma for a week and later sent back to Jakarta without her pay. The most frequent cause of death among immigrant housemaids in GCC Member States is “falling down from high floors” according to an attorney investigating worker grievances. Some of these women may have been driven to suicide by their horrid circumstances, but many probably were murdered. There is no respect for their lives. An Emirati woman and her male neighbor were convicted in Abu Dhabi of stripping the woman’s Asian housemaid naked and beating her to death with a frying pan, then threatening the maid’s colleague against reporting the murder to authorities. Three Kuwaiti men stalking a Sri Lankan housemaid waited for her to finish shopping and start walking home before jumping on her and throwing her into their car. They then drove to an empty lot behind a building and took turns in raping her despite her constant screams. The attackers have not yet been found. In 2008, in the United Arab Emirates, a woman who was gang-raped by a group of men was imprisoned for eight months for adultery after reporting the crime to the police. Employers or Sponsors often rape housemaids too. If a pregnancy results, they will abuse her until she miscarries, get her deported, or cause her death. If her child somehow survives, it will have no rights, no protection, no food, and no shelter. A Saudi employer and his wife were arrested in Riyadh for torturing a Sri Lankan housemaid by hammering 18 heated nails into her arms, legs, and forehead. The nails ranged in length from one to three inches. The case is still pending. Another Indonesian maid was tortured and so badly maimed and burned by her female Saudi employer that she became unrecognizable as the pretty 23-year-old she had been. Before and after pictures in this article would make any decent person both sick and very angry. Also, the employer, though initially sentenced to three years for her crime, was later allowed to go free. The appeals court in Kuwait upheld the death sentence of a Kuwaiti housewife for murdering her Filipina domestic helper but commuted the punishment on her disabled husband. They had regularly beaten the maid until her health failed, then taken her to the desert where they threw her out of the car and ran over her repeatedly until she died. Cases like these have prompted Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, and Kenya to ban travel by women to serve as housemaids in GCC Member States, which is why Saudi Arabia in particular is looking for fresh recruitment sources in Vietnam and Cambodia. FP: What about the immigrant men who work in the oil fields or construction? Johnson: They have an excessive death rate too, mostly from high falls that are rarely reported unless obvious suicides – which are a significant percentage – but also from poorly treated injuries suffered because of unnecessarily hazardous work conditions or disease from the filthy, overcrowded labor camps they are forced to live in. In Bahrain, ten immigrant men crowded into a flat in an old house died of smoke inhalation before fire crews arrived to fight the blaze, which was caused by faulty wiring. The building had never been legally registered for labor camp use. It was supposed to be bachelor apartments. Many of the places legally designated as labor camps have no indoor cooking equipment, no garbage collection, and no bathroom facilities at all. You can imagine how depressing it must be to live there, not even be paid the wages you were promised, and knowing you are trapped in that situation because your employer is holding your passport.

#### Indian workers are exploited – a living wage solves

Misra 14 [(Satish, senior fellow with Observer Research Foundation) “Bring a Labour Migration Policy for Gulf Nations” New Indian Express 29th June 2014] AT

Most of Indian workers in the Middle-East are low-wage earners without any long-term benefits like pension and deferred wages called bonus. What’s worse, they are often victims of exploitation by their employers, who do not give them the promised wages or provide proper living conditions. In the run-up to the football World Cup in Qatar, migrant labour from India has been facing almost inhuman working conditions in the construction sector there. But it’s not just Qatar, as cramped conditions and exploitation by employers under the infamous “kafala” system affected workers in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE etc., leaving Indian migrant workers in semi-slave conditions, where they cannot even protest against lower wages or poor living conditions, because that is tied to them being able to leave the country. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj has declared she will focus on the problems of migrant Indian workers in the Gulf countries. The need for a detailed labour migration policy vis-a-vis members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is long overdue and New Delhi must persuade GCC countries to develop a common immigration law. The GCC as a bloc needs a common labour policy as Gulf states receive labour from the same countries. Simultaneously, the government must undertake a detailed study of the labour market dynamics in Gulf countries. This will help it formulate a better emigration policy that will train and prepare the kind of workforce that can compete internationally. Since migrant workers do not have the capacity to negotiate salaries and minimum safeguards for their working conditions in the destination countries, India must evolve a living wage formula for them through negotiations with the host countries.

#### The 6 governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council ought to require employers to pay a living wage to all workers, regardless of nationality, and ensure the enforcement of the minimum wage standards.

#### The plan is enforceable which solves

Piper 14 DLA Piper, global law firm operating through various separate and distinct legal entities, "MIGRANT LABOUR IN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR IN THE STATE OF QATAR", April 2014

13.18 Consideration should be given to introducing a minimum wage. We recommend that the State of Qatar, in consultation with States of Origin, undertakes an expert evaluation of the appropriate Relevant Minimum Wage 34 rates for each type of construction worker in Qatar which an employer would be required to pay. This requirement should be clearly stated in the Bilateral Treaties as well as provided in the Migrant Worker Model Employment Contact appended to them, and should be legally binding on all employers operating in the construction sector in Qatar. There should be civil and criminal sanctions for non-compliance with this requirement, with the right of an appropriate inspection of records to demonstrate compliance with these obligations, and an inspector should undertake regular spot-checks. 13.19 Sanctions for employers' / sponsors' failure to pay wages. We recommend that in the event of proven failure to pay wages by any employer / sponsor , that employer / sponsor should automatically be disqualified from objecting to a transfer of employment or exit visa being granted, or should have an appropriate short period of time in which he must prove that the wages have been paid. The default position should be that the transfer will be granted, and in the event of repeat offences of failure to pay such employer / sponsor should be disqualified from being a sponsor. 13.20 Preventing undue delay for payment of wages. We recommend that the payment process in respect of projects ultimately funded by the State of Qatar needs revisiting to ensure that there is no undue delay which would impact upon the payment of wages to migrant workers through Sub-Contracting entities, or be used as an excuse for delay in payment. We also recommend introducing appropriate sanctions for late payment throughout the chain of contracting, for example suspension of contracts and financial penalties provided for in the contract for the Lead Contractor in the event of late payment of wages, reduction of payment period in all contracts from 90 to 60 days, Lead Contractors should be under an obligation to pay their Sub-Contractors promptly and these obligations should be reflected in all contracts in the supply chain. 13.21 Monitoring of payment of wages electronically. We recommend that the State of Qatar should give consideration to implementing a scheme whereby payment of migrant worker wages is monitored electronically by, or in conjunction with, the Qatar Central Bank.

#### The plan avoids labor exploitation by equalizing bargaining power

HRW 14 [Human Rights Watch “Gulf Countries: Increase Migrant Worker Protection” NOVEMBER 23, 2014] AT

“The proposals made by GCC countries fall far short of the changes needed to protect domestic workers’ rights, safety, and dignity,” said Elizabeth Tang, general secretary of the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). “GCC countries should join the growing number of countries worldwide that are extending full protection of their labor laws to domestic workers, including a minimum wage, a weekly rest day, the right to organize, and social benefits.” The GCC has discussed a potential region-wide standard employment contract for domestic workers. Recent media reports suggest that the GCC is also considering establishing a body to coordinate policies on hiring domestic workers that would consist of recruitment agency and government representatives. These developments have lacked transparency and have suffered from inadequate consultation with migrant domestic workers, trade unions, and migrants’ rights organizations. Migrants’ countries of origin are also discussing their own standard contract through a separate process. “Standard contracts are not a substitute for labor law reform, and taken alone do not meet the standards in the ILO Domestic Workers Convention,” said Sharan Burrow, general secretary of the ITUC. “The GCC should work in closer coordination with – not separately from – countries of origin to develop labor migration policies that fully respect the human and labor rights of migrants.” Migrants in the Gulf make an important contribution both to the economies of their own countries and those of the countries where they work. In 2011, migrant workers in GCC countries sent home more than US$60 billion in remittances. Competition for jobs among the workers’ countries of origin, combined with their relative lack of bargaining power in relation to the labor-destination countries, means that the pressure they exert for better labor protections is weak. “The meetings over the next few days provide a key opportunity to promote regional minimum standards that would avoid a counterproductive race to the bottom in labor conditions,” said William Gois of Migrant Forum Asia. “The governments should develop a concrete action plan, in consultation with migrant workers themselves and the organizations that represent them, with benchmarks to monitor its progress.” Kuwait University Law School will host an event on November 23, 2014, at which panelists from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, IDWF, the ITUC, and Migrant Forum Asia will discuss the rights of migrant domestic workers. The groups recommend that the governments: Establish and enforce comprehensive labor law protections for migrant workers, including domestic workers; Reform the kafala (sponsorship) visa system to ensure that workers can change employers without being required to first obtain their consent; Remove the “exit permit” requirement in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; Strengthen regulation and monitoring of labor recruitment agencies, including eliminating recruitment fees for workers; Ensure that migrants have access to justice and support services; and Expand the Abu Dhabi Dialogue to include labor-origin countries from Africa, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, and participation by nongovernmental groups. Governments should ratify and implement international labor and human rights standards, the groups said. These include the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, the ILO Forced Labor Protocol, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

#### No unemployment- labor shortages mean businesses will absorb the cost

Coulom 13 [Michael Coulom. “Employment and Entitlement in the GCC: A World-systems analysis of disrupted development.” International Affairs, Working Paper Series # 20 | November 2013, American University of Beirut] AJ

The GCC labor market and subsequent unequal exchange are driven by the region’s unique demographic makeup, namely its small national population and increasingly large non-national population With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Oman, “foreigners form a majority of the population in all of the GCC states”, and make up about 90% of the population in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates42 Even in Saudi Arabia, a nation of 27 million, 84 million residents are non-nationals (see Figures 2, 3) 43 The extreme imbalance between nationals and non- nationals is attributable to two different types of labor shortages The first, an absolute shortage, means that the state’s indigenous population is too small to realize its full productive potential and to meet human resource needs44 The states of the GCC have sought to ameliorate this problem with relatively open immigration policies for migrant workers.

#### Higher public sector wages relative to the private sector depresses productivity – increasing private sector wages creates competition and causes GCC economic development, which solves all their impacts

Coulom 13 [Michael Coulom. “Employment and Entitlement in the GCC: A World-systems analysis of disrupted development.” International Affairs, Working Paper Series # 20 | November 2013, American University of Beirut] AJ

Public sector employment in the GCC is also popular because it requires few advanced skills, yet begets salaries higher than that of the public sector—unsurprisingly, the GCC public sector is notoriously underproductive Labor productivity has in fact declined since the 1980s in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite the fact that 44% of Saudi Arabia’s budget is devoted towards paying state salaries and other GCC states are increasing salaries�77 Higher salaries for less demanding work have produced what ESCWA calls a “private-public wage gap”, a phenomenon that “price[s] nationals out of the private market and weaken[s] incentives to acquire the education that market economies demand”78 The labor market of the burgeoning private sector reflects this trend� Despite impressive growth, most private sector salaries are low and working conditions are poor� Most private employment is intended for expatriates, and job quality has declined since the 1980s, as low-skill labourers (often from Asia) have replaced mid-skill labourers (often from the Arab region)� Since the 1980s, the growth elasticity of employment has been high, meaning that for every percentage point of GDP growth, the labour force has grown by more than 1 per cent This might have to do with a growing role of very labour-intensive sectors like construction and personal services The private sector has developed and financially profited off of a non-national labor market at the expense of job quality National attitudes now reflect this trend so that private sector employment is equated not only with lower salaries but also lower prestige� In Saudi Arabia the difference in salary between nationals and non-nationals is drastic; the average Saudi makes US$800 a month while the average expatriate makes $270� Furthermore, a Saudi employed in the civil service can expect to make an average of $2,100 per month�80 Declining productivity and lack of incentive to participate in the private sector collectively discourage national employment in the private sector, thereby producing dependency on the state and hindering economic and social development� Poor migration policies, employment and entitlement programs have eroded local capacity for technological development by discouraging nationals from pursuing higher education or advanced skills training necessary for private sector employment� With near certain employment in the public sector and refusal to accept lower salaries in the private sector, “students prefer to study religion, literature and arts or social sciences rather than the more demanding courses in engineering, medicine, teaching or business studies which should lead to more job opportunities�”81 As a result, Maroun et al� found that “there is an abundance of certain specializations that are not aligned with private-sector demand”� Qatar and the UAE in particular are making significant investments in the education of their youth, hoping that in the near future they will achieve relatively balanced labor markets, as well as the long sought after knowledge economy� Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), a graduate level research institution, stands out as the most likely institution to fill the regional deficit of scientists and innovators, however�82 State funds can support KAUST and other research institutions like it for several years while pulling in the best and brightest students from the Gulf� Without significant government entitlement reform, a shrinking of the public sector, and revision of the public-private wage gap, however, it seems unlikely that GCC nationals will have any incentive to pursue advanced degrees in the technological or scientific fields necessary for satisficing the regional relative labor shortage� The question remains then who will fill KAUST’s classrooms and laboratories� The combination of all of these factors—cheap foreign labor, national entitlement programs, an untrained labor force—heavily impacts development of core-like industries in the GCC� ESCWA found that “Even banks, which are among the most modern and profitable businesses in GCC countries tend to operate on old technological systems”�83 Rodney Wilson, in his article The Development of Islamic Finance in the GCC, questions the long-term sustainability of Gulf-based Islamic financial institutions� Wilson argues that Islamic banks are still dependent on non-Islamic banks to co-arrange major accounts in an agreement where the Islamic institution ensures that all transactions are compliant with shariah law while the secular institution provides the skills and expertise necessary for managing large accounts� 84 Although these relationships are beneficial for Gulf-based IFSs at the moment, they may prove dangerous in the future� In their article “Searching for the Mecca of Islamic Finance”, Bassens et al� find that IFSs in the Gulf have plenty of reason to be wary of London in particular, considered the IFS hub outside of the Gulf: Although it has only two IFS headquarters of the top 100 firms (i�e� the headquarters of the European Islamic Investment Bank and HSBC Amanah), the city ranks third in terms of site service and total connectivity� This observation is in line with the intentions of the British government and Islamic finance stakeholders to make London the international centre of Islamic finance�85 Without the ability to continually modernize and keep up productivity, the IFS sector of the GCC will quickly fall behind and be replaced by more productive competitors in different parts of the world� This demonstrates one of Wallerstein’s final points on the core-peripheral labor hierarchy—what is a core-like process today will become a peripheral process tomorrow�”86 A well-educated workforce—in turn reliant on significant educational incentives—is the only way to encourage long-term continual modernization and core-like development� The obvious conclusion that one arrives at is that the GCC is stuck in a semi-peripheral position in the global labor hierarchy� Despite achieving “considerable mid-range diversification”, productive output is stagnating� There exists little to no internal capacity for advancing the financial and educational fields, leaving the knowledge economy unobtainable� The GCC can restart development and produce a majority core-like economy by tackling three intertwined issues: 1) unproductive labor policy, 2) unsustainable state entitlement programs, and 3) limited incentives for advanced skills training.

### ---1AC Varun

#### Lack of wages is a form of exploitation – a living wage is needed

Glazov 12 [(Frontpage Magazine's editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in Russian, U.S. and Canadian foreign policy) “The Exploitation of Immigrant Workers in the Middle East” FrontPage Magazine July 10, 2012] AT

Asian immigrants to the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, however, cannot escape inferior status and oppression in working conditions, health care, residency, and legal recourse for harm done to them. They effectively become slaves to employers who consider them unworthy of any degree of decent treatment as human beings – and, thus, totally disposable. It’s actually a racial discrimination of the worst kind. Native-born citizens of Kuwait, for example, receive so much money and other benefits from their oil-rich government that they have little or no need to work at all – particularly the women. But, since these wealthy Arab women consider staying home to tend to the house and take care of their children beneath their dignity, they require maids for such tasks. According to Arab news reports, 83 percent of Kuwaiti households have foreign maids working for them. There are more than three million foreign maids working in the GCC nations, mostly from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Nepal. They can well afford to pay these housemaids a living wage and provide decent working conditions, but in reality few do. Instead they force maids to work inhumanely exhausting hours; abuse them both verbally and physically to the point of torture; willfully delay, cut, or totally withhold their wages; and beat, rape, or even kill them. Stories about such tragedies appear in various regional news media daily, but they usually are very brief and express neither outrage nor remorse. The perpetrators – if prosecuted at all – mostly receive little more than a fine (which is hardly a deterrent to the rich) or a brief jail sentence that is likely to be commuted early. So the abuse goes on. FP: Don’t the countries these maids come from protest such treatment of their citizens? Johnson: Sometimes, but with little effect. Indonesia has been the most vocal, and has for periods of time banned women from seeking work as GCC Member State housemaids while trying to negotiate better employment terms and safety assurances for them. But as soon as the travel restrictions are relaxed, the problem recurs. Indeed, Indonesia has such a ban in place right now because of the torture and murder of a maid. In response, GCC Member State employers have begun recruitment of housemaids in fresh territory – Vietnam and Cambodia – where the people are unaware of the history of this issue. FP: What about the immigrant men? Johnson: The GCC Member States are now home to some of the most beautiful and architecturally advanced buildings in the world, including Dubai’s Burj Khalifa, now the tallest man-made structure on Earth. This magnificent multi-use showpiece was designed by an American architectural firm, but – like nearly everything else newly built in the region – was constructed mostly by South Asian immigrant workers. Though some of these men are young and single, many of them are married with wives and children back home that they are trying to support but will not see for months or even years. Their working conditions are so hazardous that injuries and deaths are common, but the local news media barely notice. They have to live in filthy, overcrowded labor camps and too often do not even receive the inexcusably low pay they are allotted. Certainly, they’ll never get to enjoy as visitors what they have worked so hard and risked their lives to build. The whole present employment system for both male and female immigrant workers in GCC Member States is deeply flawed, thereby enabling the unmitigated mistreatment these people endure. FP: Please explain. Johnson: In order to work in a GCC Member State, a prospect must be recruited in her or his home country and pay an exorbitant fee to the recruiter, who then becomes a “agent” that finds employment for this worker (and may receive a fee from the employer as well). The worker’s fee is often so high relative to anticipated wages that paying it back could take years. There is something called sponsorship. Essentially, you can only work for the employer that brought you into the country – no one else. If you want to seek a job elsewhere in the host country, you need to leave that country and return on a different visa. Also, while you are working for the employer that sponsored you, the employer confiscates your passport, and does not even pay your wages on time. There are thousands of examples where employers systematically abused employees. If you are a housemaid, your employer sponsors you and then sub-leases you among his friends and neighbors for a profit. For both men and women, eighty- to hundred-hour work weeks are fairly common. Next, it is common practice for either the recruiter/agent or the employer to confiscate the worker’s passport. Because leaving the country – including escape back home – is absolutely forbidden without a proper passport, and because holding ANY job requires that passport, immigrant workers are effectively trapped by their current employers – no matter how negligent or even intentionally cruel they may be. They are thus enslaved to uncaring masters whose control over them is total, and they can be discarded (or worse) at any time without recourse. There are no unions or other organizations to protect workers in GCC Member States. As a result, there have been many suicides among both housemaids and male workers besides the deaths from job hazards, disease, and brutal treatment. These tragedies receive only the briefest mention in the local news media unless they occur publicly enough to warrant a few extra paragraphs of coverage. Even then, the public response is essentially nil. FP: Can you point us to sources for this disturbing and heart-breaking information? Johnson: Yes. Seeing the suffering of Asian immigrant workers in GCC Member States disturbed me so much that I set up a website to gather news of these events from the whole region on a daily basis, and also present articles analyzing the issues and proposing solutions. That website is gcchumanrights.org and is dedicated to improving both working conditions for immigrants and rights of citizens in general in Gulf Cooperation Council nations. FP: Can you give us some examples of what we might see there? Johnson: Yes. There are about three million immigrant housemaids employed in the GCC Member States. Here are just a few stories my website collects daily from the many news media in both the GCC region and the countries these maids come from. You can go to my site to read the complete articles. An Indonesian housemaid was pushed out of a third-floor window by her employer. She was in a coma for a week and later sent back to Jakarta without her pay. The most frequent cause of death among immigrant housemaids in GCC Member States is “falling down from high floors” according to an attorney investigating worker grievances. Some of these women may have been driven to suicide by their horrid circumstances, but many probably were murdered. There is no respect for their lives. An Emirati woman and her male neighbor were convicted in Abu Dhabi of stripping the woman’s Asian housemaid naked and beating her to death with a frying pan, then threatening the maid’s colleague against reporting the murder to authorities. Three Kuwaiti men stalking a Sri Lankan housemaid waited for her to finish shopping and start walking home before jumping on her and throwing her into their car. They then drove to an empty lot behind a building and took turns in raping her despite her constant screams. The attackers have not yet been found. In 2008, in the United Arab Emirates, a woman who was gang-raped by a group of men was imprisoned for eight months for adultery after reporting the crime to the police. Employers or Sponsors often rape housemaids too. If a pregnancy results, they will abuse her until she miscarries, get her deported, or cause her death. If her child somehow survives, it will have no rights, no protection, no food, and no shelter. A Saudi employer and his wife were arrested in Riyadh for torturing a Sri Lankan housemaid by hammering 18 heated nails into her arms, legs, and forehead. The nails ranged in length from one to three inches. The case is still pending. Another Indonesian maid was tortured and so badly maimed and burned by her female Saudi employer that she became unrecognizable as the pretty 23-year-old she had been. Before and after pictures in this article would make any decent person both sick and very angry. Also, the employer, though initially sentenced to three years for her crime, was later allowed to go free. The appeals court in Kuwait upheld the death sentence of a Kuwaiti housewife for murdering her Filipina domestic helper but commuted the punishment on her disabled husband. They had regularly beaten the maid until her health failed, then taken her to the desert where they threw her out of the car and ran over her repeatedly until she died. Cases like these have prompted Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, and Kenya to ban travel by women to serve as housemaids in GCC Member States, which is why Saudi Arabia in particular is looking for fresh recruitment sources in Vietnam and Cambodia. FP: What about the immigrant men who work in the oil fields or construction? Johnson: They have an excessive death rate too, mostly from high falls that are rarely reported unless obvious suicides – which are a significant percentage – but also from poorly treated injuries suffered because of unnecessarily hazardous work conditions or disease from the filthy, overcrowded labor camps they are forced to live in. In Bahrain, ten immigrant men crowded into a flat in an old house died of smoke inhalation before fire crews arrived to fight the blaze, which was caused by faulty wiring. The building had never been legally registered for labor camp use. It was supposed to be bachelor apartments. Many of the places legally designated as labor camps have no indoor cooking equipment, no garbage collection, and no bathroom facilities at all. You can imagine how depressing it must be to live there, not even be paid the wages you were promised, and knowing you are trapped in that situation because your employer is holding your passport.

#### The 6 governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council ought to require employers to pay a living wage to all workers, regardless of nationality, and ensure the enforcement of the minimum wage standards.

#### The plan avoids labor exploitation by equalizing bargaining power

HRW 14 [Human Rights Watch “Gulf Countries: Increase Migrant Worker Protection” NOVEMBER 23, 2014] AT

“The proposals made by GCC countries fall far short of the changes needed to protect domestic workers’ rights, safety, and dignity,” said Elizabeth Tang, general secretary of the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). “GCC countries should join the growing number of countries worldwide that are extending full protection of their labor laws to domestic workers, including a minimum wage, a weekly rest day, the right to organize, and social benefits.” The GCC has discussed a potential region-wide standard employment contract for domestic workers. Recent media reports suggest that the GCC is also considering establishing a body to coordinate policies on hiring domestic workers that would consist of recruitment agency and government representatives. These developments have lacked transparency and have suffered from inadequate consultation with migrant domestic workers, trade unions, and migrants’ rights organizations. Migrants’ countries of origin are also discussing their own standard contract through a separate process. “Standard contracts are not a substitute for labor law reform, and taken alone do not meet the standards in the ILO Domestic Workers Convention,” said Sharan Burrow, general secretary of the ITUC. “The GCC should work in closer coordination with – not separately from – countries of origin to develop labor migration policies that fully respect the human and labor rights of migrants.” Migrants in the Gulf make an important contribution both to the economies of their own countries and those of the countries where they work. In 2011, migrant workers in GCC countries sent home more than US$60 billion in remittances. Competition for jobs among the workers’ countries of origin, combined with their relative lack of bargaining power in relation to the labor-destination countries, means that the pressure they exert for better labor protections is weak. “The meetings over the next few days provide a key opportunity to promote regional minimum standards that would avoid a counterproductive race to the bottom in labor conditions,” said William Gois of Migrant Forum Asia. “The governments should develop a concrete action plan, in consultation with migrant workers themselves and the organizations that represent them, with benchmarks to monitor its progress.” Kuwait University Law School will host an event on November 23, 2014, at which panelists from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, IDWF, the ITUC, and Migrant Forum Asia will discuss the rights of migrant domestic workers. The groups recommend that the governments: Establish and enforce comprehensive labor law protections for migrant workers, including domestic workers; Reform the kafala (sponsorship) visa system to ensure that workers can change employers without being required to first obtain their consent; Remove the “exit permit” requirement in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; Strengthen regulation and monitoring of labor recruitment agencies, including eliminating recruitment fees for workers; Ensure that migrants have access to justice and support services; and Expand the Abu Dhabi Dialogue to include labor-origin countries from Africa, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, and participation by nongovernmental groups. Governments should ratify and implement international labor and human rights standards, the groups said. These include the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, the ILO Forced Labor Protocol, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

#### No unemployment- labor shortages mean businesses will absorb the cost

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The GCC labor market and subsequent unequal exchange are driven by the region’s unique demographic makeup, namely its small national population and increasingly large non-national population With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Oman, “foreigners form a majority of the population in all of the GCC states”, and make up about 90% of the population in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates42 Even in Saudi Arabia, a nation of 27 million, 84 million residents are non-nationals (see Figures 2, 3) 43 The extreme imbalance between nationals and non- nationals is attributable to two different types of labor shortages The first, an absolute shortage, means that the state’s indigenous population is too small to realize its full productive potential and to meet human resource needs44 The states of the GCC have sought to ameliorate this problem with relatively open immigration policies for migrant workers.

#### Higher public sector wages relative to the private sector depresses productivity – increasing private sector wages creates competition and causes GCC economic development, which solves unemployment effects

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the average Saudi makes US$800 a month while the average expatriate makes $270� Furthermore, a Saudi employed in the civil service can expect to make an average of $2,100 per month�80 Declining productivity and lack of incentive to participate in the private sector collectively discourage national employment in the private sector, thereby producing dependency on the state and hindering economic and social development� Poor migration policies, employment and entitlement programs have eroded local capacity for technological development by discouraging nationals from pursuing higher education or advanced skills training necessary for private sector employment� With near certain employment in the public sector and refusal to accept lower salaries in the private sector, “students prefer to study religion, literature and arts or social sciences rather than the more demanding courses in engineering, medicine, teaching or business studies which should lead to more job opportunities�”81 As a result, Maroun et al� found that “there is an abundance of certain specializations that are not aligned with private-sector demand”� Qatar and the UAE in particular are making significant investments in the education of their youth, hoping that in the near future they will achieve relatively balanced labor markets, as well as the long sought after knowledge economy� Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), a graduate level research institution, stands out as the most likely institution to fill the regional deficit of scientists and innovators, however�82 State funds can support KAUST and other research institutions like it for several years while pulling in the best and brightest students from the Gulf� Without significant government entitlement reform, a shrinking of the public sector, and revision of the public-private wage gap, however, it seems unlikely that GCC nationals will have any incentive to pursue advanced degrees in the technological or scientific fields necessary for satisficing the regional relative labor shortage� The question remains then who will fill KAUST’s classrooms and laboratories� The combination of all of these factors—cheap foreign labor, national entitlement programs, an untrained labor force—heavily impacts development of core-like industries in the GCC� ESCWA found that “Even banks, which are among the most modern and profitable businesses in GCC countries tend to operate on old technological systems”�83 Rodney Wilson, in his article The Development of Islamic Finance in the GCC, questions the long-term sustainability of Gulf-based Islamic financial institutions� Wilson argues that Islamic banks are still dependent on non-Islamic banks to co-arrange major accounts in an agreement where the Islamic institution ensures that all transactions are compliant with shariah law while the secular institution provides the skills and expertise necessary for managing large accounts� 84 Although these relationships are beneficial for Gulf-based IFSs at the moment, they may prove dangerous in the future� In their article “Searching for the Mecca of Islamic Finance”, Bassens et al� find that IFSs in the Gulf have plenty of reason to be wary of London in particular, considered the IFS hub outside of the Gulf: Although it has only two IFS headquarters of the top 100 firms (i�e� the headquarters of the European Islamic Investment Bank and HSBC Amanah), the city ranks third in terms of site service and total connectivity� This observation is in line with the intentions of the British government and Islamic finance stakeholders to make London the international centre of Islamic finance�85 Without the ability to continually modernize and keep up productivity, the IFS sector of the GCC will quickly fall behind and be replaced by more productive competitors in different parts of the world� This demonstrates one of Wallerstein’s final points on the core-peripheral labor hierarchy—what is a core-like process today will become a peripheral process tomorrow�”86 A well-educated workforce—in turn reliant on significant educational incentives—is the only way to encourage long-term continual modernization and core-like development� The obvious conclusion that one arrives at is that the GCC is stuck in a semi-peripheral position in the global labor hierarchy� Despite achieving “considerable mid-range diversification”, productive output is stagnating� There exists little to no internal capacity for advancing the financial and educational fields, leaving the knowledge economy unobtainable� The GCC can restart development and produce a majority core-like economy by tackling three intertwined issues: 1) unproductive labor policy, 2) unsustainable state entitlement programs, and 3) limited incentives for advanced skills training.

### 1AC Solvency

#### The 6 governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council ought to require employers to pay a living wage to all workers, regardless of nationality, and ensure the enforcement of the minimum wage standards.

#### The plan is enforceable and avoids labor exploitation by equalizing bargaining power

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#### Lack of wages is a form of exploitation – the plan would solve

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For both men and women, eighty- to hundred-hour work weeks are fairly common. Next, it is common practice for either the recruiter/agent or the employer to confiscate the worker’s passport. Because leaving the country – including escape back home – is absolutely forbidden without a proper passport, and because holding ANY job requires that passport, immigrant workers are effectively trapped by their current employers – no matter how negligent or even intentionally cruel they may be. They are thus enslaved to uncaring masters whose control over them is total, and they can be discarded (or worse) at any time without recourse. There are no unions or other organizations to protect workers in GCC Member States. As a result, there have been many suicides among both housemaids and male workers besides the deaths from job hazards, disease, and brutal treatment. These tragedies receive only the briefest mention in the local news media unless they occur publicly enough to warrant a few extra paragraphs of coverage. Even then, the public response is essentially nil. FP: Can you point us to sources for this disturbing and heart-breaking information? Johnson: Yes. Seeing the suffering of Asian immigrant workers in GCC Member States disturbed me so much that I set up a website to gather news of these events from the whole region on a daily basis, and also present articles analyzing the issues and proposing solutions. That website is gcchumanrights.org and is dedicated to improving both working conditions for immigrants and rights of citizens in general in Gulf Cooperation Council nations. FP: Can you give us some examples of what we might see there? Johnson: Yes. There are about three million immigrant housemaids employed in the GCC Member States. Here are just a few stories my website collects daily from the many news media in both the GCC region and the countries these maids come from. You can go to my site to read the complete articles. An Indonesian housemaid was pushed out of a third-floor window by her employer. She was in a coma for a week and later sent back to Jakarta without her pay. The most frequent cause of death among immigrant housemaids in GCC Member States is “falling down from high floors” according to an attorney investigating worker grievances. Some of these women may have been driven to suicide by their horrid circumstances, but many probably were murdered. There is no respect for their lives. An Emirati woman and her male neighbor were convicted in Abu Dhabi of stripping the woman’s Asian housemaid naked and beating her to death with a frying pan, then threatening the maid’s colleague against reporting the murder to authorities. Three Kuwaiti men stalking a Sri Lankan housemaid waited for her to finish shopping and start walking home before jumping on her and throwing her into their car. They then drove to an empty lot behind a building and took turns in raping her despite her constant screams. The attackers have not yet been found. In 2008, in the United Arab Emirates, a woman who was gang-raped by a group of men was imprisoned for eight months for adultery after reporting the crime to the police. Employers or Sponsors often rape housemaids too. If a pregnancy results, they will abuse her until she miscarries, get her deported, or cause her death. If her child somehow survives, it will have no rights, no protection, no food, and no shelter. A Saudi employer and his wife were arrested in Riyadh for torturing a Sri Lankan housemaid by hammering 18 heated nails into her arms, legs, and forehead. The nails ranged in length from one to three inches. The case is still pending. Another Indonesian maid was tortured and so badly maimed and burned by her female Saudi employer that she became unrecognizable as the pretty 23-year-old she had been. Before and after pictures in this article would make any decent person both sick and very angry. Also, the employer, though initially sentenced to three years for her crime, was later allowed to go free. The appeals court in Kuwait upheld the death sentence of a Kuwaiti housewife for murdering her Filipina domestic helper but commuted the punishment on her disabled husband. They had regularly beaten the maid until her health failed, then taken her to the desert where they threw her out of the car and ran over her repeatedly until she died. Cases like these have prompted Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, and Kenya to ban travel by women to serve as housemaids in GCC Member States, which is why Saudi Arabia in particular is looking for fresh recruitment sources in Vietnam and Cambodia. FP: What about the immigrant men who work in the oil fields or construction? Johnson: They have an excessive death rate too, mostly from high falls that are rarely reported unless obvious suicides – which are a significant percentage – but also from poorly treated injuries suffered because of unnecessarily hazardous work conditions or disease from the filthy, overcrowded labor camps they are forced to live in. In Bahrain, ten immigrant men crowded into a flat in an old house died of smoke inhalation before fire crews arrived to fight the blaze, which was caused by faulty wiring. The building had never been legally registered for labor camp use. It was supposed to be bachelor apartments. Many of the places legally designated as labor camps have no indoor cooking equipment, no garbage collection, and no bathroom facilities at all. You can imagine how depressing it must be to live there, not even be paid the wages you were promised, and knowing you are trapped in that situation because your employer is holding your passport.

#### No unemployment- labor shortages mean businesses will absorb the cost

Coulom 13 [Michael Coulom. “Employment and Entitlement in the GCC: A World-systems analysis of disrupted development.” International Affairs, Working Paper Series # 20 | November 2013, American University of Beirut] AJ

The GCC labor market and subsequent unequal exchange are driven by the region’s unique demographic makeup, namely its small national population and increasingly large non-national population With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Oman, “foreigners form a majority of the population in all of the GCC states”, and make up about 90% of the population in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates42 Even in Saudi Arabia, a nation of 27 million, 84 million residents are non-nationals (see Figures 2, 3) 43 The extreme imbalance between nationals and non- nationals is attributable to two different types of labor shortages The first, an absolute shortage, means that the state’s indigenous population is too small to realize its full productive potential and to meet human resource needs44 The states of the GCC have sought to ameliorate this problem with relatively open immigration policies for migrant workers.

### 1AC Long Util

#### Advantage 1 is Relations

#### The plan boosts relations between India and the Gulf Countries. Rising wages in India means Indian migrant workers are beginning to return to India – UAE wages must keep pace

Lay 11 [(Claire ferris, deputy editor of CEO Middle East) “UAE sees Indian workforce shrink as home salaries rise” 22 November 2011] AT

The Indian Consulate in the UAE saw a fall in new visas for Indian nationals last year for the first time, as rising salaries in the Asian state kept workers at home. The Gulf state is likely to see a steady decline in blue-collar migrants as India’s economic growth offers better opportunities to workers, the Consul General told Arabian Business. “Last year, for the first time ever, the Indian Consulate served less passports than in 2009 so that would be an indication that the number of Indians declined coming to the UAE,” Sanjay Verma said on the sidelines of the 5th Arabian Business Forum. “Passport services saw a two percent drop. “The numbers are declining because of the demand for labour in India. The civil construction sector has a shortage of civil engineers and skilled workers, plumbing and carpentry.” The Asian state has rolled out a National Rural Employment Guarantee Act which offers 100 days of work a year to rural households, giving employment to workers in villages who traditionally have looked abroad for jobs. “The advantage of that is it is offered it to you in your home town or village so that has taken away some workers who otherwise would have come abroad,” Verma said. The Gulf plays host to millions of migrants, primarily from Asia, who account for the majority of blue-collar workers in the construction, domestic work, and service industries. An estimated three million migrate each year, sending back an estimated $175bn in remittances annually, according to Human Rights Watch data. The UAE alone is home to an estimated 1.75 million Indian expatriates, the largest group of foreign workers in the Gulf country. But experts have warned the country may struggle to attract and retain migrants if it fails to keep pace with rising salaries in India. Minimum wages for unskilled foreign workers in the UAE are as low as AED600 a month, with skilled workers receiving AED1,200 a month, according to the Indian Embassy, Abu Dhabi. By comparison, wages in India, the world’s fastest-growing economy after China, surged by 11.1 percent last year, said recruitment firm GulfTalent in February. The Indian Ambassador to the UAE said earlier this year the government planned to enforce a minimum wage for Indian nationals hoping to work in the UAE. If approved, the ruling will mean workers only receive immigration clearance from India if their employment contract meets with a set minimum salary. Verma said the professional sectors were likely to feel the pinch first as India strives to hold on to homegrown talent and keep pace with its fast-growing economy. “It will be more expensive getting Indian workers. It’s already happening in the professional sector, it’s not as easy as it used to be to attract Indian doctors or accountants to come here.” In 2011, the number of new visas issued by the consulate will be flat, he added. “I think it’s going to be closer to 2010, probably the same as 2010 but not a drastic increase.”

#### Expatriate laborers are the *key internal link* to relations and India’s role in the GCC as a peacekeeper

GRC 9 [(Gulf Research Center (GRC) is an independent research institute located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

The major countries of Asia are looming as important regional players in the Middle East. A primary reason for the growing Asian footprint is economics, but it is more than simply the need for petroleum and natural gas that draws in the Asian states. They are attracted by opportunities for consumer sales and, in the case of South Asia, the export of millions of laborers to build the emerging city-states of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, the paradox is that despite the threat of new conflicts, billions of dollars have been invested in the region and vast wealth accumulated and spent only a few hundred miles from ongoing military conflict. The financial crisis, which began in earnest in September 2008, has raised the prospects for a prolonged global recession, which will have a negative impact in most economic activities, including the value of energy exports, investments, tourism and consumer sales. Nevertheless, many observers believe that, in the long run, the global economy will recover and the economic trend lines that were in effect before September 2008, which showed growing economic activity between Asia and the Middle East, will be resumed. A number of traumatic events could upset this assumption including a new major Middle East war, severe social and political chaos in the region, Asia or even Europe and the US, or a total re-evaluation of the models of economic growth that are predicated on transparency, open markets and relatively free trade. The depth of Asia’s involvement in the Middle East can be measured in a number of ways, including the projected increase in the amounts of energy flowing east to Asian markets over the coming decades, the value of Asian exports to the Middle East, financial investment by Asian and Middle East countries in each others’ development, including construction and infrastructure, the number of tourists in both directions and the number of Middle Easterners enrolling for higher education in key Asian countries. Perhaps the most visible element of the growing Asian-Middle East partnership concerns expatriate workers in the GCC countries. Over 4 million Indians are to be found at every level of occupation on the Arabian Peninsula. In addition to Indian workers, millions of others come from South Asian countries. Without Asian labor, the oil rich economies of the Gulf would be in deep trouble, and without the all- powerful military presence of the US in the Gulf, they would be easy prey to regional predators, of whom Saddam Hussein was the classic example. It is the emergence of China and India as regional superpowers with an increasingly global outreach that has had the greatest impact on the region. In different ways, India and China will pose challenges and opportunities for the current regional hegemon, the United States. Questions about energy access, the security of the Arab Gulf, military cooperation, arms sales, oil and gas pipelines and energy security all need to be considered. These issues must be analyzed against the historical background of past Indian and Chinese influence in the region. India’s direct involvement in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf, is more extensive than China’s, due to proximity. But for the future, as China expands its geo-economic reach westward into Central Asia and Pakistan with new infrastructure projects, as well as increasing trade relations, it too will become a more important player. India and China have achieved a remarkable diplomatic presence in the Middle East, and unlike the United States or the former colonial powers (Britain, France, and Italy), they have made very few enemies and have managed to build good working relationships with all countries including close ties with Israel. Both countries are engaged in Mid-East peacekeeping operations. China’s participation in Lebanon within the framework of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) began officially on April 9, 2006. India has a much longer record of post World War II Mid-East peacekeeping, beginning with its participation in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) established in 1956 to monitor the Sinai desert. India has peacekeeping forces in UNIFIL, numbering 672 troops and staff officers and provided two of the last four commanding officers, but has not added any forces recently. Although India has historically had a more visible presence in the Gulf than China, it is only recently that is has begun to demonstrate power and influence. India has so far not had a major arms supply relationship with the Middle East countries, except Israel, but has been cooperating on a military-to-military basis with all of the small countries in the Gulf in recent years.

#### Shifting security commitments in the Gulf means India must fill in. Economic relations from migrant laborers provide ground for strengthened relations that solves war

Pradhan 9 [(Samir, economics specialist based in the UAE. Previously, he served as a senior consultant, macroeconomics research at Tanween,a leading consultancy in Doha, Qatar. Before that, he was senior researcher, GCC economics and Gulf-Asia programmes at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai/ UAE, the leading think tank of the Gulf region) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

By all accounts, the world is moving rapidly towards multipolarity. The post- Cold War era geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic imperatives underwent substantial changes in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 forced regime change in Iraq. Simultaneously, the growth of emerging economic powers also considerably influenced the process. What one sees now is a hexagonal power polarity with three nodes; Russia, China, and India on the one side and the United States, Japan and the European Union forming the other three points. Moreover, with increasing global interdependence, it appears that the various nodes are striving for greater accommodation of interests and better management of contradictions, despite having divergent security and strategic cultures. With such changes in the global power architecture, reverberations are strikingly evident in the power configurations at the bilateral as well as regional level. Importantly, nation states are increasingly managing their bilateral relations on the basis of a realpolitik assessment rather than ideology alone. A case in point is the contemporary strategic environment in the Gulf region, which is increasingly becoming unpredictable, having local, regional and global implications. With windfall capital and vibrant economic growth, the region is witnessing unprecedented transformation in the social, political, economic, cultural and strategic realms. Importantly, certain favorable and adverse domestic, regional and international factors pervasively influence their security and strategic perceptions and increase their anxiety about the imminent future. Coincidentally, being a neighbor and an emerging global power, India becomes a reference point for the Gulf countries as a partner in their quest for managing the evolving security equations. The change of perception in the Gulf region is based on a ‘new constellation’ in which India is increasingly viewed as a credible non-partisan global player who can play a constructive role in managing conflicts and restoring peace and tranquility in the region. Thanks to the Gulf ’s eastward shifting economic engagements, burgeoning trade and investment linkages, and the civilizational affinities between India and the Gulf region there is the promise of a new era of deepening ties. The strategic importance of the Gulf region dates to the 19th century when three great empires –British India,Tsarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey – confronted each other for power projection. Since then, the region has a tradition of overwhelming security dependence on external powers. With the discovery of oil, the Gulf region became intrinsically enmeshed with the nuances of great power politics. This process continued until the whole region came under pervasive control of the security cordon provided by the US. Given the small population size of the countries, the regional governments continued to rely upon outside powers to maintain a crude balance of power in order to maintain sovereignty, domestic identity and regime security. This balance of power was maintained with the direct and extensive contributions from the external powers, either through providing military technology and weapons (Russian sales of missile and arms to Iran) or deploying military personnel in the region (US providing armaments and maintaining military bases in some member countries of the GCC). Today the strategic environment in the region is in a state of flux. This is due to the crystallization of several conflicting factors. Iran’s increasing military posture and Israel’s policy in the East Mediterranean region constitute the twin strategic faultlines surrounding the Gulf region. The turmoil in Iraq, which used to be the countervailing power to Iran, further adds to the security risks for the Gulf regimes. Above all, the perception of an Israel-centric foreign policy by the United States only increases tensions in the region. It is noteworthy to point out the central role played by the United States as the security lynchpin of the Gulf region (Koch 2008). The role and extent of US involvement in the Gulf region has expanded tremendously since it filled the power vacuum following the British withdrawal from the region in 1968.The overarching presence of the US has considerably changed the region’s strategic dynamics. From the initial ‘dual containment policy’ of orchestrating regional countervailing powers against each other, the US has become in a sense the sole superpower in the region as reflected in the forced regime change in Iraq in 2003. At present, nearly 200,000 American troops are stationed in the Gulf region, the majority of course in Iraq but with significant numbers in the GCC, thereby firmly entrenching the US in the Gulf security scenario. Further, given the Gulf region’s real security concerns, the regimes cannot afford to suddenly change the status quo and seek an alternate security arrangement. But while the US is an indispensable security ally and would continue to play a formidable role in the Gulf region’s emerging strategic paradigm, it is increasingly apparent that such an exclusive role in its present scope is neither sustainable nor unanimously acceptable to the Gulf regimes. In a sense, the unilateral strategic dominance of the US in the Gulf region is coming to an end, albeit slowly. Thus, a clear strategic shift is in motion which is primarily due to the increasing internationalization of the Gulf with other powers from Europe and Asia on the fringe, but also due to a reorientation and self introspection by the Gulf countries about their place in the international system and the role played by the US within that system. Given the multidimensional security environment in the Gulf region – from the threat posed by Islamic radicalism and Iranian nuclear ambitions, to concerns about the stalemate in Iraq, tensions surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, securing supply lines of oil exports and the role of Gulf finance in world economics – the regimes no longer feel safe in the comfort zone of the American security umbrella. The ambiguity about the US role, either as a source of regional stability or greater instability, entices the Gulf regimes to rethink their national interests amidst volatile regional events. The region is in the throes of a transition which evolves from patterns of interaction that are characterized by power politics and geopolitical concerns to new ones that are marked by the politics of geoeconomics. Adding to the complexity is the sheer pace of post modernism and its structural spill over as reflected in domestic discontentment and the region’s search of an identity in the increasingly interdependent globalized world in which the parochial projection of the Gulf (especially in the Western world) is not only hampering their commercial pursuits, but also questioning the region’s integrity. As a result, there is a growing sense of confidence in the region that has led the GCC states to play an increasing regional political and diplomatic role. Especially in the security domain, the Gulf countries are increasingly re-shifting their strategies from bilateral dependence to multilateral interdependence, sensing that bilateralism will no longer meet the requirements of a multi-polar world in geo-economic terms. Furthermore, the GCC leaderships are anticipating the shifting circumstances surrounding the declining role of the US. Bahrain’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Abdul Ghaffar, has, for example, called for a new security order in the Gulf with the GCC states as the main pillar of defense while Qatar’s Amir Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani told the General Debate of the United National General Assembly in September 2007 that: “The major conflicts in the world have become too big for one single power to handle them on its own” (Koch 2008). Nevertheless, it is certain that complete removal of external powers from the region is not at all a possibility in the absence of a regional architecture and the existence of glaring distrust among the states in the region (consider, for example, the continuing problem of border disputes). Besides, given the global strategic importance of the region, outside powers would not simply keep themselves away from developments in the region as formidable stakes are involved. Thus, in the current circumstances, a viable security framework is simply unthinkable at this stage and it is certain that neither a regional solution nor an outside power can counter the wide variety of threats to the region. Thus, the key before the Gulf countries is to multilateralize the regional security space with the involvement of other powers, especially an emerging global power like India with whom the future stakes of the region are formidable. Therefore, India can become a natural security ally for the Gulf. Transforming Strategic Overlap into Partnership The strategic horizon comprising the Gulf region and India shows the growing interconnectedness in the security space extending from Afghanistan to the Middle East. India’s location at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean gives it a strategic location in Eurasia as well as among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean from East Africa to Indonesia. India's peninsular projection in the ocean gives it a stake in the security and stability of these waters which is crucial for oil trade – the lifeblood of Gulf economies. While the overall strategic environment involving India and the Gulf region is in a state of flux evincing uncertainties and dilemmas, there is no doubt that the stakes are formidable. It may be noted that the connection between security and stability in the two regions was first propounded in 1981 by the former Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and former UAE President Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan. From a strategic point of view, the Gulf countries and India share a desire for political stability and security in the region. The emerging common security perceptions create further opportunities for Gulf-India cooperation in the future. In the recent past, several Gulf countries, especially Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE have concluded a number of bilateral strategic pacts with India. The UAE and India entered into a strategic pact, signed on July 1, 2003 when a high-level delegation led by the then Chief of Staff and now Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Shaikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, visited India. That agreement envisages cooperation in security, defense policy, development of defense cooperation, training for the UAE military and military medical personnel, exchange of cultural and sports activities between the friendly forces of the two countries and joint efforts to tackle environmental issues, particularly pollution in the seas. Saudi Arabia and India have entered into a similar pact. Such pacts confirm the increasing recognition of India as an emerging power by the Gulf countries and simultaneously the common strategic outlook of both. As aptly stated by the UAE Foreign Minister, Shaikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, at the opening of the ministerial session of the Indo-UAE Joint Commission, “At a regional level, we also look forward to an increased involvement by India in issues affecting the Gulf and neighboring countries” and that “it is in both of our interests to work together more and more closely.” The process of mutual recognition got a major boost with the landmark visit of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to India and consequent ratification of the New Delhi Declaration. This inclination of a major Gulf power like Saudi Arabia to deepen and broaden ties with India points to the changing geopolitical dynamics in both regions. Moreover, Gulf countries are increasingly cooperating with India for military training. Since India’s dependence on Gulf energy and the Gulf ’s dependence on India and Asia as a future major market for oil exports will remain significant, the security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) has become a critical component within the ambit of strategic matters. It is not just oil, but the increasing movement of merchandise imports and exports on the sea route spanning the vast arc of Indian Ocean has also become a critical security concern for India and the Gulf countries. The sheer number of Indian expatriates in the Gulf region’s workforce makes a strong case for deepening ties with India to manage domestic security. Countries like Saudi Arabia have the potential to support India in her efforts for the educational and social transformation of India’s vast Muslim population that constantly look towards the Gulf region for moral and religious guidance. India as a ‘Bridging Power’ India’s credibility and role as a “neutral” player in Asia may serve Gulf interests in managing their emerging security and strategic objectives. Two crucial factors that can possibly give the Gulf countries policy flexibility are India’s growing ties with the US and stable ties with Iran and Israel. India’s strategic objectives attest to the fact that the Gulf, South Asia and Central Asia are now strategically interactive and interrelated regions. The objectives of India's quest for greater influence throughout the Gulf are to prevent proliferation as well as terrorism. As a bridging power, India could possibly leverage its links with both US and Iran to the benefit of the Gulf countries. Unlike the US and other European powers that tie security cooperation with sensitive issues such as human rights, democracy and regime change, Gulf countries view India as a non-interfering partner to align with. India maintains a substantial economic presence in the Gulf and is set to create a significant political presence as well. Despite civilizational propinquities, historical commercial linkages, and geographical proximity, the Gulf and India have failed to capitalize on commonalities, which has prevented their association from truly becoming the “unbroken relation of cordiality.” Nevertheless, the growing economic presence of India in the Gulf and the Gulf ’s new geo-economic realities provide the platform to synergize complementarities into multipronged stable relations. The trend of mutual ignorance of the two regions is slowly reversing due to the growing economic importance of India in the world and the Gulf's increased interest in building its relations with its immediate neighbor, against the backdrop of faltering bonhomie with the West. The relationship between the two regions has been in focus in the evolving interdependence centering on energy-economy dynamics and changed geopolitical environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The ‘Look East’ strategy of the Gulf provides an impetus for closer relations. It is therefore necessary that since a sustainable relationship entails multifaceted cooperation, India and the GCC countries should broaden relations on the strategic and political levels. It is in the interests of both the GCC and India to recognize the other’s potential as a serious trading partner, and further strengthen their external relations. Both parties could nurture their relations in a constructive way by finding the right balance between regionalism and multilateralism to excel in today’s fast paced economic arena. To sum up, geopolitical and geoeconomic complementarities drive security and strategic aspects of the Gulf region’s Look East Policy towards India. While India's ambitions, capabilities, experience and interests all suggest that it is capable of playing a major role in the Gulf, the Gulf countries see India as a bridging power to shift their status quo security and strategic imperatives to better align with the changed dynamics. The stakes are formidable, challenges are mutual, potentials are huge and, hence, cooperation becomes imperative. This calls for greater political will.

#### And an Indian shift to the Gulf means they’ll engage the UAE specifically – sustained economic relations are key

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

In the last couple of years India has been trying to regain international clout in West Asia and this has resulted in an increasing number of visits of the Foreign Minister to Egypt, Jordan, UAE (United Arab Emirates), Israel and also Palestine.i Likewise, the Indian Defence Minister also undertook visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar.ii This clearly shows that India’s strategic orientation is being redefined in the Gulf region. While India has engaged a number of countries in the region, it has nurtured special relations with the UAE because it has been the largest trading partner as well as a strategically important country. Indian expatriate workers also list the UAE as a relatively labour friendly country in terms of wages, facilities, freedom and the annual leave. UAE had assumed the chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) immediately after India and, therefore, greater understanding was developed on the maritime issues also. With shrinking markets in Europe and the US, UAE is increasingly looking towards India for exports and investment. In less than six months, India and the UAE have exchanged four high level bilateral visits and almost all visits underpinned the significance of economic and strategic engagements between the two countries. A host of factors such as deep historical links, culture, economy, polity, security and changing geo- strategic and maritime environment helped bring the two nations closer. On his visit to India on 15-16 May this year, the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abduallah Zayed bin Al Nayahan, described India as an ‘ally and cherished neighbour’ and said that UAE would like to have a ‘strong presence’ in the Indian market in the future. Besides this, he also acknowledged the need for working together with India on some of the pressing regional issues such as stabilising Afghanistan, combating maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden as well as stabilising Somalia and religious and sectarian faultlines emerging in the West Asian countries.

#### UAE-India relations solve piracy-terror networks between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

Although both countries have signed defence cooperation agreements in 2006, it needs fine-tuning, particularly on two policy-dimensions: one, a real time assistance and cooperation by sharing information and providing necessary support to the Indian Navy to check the growing and expanding menace of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which is equally fatal to the oil- exporting Gulf rentier economies.xxvi Besides, the presence of the Indian Navy can also effectively handle the growing nexus between pirates and the terror outfits, particularly between the Somali-based al Shabab and the al Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) of Yemen. UAE could consider giving the Indian Navy logistic supports such as refuelling, deployment, providing bases during emergency as well as enabling Indian Navy to evacuate its large diaspora community during crisis period.xxvii India can assist and train the UAE crew in counter-terrorism, disaster relief management, rescue and search operations, etc.

#### Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda network causes an attack on the US

Zarif 11—(Maseh Zarif, deputy director and Iran research Team Lead for the American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project July, 2, 2011, Terror Partnership: AQAP and Shabaab http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/maseh-zarif-terror-partnership-shabaab-aqap-july-2-2011)

The terrorist threat to America from the Gulf of Aden is metastasizing as the most dangerous al Qaeda affiliate, Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), appears to be partnering with Somalia-based militant Islamist group al Shabaab in attacking the West. On June 23, an American drone strike targeted two senior al Shabaab leaders in Qandal, outside the al Shabaab-controlled southern port city of Kismayo.[1] Somalia’s defense minister said on July 1 that U.S. military forces retrieved the two men; it is unclear whether they were killed in the strike.[2] The identities of the militants have not been released, but a senior American military official said that they had “direct ties” to Anwar al Awlaki, the Yemeni-American radical cleric who has been operational within AQAP.[3] The official added, “They were planning operations outside of Somalia.”[4] The reported links between Awlaki—whose primary focus has been on attacking the American homeland—and the al Shabaab leaders targeted in the strike suggest that AQAP and al Shabaab have established operational ties. Such an alliance would enable the two groups to leverage their joint resources, including AQAP’s bomb-making expertise and al Shabaab’s recruitment and hosting of militants from the West, to conduct spectacular attacks in the West. Both AQAP and al Shabaab have demonstrated the ability to plan and launch terrorist attacks outside their safe havens. AQAP has launched two significant operations against the United States—the 2009 Christmas Day attack and the October 2010 parcel plot. AQAP continues to target America and has benefited from Yemen’s recent unrest and state fragmentation.[5] Al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab is waging an insurgency in Somalia against the United Nations-backed Transitional Federal Government and African Union troops in a bid to expand its operating space. It currently controls large regions in the country and operates in the capital, Mogadishu. The organization has demonstrated the desire and the ability to export terror beyond Somalia’s borders. It has in the past threatened the United States and embraced al Qaeda’s global ideology.[6] The group executed its first attack outside of Somalia in July 2010 when it bombed a restaurant and rugby club in Kampala, Uganda, killing 76 people.[7] Al Shabaab may also have been involved in the June 2011 suicide bombing in Abuja, Nigeria.[8] It continues to explore targets outside Somalia.[9]

#### Gulf of Aden piracy allows terrorists to go nuclear and independently causes regional war and commerce shutdown

Sterio 10 [Melena, Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School, magna cum laude, 2002; Maitrise en Droit (French law degree), Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2002; D.E.A. (master’s degree), Private International Law, Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2003; B.A., Rutgers University, French Literature and Political Science, summa cum laude, 1998, THE SOMALI PIRACY PROBLEM: A GLOBAL PUZZLE NECESSITATING A GLOBAL SOLUTION]

According to Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), piracy in the Gulf of Aden is “out of control.”20 In 2008, Somali pirates took nearly 600 crewmembers hostage; several hundred of these crewmembers, as well as a dozen ships, are still being held by the pirates, who may demand millions of dollars in ransom for their release.21 Somali pirates have become more aggressive in their operations, recently beginning to attack larger ships. In 2008, they seized the Faina, which was carrying Russian tanks and ammunition, as well as the supertanker Sirius Star, which was carrying two million barrels of oil.22 Section I.A will discuss how, if left unchecked, Somali piracy, in the long-term, could eventually lead to the decline of commercial activity and commercial centers in East Africa.23 Section I.B will show how Somali piracy imposes significant costs on shipping companies that are already financially stressed, deterring maritime commerce, endangering sea lines of transportation and communication, and undermining regional stability.24 In 2008, the United Nations Security Council, recognizing the seriousness of the threat posed by Somali piracy, passed Resolution 1816, which states that piracy “exacerbate[s] the situation in Somalia[,] which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.”25 Section I.C will discuss how piracy can both contribute to the formation of maritime terrorism and provide funding and other assistance to terrorist causes, aiding groups such as al-Qaida. This section will also demonstrate how allowing pirates to pursue their activities without resistance sends a strong lack-of-deterrence message to other potential sea and land- based terrorists, who may infer that their efforts will remain unchecked for many years as well. A. Piracy and the Failed Somali State: A Threat to Global Peace Somalia is a failed state.26 Since the early 1990s, Somalia has not had a stable government, and its fragile government is currently battling warlords and militant Islamic groups for control of the country.2 The country does not have a functional economy, and its official law enforcement operations are slim, with gangs of paramilitary groups and rebel forces controlling the streets of Mogadishu and other towns.28Piracy has thrived in this cowboy culture of inefficient government, and everyday life is ruled by violence.29 A functional Somali government is so absent that some Somali coastal towns have established pirate-centric societies where piracy not only enjoys local support, but local governments rely on it.30 If nothing is done to thwart the rise of piracy in Somalia, piracy will not only continue to prosper in Somalia, undermining efforts to stabilize the country, but also seriously threaten regional and international peace and stability.31 Piracy can spread elsewhere from Somalia. Other African states, whether Somali neighbors or located farther away, could fall prey to powerful pirate operations, especially if such operations become firmly rooted in Somalia and ruled by powerful warlords enjoying Somali government support. Regional pirate networks could be created, posing a significant threat to global commerce and human safety.32 Moreover, piracy can endanger commercial and tourist routes, undermining the regional economy and exposing neighboring states to all sorts of potential problems.33 Potential problems include economic non-viability, political and civil unrest caused by poverty, and border instability provoked by the need to expend vast resources on the fight against piracy. In addition, Somali piracy can threaten global peace and security if pirates start collaborating with other maritime trafficking groups, such as those who smuggle narcotics or weapons of mass destruction, either for a financial or political cause. Thus, the development of Somali piracy could contribute to the spread of maritime violence, endangering sea routes everywhere and supporting dangerous factions across the globe.34 As discussed below, the Somali pirates could become linked to powerful terrorist organizations and could significantly contribute to the development and growth of such groups. These global implications, highlighted below, show why a present-day global response is needed to curb and eventually eliminate this menace.

#### Safe shipping routes key to global economy and food security

Mitropoulos 5 [(Efthimios, Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations) World Maritime Day Parallel Event, 11/15, International Maritime Organization]

We hoped to kick-start moves towards creating a far broader awareness that a healthy and successful shipping industry has ramifications that reach far beyond the industry itself. Global economic prosperity is dependent on trade and trade, in turn, is dependent on a safe and secure transport network. Shipping is the most important part of that global network, although it is rarely acknowledged as such, and seldom given the credit it deserves. Indeed, I have long come to the sad conclusion that the contribution made by the shipping industry - and, in particular, by those who work hard, both on board ships and ashore, to make it safer and more environmentally friendly - is greatly undervalued by the public at large. You may have noticed that I used the word "sad" to brand my conclusion. I am sorry to say that there is another word I might suggest as more fitting to characterize the situation and that is the word "unfair" - in capital letters! I think it is worth pausing for a moment to consider just how vital the contribution of ships and shipping actually is. More than 90 per cent of global trade is reportedly carried by sea; over the last four decades, total seaborne trade estimates have nearly quadrupled, from less than 6 thousand billion tonne-miles in 1965 to 25 thousand billion tonne-miles in 2003; and, according to UN figures, the operation of merchant ships in the same year contributed about US$380 billion in freight rates within the global economy, equivalent to about 5 per cent of total world trade. This year, the shipping industry is expected to transport 6.6 billion tonnes of cargo. If you consider this figure vis-a-vis the 6.4 billion population of the world, you will realize that this works out at more than one tonne of cargo for every man, woman and child on the face of the planet - even more for the richer nations. As seaborne trade continues to expand, it also brings benefits for consumers throughout the world. The transport cost element in the price of consumer goods varies from product to product and is estimated to account for around 2 per cent of the shelf price of a television set and only around 1.2 per cent of a kilo of coffee. Thanks to the growing efficiency of shipping as a mode of transport and to increased economic liberalization, the prospects for the industry's further growth continue to be strong. Shipping is truly the lynchpin of the global economy. Without shipping, intercontinental trade, the bulk transport of raw materials and the import and export of affordable food and manufactured goods would simply not be possible. Shipping makes the world go round and, so, let us be in no doubt about its broader significance. To put it in simple terms, as I have done before on a number of occasions during the campaign initiated at IMO to encourage all those involved in shipping to pay more attention to its public perception, without international shipping half the world would starve and the other half would freeze.

#### Terrorism causes extinction – defense mechanisms don’t check and a nuclear response is automated

Barrett et al 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction independent of retaliation

Owen B. Toon 7, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

#### The 6 governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council ought to require employers to pay a living wage to all workers, regardless of nationality, and ensure the enforcement of the minimum wage standards.

#### The plan is enforceable and avoids labor exploitation by equalizing bargaining power

HRW 14 [Human Rights Watch “Gulf Countries: Increase Migrant Worker Protection” NOVEMBER 23, 2014] AT

“The proposals made by GCC countries fall far short of the changes needed to protect domestic workers’ rights, safety, and dignity,” said Elizabeth Tang, general secretary of the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). “GCC countries should join the growing number of countries worldwide that are extending full protection of their labor laws to domestic workers, including a minimum wage, a weekly rest day, the right to organize, and social benefits.” The GCC has discussed a potential region-wide standard employment contract for domestic workers. Recent media reports suggest that the GCC is also considering establishing a body to coordinate policies on hiring domestic workers that would consist of recruitment agency and government representatives. These developments have lacked transparency and have suffered from inadequate consultation with migrant domestic workers, trade unions, and migrants’ rights organizations. Migrants’ countries of origin are also discussing their own standard contract through a separate process. “Standard contracts are not a substitute for labor law reform, and taken alone do not meet the standards in the ILO Domestic Workers Convention,” said Sharan Burrow, general secretary of the ITUC. “The GCC should work in closer coordination with – not separately from – countries of origin to develop labor migration policies that fully respect the human and labor rights of migrants.” Migrants in the Gulf make an important contribution both to the economies of their own countries and those of the countries where they work. In 2011, migrant workers in GCC countries sent home more than US$60 billion in remittances. Competition for jobs among the workers’ countries of origin, combined with their relative lack of bargaining power in relation to the labor-destination countries, means that the pressure they exert for better labor protections is weak. “The meetings over the next few days provide a key opportunity to promote regional minimum standards that would avoid a counterproductive race to the bottom in labor conditions,” said William Gois of Migrant Forum Asia. “The governments should develop a concrete action plan, in consultation with migrant workers themselves and the organizations that represent them, with benchmarks to monitor its progress.” Kuwait University Law School will host an event on November 23, 2014, at which panelists from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, IDWF, the ITUC, and Migrant Forum Asia will discuss the rights of migrant domestic workers. The groups recommend that the governments: Establish and enforce comprehensive labor law protections for migrant workers, including domestic workers; Reform the kafala (sponsorship) visa system to ensure that workers can change employers without being required to first obtain their consent; Remove the “exit permit” requirement in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; Strengthen regulation and monitoring of labor recruitment agencies, including eliminating recruitment fees for workers; Ensure that migrants have access to justice and support services; and Expand the Abu Dhabi Dialogue to include labor-origin countries from Africa, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, and participation by nongovernmental groups. Governments should ratify and implement international labor and human rights standards, the groups said. These include the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, the ILO Forced Labor Protocol, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

### 1AC Long Relations [Arjun TL]

#### Lack of minimum wage standards in the Gulf means Labor-Sending Countries are cutting off relations with the GCC now

Youha 14 [(Ali Al Youha, MSc in global governance and diplomacy from Oxford University and a BA in economics from Boston College) “Gulf labor policies need context” Al-Monitor Feb 17] AT

While the GCC states are not exempt from the need to manage labor conditions, Western institutions should examine the GCC's internal labor dilemmas. They need to rigorously and holistically assess ongoing GCC state policy efforts to control labor practices within their markets. Therefore, multilateral cooperation and genuine dialogue should be prioritized, rather than politically framing the GCC region as the face of labor exploitation. Issues over protections, a standard minimum wage and labor-import bans have often been the inevitable outcomes of ongoing struggles between GCC states and Asian LSCs. GCC countries ban labor importation from major Asian suppliers when these LSCs violate strict labor and immigration laws Other LSCs, like the Philippine and Indonesian governments, also imposed labor-export bans on Saudi Arabia for failing to address violations of domestic workers’ rights and minimum wage requirements. This particular tension is expected to continue, given the increasing labor and minimum wage standards demanded by Asian LSCs, and has shaped diplomatic relations and produced criticism from rights groups.

#### Rising wages in India means Indian migrant workers are beginning to return to India – Gulf wages must keep pace

Lay 11 [(Claire ferris, deputy editor of CEO Middle East) “UAE sees Indian workforce shrink as home salaries rise” 22 November 2011] AT

The Indian Consulate in the UAE saw a fall in new visas for Indian nationals last year for the first time, as rising salaries in the Asian state kept workers at home. The Gulf state is likely to see a steady decline in blue-collar migrants as India’s economic growth offers better opportunities to workers, the Consul General told Arabian Business. “Last year, for the first time ever, the Indian Consulate served less passports than in 2009 so that would be an indication that the number of Indians declined coming to the UAE,” Sanjay Verma said on the sidelines of the 5th Arabian Business Forum. “Passport services saw a two percent drop. “The numbers are declining because of the demand for labour in India. The civil construction sector has a shortage of civil engineers and skilled workers, plumbing and carpentry.” The Asian state has rolled out a National Rural Employment Guarantee Act which offers 100 days of work a year to rural households, giving employment to workers in villages who traditionally have looked abroad for jobs. “The advantage of that is it is offered it to you in your home town or village so that has taken away some workers who otherwise would have come abroad,” Verma said. The Gulf plays host to millions of migrants, primarily from Asia, who account for the majority of blue-collar workers in the construction, domestic work, and service industries. An estimated three million migrate each year, sending back an estimated $175bn in remittances annually, according to Human Rights Watch data. The UAE alone is home to an estimated 1.75 million Indian expatriates, the largest group of foreign workers in the Gulf country. But experts have warned the country may struggle to attract and retain migrants if it fails to keep pace with rising salaries in India. Minimum wages for unskilled foreign workers in the UAE are as low as AED600 a month, with skilled workers receiving AED1,200 a month, according to the Indian Embassy, Abu Dhabi. By comparison, wages in India, the world’s fastest-growing economy after China, surged by 11.1 percent last year, said recruitment firm GulfTalent in February. The Indian Ambassador to the UAE said earlier this year the government planned to enforce a minimum wage for Indian nationals hoping to work in the UAE. If approved, the ruling will mean workers only receive immigration clearance from India if their employment contract meets with a set minimum salary. Verma said the professional sectors were likely to feel the pinch first as India strives to hold on to homegrown talent and keep pace with its fast-growing economy. “It will be more expensive getting Indian workers. It’s already happening in the professional sector, it’s not as easy as it used to be to attract Indian doctors or accountants to come here.” In 2011, the number of new visas issued by the consulate will be flat, he added. “I think it’s going to be closer to 2010, probably the same as 2010 but not a drastic increase.”

#### Expatriate laborers are the *key internal link* to relations and India’s role in the GCC as a peacekeeper

GRC 9 [(Gulf Research Center (GRC) is an independent research institute located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

The major countries of Asia are looming as important regional players in the Middle East. A primary reason for the growing Asian footprint is economics, but it is more than simply the need for petroleum and natural gas that draws in the Asian states. They are attracted by opportunities for consumer sales and, in the case of South Asia, the export of millions of laborers to build the emerging city-states of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, the paradox is that despite the threat of new conflicts, billions of dollars have been invested in the region and vast wealth accumulated and spent only a few hundred miles from ongoing military conflict. The financial crisis, which began in earnest in September 2008, has raised the prospects for a prolonged global recession, which will have a negative impact in most economic activities, including the value of energy exports, investments, tourism and consumer sales. Nevertheless, many observers believe that, in the long run, the global economy will recover and the economic trend lines that were in effect before September 2008, which showed growing economic activity between Asia and the Middle East, will be resumed. A number of traumatic events could upset this assumption including a new major Middle East war, severe social and political chaos in the region, Asia or even Europe and the US, or a total re-evaluation of the models of economic growth that are predicated on transparency, open markets and relatively free trade. The depth of Asia’s involvement in the Middle East can be measured in a number of ways, including the projected increase in the amounts of energy flowing east to Asian markets over the coming decades, the value of Asian exports to the Middle East, financial investment by Asian and Middle East countries in each others’ development, including construction and infrastructure, the number of tourists in both directions and the number of Middle Easterners enrolling for higher education in key Asian countries. Perhaps the most visible element of the growing Asian-Middle East partnership concerns expatriate workers in the GCC countries. Over 4 million Indians are to be found at every level of occupation on the Arabian Peninsula. In addition to Indian workers, millions of others come from South Asian countries. Without Asian labor, the oil rich economies of the Gulf would be in deep trouble, and without the all- powerful military presence of the US in the Gulf, they would be easy prey to regional predators, of whom Saddam Hussein was the classic example. It is the emergence of China and India as regional superpowers with an increasingly global outreach that has had the greatest impact on the region. In different ways, India and China will pose challenges and opportunities for the current regional hegemon, the United States. Questions about energy access, the security of the Arab Gulf, military cooperation, arms sales, oil and gas pipelines and energy security all need to be considered. These issues must be analyzed against the historical background of past Indian and Chinese influence in the region. India’s direct involvement in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf, is more extensive than China’s, due to proximity. But for the future, as China expands its geo-economic reach westward into Central Asia and Pakistan with new infrastructure projects, as well as increasing trade relations, it too will become a more important player. India and China have achieved a remarkable diplomatic presence in the Middle East, and unlike the United States or the former colonial powers (Britain, France, and Italy), they have made very few enemies and have managed to build good working relationships with all countries including close ties with Israel. Both countries are engaged in Mid-East peacekeeping operations. China’s participation in Lebanon within the framework of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) began officially on April 9, 2006. India has a much longer record of post World War II Mid-East peacekeeping, beginning with its participation in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) established in 1956 to monitor the Sinai desert. India has peacekeeping forces in UNIFIL, numbering 672 troops and staff officers and provided two of the last four commanding officers, but has not added any forces recently. Although India has historically had a more visible presence in the Gulf than China, it is only recently that is has begun to demonstrate power and influence. India has so far not had a major arms supply relationship with the Middle East countries, except Israel, but has been cooperating on a military-to-military basis with all of the small countries in the Gulf in recent years.

#### Shifting security commitments in the Gulf means India must fill in. Economic relations from migrant laborers provide ground for strengthened relations that solves war

Pradhan 9 [(Samir, economics specialist based in the UAE. Previously, he served as a senior consultant, macroeconomics research at Tanween,a leading consultancy in Doha, Qatar. Before that, he was senior researcher, GCC economics and Gulf-Asia programmes at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai/ UAE, the leading think tank of the Gulf region) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

By all accounts, the world is moving rapidly towards multipolarity. The post- Cold War era geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic imperatives underwent substantial changes in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 forced regime change in Iraq. Simultaneously, the growth of emerging economic powers also considerably influenced the process. What one sees now is a hexagonal power polarity with three nodes; Russia, China, and India on the one side and the United States, Japan and the European Union forming the other three points. Moreover, with increasing global interdependence, it appears that the various nodes are striving for greater accommodation of interests and better management of contradictions, despite having divergent security and strategic cultures. With such changes in the global power architecture, reverberations are strikingly evident in the power configurations at the bilateral as well as regional level. Importantly, nation states are increasingly managing their bilateral relations on the basis of a realpolitik assessment rather than ideology alone. A case in point is the contemporary strategic environment in the Gulf region, which is increasingly becoming unpredictable, having local, regional and global implications. With windfall capital and vibrant economic growth, the region is witnessing unprecedented transformation in the social, political, economic, cultural and strategic realms. Importantly, certain favorable and adverse domestic, regional and international factors pervasively influence their security and strategic perceptions and increase their anxiety about the imminent future. Coincidentally, being a neighbor and an emerging global power, India becomes a reference point for the Gulf countries as a partner in their quest for managing the evolving security equations. The change of perception in the Gulf region is based on a ‘new constellation’ in which India is increasingly viewed as a credible non-partisan global player who can play a constructive role in managing conflicts and restoring peace and tranquility in the region. Thanks to the Gulf ’s eastward shifting economic engagements, burgeoning trade and investment linkages, and the civilizational affinities between India and the Gulf region there is the promise of a new era of deepening ties. The strategic importance of the Gulf region dates to the 19th century when three great empires –British India,Tsarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey – confronted each other for power projection. Since then, the region has a tradition of overwhelming security dependence on external powers. With the discovery of oil, the Gulf region became intrinsically enmeshed with the nuances of great power politics. This process continued until the whole region came under pervasive control of the security cordon provided by the US. Given the small population size of the countries, the regional governments continued to rely upon outside powers to maintain a crude balance of power in order to maintain sovereignty, domestic identity and regime security. This balance of power was maintained with the direct and extensive contributions from the external powers, either through providing military technology and weapons (Russian sales of missile and arms to Iran) or deploying military personnel in the region (US providing armaments and maintaining military bases in some member countries of the GCC). Today the strategic environment in the region is in a state of flux. This is due to the crystallization of several conflicting factors. Iran’s increasing military posture and Israel’s policy in the East Mediterranean region constitute the twin strategic faultlines surrounding the Gulf region. The turmoil in Iraq, which used to be the countervailing power to Iran, further adds to the security risks for the Gulf regimes. Above all, the perception of an Israel-centric foreign policy by the United States only increases tensions in the region. It is noteworthy to point out the central role played by the United States as the security lynchpin of the Gulf region (Koch 2008). The role and extent of US involvement in the Gulf region has expanded tremendously since it filled the power vacuum following the British withdrawal from the region in 1968.The overarching presence of the US has considerably changed the region’s strategic dynamics. From the initial ‘dual containment policy’ of orchestrating regional countervailing powers against each other, the US has become in a sense the sole superpower in the region as reflected in the forced regime change in Iraq in 2003. At present, nearly 200,000 American troops are stationed in the Gulf region, the majority of course in Iraq but with significant numbers in the GCC, thereby firmly entrenching the US in the Gulf security scenario. Further, given the Gulf region’s real security concerns, the regimes cannot afford to suddenly change the status quo and seek an alternate security arrangement. But while the US is an indispensable security ally and would continue to play a formidable role in the Gulf region’s emerging strategic paradigm, it is increasingly apparent that such an exclusive role in its present scope is neither sustainable nor unanimously acceptable to the Gulf regimes. In a sense, the unilateral strategic dominance of the US in the Gulf region is coming to an end, albeit slowly. Thus, a clear strategic shift is in motion which is primarily due to the increasing internationalization of the Gulf with other powers from Europe and Asia on the fringe, but also due to a reorientation and self introspection by the Gulf countries about their place in the international system and the role played by the US within that system. Given the multidimensional security environment in the Gulf region – from the threat posed by Islamic radicalism and Iranian nuclear ambitions, to concerns about the stalemate in Iraq, tensions surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, securing supply lines of oil exports and the role of Gulf finance in world economics – the regimes no longer feel safe in the comfort zone of the American security umbrella. The ambiguity about the US role, either as a source of regional stability or greater instability, entices the Gulf regimes to rethink their national interests amidst volatile regional events. The region is in the throes of a transition which evolves from patterns of interaction that are characterized by power politics and geopolitical concerns to new ones that are marked by the politics of geoeconomics. Adding to the complexity is the sheer pace of post modernism and its structural spill over as reflected in domestic discontentment and the region’s search of an identity in the increasingly interdependent globalized world in which the parochial projection of the Gulf (especially in the Western world) is not only hampering their commercial pursuits, but also questioning the region’s integrity. As a result, there is a growing sense of confidence in the region that has led the GCC states to play an increasing regional political and diplomatic role. Especially in the security domain, the Gulf countries are increasingly re-shifting their strategies from bilateral dependence to multilateral interdependence, sensing that bilateralism will no longer meet the requirements of a multi-polar world in geo-economic terms. Furthermore, the GCC leaderships are anticipating the shifting circumstances surrounding the declining role of the US. Bahrain’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Abdul Ghaffar, has, for example, called for a new security order in the Gulf with the GCC states as the main pillar of defense while Qatar’s Amir Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani told the General Debate of the United National General Assembly in September 2007 that: “The major conflicts in the world have become too big for one single power to handle them on its own” (Koch 2008). Nevertheless, it is certain that complete removal of external powers from the region is not at all a possibility in the absence of a regional architecture and the existence of glaring distrust among the states in the region (consider, for example, the continuing problem of border disputes). Besides, given the global strategic importance of the region, outside powers would not simply keep themselves away from developments in the region as formidable stakes are involved. Thus, in the current circumstances, a viable security framework is simply unthinkable at this stage and it is certain that neither a regional solution nor an outside power can counter the wide variety of threats to the region. Thus, the key before the Gulf countries is to multilateralize the regional security space with the involvement of other powers, especially an emerging global power like India with whom the future stakes of the region are formidable. Therefore, India can become a natural security ally for the Gulf. Transforming Strategic Overlap into Partnership The strategic horizon comprising the Gulf region and India shows the growing interconnectedness in the security space extending from Afghanistan to the Middle East. India’s location at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean gives it a strategic location in Eurasia as well as among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean from East Africa to Indonesia. India's peninsular projection in the ocean gives it a stake in the security and stability of these waters which is crucial for oil trade – the lifeblood of Gulf economies. While the overall strategic environment involving India and the Gulf region is in a state of flux evincing uncertainties and dilemmas, there is no doubt that the stakes are formidable. It may be noted that the connection between security and stability in the two regions was first propounded in 1981 by the former Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and former UAE President Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan. From a strategic point of view, the Gulf countries and India share a desire for political stability and security in the region. The emerging common security perceptions create further opportunities for Gulf-India cooperation in the future. In the recent past, several Gulf countries, especially Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE have concluded a number of bilateral strategic pacts with India. The UAE and India entered into a strategic pact, signed on July 1, 2003 when a high-level delegation led by the then Chief of Staff and now Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Shaikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, visited India. That agreement envisages cooperation in security, defense policy, development of defense cooperation, training for the UAE military and military medical personnel, exchange of cultural and sports activities between the friendly forces of the two countries and joint efforts to tackle environmental issues, particularly pollution in the seas. Saudi Arabia and India have entered into a similar pact. Such pacts confirm the increasing recognition of India as an emerging power by the Gulf countries and simultaneously the common strategic outlook of both. As aptly stated by the UAE Foreign Minister, Shaikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, at the opening of the ministerial session of the Indo-UAE Joint Commission, “At a regional level, we also look forward to an increased involvement by India in issues affecting the Gulf and neighboring countries” and that “it is in both of our interests to work together more and more closely.” The process of mutual recognition got a major boost with the landmark visit of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to India and consequent ratification of the New Delhi Declaration. This inclination of a major Gulf power like Saudi Arabia to deepen and broaden ties with India points to the changing geopolitical dynamics in both regions. Moreover, Gulf countries are increasingly cooperating with India for military training. Since India’s dependence on Gulf energy and the Gulf ’s dependence on India and Asia as a future major market for oil exports will remain significant, the security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) has become a critical component within the ambit of strategic matters. It is not just oil, but the increasing movement of merchandise imports and exports on the sea route spanning the vast arc of Indian Ocean has also become a critical security concern for India and the Gulf countries. The sheer number of Indian expatriates in the Gulf region’s workforce makes a strong case for deepening ties with India to manage domestic security. Countries like Saudi Arabia have the potential to support India in her efforts for the educational and social transformation of India’s vast Muslim population that constantly look towards the Gulf region for moral and religious guidance. India as a ‘Bridging Power’ India’s credibility and role as a “neutral” player in Asia may serve Gulf interests in managing their emerging security and strategic objectives. Two crucial factors that can possibly give the Gulf countries policy flexibility are India’s growing ties with the US and stable ties with Iran and Israel. India’s strategic objectives attest to the fact that the Gulf, South Asia and Central Asia are now strategically interactive and interrelated regions. The objectives of India's quest for greater influence throughout the Gulf are to prevent proliferation as well as terrorism. As a bridging power, India could possibly leverage its links with both US and Iran to the benefit of the Gulf countries. Unlike the US and other European powers that tie security cooperation with sensitive issues such as human rights, democracy and regime change, Gulf countries view India as a non-interfering partner to align with. India maintains a substantial economic presence in the Gulf and is set to create a significant political presence as well. Despite civilizational propinquities, historical commercial linkages, and geographical proximity, the Gulf and India have failed to capitalize on commonalities, which has prevented their association from truly becoming the “unbroken relation of cordiality.” Nevertheless, the growing economic presence of India in the Gulf and the Gulf ’s new geo-economic realities provide the platform to synergize complementarities into multipronged stable relations. The trend of mutual ignorance of the two regions is slowly reversing due to the growing economic importance of India in the world and the Gulf's increased interest in building its relations with its immediate neighbor, against the backdrop of faltering bonhomie with the West. The relationship between the two regions has been in focus in the evolving interdependence centering on energy-economy dynamics and changed geopolitical environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The ‘Look East’ strategy of the Gulf provides an impetus for closer relations. It is therefore necessary that since a sustainable relationship entails multifaceted cooperation, India and the GCC countries should broaden relations on the strategic and political levels. It is in the interests of both the GCC and India to recognize the other’s potential as a serious trading partner, and further strengthen their external relations. Both parties could nurture their relations in a constructive way by finding the right balance between regionalism and multilateralism to excel in today’s fast paced economic arena. To sum up, geopolitical and geoeconomic complementarities drive security and strategic aspects of the Gulf region’s Look East Policy towards India. While India's ambitions, capabilities, experience and interests all suggest that it is capable of playing a major role in the Gulf, the Gulf countries see India as a bridging power to shift their status quo security and strategic imperatives to better align with the changed dynamics. The stakes are formidable, challenges are mutual, potentials are huge and, hence, cooperation becomes imperative. This calls for greater political will.

#### 2 scenarios for extinction

#### 1. US withdrawal kills the peace process, guaranteeing unending violence – their defense assumes intervening actors

Smith 13 [(Lee, senior editor at the Weekly Standard and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is also the author of the recently published The Consequences of Syria) “The Arab-Israeli Peace Process Is Over. Enter the Era of Chaos.” Tablet Mag October 30, 2013] AT

To judge by the president’s decision making, Egypt and Syria apparently are no longer important parts of that world, nor is the shakeout from the Arab Spring, or preserving Washington’s special relationship with the Saudi oil kingdom, or other familiar features of American Middle East policy, like democracy promotion, which have been taken for granted by locals and the rest of the world alike. What matters seems to be getting out of the region faster, by making a snap deal with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani over Tehran’s nuclear program. But yeah, administration sources told the Times almost as an afterthought, we still care about the peace process. The problem is that a deal with Iran, when taken together with a U.S. withdrawal from the region, means the end of the peace process. As an Israeli official visiting Washington told me last week, one result of the administration’s minimalist regional profile is that the Arab allies of the United States—from Jordan and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council states—will no longer enjoy the luxury of being able to count on the United States to pursue and protect their national interests, which means that they’ll have to do it themselves in a region where, as President Barack Obama said in his speech at the U.N. General Assembly meeting last month, the leaders “avoid addressing difficult problems themselves.” What that means is that Washington’s Arab partners who are most concerned about Iran, like Saudi Arabia, now have a choice: They can defend themselves with all the weaponry the American defense industry has sold them over the years—or they can get someone else to do it. If most Arab regimes never really cared that much for the Palestinians in the first place, they clearly had even less use for the Israelis. But in the wake of a bad American deal with Rouhani, the Israelis may come in quite handy, as the only local power capable of standing up to a nuclear-armed Iran or stopping the Iranian nuclear program in its tracks. There is plenty of evidence that the Gulf Cooperation Council states have already reached the conclusion that using the Israeli air force to fight their wars may be no more inherently loathsome—and a good deal cheaper—than relying on the unreliable Americans. Coordination between Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council states is reportedly higher than it’s ever been before. And military and security relations between Jerusalem and Egypt’s ruling military junta are excellent, as both countries face mutual foes like Hamas in Gaza and local franchises of al-Qaida in Sinai. What’s clear amidst all this traffic is that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is presently the least important and least bloody conflict in the region, after the Syrian civil war, the Libyan civil war, Iraq’s violent partition, Egypt’s military crack-down, etc. From the point of view of national realpolitik, the only people who should be thinking long and hard about the end of the Arab-Israeli peace process are American policymakers. Maybe it’s good news then that the lake of crocodile tears shed for 80 years over the Palestinian cause is about to evaporate into the thin desert air because the United States is leaving, and the Arab regimes obviously have more important things to worry about now—like their own security and survival. Yet from an American standpoint the end of the peace process is unfortunate—and not because it was ever likely to bring about peace between Arabs and Israelis, or usher in a reign of good feeling and peaceful relations across the Middle East. \* \* \* Since Henry Kissinger first engineered the Arab-Israeli peace talks strategy in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, many American policymakers have forgotten, or perhaps never understood, that peace talks were primarily a device to advance American interests—a regional puppet show with Washington pulling the strings. With overwhelming political, diplomatic, and (most important) military support for Israel, Washington turned Jerusalem into a dependent client. It was also an invitation to the Arabs who, having despaired of any hope of defeating Israel in war, were forced to come to Washington on bended knee to secure concessions—like promises of withdrawals—from the Jewish state. The point of the peace process, therefore, was to turn Israelis and Arabs alike into servants of Washington, which succeeded in ejecting the Soviets as the United States became the ruling hegemon of the Middle East—home to a very large percentage of the world’s supply of oil. In turn, its ability to guarantee the security and safe transit of the world’s oil supply made the United States not only the de facto ruler of the Middle East, but also the most important power on the planet, even in the eyes of its potential rivals, like the Chinese. U.S. policymakers lost the thread of this effective decades-long regional strategy when the Cold War ended. In the absence of the familiar global Soviet threat, Americans were easily overwhelmed by cries for a final peace deal that was arguably never in the American interest—since the perpetuation of the conflict by kicking the can down the road forever was the key to keeping both the Arabs and the Israelis firmly in the American fold. American policymakers and analysts who believed in what I’ve called “hard linkage” argued that because the conflict really did motivate the policies of regional rulers, solving the crisis would make all the region’s other problems go away. Advocates of “soft linkage” meanwhile argued that progress on the peace process would make American partners in the Middle East more willing to cooperate on matters of greater U.S. national interest, like for instance, the Iranian nuclear issue. For anyone who doubted that the Israeli-Palestinian crisis was simply a local problem that made for useful political theater and not an active threat to the peace and stability of the entire planet, the Arab Spring provided a helpful reminder of the region’s true underlying fault lines. Obama was in office for barely two years when the Tunisian revolution erupted in December 2010, and soon the established order was in jeopardy throughout the region. Obama stopped pushing Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas into negotiations because he eventually came to see that by forcing the issue he was getting nowhere and losing prestige in the process. In retrospect, the Arab Spring was the first real assault on the peace process because it undermined the regional status quo that the United States had underwritten for four decades and kept in stasis with the peace process. Egypt and Jordan had treaties with Israel, and Syria was stalemated. The peace process was capable of checking states and their regional ambitions, but it had no power over the internal dynamics of Arab societies. While the White House saw the upheavals in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria as popular revolutions against a repressive order, they were actually, in each case, civil wars within Arab societies— pitting tribes, sects, Islamists, armies, and security services against each other. By avoiding all entreaties to support the Syrian rebels and topple Bashar al-Assad, Obama signaled that the United States had no dog in the fight, and no desire to work with key regional partners—especially Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey—to solve a problem that affected them directly. Riyadh’s former ambassador to Washington and currently head of Saudi’s National Security Council, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, has gone on a very public media campaign against the White House to express Saudi Arabia’s displeasure over the Obama Administration’s policies regarding—in ascending order of importance—Egypt, Syria, and Iran. It is possible that, in time, Obama will be seen to be a visionary who understood that American interests would be best served by putting as much distance as possible between us and a messy, violent part of the world. Few people think that now. According to administration officials, Obama seemed to them “impatient or disengaged” during meetings on Syria policy. And maybe he has a point. Why commit American prestige—and money, and troops—to help one side or another in Syria’s civil war? Similarly, if Arabs and Israelis really want peace, let them figure it out. And if the Israelis and the Arabs have a problem with Iran, let them work out it out themselves, while the United States moves on to more important issues, like health care, or China policy. But the reason the American withdrawal from the Middle East is a problem is that we already know what the region looks like without the United States—it looks like Syria, with every regional actor, from Saudi Arabia and Iran, al-Qaida and Hezbollah, at war with each other. The upside of not having an Arab-Israeli peace process—with round after round of worthless negotiations that go nowhere—is no upside at all, since the process was never really meant to bring peace to the Israelis and Palestinians in the first place. Rather, it was a token of the Pax Americana, Washington’s assurance of stability in a strategically vital region. With the United States absent from the Middle East, there’s no peace process, and as a result there will likely be no peace for anyone in the region.

#### India can solve the peace process and is a model for peaceful ethnic/religious relations – increased engagement is key

Kumaraswamy 13 [(PR, Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also the Honorary Director of Middle East Institute, New Delhi) “Can India Mediate the Middle East Peace Process” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 8, No. 4, October–December 2013, 400-412] AT

Palestinian Foreign Minister Nabil Shaath came to India in August 2003, just days before the visit of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to New Delhi. The Palestinian leader visualised a role for India to bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians because India is “a global player”.1 Leading a delegation to India for the third round of the India-Arab League bilateral dialogue in May 2007, a senior League official urged India to give momentum to the stalled peace process, and thereby strengthen the prospects of stability in the region. According to Heshem Youssef, “We want India to use its weight in the international community and its contacts with other countries to advance peace in the Middle East... The voice of India is listened to with respect in the world. We want the voice of India to advance the Arab cause”. Describing India as “an emerging power” he also expressed support for India’s candidacy for the permanent membership of the UNSC.2 In an exclusive interview to The Hindu prior to his visit to India in June 2008, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad felt India should be involved in the peace process because, ... it has two aspects. You can play a direct role between the two sides, Syria and Israel, and the Palestinians and Israel. That will make the region more stable, and that will affect India itself in the long run and the world at large, especially Asia. Second, it’s about the role you can play through your weight as India, a big country, in dialoguing with other powers — the U.S., Europe, your region — about how the Middle East can be made more stable.3 According to Assad, “India has the credibility because of its objective position”. On the question of the emerging close ties between India and the US, the Syrian President observed, “India has strong relations with most of the world, including the US...If India wants to use these relations for ushering peace in West Asia, that will be positive”. Thus, Assad felt that New Delhi should “convince” the US as well as Israel to have peace on top of their agenda.4 Similar sentiments were reiterated a couple of months later by President Mahmoud Abbas who told the Indian media, “India, the second largest populated nation in the world and the biggest democracy with a booming economy, including hi-tech, could play an important role in the Middle East peace process”.5 Indeed, earlier in September 2005, during his meeting with the then External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh in New York, the Palestinian Foreign Minister Nasser al-Kidwa suggested the India’s special envoy to the region should be renamed as special envoy to the peace process.6 Even Israel was not far behind in joining this chorus. Rejecting any possibility of negotiations with Hamas in the wake of its victory in January 2006, Israel’s ambassador in New Delhi, David Danieli, observed, “India certainly can contribute by having a dialogue with Palestinians and with Israel. India maintains equally good relations with both. So the ears of both sides are certainly open to hear Indian views and advise”.7 Similar sentiments have been expressed by a number of Indian scholars and practitioners as well. Months after his appointment as the special envoy to the region, Chinmaya Gharekhan remarked, “We have a huge stake in West Asia. Peace is the overriding necessity in the region and it will certainly make our job easier to play a more effective role in the region”.8 On another occasion, he told a conference in Manama, “The appointment of a Special Envoy for the Middle East process is an indication of the importance that the Government of India attaches to it as well as of our readiness to be of whatever help that we can render to the two parties”.9 Later, in an interview to an Arab daily, he said, naming a special envoy was “indicative of the interest and concern that we have for the region and its people. The idea behind appointing a special envoy is to share with the people and the governments of this region the problems that we all face and to express our solidarity with its people and governments”.10 Similar sentiments have often been expressed by the Indian intelligentsia.11 Writing on the eve of the Annapolis conference in November 2007, Radha Kumar observed: ... there is considerable scope for Indian contribution, so long as our policymakers remain soberly and clearly aware that (1) India’s role is in the fourth tier, after the parties, the US and close allies, and the regional states; (2) there remains a very real danger of the Palestinian issue being sidelined by, for example, an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement on the Golan Heights; and (3) the critical issues — Jerusalem, the borders of the Palestinian state, the return of refugees and common security — are no easier to resolve than they were earlier. Therefore, she argued that India ... can offer quiet diplomacy to help in those tracks where change is possible, and that itself will be something of a balm for those suffering from too much public diplomacy, which is the case with all of West Asia. Second, we can offer support where it is needed or welcomed, for example to the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian civil society, in coordination with other countries. If this seems a small contribution, think again.12 While some even attributed India’s invitation to Annapolis to Abbas,13 others found fault with the international community for India’s exclusion from the Quartet.14 Not all expressions of interest in the region were direct. Speaking on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinians on 29 November 2009, then Minister of State for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor was candid, “Although we do not play a role as such in the peace process as we have not been requested to do so, we have vital stakes in the process and in the West Asian region”.15 However, many of these statements about India playing a role in the Middle East peace process are little more than diplomatic niceties. Gharekhan, who has also expressed the salience of potential Indian contribution to the peace process, recognised the ground realities. Speaking at a conference in November 2007, he remarked, During my visits to the capitals in West Asia, my interlocutors have invariably been generous in speaking highly of the role that India can play in the region. When pressed, they are understandably less specific than one would like. Nevertheless, I am convinced that India, with its close ties with all the parties and countries including Israel as well as Iran, is well placed to offer its good offices in the search for a peaceful solution to the various crises in the region. Additionally, India is perhaps a unique country with a fully functioning democracy, a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual pluralist society, with an enviable record of all sections of society living in harmony and prosperity with one another. India thus could provide a model to the societies in West Asia. Indeed, this possible role of a model has been emphasized to me by leaders in responsible positions in my conversations with them. It is in this spirit that India will participate in the Annapolis conference next week.16

#### Failure to manage ethnic/religious conflict escalates to Mideast war

UPI 13 11/12/13 [United Press International, “Analysts: Accord with Iran could ease Sunni-Shiite bloodshed,” Nov. 12, 2013 at 2:23 PM, pg. http://www.upi.com/Top\_News/Special/2013/11/12/Analysts-Accord-with-Iran-could-ease-Sunni-Shiite-bloodshed/UPI-55331384284185/

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Nov. 12 (UPI) -- There's more riding on a U.S. reconciliation with Iran than just convincing Tehran to scale back its murky and widely feared nuclear program, analysts say. An accord with Tehran could do a lot to ease the swelling conflict between the Muslim world's mainstream Sunni sect, led by Saudi Arabia, and the breakaway Shiites led by Iran, that's become the central issue in the bloodletting in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and threatens the stability of the entire Middle East. The religious rift dates back to the dynastic dispute triggered by the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. Quiescent for centuries, it has flared into violence in recent years, particularly with the turbulent birth of the radical Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. This new confrontation in a dispute that goes back 14 centuries has come to define the modern-day rivalry between Saudi Arabia, which as the birthplace of Islam and guardian of its holiest shrines, considers itself the heart of the Islamic world, and the upstart Islamic Republic, for dominance of the region. The growing sectarianism that now marks the 30-month-old civil war in Syria and the worsening slaughter in Iraq is spilling over into Lebanon, threatening to ignite a new civil war, this time between the Sunni extremists of al Qaida and the Shiite warriors of Lebanon's Hezbollah. The Syrian war is the first conflict that has thrust al Qaida and Hezbollah, Iran's highly prized Arab ally Lebanese, into direct conflict. At least one U.S. commentator has suggested these two religion- and ideology-driven protagonists be left alone to savage each other, allowing the Americans to get rid of two of its relentless tormentors. Constraining Iran's nuclear ambitions is the declared primary objective of the negotiations between the Western powers and Iran, which is also the principal backer of Syria's embattled President Bashar Assad. But as international affairs commentator David Gardner observes, "two other prizes such a deal could unlock are enlisting Iran's help in addressing the most unmanageable conflicts of the Middle East, and starting to turn back the tide of sectarian poison coursing through the region... "Detente with Iran could eventually persuade Tehran to elbow aside the Assads -- now almost totally dependent for their survival on the Islamic Republic -- and unlock a transition out of Syria's misery. "But getting Iran inside the diplomatic tent could also make it easier to manage, if not resolve, a host of other regional problems," such as the increasingly sectarian bloodletting in Iraq and Lebanon, observed the Beirut-based Gardner.

#### The lack of an overarching stabilizing force in the Middle East guarantees unending war, violence, and escalatory instability – experts agree – it’s try or die for the aff

Fishman 15 [(alex, journalist) “Military Intelligence Foresees Escalated Conflict For Israel in 2015” Ynet news 1/7/2015] AT

The Middle East is expected to be very bad place in which to live over the coming year—perhaps one of the worst and most dangerous places in the world. When Military Intelligence puts its feelers out across the borders —in the direction of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and North Africa—it sees and describes a world gripped by social decay, a world that is crumbling politically and becoming increasingly poor. The chronic economic crisis that is affecting the Arab Spring countries, and continues to worsen in light of the falling oil prices, is accelerating the internal disintegration of major countries such as Syria, Libya and Iraq, and could undermine stabilizing regimes like Iran and Egypt. In Saudi Arabia alone, which is seen as a stable country, unemployment among the young will reach 30 percent in the coming year. No wonder there are so many Saudis in the global jihad organizations. Many more young individuals will fail to find their place in the Muslim societies, resulting in the rise of many more radical movements around Israel and the spilling by Muslims of a lot more Muslim blood in relation to previous years. And this tidal wave of violence could spill over into Israel. If there is a nightmarish scenario that's going to keep MI officials awake at night in 2015 it's the possibility that they won't be able to locate this tidal wave as it begins to form. This gloomy outlook, in the drier and more professional terminology of the MI researchers, is the bottom line of the comprehensive document MI's Research Department submitted recently to senior General Staff officials in the traditional ceremony known as MI's Annual Assessment—a regular ritual designed to present the army chiefs and political leadership with a forecast outlining the expected political and military developments in the coming year. This intelligence assessment, consisting essentially of a series of potential threats to which answers must be found, is supposed to serve as the foundation for the State of Israel's security-economic-political work plan for the year to come. This time, however, this gloomy forecast will fall on the shoulders of a new government, a new cabinet, a new chief of staff and perhaps a new defense minister too, making the situation even more worrisome. The Middle East, after all, is not going to wait until the summer, until a new Israeli government settles in. The uncertainty, instability and volatility of the events taking place could shake the region without warning. It's no wonder then that MI officials themselves are saying today that an intelligence assessment for an entire year is excessively pretentious. They say they can offer an assessment with a high degree of certainty only for the first few months of 2015. Chief of staff-elect Gadi Eisenkot sits today in the temporary office set aside for incoming army chiefs on the 15th floor of the Defense Ministry tower. There's a good chance that he will have to take responsibility for everything for a few months, at least. A new government, and perhaps a new defense minister, will need time before figuring things out and starting to adopt long-term decisions. Until then, Eisenkot will be the only one to offer continuity in terms of security readiness. He will also have to act as mentor for the new group until it gets comfortable in its seats. He is very familiar with MI's assessment, having been party to its preparation. Now, he's racking his brains: How do we construct a wall of security to prevent the madness that is gripping the Middle East—and is likely to get worse throughout 2015— from spilling over into our house? The Landlord's Vanished Every MI assessment begins with an overview of the regional picture from the perspective of the world powers. The bottom line here is a very simple one: The Middle East of today has no international landlord. There's no single element that maintains the balance, that facilitates international collaboration to preserve peace of sorts in the region. Vladimir Putin's Russia is making every effort to increase its influence in the Middle East by means of a firm foothold in Syria. The United States, which for years enjoyed a free hand in the Middle East as a soloist, doesn't make a move these days without coalitions. In Syria, it's an Arab coalition;; in Iraq, a Western coalition. Without a coalition behind him, Barack Obama would not have gotten involved with Islamic State and wouldn't have come down from the fence to help the more moderate Sunni forces in Syria and the Kurds in Iraq. The Russians, who have come to the aid of the Syrians in several key battles against the rebels, have despaired with the Syrian Army. Syrian and Iranian experts, working shoulder to shoulder in Syria, have already come to the conclusion that the Syrian Army is not going to deliver the goods and stop the tide. They are trying therefore—with the Americans getting dragged along—to work towards a compromise solution between the rebels and Bashar Assad's regime that would lead to a division of powers in the country. This isn't stopping the Russians from continuing every week to deliver a shipload of arms for the Syrian Army—from bullets for Kalashnikovs and through to heavy rockets—to the port of Tartus. Greater Syria no longer exists. The accepted term these days is Assad's "Little Syria," which controls 20-30 percent of the country. The remainder comprises independent cantons that are fighting against one another. Israel's part in the story is the Golan Heights. The price Israel is paying for providing humanitarian aid to the Free Syrian Army rebels is the deployment of these moderate Sunni groups over a large portion of the Golan Heights, facing into Syria. They create a buffer and physically prevent elements such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State from spilling over into the Israeli side of the Golan Heights. North of Quneitra lie a number of Druze villages that serve as hotbeds for hostile actions against Israel on the Golan Heights. The units operating there are backed by Hezbollah and the Syrian Army. One of them is under the command of the son of Imad Mughniyeh, who oversaw Hezbollah's terror activities abroad and was assassinated by Israel in 2008. A second group is under the command of another familiar face—Samir Kuntar, who spent decades in an Israeli prison before being released in return for the bodies of Israeli soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, who were captured by Hezbollah. And by the way, the chemical weapons issue in Syria will remain unresolved in 2015 too. The body dealing with Syria's chemical disarmament, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has yet to close the file. There is reason to believe that the Assad regime is still concealing chemical agents. The Iranian front presents a complex picture too. We won't know before the summer if Iran and the United States are going to sign an agreement on the nuclear issue. MI officials believe today that such an agreement would be bad for Israel. On the one hand, it would allow for a more accurate assessment vis-à-vis Hezbollah's future conduct along Israel's northern border;; on the other, if Iran doesn't sign an agreement with the West and fails to shake off the global sanctions, it could spiral out of control. Disappointment with President Hassan Rouhani and continuing economic despair could see a return to power in Tehran of the Revolutionary Guard. These are dramatic processes that could have an immediate effect on the northern border—but no one can foresee them today. At least two more issues will determine the face of 2015 in the Middle East—the Israeli elections and the impact the falling oil prices has on the oil exporters in the region. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sates are believed to have accumulated sufficient financial reserves to allow them to get through the crisis in one piece. In contrast, the price crisis could bring down the regimes in Iran, Iraq and Libya and lead to further anarchy. The Russians, too, could change their tune in the Middle East in light of the dramatic decline in oil revenues and turn more aggressive, in an effort to combat what they perceive as an American plot to destroy them. A Ray of Light in the Dark MI's assessment also deals with the issue of the disintegration of the nation states. Libya is divided into three states—Cyrenaica in the east, Tripolitania in the west, and Fezzan in the largely desert south. Sudan has split in two. Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Somalia are falling apart. The process, MI officials say, could spread to other countries and deepen in those crumbling already now. Islamic State elements—political not military, for the time being—are in Jordan's Ma'an region. In the Sinai Peninsula, the Ansar Bait al-Maqdis organization, which was once linked with al-Qaeda, recently pledged allegiance to Islamic State. Since the declaration, the Israel Defense Forces' Southern Command has been readying for the group's first terror attack against Israel from the Sinai. The emir of Islamic State, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi, announced a few weeks ago that Israel was one of the organization's targets. The global Jihad, in all its various forms, continues to run rampant through the Middle East and Africa. It's in the Sinai, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen. Osama bin-Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who came from Egypt, has—unlike his predecessor—a Middle Eastern agenda with Israel at its center. MI officials speak of four camps in the Middle East that are fighting one another. The first is the radical-Shia axis that includes Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and the Houthis in Yemen. This axis is currently trying to embrace Hamas. In the past two weeks alone, senior Iranian officials have announced plans to begin providing military aid to Hamas in the West Bank. The second axis is the moderate camp—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Qatar, too, has recently joined this group, albeit in part only, after the Saudis coerced the Qataris into reaching an understanding with the Egyptians. This understanding between Qatar and Egypt is particularly significant for Israel. It could delay or prevent a conflagration along the Gaza border. This alliance could distance the Iranians from Hamas and give another boost to the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority. This process will undoubtedly encounter resistance from global jihad elements and rogue organizations in Gaza. In the last few days alone, we've twice received proof of efforts to drag Israel and Hamas into another round of hostilities—a rocket fired in the direction of the Eshkol region by global jihadis and sniper fire in the southern section of the Strip from an unidentified organization. Hamas, which can see the Qatari money and reconstruction of Gaza on the horizon, is making every effort to prevent the global jihad groups and rogue organizations from acting against Israel. The Qatari-Egyptian partnership, still in its infancy, may in 2015 turn out to be a ray of light in the darkness of the relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Israel is now keeping a close eye on Mahmoud Abbas' moves and efforts to present a request to establish a Palestinian state within two years to the UN Security Council. If Abbas does so after January, he'll have a majority for the decision, and the event will take on different dimensions. Tensions between Israel and the Palestinians will increase and could lead to deterioration in the security situation. Deterioration in the security situation between Israel and the Palestinians, or between Israel and Gaza, is a realistic option in 2015. Hamas now has 30 percent of the rocket capabilities it had on the eve of Operation Protective Edge—a 5-10 percent improvement since the ceasefire. While the defensive tunnels in Shujaiya and Khan Younis are undergoing renovations and rebuilding, there are no signs meanwhile of new tunnels leading into Israeli territory. Israel has proof that Hamas has purchased cement from more than 8,000 homeowners in Gaza who received the building material from the United Nations, in cooperation with Israel, in order to repair their homes. The third camp is the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. They are in Gaza, Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Syria. MI's assessment doesn't rule out the possibility that the protest rallies will return again to the public squares in Jordan and Egypt, as the chances of stabilizing the economies in the Arab states are very low. The fourth camp in the Jihadist-Sunni one—Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis and their offshoots. All four of these camps are at war with one another on the playing field of the Middle East. Israel, meanwhile, is the observer that sometimes gets hit with a ricochet from the fighting. Get Ready for a Cyber Assault The MI assessment also points to a change in the enemy's perceptions, vis-à-vis its use of force. Both Hezbollah and Hamas have dropped their projectile-based defensive and attrition tactics in favor of offensive methods and close-quarter hostilities with the use of forces operating inside Israeli territory. The goal is also to create the image of victory and undermine the resolve of Israel's citizens. This change was clearly evident during the course of Operation Protective Edge, in terms of the tunnel tactics and the establishment of the special units for carrying out operations inside Israel. At the same time, both Hezbollah and Hamas are focusing on striking at Israel with precise weapons—cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and sophisticated rockets. One of the lessons the two organizations learned from Operation Protective Edge concerns the introduction of short-range missiles with large warheads that can destroy structures near the border—a move perceived during the fighting in Gaza as an essential element in terms of breaking the enemy's spirit. And indeed, Hezbollah has acquired Borkan missiles, which have a range of just 4-5 kilometers but are armed with a huge warhead. The new military doctrine that Israel will face also involves the decentralization of the military forces it will encounter, with no clear-cut target or two on the other side that if taken out could leave the enemy unbalanced. The duration of the hostilities, too, is a crucial factor from the point of view of the enemy, which will try to spark more prolonged military campaigns.

#### Middle east war causes extinction

Russell 9 James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### 2. Sustained cooperation solves ISIS and piracy

Wong 11/10 [Joy Wong, journalist “Int'l cooperation needed to enhance security in Gulf and Indo-Pacific: Dr Maliki” Cyber Pioneer, Nov 10, 2014] AT

As the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific saw changes in the global order and the rise of new security challenges, it was imperative that all states, including major powers like the United States, cooperate and work together collectively to promote regional security and stability. Minister of State for Defence Dr Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman made this point when he spoke at the Simultaneous Special Session on the topic "Regional security in the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific", at the inaugural India Global Forum on 9 Nov. Noting that present security challenges were increasingly transnational and complex, Dr Maliki identified two key issues in the region and beyond which required close international cooperation - the threat of terrorism and maritime security challenges such as piracy. "The latest manifestation of violence and extremism is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which has plagued the Middle East. The threat of ISIS is of particular concern," said Dr Maliki. Not only could ISIS potentially sustain their efforts for a prolonged period based on the rich oil resources in the territories they occupy, they are also able to effectively recruit followers from around the world to join their efforts and to extend their linkages to other religious militant groups - through the sophisticated use of social media. Dr Maliki expressed his concern on trained and further radicalised foreign fighters, who might return to their home countries and endanger innocent lives. He said: "Singapore, though some 7,000km away from the Middle East, is also not immune to the ISIS threat. As part of our ongoing efforts to combat terrorism, Singapore will be contributing to the multinational coalition effort against the ISIS. "We will also be working with other countries to combat this threat by sharing information on the ISIS and on returning jihadists, and stemming the flow on terrorist financing. The transnational nature of this threat requires all countries to work together to curb the export of terrorism to our region." Similarly, piracy and maritime terrorism - which typically manifested in lucrative sea routes of which the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific had plenty of - was the other key challenge that required international cooperation to deal with effectively. "Maritime security challenges cannot be solved by any one nation, no matter how well resourced," Dr Maliki said. "Promoting stability in the Persian Gulf, maintaining freedom of the seas, protecting the sea lines of communication, and choke points such as the Strait of Malacca, are important economic and security interests for all nations." One way to strengthen practical cooperation was for militaries to exercise together to build capabilities and enhance inter-operability, said Dr Maliki. He added that exercises such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/Military Medicine Exercise held in Brunei last year and the upcoming ADMM-Plus Counter-Terrorism/Maritime Security Exercise would allow the region to better respond to armed robbery and piracy in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Dr Maliki also noted that Singapore welcomed India's greater participation and leadership role in the region. "As a close friend of India, Singapore looks forward to continue working with India to forge peace and prosperity for Asia and beyond," he said. Themed India 2014: New Opportunities for a New Government and held over two days from 9 Nov, the Forum focused on economic and security issues related to India's rise as a regional power and the policy outlook of the new Indian government. Participants included the Indian political leadership and senior government officials, as well as business leaders and policymakers from over 20 countries in the region and beyond.

#### ISIS causes nuclear terror

Plame 9/26 [(Valerie, former career covert CIA operations officer, Plame worked to protect U.S. national security and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) “Nuclear terrorism: Most immediate and extreme threat to global security” The hill 09/26/14] AT

Achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons is one of the U.N.’s longstanding objectives, one it has failed to prioritize. It’s no surprise that the security discussions this year were overshadowed by the plans of 10 member states to dismantle and defeat the Islamic State group, especially as their assault on radical Sunni resistance and aggression toward U.S. and British journalists continues to grow. Yet this mounting violence and instability pales in comparison to what could be wrought by nuclear-armed terrorists. We know that the Islamic State group has the means and motive to attain weapons of mass destruction. They have an appetite for shocking demonstrations and indiscriminate killing, and have already seized low-grade nuclear material from a facility in Mosul. They are acquiring the ability to build radioactive dirty bombs that could cause major health and economic damage. With reports of escalating funding and recruitment of citizens from every continent, and ties to radicals in nuclear weapons-states such as Pakistan, it is increasingly conceivable that weapons-grade materials – or even a ready-made nuclear device – could fall into their hands. If that happens, they would not hesitate to use them – possibly at a cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. There are more than 16,000 nuclear weapons in the world and enough highly-enriched uranium and plutonium to make hundreds of thousands more. We can do our best to prevent isolated incidents in which terrorists buy, build or steal them – but those efforts are stop-gap at best, and we won’t know if we missed something until it’s too late. Nuclear terrorism is all but inevitable unless we work quickly and urgently to secure all nuclear materials and eradicate all nuclear weapons. To eliminate the risk we have to drain the swamp. This will not be easy. The world faces many dangerous and evolving challenges, and tensions between Russian and the West cannot be ignored. But we must not allow the crisis of the day to overshadow the enormity of the nuclear threat. With plans to defeat the Islamic State group that may take years and the next U.S. presidential election on the horizon, President Obama is running short of time to set us on the path to Global Zero.

#### Gulf of Aden piracy allows terrorists to go nuclear and causes regional war

Sterio 10 [Melena, Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School, magna cum laude, 2002; Maitrise en Droit (French law degree), Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2002; D.E.A. (master’s degree), Private International Law, Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2003; B.A., Rutgers University, French Literature and Political Science, summa cum laude, 1998, THE SOMALI PIRACY PROBLEM: A GLOBAL PUZZLE NECESSITATING A GLOBAL SOLUTION]

According to Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), piracy in the Gulf of Aden is “out of control.”20 In 2008, Somali pirates took nearly 600 crewmembers hostage; several hundred of these crewmembers, as well as a dozen ships, are still being held by the pirates, who may demand millions of dollars in ransom for their release.21 Somali pirates have become more aggressive in their operations, recently beginning to attack larger ships. In 2008, they seized the Faina, which was carrying Russian tanks and ammunition, as well as the supertanker Sirius Star, which was carrying two million barrels of oil.22 Section I.A will discuss how, if left unchecked, Somali piracy, in the long-term, could eventually lead to the decline of commercial activity and commercial centers in East Africa.23 Section I.B will show how Somali piracy imposes significant costs on shipping companies that are already financially stressed, deterring maritime commerce, endangering sea lines of transportation and communication, and undermining regional stability.24 In 2008, the United Nations Security Council, recognizing the seriousness of the threat posed by Somali piracy, passed Resolution 1816, which states that piracy “exacerbate[s] the situation in Somalia[,] which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.”25 Section I.C will discuss how piracy can both contribute to the formation of maritime terrorism and provide funding and other assistance to terrorist causes, aiding groups such as al-Qaida. This section will also demonstrate how allowing pirates to pursue their activities without resistance sends a strong lack-of-deterrence message to other potential sea and land- based terrorists, who may infer that their efforts will remain unchecked for many years as well. A. Piracy and the Failed Somali State: A Threat to Global Peace Somalia is a failed state.26 Since the early 1990s, Somalia has not had a stable government, and its fragile government is currently battling warlords and militant Islamic groups for control of the country.2 The country does not have a functional economy, and its official law enforcement operations are slim, with gangs of paramilitary groups and rebel forces controlling the streets of Mogadishu and other towns.28Piracy has thrived in this cowboy culture of inefficient government, and everyday life is ruled by violence.29 A functional Somali government is so absent that some Somali coastal towns have established pirate-centric societies where piracy not only enjoys local support, but local governments rely on it.30 If nothing is done to thwart the rise of piracy in Somalia, piracy will not only continue to prosper in Somalia, undermining efforts to stabilize the country, but also seriously threaten regional and international peace and stability.31 Piracy can spread elsewhere from Somalia. Other African states, whether Somali neighbors or located farther away, could fall prey to powerful pirate operations, especially if such operations become firmly rooted in Somalia and ruled by powerful warlords enjoying Somali government support. Regional pirate networks could be created, posing a significant threat to global commerce and human safety.32 Moreover, piracy can endanger commercial and tourist routes, undermining the regional economy and exposing neighboring states to all sorts of potential problems.33 Potential problems include economic non-viability, political and civil unrest caused by poverty, and border instability provoked by the need to expend vast resources on the fight against piracy. In addition, Somali piracy can threaten global peace and security if pirates start collaborating with other maritime trafficking groups, such as those who smuggle narcotics or weapons of mass destruction, either for a financial or political cause. Thus, the development of Somali piracy could contribute to the spread of maritime violence, endangering sea routes everywhere and supporting dangerous factions across the globe.34 As discussed below, the Somali pirates could become linked to powerful terrorist organizations and could significantly contribute to the development and growth of such groups. These global implications, highlighted below, show why a present-day global response is needed to curb and eventually eliminate this menace.

#### Terrorism causes extinction – defense mechanisms don’t check and a nuclear response is automated

Barrett et al 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction independent of retaliation

Owen B. Toon 7, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

### 1AC Relations [standard]

#### Rising wages in India means Indian migrant workers are beginning to return to India – UAE wages must keep pace

Lay 11 [(Claire ferris, deputy editor of CEO Middle East) “UAE sees Indian workforce shrink as home salaries rise” 22 November 2011] AT

The Indian Consulate in the UAE saw a fall in new visas for Indian nationals last year for the first time, as rising salaries in the Asian state kept workers at home. The Gulf state is likely to see a steady decline in blue-collar migrants as India’s economic growth offers better opportunities to workers, the Consul General told Arabian Business. “Last year, for the first time ever, the Indian Consulate served less passports than in 2009 so that would be an indication that the number of Indians declined coming to the UAE,” Sanjay Verma said on the sidelines of the 5th Arabian Business Forum. “Passport services saw a two percent drop. “The numbers are declining because of the demand for labour in India. The civil construction sector has a shortage of civil engineers and skilled workers, plumbing and carpentry.” The Asian state has rolled out a National Rural Employment Guarantee Act which offers 100 days of work a year to rural households, giving employment to workers in villages who traditionally have looked abroad for jobs. “The advantage of that is it is offered it to you in your home town or village so that has taken away some workers who otherwise would have come abroad,” Verma said. The Gulf plays host to millions of migrants, primarily from Asia, who account for the majority of blue-collar workers in the construction, domestic work, and service industries. An estimated three million migrate each year, sending back an estimated $175bn in remittances annually, according to Human Rights Watch data. The UAE alone is home to an estimated 1.75 million Indian expatriates, the largest group of foreign workers in the Gulf country. But experts have warned the country may struggle to attract and retain migrants if it fails to keep pace with rising salaries in India. Minimum wages for unskilled foreign workers in the UAE are as low as AED600 a month, with skilled workers receiving AED1,200 a month, according to the Indian Embassy, Abu Dhabi. By comparison, wages in India, the world’s fastest-growing economy after China, surged by 11.1 percent last year, said recruitment firm GulfTalent in February. The Indian Ambassador to the UAE said earlier this year the government planned to enforce a minimum wage for Indian nationals hoping to work in the UAE. If approved, the ruling will mean workers only receive immigration clearance from India if their employment contract meets with a set minimum salary. Verma said the professional sectors were likely to feel the pinch first as India strives to hold on to homegrown talent and keep pace with its fast-growing economy. “It will be more expensive getting Indian workers. It’s already happening in the professional sector, it’s not as easy as it used to be to attract Indian doctors or accountants to come here.” In 2011, the number of new visas issued by the consulate will be flat, he added. “I think it’s going to be closer to 2010, probably the same as 2010 but not a drastic increase.”

#### Expatriate laborers are the *key internal link* to relations and Mideast peacekeeping

GRC 9 [(Gulf Research Center (GRC) is an independent research institute located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

The major countries of Asia are looming as important regional players in the Middle East. A primary reason for the growing Asian footprint is economics, but it is more than simply the need for petroleum and natural gas that draws in the Asian states. They are attracted by opportunities for consumer sales and, in the case of South Asia, the export of millions of laborers to build the emerging city-states of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, the paradox is that despite the threat of new conflicts, billions of dollars have been invested in the region and vast wealth accumulated and spent only a few hundred miles from ongoing military conflict. The financial crisis, which began in earnest in September 2008, has raised the prospects for a prolonged global recession, which will have a negative impact in most economic activities, including the value of energy exports, investments, tourism and consumer sales. Nevertheless, many observers believe that, in the long run, the global economy will recover and the economic trend lines that were in effect before September 2008, which showed growing economic activity between Asia and the Middle East, will be resumed. A number of traumatic events could upset this assumption including a new major Middle East war, severe social and political chaos in the region, Asia or even Europe and the US, or a total re-evaluation of the models of economic growth that are predicated on transparency, open markets and relatively free trade. The depth of Asia’s involvement in the Middle East can be measured in a number of ways, including the projected increase in the amounts of energy flowing east to Asian markets over the coming decades, the value of Asian exports to the Middle East, financial investment by Asian and Middle East countries in each others’ development, including construction and infrastructure, the number of tourists in both directions and the number of Middle Easterners enrolling for higher education in key Asian countries. Perhaps the most visible element of the growing Asian-Middle East partnership concerns expatriate workers in the GCC countries. Over 4 million Indians are to be found at every level of occupation on the Arabian Peninsula. In addition to Indian workers, millions of others come from South Asian countries. Without Asian labor, the oil rich economies of the Gulf would be in deep trouble, and without the all- powerful military presence of the US in the Gulf, they would be easy prey to regional predators, of whom Saddam Hussein was the classic example. It is the emergence of China and India as regional superpowers with an increasingly global outreach that has had the greatest impact on the region. In different ways, India and China will pose challenges and opportunities for the current regional hegemon, the United States. Questions about energy access, the security of the Arab Gulf, military cooperation, arms sales, oil and gas pipelines and energy security all need to be considered. These issues must be analyzed against the historical background of past Indian and Chinese influence in the region. India’s direct involvement in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf, is more extensive than China’s, due to proximity. But for the future, as China expands its geo-economic reach westward into Central Asia and Pakistan with new infrastructure projects, as well as increasing trade relations, it too will become a more important player. India and China have achieved a remarkable diplomatic presence in the Middle East, and unlike the United States or the former colonial powers (Britain, France, and Italy), they have made very few enemies and have managed to build good working relationships with all countries including close ties with Israel. Both countries are engaged in Mid-East peacekeeping operations. China’s participation in Lebanon within the framework of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) began officially on April 9, 2006. India has a much longer record of post World War II Mid-East peacekeeping, beginning with its participation in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) established in 1956 to monitor the Sinai desert. India has peacekeeping forces in UNIFIL, numbering 672 troops and staff officers and provided two of the last four commanding officers, but has not added any forces recently. Although India has historically had a more visible presence in the Gulf than China, it is only recently that is has begun to demonstrate power and influence. India has so far not had a major arms supply relationship with the Middle East countries, except Israel, but has been cooperating on a military-to-military basis with all of the small countries in the Gulf in recent years.

#### Shifting security commitments in the Gulf means India must fill in. Economic relations from migrant laborers provide ground for strengthened relations that solves war

Pradhan 9 [(Samir, economics specialist based in the UAE. Previously, he served as a senior consultant, macroeconomics research at Tanween,a leading consultancy in Doha, Qatar. Before that, he was senior researcher, GCC economics and Gulf-Asia programmes at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai/ UAE, the leading think tank of the Gulf region) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

By all accounts, the world is moving rapidly towards multipolarity. The post- Cold War era geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic imperatives underwent substantial changes in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 forced regime change in Iraq. Simultaneously, the growth of emerging economic powers also considerably influenced the process. What one sees now is a hexagonal power polarity with three nodes; Russia, China, and India on the one side and the United States, Japan and the European Union forming the other three points. Moreover, with increasing global interdependence, it appears that the various nodes are striving for greater accommodation of interests and better management of contradictions, despite having divergent security and strategic cultures. With such changes in the global power architecture, reverberations are strikingly evident in the power configurations at the bilateral as well as regional level. Importantly, nation states are increasingly managing their bilateral relations on the basis of a realpolitik assessment rather than ideology alone. A case in point is the contemporary strategic environment in the Gulf region, which is increasingly becoming unpredictable, having local, regional and global implications. With windfall capital and vibrant economic growth, the region is witnessing unprecedented transformation in the social, political, economic, cultural and strategic realms. Importantly, certain favorable and adverse domestic, regional and international factors pervasively influence their security and strategic perceptions and increase their anxiety about the imminent future. Coincidentally, being a neighbor and an emerging global power, India becomes a reference point for the Gulf countries as a partner in their quest for managing the evolving security equations. The change of perception in the Gulf region is based on a ‘new constellation’ in which India is increasingly viewed as a credible non-partisan global player who can play a constructive role in managing conflicts and restoring peace and tranquility in the region. Thanks to the Gulf ’s eastward shifting economic engagements, burgeoning trade and investment linkages, and the civilizational affinities between India and the Gulf region there is the promise of a new era of deepening ties. The strategic importance of the Gulf region dates to the 19th century when three great empires –British India,Tsarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey – confronted each other for power projection. Since then, the region has a tradition of overwhelming security dependence on external powers. With the discovery of oil, the Gulf region became intrinsically enmeshed with the nuances of great power politics. This process continued until the whole region came under pervasive control of the security cordon provided by the US. Given the small population size of the countries, the regional governments continued to rely upon outside powers to maintain a crude balance of power in order to maintain sovereignty, domestic identity and regime security. This balance of power was maintained with the direct and extensive contributions from the external powers, either through providing military technology and weapons (Russian sales of missile and arms to Iran) or deploying military personnel in the region (US providing armaments and maintaining military bases in some member countries of the GCC). Today the strategic environment in the region is in a state of flux. This is due to the crystallization of several conflicting factors. Iran’s increasing military posture and Israel’s policy in the East Mediterranean region constitute the twin strategic faultlines surrounding the Gulf region. The turmoil in Iraq, which used to be the countervailing power to Iran, further adds to the security risks for the Gulf regimes. Above all, the perception of an Israel-centric foreign policy by the United States only increases tensions in the region. It is noteworthy to point out the central role played by the United States as the security lynchpin of the Gulf region (Koch 2008). The role and extent of US involvement in the Gulf region has expanded tremendously since it filled the power vacuum following the British withdrawal from the region in 1968.The overarching presence of the US has considerably changed the region’s strategic dynamics. From the initial ‘dual containment policy’ of orchestrating regional countervailing powers against each other, the US has become in a sense the sole superpower in the region as reflected in the forced regime change in Iraq in 2003. At present, nearly 200,000 American troops are stationed in the Gulf region, the majority of course in Iraq but with significant numbers in the GCC, thereby firmly entrenching the US in the Gulf security scenario. Further, given the Gulf region’s real security concerns, the regimes cannot afford to suddenly change the status quo and seek an alternate security arrangement. But while the US is an indispensable security ally and would continue to play a formidable role in the Gulf region’s emerging strategic paradigm, it is increasingly apparent that such an exclusive role in its present scope is neither sustainable nor unanimously acceptable to the Gulf regimes. In a sense, the unilateral strategic dominance of the US in the Gulf region is coming to an end, albeit slowly. Thus, a clear strategic shift is in motion which is primarily due to the increasing internationalization of the Gulf with other powers from Europe and Asia on the fringe, but also due to a reorientation and self introspection by the Gulf countries about their place in the international system and the role played by the US within that system. Given the multidimensional security environment in the Gulf region – from the threat posed by Islamic radicalism and Iranian nuclear ambitions, to concerns about the stalemate in Iraq, tensions surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, securing supply lines of oil exports and the role of Gulf finance in world economics – the regimes no longer feel safe in the comfort zone of the American security umbrella. The ambiguity about the US role, either as a source of regional stability or greater instability, entices the Gulf regimes to rethink their national interests amidst volatile regional events. The region is in the throes of a transition which evolves from patterns of interaction that are characterized by power politics and geopolitical concerns to new ones that are marked by the politics of geoeconomics. Adding to the complexity is the sheer pace of post modernism and its structural spill over as reflected in domestic discontentment and the region’s search of an identity in the increasingly interdependent globalized world in which the parochial projection of the Gulf (especially in the Western world) is not only hampering their commercial pursuits, but also questioning the region’s integrity. As a result, there is a growing sense of confidence in the region that has led the GCC states to play an increasing regional political and diplomatic role. Especially in the security domain, the Gulf countries are increasingly re-shifting their strategies from bilateral dependence to multilateral interdependence, sensing that bilateralism will no longer meet the requirements of a multi-polar world in geo-economic terms. Furthermore, the GCC leaderships are anticipating the shifting circumstances surrounding the declining role of the US. Bahrain’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Abdul Ghaffar, has, for example, called for a new security order in the Gulf with the GCC states as the main pillar of defense while Qatar’s Amir Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani told the General Debate of the United National General Assembly in September 2007 that: “The major conflicts in the world have become too big for one single power to handle them on its own” (Koch 2008). Nevertheless, it is certain that complete removal of external powers from the region is not at all a possibility in the absence of a regional architecture and the existence of glaring distrust among the states in the region (consider, for example, the continuing problem of border disputes). Besides, given the global strategic importance of the region, outside powers would not simply keep themselves away from developments in the region as formidable stakes are involved. Thus, in the current circumstances, a viable security framework is simply unthinkable at this stage and it is certain that neither a regional solution nor an outside power can counter the wide variety of threats to the region. Thus, the key before the Gulf countries is to multilateralize the regional security space with the involvement of other powers, especially an emerging global power like India with whom the future stakes of the region are formidable. Therefore, India can become a natural security ally for the Gulf. Transforming Strategic Overlap into Partnership The strategic horizon comprising the Gulf region and India shows the growing interconnectedness in the security space extending from Afghanistan to the Middle East. India’s location at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean gives it a strategic location in Eurasia as well as among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean from East Africa to Indonesia. India's peninsular projection in the ocean gives it a stake in the security and stability of these waters which is crucial for oil trade – the lifeblood of Gulf economies. While the overall strategic environment involving India and the Gulf region is in a state of flux evincing uncertainties and dilemmas, there is no doubt that the stakes are formidable. It may be noted that the connection between security and stability in the two regions was first propounded in 1981 by the former Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and former UAE President Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan. From a strategic point of view, the Gulf countries and India share a desire for political stability and security in the region. The emerging common security perceptions create further opportunities for Gulf-India cooperation in the future. In the recent past, several Gulf countries, especially Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE have concluded a number of bilateral strategic pacts with India. The UAE and India entered into a strategic pact, signed on July 1, 2003 when a high-level delegation led by the then Chief of Staff and now Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Shaikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, visited India. That agreement envisages cooperation in security, defense policy, development of defense cooperation, training for the UAE military and military medical personnel, exchange of cultural and sports activities between the friendly forces of the two countries and joint efforts to tackle environmental issues, particularly pollution in the seas. Saudi Arabia and India have entered into a similar pact. Such pacts confirm the increasing recognition of India as an emerging power by the Gulf countries and simultaneously the common strategic outlook of both. As aptly stated by the UAE Foreign Minister, Shaikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, at the opening of the ministerial session of the Indo-UAE Joint Commission, “At a regional level, we also look forward to an increased involvement by India in issues affecting the Gulf and neighboring countries” and that “it is in both of our interests to work together more and more closely.” The process of mutual recognition got a major boost with the landmark visit of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to India and consequent ratification of the New Delhi Declaration. This inclination of a major Gulf power like Saudi Arabia to deepen and broaden ties with India points to the changing geopolitical dynamics in both regions. Moreover, Gulf countries are increasingly cooperating with India for military training. Since India’s dependence on Gulf energy and the Gulf ’s dependence on India and Asia as a future major market for oil exports will remain significant, the security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) has become a critical component within the ambit of strategic matters. It is not just oil, but the increasing movement of merchandise imports and exports on the sea route spanning the vast arc of Indian Ocean has also become a critical security concern for India and the Gulf countries. The sheer number of Indian expatriates in the Gulf region’s workforce makes a strong case for deepening ties with India to manage domestic security. Countries like Saudi Arabia have the potential to support India in her efforts for the educational and social transformation of India’s vast Muslim population that constantly look towards the Gulf region for moral and religious guidance. India as a ‘Bridging Power’ India’s credibility and role as a “neutral” player in Asia may serve Gulf interests in managing their emerging security and strategic objectives. Two crucial factors that can possibly give the Gulf countries policy flexibility are India’s growing ties with the US and stable ties with Iran and Israel. India’s strategic objectives attest to the fact that the Gulf, South Asia and Central Asia are now strategically interactive and interrelated regions. The objectives of India's quest for greater influence throughout the Gulf are to prevent proliferation as well as terrorism. As a bridging power, India could possibly leverage its links with both US and Iran to the benefit of the Gulf countries. Unlike the US and other European powers that tie security cooperation with sensitive issues such as human rights, democracy and regime change, Gulf countries view India as a non-interfering partner to align with. India maintains a substantial economic presence in the Gulf and is set to create a significant political presence as well. Despite civilizational propinquities, historical commercial linkages, and geographical proximity, the Gulf and India have failed to capitalize on commonalities, which has prevented their association from truly becoming the “unbroken relation of cordiality.” Nevertheless, the growing economic presence of India in the Gulf and the Gulf ’s new geo-economic realities provide the platform to synergize complementarities into multipronged stable relations. The trend of mutual ignorance of the two regions is slowly reversing due to the growing economic importance of India in the world and the Gulf's increased interest in building its relations with its immediate neighbor, against the backdrop of faltering bonhomie with the West. The relationship between the two regions has been in focus in the evolving interdependence centering on energy-economy dynamics and changed geopolitical environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The ‘Look East’ strategy of the Gulf provides an impetus for closer relations. It is therefore necessary that since a sustainable relationship entails multifaceted cooperation, India and the GCC countries should broaden relations on the strategic and political levels. It is in the interests of both the GCC and India to recognize the other’s potential as a serious trading partner, and further strengthen their external relations. Both parties could nurture their relations in a constructive way by finding the right balance between regionalism and multilateralism to excel in today’s fast paced economic arena. To sum up, geopolitical and geoeconomic complementarities drive security and strategic aspects of the Gulf region’s Look East Policy towards India. While India's ambitions, capabilities, experience and interests all suggest that it is capable of playing a major role in the Gulf, the Gulf countries see India as a bridging power to shift their status quo security and strategic imperatives to better align with the changed dynamics. The stakes are formidable, challenges are mutual, potentials are huge and, hence, cooperation becomes imperative. This calls for greater political will.

#### **Shifting security commitments guarantee aggression**

Thompson 12 [(Loren, Former Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University) “What Happens When America No Longer Needs Middle East Oil?”, Forbes, 12/03/12] DD

The biggest losers would be the Arab oil states grouped in the Gulf Cooperation Council, most of which are monarchies kept in power by a combination oil dollars and American military power.  Despite their oil revenues, none of these countries except Saudi Arabia has the wherewithal to defend itself against military pressure from Iran if America leaves the stage – or for that matter from Iraq, which has repeatedly laid claim to oil fields in Kuwait and other nearby states.  The vacuum created by an American departure would force nations like Bahrain and Qatar to seek new military protectors, either by submitting to the influence of bigger regional powers or by reaching out to China. The second category of losers would be the economies of East Asia, which the International Energy Agency says will be the main consumers of Persian Gulf oil in the years ahead.  China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are heavily dependent on the flow of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and yet do little to assure that flow is not disrupted by local tensions.  If America pulls out of the Gulf, the nations of East Asia will either have to play a bigger military role in the Middle East, or find other sources of oil.  America might have sufficient new-found reserves of fossil fuel to supply Japan and South Korea in an emergency, but concern about access to Persian Gulf oil would undoubtedly exacerbate tensions over who owns contested oil reserves in the South China Sea and elsewhere. Israel too would likely be a big loser.  Washington spends billions of dollars each year subsidizing the security of the Jewish state.  The reason that isn’t controversial even though Americans usually want to cut foreign aid ahead of every other type of federal spending is because it is hard to separate securing Israel from securing Middle East oil.  The same U.S. military forces and programs that help protect Israel from Iranian missiles and Islamist terror groups also protect Arab oil-producing states.  But if America’s role in securing the oil were to wane, it would be harder to ignore the cost of defending Israel, and that might force Jerusalem to become more self-sufficient. There would be plenty of other losers too, from the nations that depend on a steady flow of Middle East oil to stabilize global energy prices to the shippers that count on the Fifth Fleet for protection to the local companies that help sustain U.S. forces in the region.  No doubt about it, a lot of players dependent on America’s military presence in and around the Persian Gulf would be hurt if America went home.  But there would be winners, too. One big winner would be Iran, because it would no longer find its regional pretensions blocked by America’s military.  Although there are ethnic and religious differences separating Persians from their Arab neighbors on the western side of the Gulf, Iran’s big population and economic resources over time could come to dominate the region.  Homegrown terrorist groups might also thrive in America’s absence, although Arab governments could feel freer to deal with them in the absence of American concepts about freedom and justice.  The biggest winner of all, though, might be China’s Peoples Liberation Army, which would have a compelling reason for extending its presence outside of East Asia in order to secure the Middle Kingdom’s most important foreign sources of petroleum.

#### Relations are at a critical juncture – economic relations based on labor are key to relations between the UAE and India specifically

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

In the last couple of years India has been trying to regain international clout in West Asia and this has resulted in an increasing number of visits of the Foreign Minister to Egypt, Jordan, UAE (United Arab Emirates), Israel and also Palestine.i Likewise, the Indian Defence Minister also undertook visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar.ii This clearly shows that India’s strategic orientation is being redefined in the Gulf region. While India has engaged a number of countries in the region, it has nurtured special relations with the UAE because it has been the largest trading partner as well as a strategically important country. Indian expatriate workers also list the UAE as a relatively labour friendly country in terms of wages, facilities, freedom and the annual leave. UAE had assumed the chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) immediately after India and, therefore, greater understanding was developed on the maritime issues also. With shrinking markets in Europe and the US, UAE is increasingly looking towards India for exports and investment. In less than six months, India and the UAE have exchanged four high level bilateral visits and almost all visits underpinned the significance of economic and strategic engagements between the two countries. A host of factors such as deep historical links, culture, economy, polity, security and changing geo- strategic and maritime environment helped bring the two nations closer. On his visit to India on 15-16 May this year, the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abduallah Zayed bin Al Nayahan, described India as an ‘ally and cherished neighbour’ and said that UAE would like to have a ‘strong presence’ in the Indian market in the future. Besides this, he also acknowledged the need for working together with India on some of the pressing regional issues such as stabilising Afghanistan, combating maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden as well as stabilising Somaliaiv and religious and sectarian faultlines emerging in the West Asian countries.

#### UAE-India relations solve piracy-terror networks between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

Although both countries have signed defence cooperation agreements in 2006, it needs fine-tuning, particularly on two policy-dimensions: one, a real time assistance and cooperation by sharing information and providing necessary support to the Indian Navy to check the growing and expanding menace of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which is equally fatal to the oil- exporting Gulf rentier economies.xxvi Besides, the presence of the Indian Navy can also effectively handle the growing nexus between pirates and the terror outfits, particularly between the Somali-based al Shabab and the al Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) of Yemen. UAE could consider giving the Indian Navy logistic supports such as refuelling, deployment, providing bases during emergency as well as enabling Indian Navy to evacuate its large diaspora community during crisis period.xxvii India can assist and train the UAE crew in counter-terrorism, disaster relief management, rescue and search operations, etc.

#### Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda network causes an attack on the US

Zarif 11—(Maseh Zarif, deputy director and Iran research Team Lead for the American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project July, 2, 2011, Terror Partnership: AQAP and Shabaab http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/maseh-zarif-terror-partnership-shabaab-aqap-july-2-2011)

The terrorist threat to America from the Gulf of Aden is metastasizing as the most dangerous al Qaeda affiliate, Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), appears to be partnering with Somalia-based militant Islamist group al Shabaab in attacking the West. On June 23, an American drone strike targeted two senior al Shabaab leaders in Qandal, outside the al Shabaab-controlled southern port city of Kismayo.[1] Somalia’s defense minister said on July 1 that U.S. military forces retrieved the two men; it is unclear whether they were killed in the strike.[2] The identities of the militants have not been released, but a senior American military official said that they had “direct ties” to Anwar al Awlaki, the Yemeni-American radical cleric who has been operational within AQAP.[3] The official added, “They were planning operations outside of Somalia.”[4] The reported links between Awlaki—whose primary focus has been on attacking the American homeland—and the al Shabaab leaders targeted in the strike suggest that AQAP and al Shabaab have established operational ties. Such an alliance would enable the two groups to leverage their joint resources, including AQAP’s bomb-making expertise and al Shabaab’s recruitment and hosting of militants from the West, to conduct spectacular attacks in the West. Both AQAP and al Shabaab have demonstrated the ability to plan and launch terrorist attacks outside their safe havens. AQAP has launched two significant operations against the United States—the 2009 Christmas Day attack and the October 2010 parcel plot. AQAP continues to target America and has benefited from Yemen’s recent unrest and state fragmentation.[5] Al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab is waging an insurgency in Somalia against the United Nations-backed Transitional Federal Government and African Union troops in a bid to expand its operating space. It currently controls large regions in the country and operates in the capital, Mogadishu. The organization has demonstrated the desire and the ability to export terror beyond Somalia’s borders. It has in the past threatened the United States and embraced al Qaeda’s global ideology.[6] The group executed its first attack outside of Somalia in July 2010 when it bombed a restaurant and rugby club in Kampala, Uganda, killing 76 people.[7] Al Shabaab may also have been involved in the June 2011 suicide bombing in Abuja, Nigeria.[8] It continues to explore targets outside Somalia.[9]

#### Nuclear war

Barrett et al 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

### 1AC Remittances

#### Plan boosts remittance income to India

Nair 14 [(RUPAM JAIN NAIR, journalist) “India urges higher pay for millions of Gulf workers” NEW DELHI/DUBAI/RIYADH, Reuters Nov 17, 2014] AT

(Reuters) - India is pressing rich countries in the Gulf to raise the wages of millions of Indians working there, in a drive that could secure it billions of dollars in fresh income but risks pricing some of its citizens out of the market. Over 5 million Indian nationals are believed to be employed in the oil exporting states of the Gulf, the single largest group in a migrant worker population of more than 20 million. Migrants do many of the dirty and dangerous jobs in the region, from construction to the oil industry, transport and services. They account for nearly half of the roughly 50 million population of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council. So India's campaign for much higher pay could have an impact on economies around the region, especially if it leads to a general increase in wages for workers from other big labour-supplying countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. Over the past seven months, Indian diplomats in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have sharply increased the minimum salaries that they recommend for Indian workers at private and public firms in those states. "We want the Indian workforce to be paid higher salaries. Inflation, the value of the Indian currency and a rise in the cost of living in the Gulf were the factors that led to the decision," Y.S. Kataria, a spokesman for the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in New Delhi, told Reuters. The success of India's strategy is not yet clear, however. Officials in at least some GCC nations have expressed displeasure, and the strategy could backfire if those countries end up hiring more workers from elsewhere in the world. "Of course it will encourage companies to look at Bangladesh and Pakistan as more viable options to get migrant workers,” said Mohammed Jindran, managing director of UAE-based recruitment agency Overseas Labour Supply. PRESSURE The Indian government cannot dictate the pay of its citizens in the Gulf - decisions to hire workers are made by labour recruiters in individual countries, which have not set minimum wages for migrants and usually prohibit union activity by them. However, the recruiters must rely on the co-operation of local authorities to operate in India. An internal memorandum prepared by the MOIA, sent last month and seen by Reuters, says that if workers are offered wages below specified minimums, ministry officials "would deny emigration clearance". In Saudi Arabia, the Indian embassy lifted the recommended minimum salary posted on its website to 1,200 riyals ($320) a month earlier this year from 670 riyals. In the UAE, the minimum wage for Indian blue-collar workers rose to 1,500 dirhams ($409) in recent weeks from 1,200 dirhams last year, Jindran said. Even when Gulf recruiters agree to certain wage levels, the numbers do not necessarily stick. Some workers are promised one salary when they sign up in their home country, then forced to renegotiate lower wages when they arrive in the Gulf. India's role as a top labour supplier means its drive cannot be totally ignored by recruiters, and it could have a big impact in some countries and industries. But there may be a backlash. Another MOIA official said India's pay demands had met initial resistance in all six GCC countries, while two of the countries had threatened to reduce their Indian workforces and hire more, lower-paid workers from Bangladesh and Nepal instead. Ahmed Al-Fahaid, Saudi deputy labour minister for international affairs, told Sky News Arabia last month: "If this is a decision that is applied throughout India as a whole, meaning no one gets out of India for work unless with that limit, then this is a sovereign decision for the country and we will not interfere," Fahaid said. "But if it is a special decision to raise wages for whoever comes to work in the kingdom, then we oppose it and do not accept it, as it would be an act of discrimination and we don’t accept that in international agreements.” He did not elaborate. IMPACT If India's efforts to secure higher pay succeed, they could boost its economy, because migrants send much of their pay home. India received $69 billion as remittances in 2012; a 2010 central bank study found Gulf nations accounted for 31 percent.

#### Remittances are stable now but set to slow down – increases poverty

Chand 14 [(Indira Chand, Communications Officer with the Development Prospects Group at The World Bank in Washington D.C.) “Remittances to developing countries to stay robust this year, despite increased deportations of migrant workers, says WB” The World Bank, press release April 11, 2014] AT

Remittances remain a key source of external resource flows for developing countries, far exceeding official development assistance and more stable than private debt and portfolio equity flows. For many developing countries, remittances are an important source of foreign exchange, surpassing earnings from major exports, and covering a substantial portion of imports. For example, in Nepal, remittances are nearly double the country’s revenues from exports of goods and services, while in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, they are over 50 per cent and 38 percent, respectively. In India, remittances during 2013 were $70 billion, more than the $65 billion earned from the country’s flagship software services exports. In Uganda, remittances are double the country’s income from its main export of coffee. "Remittances have become a major component of the balance of payments of nations. India led the chart of remittance flows, receiving $70 billion last year, followed by China with $60 billion and the Philippines with $25 billion. There is no doubt that these flows act as an antidote to poverty and promote prosperity. Remittances and migration data are also barometers of global peace and turmoil and this is what makes World Bank’s KNOMAD initiative to organize, analyze, and make available these data so important," said Kaushik Basu, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank. The brief notes that while the medium term outlook for remittances is strong, downside risks loom mainly from migrants’ return to their home countries as a result of conflict or deportation from host countries. Last year saw an intensification of deportations, with more than 370,000 migrants sent back to their home countries from Saudi Arabia alone in the five months since November 2013. Many of these migrants were from Ethiopia, Egypt and Yemen. In the US, over 368,000 people (mostly migrants seeking entry into the US and apprehended at the border) were deported to their home countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), particularly Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. In addition, asylum-seekers have surged, as a result of strife and conflict. According to a recent report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), asylum claims in 44 industrialized countries reached 612,700 in 2013, a 28 percent increase over 2012, and the second highest level in the past 20 years. In Europe, the number of asylum applications rose by 32 percent to 484,560 in 2013, with Germany the largest recipient of asylum requests (109,600). The vast majority of asylum applicants are from Syria, Russia, Serbia and Kosovo. This trend is accompanied by a rise in anti-immigration sentiment, which appears to be gaining momentum in several European countries, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In Switzerland, a referendum held in February 2014 on imposing immigration quotas passed, albeit with a slim majority. During 2013, remittance flows were generally robust in all regions except LAC, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where the two largest remittance-recipient countries, Mexico and Egypt, saw declines in remittance inflows, due in part to removals and deportations from the US and Saudi Arabia, respectively. However, both countries retained their rankings in the top 10 remittance-receiving countries globally. India remained in the top spot, with $70 billion in remittances in 2013. Other large recipients were China ($60 billion), the Philippines ($25 billion), Mexico ($22 billion), Nigeria ($21 billion), Egypt ($17 billion), Pakistan ($15 billion), Bangladesh ($14 billion), Vietnam ($11 billion) and Ukraine ($10 billion). In terms of remittances as a share of GDP, the top recipients were Tajikistan (52 percent), Kyrgyz Republic (31 percent), Nepal and Moldova (both 25 percent), Samoa and Lesotho (both 23 percent), Armenia and Haiti (both 21 percent), Liberia (20 percent) and Kosovo (17 percent). “In addition to the large annual flows of remittances, migrants living in high income countries are estimated to hold savings in excess of $500 billion annually. These savings represent a huge pool of funds that developing countries can do much more to tap into,” said Dilip Ratha, Manager of the Migration and Remittances Team at the Bank’s Development Prospects Group. Nigeria is readying a diaspora bond issue to mobilize diaspora savings and boost financing for development. Continued efforts are required to lower the cost of sending money through official channels, although inroads are being made. During the first quarter, the global average cost for sending money fell to 8.4 percent of the transaction value, compared with 9.1 percent a year earlier. However, the average cost of remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa has remained stubbornly high at around 12 percent. Also, South-South remittances, which are on the rise, are in many cases either not permitted or very costly due to outward exchange controls in many developing countries, such as Gambia, Ghana and Venezuela. The closure of bank accounts of money transfer operators serving Somalia and other fragile countries is also worrying, notes the brief. Remittances provide a lifeline to ‘fragile and conflict-affected situations’ where they are more than 5 times larger than foreign aid, foreign direct investment and other sources of international finance. More needs to be done to ensure that anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations do not unduly undermine development objectives and harm the poor. “As development experts debate the post-2015 agenda, they also need to turn their attention to reducing the high cost of migration, particularly exorbitant fees paid by low-skilled workers to recruitment agents to secure jobs overseas,” said Ratha. Recognizing the close links between migration and development, the World Bank Group is deepening its engagement on the issue. Central to its involvement is its leading role in establishing and advancing the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) program, which is envisaged as a hub of knowledge and policy expertise on migration. KNOMAD’s work program is undertaken through 12 thematic working groups: data; skilled labor; low-skilled labor; integration issues in host communities; policy and institutional coherence; security; migrant rights and social aspects of migration; demography; remittances; diaspora resources; environmental change; and internal migration. It also covers four cross cutting themes: gender, monitoring and evaluation, capacity building, and public perceptions. Regional Trends Remittances to the East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) region are estimated to have risen by 4.8 percent in 2013 to reach $112 billion, with Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines seeing robust growth. Substantial movement of people continues within the region, driven in large part by persistent disparities in opportunities and incomes. While low-skilled workers account for the majority of migration, the need for high-skilled workers is growing in the region. With free mobility of high skilled workers within ASEAN countries expected to be introduced in 2015, remittance flows are forecast to exceed $148 billion by 2016. In Europe and Central Asia (ECA), remittances rebounded from the slowdown in 2012, expanding by 10 percent in 2013 to reach $43 billion. Firm oil prices through 2013 helped fuel Russia’s economy, which is the largest source of remittances sent to the other countries in the region. The crisis in Ukraine has precipitated a substantial depreciation of the ruble so far in 2014, and brings substantial uncertainty to projections through 2016. Remittance flows to countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region grew slightly by 1.9 percent in 2013 to reach $61 billion. Following a 13-month decline, remittance flows to the region began recovering in the second half of 2013. However, remittances to Mexico, the largest remittance-recipient country in the region, contracted in 2013. The positive impetus from the US economic recovery was partly offset by removals of migrants from the US. The economic slowdown and unemployment in Spain and Italy, which are also large destinations of Latin American migrants, contributed to the slowdown in remittances to the region. In the medium term, improving employment conditions in the US point to stronger growth in remittances, which are expected to reach $81 billion by 2016. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, remittances are estimated to have fallen by 2 percent in 2013, as a drop in remittances to Egypt more than offset modest growth in the rest of the region. Despite oil prices remaining firm and underpinning the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, departures and deportations from Saudi Arabia and other disruptions are hurting remittance flows. About 300,000 migrants returned to Egypt from Saudi Arabia in the second half of 2013, precipitated by a sharpened labor inspection campaign and set amnesty period. In addition, since November 2013, the Government of Saudi Arabia has deported over 370,000 migrants, mainly nationals of Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Egypt and Yemen. The refugee crisis in Syria continues in staggering proportions. More than 2.5 million Syrians (11 percent of the population) are now living in neighboring countries, with over 1 million in Lebanon alone. Remittance flows to the region are expected to increase modestly to $55 billion in 2016. Growth in remittances to the South Asia region has slowed, rising by a modest 2.3 percent to $111 billion in 2013, compared with an average annual increase of more than 13 percent during the previous three years. The slowdown was driven by a marginal increase in India of 1.7 percent in 2013, and a decline in Bangladesh of 2.4 percent. The depreciation of the Indian rupee during 2013 appears to have attracted inflows through a surge in the deposits of non-resident Indians rather than remittances. In Bangladesh, the fall in remittances stems from a combination of factors, including fewer migrants finding jobs in the GCC countries, more migrants returning from GCC countries due to departures and deportations, and the appreciation of the Bangladeshi taka against the US dollar. Still, some rebound is projected in the coming years, with remittances across the region forecast to grow to $136 billion in 2016.

#### Indian poverty results in radicalization and Pakistan conflict

Misra 8 [(Pankaj, author of Temptations of the West: How to Be Modern in India, Pakistan and Beyond) “Violence runs through this 'stable' India, built on poverty and injustice” The Guardian 2008 19.01] AT

In the past five years bomb attacks claimed by Islamist groups have killed hundreds across the Indian cities of Mumbai, Delhi, Jaipur, Varanasi, Bangalore, Hyderabad and Ahmedabad. An Indian Muslim was even involved in the failed assault on Glasgow airport in July last year. Yet George Bush reportedly introduced Manmohan Singh to his wife, Laura, as "the prime minister of India, a democracy which does not have a single al-Qaida member in a population of 150 million Muslims". To be fair to Bush, he was only repeating a cliche deployed by Indian politicians and American pundits such as Thomas Friedman to promote India as a squeaky-clean ally of the United States. However, Fareed Zakaria, the Indian-born Muslim editor of Newsweek International, ought to know better. In his new book, The Post-American World, he describes India as a "powerful package" and claims it has been "peaceful, stable, and prosperous" since 1997 - a decade in which India and Pakistan came close to nuclear war, tens of thousands of Indian farmers took their own lives, Maoist insurgencies erupted across large parts of the country, and Hindu nationalists in Gujarat murdered more than 2,000 Muslims. Apparently, no inconvenient truths are allowed to mar what Foreign Affairs, the foreign policy journal of America's elite, has declared a "roaring capitalist success story". Add Bollywood's singing and dancing stars, beauty queens and Booker prize-winning writers to the Tatas, the Mittals and the IT tycoons, and the picture of Indian confidence, vigour and felicity is complete. The passive consumer of this image, already puzzled by recurring reports of explosions in Indian cities, may be startled to learn from the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC) in Washington that the death toll from terrorist attacks in India between January 2004 and March 2007 was 3,674, second only to that in Iraq. (In the same period, 1,000 died as a result of such attacks in Pakistan, the "most dangerous place on earth" according to the Economist, Newsweek and other vendors of geopolitical insight.) To put it in plain language - which the NCTC is unlikely to use - India is host to some of the fiercest conflicts in the world. Since 1989 more than 80,000 have died in insurgencies in Kashmir and the northeastern states. Manmohan Singh himself has called the Maoist insurgency centred on the state of Chhattisgarh the biggest internal security threat to India since independence. The Maoists, however, are confined to rural areas; their bold tactics haven't rattled Indian middle-class confidence in recent years as much as the bomb attacks in major cities have. Politicians and the media routinely blame Pakistan for terrorist violence in India. It is likely that the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency, was involved in the bombings two weeks ago in Ahmedabad and Bangalore, which killed 46 people. But their scale and audacity also hints that the perpetrators have support networks within India. The Indian elite's obsession with the "foreign hand" obscures the fact that the roots of some of the violence lie in the previous two decades of traumatic political and economic change, particularly the rise of Hindu nationalism, and the related growth of ruthlessness towards those left behind by India's expanding economy. In 2006 a commission appointed by the government revealed that Muslims in India are worse educated and less likely to find employment than low-caste Hindus. Muslim isolation and despair is compounded by what B Raman, a hawkish security analyst, was moved after the most recent attacks to describe as the "inherent unfairness of the Indian criminal justice system". To take one example, the names of the politicians, businessmen, officials and policemen who colluded in the anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat in 2002 are widely known. Some of them were caught on video, in a sting carried out last year by the weekly magazine Tehelka, proudly recalling how they murdered and raped Muslims. But, as Amnesty International pointed out in a recent report, justice continues to evade most victims and survivors of the violence. Tens of thousands still languish in refugee camps, too afraid to return to their homes. In an article I wrote for the New York Times in 2003 I underlined the likely perils if the depressed and alienated minority of Muslims were to abandon their much-tested faith in the Indian political and legal system. Predictably Hindu nationalists, most of them resident in the UK and US, inundated my email inbox, accusing me of showing India in a bad light. It is now clear that a tiny but militantly disaffected minority of Indian Muslims has begun to heed the international pied pipers of jihad. Furthermore, there is no effective defence against their malevolence. Conventional counter-terrorism strategies - increased police presence or greater surveillance - don't work in India's large, densely populated cities. Nor do draconian laws such as the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act, which allowed police to hold suspects without charge for six months and was repealed in 2004. Gung-ho members of the middle class clamour for Israeli-style retaliation against jihadi training camps in Pakistan. But India can "do a Lebanon" only by risking nuclear war with its neighbour; and Indian intelligence agencies are too inept to imitate Mossad's policy of targeted killings, which have reaped for Israel an endless supply of dedicated and resourceful enemies. As we now know, the promoters of pre-emptive strikes and rendition have proved to be the most effective recruiting agents for jihad. In that sense the Indian government's inability to raise the ante, to pursue an endless war on terror or to order 150 million of its poorest citizens to reform their religion is a good thing. For it helps to maintain a necessary focus on terrorism as another symptom of a wider crisis that will be alleviated not so much by better policing, intelligence gathering or consultation with mullahs as by confronting socioeconomic frustrations and political grievances. The absence of "tough" retaliation also leaves the jihadi terrorists incapable of dealing more than a few glancing blows to the Indian state. Certainly, a hysterical response of the kind that followed the 7/7 attacks in London - a crackdown on civil liberties and demonisation of Islam - would in India only have accelerated the radicalisation of the Muslim minority. It is true that nihilist terrorism has no greater adversary than people who refuse to be terrorised or provoked. There have been remarkably few instances of retaliation against Muslims in the wake of terror attacks. In Mumbai, where nearly 200 people were killed by bomb explosions on commuter trains in 2006, normal life resumed even more quickly than in London in July 2005. But the resilience of India's poor, who have no option but to get on with their lives, should not be taken for granted, or used to peddle India as a stable, business-friendly country. For their stoicism in the face of terror also expresses the bitter wisdom of the weak: that violence is far from being an aberration in the inequitable world our political and business elites have made.

#### And, sustained flow of remittances sustains India’s economy in the face of crisis

Debabrata 3 [(Michael, Senior Adviser to Executive Director for Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Sri Lanka at the IMF) “India’s Worker Remittances: A Users’ Lament About Balance of Payments Compilation” IMF, 2003] AT

In the aftermath of the severe financial crises of the 1990s and the marked volatility of cross-border financial flows, workers’ remittances have gained prominence in professional and academic interest as a source of external funding for developing countries. In recent years, these remittances have emerged as the second largest source of foreign inflows after foreign direct investment (FDI). In sharp contrast to private capital flows, workers’ remittances are credited with stability associated with a home bias as they are perceived to be less prone to sudden reversals and euphoric surges (World Bank, 2003). They exhibit low sensitivity to credit ratings. Furthermore, despite being influenced by phases of the business cycle in host countries, workers’ remittances often tend to be counter cyclical in economic downturns in recipient countries. In the case of India’s BoP crisis after the Gulf war of 1990, large remittances prevented a collapse in current receipts under a combination of adverse shocks.

#### Indian economic decline leads to global conflict and nuclear war between India and Pakistan

Bouton 10 (Marshall M. Bouton, President – Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “America’s Interests in India”, CNAS Working Paper, October)

In South Asia, the most immediately compelling U.S. interest is preventing terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland originating in or facilitated by actors in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To avert that possibility, the United States also has an interest in the stability and development of both countries. At the same time, the United States has a vital interest in preventing conflict between Pakistan and India, immediately because such a conflict would do great damage to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan (such as the diversion of Pakistani military attention away from the insurgency) and because it would pose the severe risk of nuclear escalation. Finally, the United States has an interest in peace and stability in South Asia as a whole. Instability and violence in nearly every one of India’s neighbors, not to mention in India itself, could, if unchecked, undermine economic and political progress, potentially destabilizing the entire region. At present, a South Asia dominated by a politically stable and economically dynamic India is a hugely important counterweight to the prevalent instability and conflict all around India’s periphery. Imagining the counterfactual scenario, a South Asian region, including India, that is failing economically and stumbling politically, is to imagine instability on a scale that would have global consequences, including damage to the global economy, huge dislocations of people and humanitarian crisis, increasing extremism and terrorism, and much greater potential for unchecked interstate and civil conflict.

#### Indo-Pak nuclear war is the most likely impact and causes extinction

Shifferd 1/3 [(Kent, Ph.D. in history from Northern Illinois University and prof at Northland College, directed the Peace Studies program, founder and exec director of the Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies) “OP-ED: What's Worse Than a Nuclear War?” Huntington News 2014] AT

What could be worse than a nuclear war? A nuclear famine following a nuclear war. And where is the most likely nuclear war to break out? The India-Pakistan border. Both countries are nuclear armed, and although their arsenals are “small” compared to the U.S. and Russia, they are extremely deadly. Pakistan has about 100 nuclear weapons; India about 130. They have fought three wars since 1947 and are contending bitterly for control over the Kashmir and for influence in Afghanistan. While India has renounced first use, for whatever that is worth, Pakistan has not, declaring that in the event of an impending defeat by India’s overwhelming conventional forces it would strike first with nuclear weapons. Saber rattling is common. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that a fourth war could take place if the Kashmir issue wasn’t resolved, and the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh replied that Pakistan “will never win a war in my lifetime.” A nuclear China already hostile to India could also quickly become involved in a conflict between the two enemies, and Pakistan is on the brink of becoming a failed state a development unknown and thus highly risky for a nuclear weapons nation-state. Experts predict a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would kill about 22 million people from blast, acute radiation, and firestorms. However, the global famine caused by such a “limited” nuclear war would result in two billion deaths over 10 years. That’s right, a nuclear famine. A war using fewer than half their weapons would lift so much black soot and soil into the air that it would cause a nuclear winter. Such a scenario was known as far back as the 1980s, but no one had calculated the impact on agriculture. The irradiated cloud would cover vast portions of the earth, bringing low temperatures, shorter growing seasons, sudden crop-killing extremes of temperature, altered rainfall patterns and would not dissipate for about 10 years. Now, a new report based on some very sophisticated studies reveals the crop losses that would result and the number of people who would be put at risk for malnutrition and starvation. The computer models show declines in wheat, rice, corn, and soybeans. Overall production of crops would fall, hitting their low in year five and gradually recovering by year ten. Corn and soybeans in Iowa, Illinois, Indiana and Missouri would suffer an average of 10 percent and, in year five, 20 percent. In China, corn would fall by 16 percent over the decade, rice by 17 percent, and wheat by 31 percent. Europe would also have declines. Making the impact even worse, there are already almost 800 million malnourished people in the world. A mere 10 percent decline in their calorie intake puts them at risk for starvation. And we will add hundreds of millions of people to the world population over the next couple of decades. Just to stay even with we will need hundreds of millions more meals than we now produce. Second, under the conditions of a nuclear war-induced winter and severe food shortages, those who have will horde. We saw this when drought depressed production a couple of years ago and several food exporting nations stopped exporting. The economic disruption to the food markets would be severe and the price of food will go up as it did then, placing what food is available out of reach for millions. And what follows famine is epidemic disease. “Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk?” is a report from a world-wide federation of medical societies, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (Nobel Peace Prize recipients, 1985) and their American affiliate, Physicians for Social Responsibility. It’s online at http://www.psr.org/resources/two-billion-at-risk.html They have no political axe to grind. Their sole concern is human health.

### 1AC super short

#### Lack of minimum wage standards in the Gulf means Labor-Sending Countries are cutting off relations with the GCC now

Youha 14 [(Ali Al Youha, MSc in global governance and diplomacy from Oxford University and a BA in economics from Boston College) “Gulf labor policies need context” Al-Monitor Feb 17] AT

While the GCC states are not exempt from the need to manage labor conditions, Western institutions should examine the GCC's internal labor dilemmas. They need to rigorously and holistically assess ongoing GCC state policy efforts to control labor practices within their markets. Therefore, multilateral cooperation and genuine dialogue should be prioritized, rather than politically framing the GCC region as the face of labor exploitation. Issues over protections, a standard minimum wage and labor-import bans have often been the inevitable outcomes of ongoing struggles between GCC states and Asian LSCs. GCC countries ban labor importation from major Asian suppliers when these LSCs violate strict labor and immigration laws Other LSCs, like the Philippine and Indonesian governments, also imposed labor-export bans on Saudi Arabia for failing to address violations of domestic workers’ rights and minimum wage requirements. This particular tension is expected to continue, given the increasing labor and minimum wage standards demanded by Asian LSCs, and has shaped diplomatic relations and produced criticism from rights groups.

#### Shifting security commitments in the Gulf means India must fill in. Economic relations from migrant laborers provide ground for strengthened relations that solves war

Pradhan 9 [(Samir, economics specialist based in the UAE. Previously, he served as a senior consultant, macroeconomics research at Tanween,a leading consultancy in Doha, Qatar. Before that, he was senior researcher, GCC economics and Gulf-Asia programmes at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai/ UAE, the leading think tank of the Gulf region) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

By all accounts, the world is moving rapidly towards multipolarity. The post- Cold War era geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic imperatives underwent substantial changes in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 forced regime change in Iraq. Simultaneously, the growth of emerging economic powers also considerably influenced the process. What one sees now is a hexagonal power polarity with three nodes; Russia, China, and India on the one side and the United States, Japan and the European Union forming the other three points. Moreover, with increasing global interdependence, it appears that the various nodes are striving for greater accommodation of interests and better management of contradictions, despite having divergent security and strategic cultures. With such changes in the global power architecture, reverberations are strikingly evident in the power configurations at the bilateral as well as regional level. Importantly, nation states are increasingly managing their bilateral relations on the basis of a realpolitik assessment rather than ideology alone. A case in point is the contemporary strategic environment in the Gulf region, which is increasingly becoming unpredictable, having local, regional and global implications. With windfall capital and vibrant economic growth, the region is witnessing unprecedented transformation in the social, political, economic, cultural and strategic realms. Importantly, certain favorable and adverse domestic, regional and international factors pervasively influence their security and strategic perceptions and increase their anxiety about the imminent future. Coincidentally, being a neighbor and an emerging global power, India becomes a reference point for the Gulf countries as a partner in their quest for managing the evolving security equations. The change of perception in the Gulf region is based on a ‘new constellation’ in which India is increasingly viewed as a credible non-partisan global player who can play a constructive role in managing conflicts and restoring peace and tranquility in the region. Thanks to the Gulf ’s eastward shifting economic engagements, burgeoning trade and investment linkages, and the civilizational affinities between India and the Gulf region there is the promise of a new era of deepening ties. The strategic importance of the Gulf region dates to the 19th century when three great empires –British India,Tsarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey – confronted each other for power projection. Since then, the region has a tradition of overwhelming security dependence on external powers. With the discovery of oil, the Gulf region became intrinsically enmeshed with the nuances of great power politics. This process continued until the whole region came under pervasive control of the security cordon provided by the US. Given the small population size of the countries, the regional governments continued to rely upon outside powers to maintain a crude balance of power in order to maintain sovereignty, domestic identity and regime security. This balance of power was maintained with the direct and extensive contributions from the external powers, either through providing military technology and weapons (Russian sales of missile and arms to Iran) or deploying military personnel in the region (US providing armaments and maintaining military bases in some member countries of the GCC). Today the strategic environment in the region is in a state of flux. This is due to the crystallization of several conflicting factors. Iran’s increasing military posture and Israel’s policy in the East Mediterranean region constitute the twin strategic faultlines surrounding the Gulf region. The turmoil in Iraq, which used to be the countervailing power to Iran, further adds to the security risks for the Gulf regimes. Above all, the perception of an Israel-centric foreign policy by the United States only increases tensions in the region. It is noteworthy to point out the central role played by the United States as the security lynchpin of the Gulf region (Koch 2008). The role and extent of US involvement in the Gulf region has expanded tremendously since it filled the power vacuum following the British withdrawal from the region in 1968.The overarching presence of the US has considerably changed the region’s strategic dynamics. From the initial ‘dual containment policy’ of orchestrating regional countervailing powers against each other, the US has become in a sense the sole superpower in the region as reflected in the forced regime change in Iraq in 2003. At present, nearly 200,000 American troops are stationed in the Gulf region, the majority of course in Iraq but with significant numbers in the GCC, thereby firmly entrenching the US in the Gulf security scenario. Further, given the Gulf region’s real security concerns, the regimes cannot afford to suddenly change the status quo and seek an alternate security arrangement. But while the US is an indispensable security ally and would continue to play a formidable role in the Gulf region’s emerging strategic paradigm, it is increasingly apparent that such an exclusive role in its present scope is neither sustainable nor unanimously acceptable to the Gulf regimes. In a sense, the unilateral strategic dominance of the US in the Gulf region is coming to an end, albeit slowly. Thus, a clear strategic shift is in motion which is primarily due to the increasing internationalization of the Gulf with other powers from Europe and Asia on the fringe, but also due to a reorientation and self introspection by the Gulf countries about their place in the international system and the role played by the US within that system. Given the multidimensional security environment in the Gulf region – from the threat posed by Islamic radicalism and Iranian nuclear ambitions, to concerns about the stalemate in Iraq, tensions surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, securing supply lines of oil exports and the role of Gulf finance in world economics – the regimes no longer feel safe in the comfort zone of the American security umbrella. The ambiguity about the US role, either as a source of regional stability or greater instability, entices the Gulf regimes to rethink their national interests amidst volatile regional events. The region is in the throes of a transition which evolves from patterns of interaction that are characterized by power politics and geopolitical concerns to new ones that are marked by the politics of geoeconomics. Adding to the complexity is the sheer pace of post modernism and its structural spill over as reflected in domestic discontentment and the region’s search of an identity in the increasingly interdependent globalized world in which the parochial projection of the Gulf (especially in the Western world) is not only hampering their commercial pursuits, but also questioning the region’s integrity. As a result, there is a growing sense of confidence in the region that has led the GCC states to play an increasing regional political and diplomatic role. Especially in the security domain, the Gulf countries are increasingly re-shifting their strategies from bilateral dependence to multilateral interdependence, sensing that bilateralism will no longer meet the requirements of a multi-polar world in geo-economic terms. Furthermore, the GCC leaderships are anticipating the shifting circumstances surrounding the declining role of the US. Bahrain’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Abdul Ghaffar, has, for example, called for a new security order in the Gulf with the GCC states as the main pillar of defense while Qatar’s Amir Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani told the General Debate of the United National General Assembly in September 2007 that: “The major conflicts in the world have become too big for one single power to handle them on its own” (Koch 2008). Nevertheless, it is certain that complete removal of external powers from the region is not at all a possibility in the absence of a regional architecture and the existence of glaring distrust among the states in the region (consider, for example, the continuing problem of border disputes). Besides, given the global strategic importance of the region, outside powers would not simply keep themselves away from developments in the region as formidable stakes are involved. Thus, in the current circumstances, a viable security framework is simply unthinkable at this stage and it is certain that neither a regional solution nor an outside power can counter the wide variety of threats to the region. Thus, the key before the Gulf countries is to multilateralize the regional security space with the involvement of other powers, especially an emerging global power like India with whom the future stakes of the region are formidable. Therefore, India can become a natural security ally for the Gulf. Transforming Strategic Overlap into Partnership The strategic horizon comprising the Gulf region and India shows the growing interconnectedness in the security space extending from Afghanistan to the Middle East. India’s location at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean gives it a strategic location in Eurasia as well as among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean from East Africa to Indonesia. India's peninsular projection in the ocean gives it a stake in the security and stability of these waters which is crucial for oil trade – the lifeblood of Gulf economies. While the overall strategic environment involving India and the Gulf region is in a state of flux evincing uncertainties and dilemmas, there is no doubt that the stakes are formidable. It may be noted that the connection between security and stability in the two regions was first propounded in 1981 by the former Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and former UAE President Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan. From a strategic point of view, the Gulf countries and India share a desire for political stability and security in the region. The emerging common security perceptions create further opportunities for Gulf-India cooperation in the future. In the recent past, several Gulf countries, especially Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE have concluded a number of bilateral strategic pacts with India. The UAE and India entered into a strategic pact, signed on July 1, 2003 when a high-level delegation led by the then Chief of Staff and now Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Shaikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, visited India. That agreement envisages cooperation in security, defense policy, development of defense cooperation, training for the UAE military and military medical personnel, exchange of cultural and sports activities between the friendly forces of the two countries and joint efforts to tackle environmental issues, particularly pollution in the seas. Saudi Arabia and India have entered into a similar pact. Such pacts confirm the increasing recognition of India as an emerging power by the Gulf countries and simultaneously the common strategic outlook of both. As aptly stated by the UAE Foreign Minister, Shaikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, at the opening of the ministerial session of the Indo-UAE Joint Commission, “At a regional level, we also look forward to an increased involvement by India in issues affecting the Gulf and neighboring countries” and that “it is in both of our interests to work together more and more closely.” The process of mutual recognition got a major boost with the landmark visit of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to India and consequent ratification of the New Delhi Declaration. This inclination of a major Gulf power like Saudi Arabia to deepen and broaden ties with India points to the changing geopolitical dynamics in both regions. Moreover, Gulf countries are increasingly cooperating with India for military training. Since India’s dependence on Gulf energy and the Gulf ’s dependence on India and Asia as a future major market for oil exports will remain significant, the security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) has become a critical component within the ambit of strategic matters. It is not just oil, but the increasing movement of merchandise imports and exports on the sea route spanning the vast arc of Indian Ocean has also become a critical security concern for India and the Gulf countries. The sheer number of Indian expatriates in the Gulf region’s workforce makes a strong case for deepening ties with India to manage domestic security. Countries like Saudi Arabia have the potential to support India in her efforts for the educational and social transformation of India’s vast Muslim population that constantly look towards the Gulf region for moral and religious guidance. India as a ‘Bridging Power’ India’s credibility and role as a “neutral” player in Asia may serve Gulf interests in managing their emerging security and strategic objectives. Two crucial factors that can possibly give the Gulf countries policy flexibility are India’s growing ties with the US and stable ties with Iran and Israel. India’s strategic objectives attest to the fact that the Gulf, South Asia and Central Asia are now strategically interactive and interrelated regions. The objectives of India's quest for greater influence throughout the Gulf are to prevent proliferation as well as terrorism. As a bridging power, India could possibly leverage its links with both US and Iran to the benefit of the Gulf countries. Unlike the US and other European powers that tie security cooperation with sensitive issues such as human rights, democracy and regime change, Gulf countries view India as a non-interfering partner to align with. India maintains a substantial economic presence in the Gulf and is set to create a significant political presence as well. Despite civilizational propinquities, historical commercial linkages, and geographical proximity, the Gulf and India have failed to capitalize on commonalities, which has prevented their association from truly becoming the “unbroken relation of cordiality.” Nevertheless, the growing economic presence of India in the Gulf and the Gulf ’s new geo-economic realities provide the platform to synergize complementarities into multipronged stable relations. The trend of mutual ignorance of the two regions is slowly reversing due to the growing economic importance of India in the world and the Gulf's increased interest in building its relations with its immediate neighbor, against the backdrop of faltering bonhomie with the West. The relationship between the two regions has been in focus in the evolving interdependence centering on energy-economy dynamics and changed geopolitical environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The ‘Look East’ strategy of the Gulf provides an impetus for closer relations. It is therefore necessary that since a sustainable relationship entails multifaceted cooperation, India and the GCC countries should broaden relations on the strategic and political levels. It is in the interests of both the GCC and India to recognize the other’s potential as a serious trading partner, and further strengthen their external relations. Both parties could nurture their relations in a constructive way by finding the right balance between regionalism and multilateralism to excel in today’s fast paced economic arena. To sum up, geopolitical and geoeconomic complementarities drive security and strategic aspects of the Gulf region’s Look East Policy towards India. While India's ambitions, capabilities, experience and interests all suggest that it is capable of playing a major role in the Gulf, the Gulf countries see India as a bridging power to shift their status quo security and strategic imperatives to better align with the changed dynamics. The stakes are formidable, challenges are mutual, potentials are huge and, hence, cooperation becomes imperative. This calls for greater political will.

#### The impact is global war

Kapila 9 (Subhash, Royal British Army Staff College, MA Defense Science – Madras U., PhD Strategic Studies – Allahabad U., Consultant in Strategic Affairs – South Asia Analysis Group, South Asia Analysis Group Paper # 3114, “MIDDLE EAST 2009: POLITICAL DYNAMICS STIRRED BY UNITED STATES”

More than any other strategic regions of the globe, the Middle East in the 21st Century presents the dubious prospect of being the most conflict-prone region globally. Global armed conflicts or strategic jostling can arise at any moment in this region not only because of intra-regional rivalries but more for reasons connected to energy security, control of strategic choke points and nuclear and WMD proliferation. Besides these major issues the propensity of major conservative Islamic countries not to be pro-active in controlling or liquidating Islamic Jihadi impulses to proliferate to threaten US and the West, are another complicating feature.

#### The 6 governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council ought to require employers to pay a living wage to all workers, regardless of nationality, and ensure the enforcement of the minimum wage standards.

#### The plan is enforceable and avoids labor exploitation by equalizing bargaining power

HRW 14 [Human Rights Watch “Gulf Countries: Increase Migrant Worker Protection” NOVEMBER 23, 2014] AT

“The proposals made by GCC countries fall far short of the changes needed to protect domestic workers’ rights, safety, and dignity,” said Elizabeth Tang, general secretary of the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). “GCC countries should join the growing number of countries worldwide that are extending full protection of their labor laws to domestic workers, including a minimum wage, a weekly rest day, the right to organize, and social benefits.” The GCC has discussed a potential region-wide standard employment contract for domestic workers. Recent media reports suggest that the GCC is also considering establishing a body to coordinate policies on hiring domestic workers that would consist of recruitment agency and government representatives. These developments have lacked transparency and have suffered from inadequate consultation with migrant domestic workers, trade unions, and migrants’ rights organizations. Migrants’ countries of origin are also discussing their own standard contract through a separate process. “Standard contracts are not a substitute for labor law reform, and taken alone do not meet the standards in the ILO Domestic Workers Convention,” said Sharan Burrow, general secretary of the ITUC. “The GCC should work in closer coordination with – not separately from – countries of origin to develop labor migration policies that fully respect the human and labor rights of migrants.” Migrants in the Gulf make an important contribution both to the economies of their own countries and those of the countries where they work. In 2011, migrant workers in GCC countries sent home more than US$60 billion in remittances. Competition for jobs among the workers’ countries of origin, combined with their relative lack of bargaining power in relation to the labor-destination countries, means that the pressure they exert for better labor protections is weak. “The meetings over the next few days provide a key opportunity to promote regional minimum standards that would avoid a counterproductive race to the bottom in labor conditions,” said William Gois of Migrant Forum Asia. “The governments should develop a concrete action plan, in consultation with migrant workers themselves and the organizations that represent them, with benchmarks to monitor its progress.” Kuwait University Law School will host an event on November 23, 2014, at which panelists from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, IDWF, the ITUC, and Migrant Forum Asia will discuss the rights of migrant domestic workers. The groups recommend that the governments: Establish and enforce comprehensive labor law protections for migrant workers, including domestic workers; Reform the kafala (sponsorship) visa system to ensure that workers can change employers without being required to first obtain their consent; Remove the “exit permit” requirement in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; Strengthen regulation and monitoring of labor recruitment agencies, including eliminating recruitment fees for workers; Ensure that migrants have access to justice and support services; and Expand the Abu Dhabi Dialogue to include labor-origin countries from Africa, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, and participation by nongovernmental groups. Governments should ratify and implement international labor and human rights standards, the groups said. These include the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, the ILO Forced Labor Protocol, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

## Uniqueness/Misc

### A2 GCC Report

#### This was a ruse by GCC countries – no actual hike

Herald 14 [(Deccan Herald, news source, cites India UAE ambassador) “No hike in wages of Indian workers, says envoy to UAE” Nov 18, 2014] AT

Refuting a report published in a section of the media about a hike in wages of Indian workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council copuntries, Indian Ambassador to the UAE T.P. Seetharam said that no such revision in the minimum wages of Indian workers in this Gulf nation was made in the recent past. A media report Monday had said: "Over the past seven months Indian diplomats in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have sharply increased the minimum salaries that they recommend for Indian workers at private and public firms in those states." The report has also quoted the managing director of a recruitment agency in the UAE as saying that the minimum wage for Indian blue-collar workers rose to 1,500 dirhams ($409) in recent weeks from 1,200 dirhams last year. "We had last revised minimum wages for various categories of Indian workers employed in the UAE March 15, 2011," Khaleej Times Tuesday quoted Seetharam as saying. "What is happening obviously is that they might be enforcing these things now. The recruiting agencies have woken up to the fact that there is a minimum wage. So far, they might have been recruiting people without paying them the prescribed minimum wage," said the envoy. He said the comments from the managing director of the agency quoted were false. "His allegation that it has gone up in the recent weeks shows that he doesn't know the facts. We have not made any changes in recent weeks as suggested in the story, which basically has a lot of inaccuracies."

#### Doesn’t solve – it’s still not a living wage and our uniqueness proves higher wages are needed

#### No reform has followed from the proposed reforms

Migrant rights 14 [(non-profit labor advocacy organization) “GCC Unified Contract for Domestic Workers to be Discussed in November” May 23 2014] AT

Last March the UAE announced a draft of its own standardized contract. Reports indicate the move is driven to meet the demands of “unhappy sponsors” paying high recruitment costs rather than to guarantee domestic worker rights. However, if the contract approximates the 2012 draft law for domestic workers, it could stipulate a paid day off, two weeks of paid annual leave, holidays, and 15 paid sick days. The 2012 draft was never finalized, and received criticism for neglecting to regulate working hours or rest break, and for its harsh punitive measures; the draft contract punished domestic workers with six months to one year in jail and a 100,000 Dh fine (27,000) in case of “revealing secrets of employers,” a punishable offense also found in the GCC wide unified contract. The draft also levied imprisonment and fines for those aiding or sheltering absconded workers. Qatar has announced also plans to implement a standard contract several times over the past few years, but have yet to follow through with reform. A 2010 study on domestic workers in Saudi Arabia and the UAE highlighted prevalent contract issues, some of which have not been solved as of the last contract draft; a questionnaire showed that only 73% of those surveyed had contracts, only 58% could read it, and only 35% received copies of their contracts. The study referenced cases in which domestic workers were promised salaries in US dollars but after arrival, were given the same amount in local currencies. Many also reported contract substitution, whereby recruitment agencies provided them with enticing contracts in English and must less favorable contracts in Arabic – the latter of which is the only version recognized in Emirati courts. The study also evidenced the danger of ambiguous language in domestic worker contracts; for example, in Saudi, sponsors must pay for a worker’s return ticket unless “the domestic worker does something wrong” or “wants to end the work relation prematurely for personal reasons.” Employers are advantaged when they can define their own contractual obligations. In contrast, the burden of proof lies on the domestic worker to prove they have been wronged by their employer, which is particularly difficult when workers have very limited access to legal services. Vague language that unfairly empowers the employer was still an issue in the last published version of the draft contract; for example, the contract requires employers to provide domestic workers with adequate accommodation, without prescribing actual minimum standards. Migrant-Rights.org urged the GCC committee to revise the 2013 draft contract, which did improve protections for domestic workers but still omitted critical rights, including core components of the ILO’s Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers. The convention, adopted by the ILO in 2011, enumerates minimum standards and rights specific to domestic workers while affirming that all other migrant, labor, and human rights conventions are also inclusive of domestic workers. No states in the Middle East or North Africa region have ratified the convention.

### A2 GCC are US’s Client States

#### The GCC are an independent bloc of countries

Baraka 13 [(Ajamu Baraka, critical theorist) “From Egypt to Syria: Is The Gulf Cooperation Council the tail that wags the U.S. Dog” July 9, 2013] AT

There are some fascinating implications here when you look at the moves made in Egypt by the GCC and the role it assumed in the region related to Syria. While it is a fact that Israeli interests have always dominated the trajectory of U.S. policy in the region, often to the detriment of the long term interests of the, a new convergence of interests might be emerging in the region that has enhanced the influence of the GCC. Perhaps we can no longer just refer to those states as merely client states of the U.S. At this point, the complexities of the relationships make it very difficult to determine with certainty the GCC’s ability to influence U.S. policies in the region or to execute an independent political agenda. Instead of the growing influence of the GCC, events in Egypt may have very well represented the “perfect storm” of interests convergence between the U.S. who feared continued chaos; the Egyptian military who saw their vast economic empire under duress with the continued economic crisis in the country; and the desires of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Muhammad Bin Zayed of the UAE, representing the predominant interests of the GCC who saw the overthrow of Morsi as payback for the Brotherhood’s role in ending the rule of Hosni Mubarak. What is clear, however, is that with the relative decline of U.S. influence with its defeat in Iraq, the face-saving surrender that it has initiated in Afghanistan and its inability to overthrow the government in Syria, the relationship between the U.S. and the GCC is a relationship that must be looked at freed from the old assumptions regarding who is influencing whom in the region.

## Relations Advantage

### UQ---Ties Low

#### Relations are low now but expatriates are expanding the relationship

Chaudary 14 [Rahul, Senior Fellow for South Asia, IISS “India: Gulf Security Partner in Waiting?” 09 December 2014] AT

The Gulf does not get the attention it deserves from India’s leadership. New Delhi has no publicly articulated, comprehensive Gulf policy. Although some Gulf countries are now recognised as ‘strategic partners’, reciprocal leadership visits are rare, and India’s diplomatic missions in the Gulf are small. Notwithstanding recent attempts to build defence links, the Indian embassies in Bahrain and Kuwait, for example, still do not have resident defence attachés; nor, until March 2013, did the Indian embassy in the UAE. However, historic maritime and cultural links between India and the Gulf have developed into strong relationships of ‘energy, expatriates and economy’. India is dependent on the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states for 42% of its overall oil imports; adding Iran, Iraq and Yemen brings the total to 60%. Although neither the Gulf states nor their Indian embassies have a reliable figure for the number of Indian nationals working or living in the region, Indians are now widely acknowledged to constitute the largest expatriate community in all Gulf states. The Indian expatriate community in the Gulf is also the largest such community anywhere in the world. India’s largest regional-bloc trading partner is the GCC, which accounted for $145 billion of trade in 2011–12, nearly a 75% increase from the $84bn of two years earlier. This is far above the level of India–ASEAN trade ($76bn) or India–EU trade ($90bn). Upgrading bilateral ties between India and Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia to the level of ‘strategic partnerships’ has not brought with it top-level political input, it has nevertheless led to defence and security cooperation on counter-terrorism, money laundering, cyber issues, organised crime, human trafficking and anti-piracy. Amid evolving security dynamics and India’s direct interest in the Gulf’s security and stability, influential Indian experts have recently begun to advocate a more active strategic role for India.

### UQ---Labor

#### Lack of minimum wage standards in the Gulf means Labor-Sending Countries are cutting off relations with the GCC now

Youha 14 [(Ali Al Youha, MSc in global governance and diplomacy from Oxford University and a BA in economics from Boston College) “Gulf labor policies need context” Al-Monitor Feb 17] AT

While the GCC states are not exempt from the need to manage labor conditions, Western institutions should examine the GCC's internal labor dilemmas. They need to rigorously and holistically assess ongoing GCC state policy efforts to control labor practices within their markets. Therefore, multilateral cooperation and genuine dialogue should be prioritized, rather than politically framing the GCC region as the face of labor exploitation. Issues over protections, a standard minimum wage and labor-import bans have often been the inevitable outcomes of ongoing struggles between GCC states and Asian LSCs. GCC countries ban labor importation from major Asian suppliers when these LSCs violate strict labor and immigration laws Other LSCs, like the Philippine and Indonesian governments, also imposed labor-export bans on Saudi Arabia for failing to address violations of domestic workers’ rights and minimum wage requirements. This particular tension is expected to continue, given the increasing labor and minimum wage standards demanded by Asian LSCs, and has shaped diplomatic relations and produced criticism from rights groups.

### A2 Unemployment Link Turn

#### Unemployment is not a link turn – the advantage is about relations, not economics

#### Perception – the minimum wage is PERCEIVED as a pro-human rights policy – the actual consequences are irrelevant since it’s a symbolic measure, and they have no evidence unemployment effects would be perceived

#### Desire – labor sending countries explicitly demanded the GCC to raise wages and staked relations on it – even if wages make things worse for expatriates, the labor senders can’t go back on an internationally binding action they’ve already taken and ask the GCC to take back the wage increases – that’s Youha

#### I control uniqueness – relations are being cut off now – only a risk the aff makes things better

#### Scope – the plan benefits most workers; even if it hurts some, the overall relationship will be stronger

### A2 Labor Standards alt Cause

#### HRW evidence says the plan increases bargaining power, so workers can bargain for better labor standards after getting a living wage

#### Plan overcomes the alt cause – it increases quality of life enough that workers would tolerate low living conditions – empirically proven by the large expatriate communities that already exist despite poor working conditions

#### Signaling- the plan is a signal that Gulf countries are working towards better labor policies, which increases Indian engagement regardless of real action on labor standards

#### Lay evidence says rising wages in India are the reason expatriates are returning – labor standards aren’t a core factor – this is especially true since labor standards are also poor in India, so where Indians work is determined by wages alone, not labor standards.

### Relations Link

#### India is pressing Gulf countries to raise wages – low wages will destroy labor ties between the UAE and India

Nair 14 [(RUPAM JAIN NAIR, journalist) “India urges higher pay for millions of Gulf workers” NEW DELHI/DUBAI/RIYADH, Reuters Nov 17, 2014] AT

(Reuters) - India is pressing rich countries in the Gulf to raise the wages of millions of Indians working there, in a drive that could secure it billions of dollars in fresh income but risks pricing some of its citizens out of the market. Over 5 million Indian nationals are believed to be employed in the oil exporting states of the Gulf, the single largest group in a migrant worker population of more than 20 million. Migrants do many of the dirty and dangerous jobs in the region, from construction to the oil industry, transport and services. They account for nearly half of the roughly 50 million population of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council. So India's campaign for much higher pay could have an impact on economies around the region, especially if it leads to a general increase in wages for workers from other big labour-supplying countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. Over the past seven months, Indian diplomats in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have sharply increased the minimum salaries that they recommend for Indian workers at private and public firms in those states. "We want the Indian workforce to be paid higher salaries. Inflation, the value of the Indian currency and a rise in the cost of living in the Gulf were the factors that led to the decision," Y.S. Kataria, a spokesman for the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in New Delhi, told Reuters. The success of India's strategy is not yet clear, however. Officials in at least some GCC nations have expressed displeasure, and the strategy could backfire if those countries end up hiring more workers from elsewhere in the world. "Of course it will encourage companies to look at Bangladesh and Pakistan as more viable options to get migrant workers,” said Mohammed Jindran, managing director of UAE-based recruitment agency Overseas Labour Supply. PRESSURE The Indian government cannot dictate the pay of its citizens in the Gulf - decisions to hire workers are made by labour recruiters in individual countries, which have not set minimum wages for migrants and usually prohibit union activity by them. However, the recruiters must rely on the co-operation of local authorities to operate in India. An internal memorandum prepared by the MOIA, sent last month and seen by Reuters, says that if workers are offered wages below specified minimums, ministry officials "would deny emigration clearance". In Saudi Arabia, the Indian embassy lifted the recommended minimum salary posted on its website to 1,200 riyals ($320) a month earlier this year from 670 riyals. In the UAE, the minimum wage for Indian blue-collar workers rose to 1,500 dirhams ($409) in recent weeks from 1,200 dirhams last year, Jindran said. Even when Gulf recruiters agree to certain wage levels, the numbers do not necessarily stick. Some workers are promised one salary when they sign up in their home country, then forced to renegotiate lower wages when they arrive in the Gulf. India's role as a top labour supplier means its drive cannot be totally ignored by recruiters, and it could have a big impact in some countries and industries. But there may be a backlash. Another MOIA official said India's pay demands had met initial resistance in all six GCC countries, while two of the countries had threatened to reduce their Indian workforces and hire more, lower-paid workers from Bangladesh and Nepal instead. Ahmed Al-Fahaid, Saudi deputy labour minister for international affairs, told Sky News Arabia last month: "If this is a decision that is applied throughout India as a whole, meaning no one gets out of India for work unless with that limit, then this is a sovereign decision for the country and we will not interfere," Fahaid said. "But if it is a special decision to raise wages for whoever comes to work in the kingdom, then we oppose it and do not accept it, as it would be an act of discrimination and we don’t accept that in international agreements.” He did not elaborate. IMPACT If India's efforts to secure higher pay succeed, they could boost its economy, because migrants send much of their pay home. India received $69 billion as remittances in 2012; a 2010 central bank study found Gulf nations accounted for 31 percent.

### Piracy impact

#### Piracy is on the brink – impact is massive terrorism, global violence and severe regional instability

Sterio 10 [Melena, Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School, magna cum laude, 2002; Maitrise en Droit (French law degree), Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2002; D.E.A. (master’s degree), Private International Law, Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2003; B.A., Rutgers University, French Literature and Political Science, summa cum laude, 1998, THE SOMALI PIRACY PROBLEM: A GLOBAL PUZZLE NECESSITATING A GLOBAL SOLUTION]

According to Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), piracy in the Gulf of Aden is “out of control.”20 In 2008, Somali pirates took nearly 600 crewmembers hostage; several hundred of these crewmembers, as well as a dozen ships, are still being held by the pirates, who may demand millions of dollars in ransom for their release.21 Somali pirates have become more aggressive in their operations, recently beginning to attack larger ships. In 2008, they seized the Faina, which was carrying Russian tanks and ammunition, as well as the supertanker Sirius Star, which was carrying two million barrels of oil.22 Section I.A will discuss how, if left unchecked, Somali piracy, in the long-term, could eventually lead to the decline of commercial activity and commercial centers in East Africa.23 Section I.B will show how Somali piracy imposes significant costs on shipping companies that are already financially stressed, deterring maritime commerce, endangering sea lines of transportation and communication, and undermining regional stability.24 In 2008, the United Nations Security Council, recognizing the seriousness of the threat posed by Somali piracy, passed Resolution 1816, which states that piracy “exacerbate[s] the situation in Somalia[,] which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.”25 Section I.C will discuss how piracy can both contribute to the formation of maritime terrorism and provide funding and other assistance to terrorist causes, aiding groups such as al-Qaida. This section will also demonstrate how allowing pirates to pursue their activities without resistance sends a strong lack-of-deterrence message to other potential sea and land- based terrorists, who may infer that their efforts will remain unchecked for many years as well. A. Piracy and the Failed Somali State: A Threat to Global Peace Somalia is a failed state.26 Since the early 1990s, Somalia has not had a stable government, and its fragile government is currently battling warlords and militant Islamic groups for control of the country.2 The country does not have a functional economy, and its official law enforcement operations are slim, with gangs of paramilitary groups and rebel forces controlling the streets of Mogadishu and other towns.28Piracy has thrived in this cowboy culture of inefficient government, and everyday life is ruled by violence.29 A functional Somali government is so absent that some Somali coastal towns have established pirate-centric societies where piracy not only enjoys local support, but local governments rely on it.30 If nothing is done to thwart the rise of piracy in Somalia, piracy will not only continue to prosper in Somalia, undermining efforts to stabilize the country, but also seriously threaten regional and international peace and stability.31 Piracy can spread elsewhere from Somalia. Other African states, whether Somali neighbors or located farther away, could fall prey to powerful pirate operations, especially if such operations become firmly rooted in Somalia and ruled by powerful warlords enjoying Somali government support. Regional pirate networks could be created, posing a significant threat to global commerce and human safety.32 Moreover, piracy can endanger commercial and tourist routes, undermining the regional economy and exposing neighboring states to all sorts of potential problems.33 Potential problems include economic non-viability, political and civil unrest caused by poverty, and border instability provoked by the need to expend vast resources on the fight against piracy. In addition, Somali piracy can threaten global peace and security if pirates start collaborating with other maritime trafficking groups, such as those who smuggle narcotics or weapons of mass destruction, either for a financial or political cause. Thus, the development of Somali piracy could contribute to the spread of maritime violence, endangering sea routes everywhere and supporting dangerous factions across the globe.34 As discussed below, the Somali pirates could become linked to powerful terrorist organizations and could significantly contribute to the development and growth of such groups. These global implications, highlighted below, show why a present-day global response is needed to curb and eventually eliminate this menace.

### Yes Coop

#### India will cooperate, and the GCC will reciprocate

Pradhan 11 [(Prasanta Kumar Pradhan is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi) “Accelerating India's “Look West Policy” in the Gulf” IDSA Issue brief February 03, 2011] AT

Forging strategic ties: While the oil and energy trade dynamics define India’s relationship with the Gulf countries, there is a growing realisation that it is time to move beyond the traditional buyer-seller relationship. India is looking forward to enhance strategic ties with the region. India needs to engage the Gulf countries to further its own influence in the region as well as the world. India has already discussed its intention of joining the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a permanent member with the Gulf countries. By forging ties in sectors other than energy and trade with the Gulf region, India is developing a warm relationship with the Muslim world. This would help in building up India’s engagement with organisations like the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab League. Military cooperation: Particular attention has been paid on military cooperation to deal with common security threats. The growing threats of Islamic extremism, terrorism and maritime piracy have become concerns for both India and the Gulf countries. There is a growing concern over the rise of criminal activities, money laundering and illegal arms trade between the two regions. India has signed defence cooperation agreements with the UAE, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The defence agreements are aimed at providing military training, cooperation in military medical services, joint exercises, joint development and manufacture of sophisticated military hardware, cooperation in product support, services, defence science and technology etc and jointly combating pollution caused by the military at sea. e The Indian Navy has been at the forefront of conducting military exercises with the Gulf region. The Indian Navy has conducted exercises with the navies of Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Besides, the Indian Air Force has also come forward to conduct ariel exercises with their counterparts. In September 2008, India conducted its first joint air force exercise with the United Arab Emirates at the Al Dhafra base in Abu Dhabi. In October 2009 the Indian Air Force conducted a joint exercise with Oman codenamed ‘Eastern Bridge’ at the Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO) base at Thumrait. The exercise, though ostensibly conceived to increase interoperability between the RAFO and the IAF, also served to underline the strategic reach of the Indian Air Force. Fighting piracy: The recent spurt in the piracy activities off the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean has affected both India and the Gulf countries. For India, the security of the Indian Ocean is important as large number of oil tankers pass through these waters. Cooperation with the Gulf countries in fighting piracy would also strengthen India’s presence in the strategic waters of the Indian Ocean. India has already deployed its naval ships to deter the pirates. Strengthening soft power: India has emphasised on strengthening the soft power relationship with the countries of the region. There is a conscious effort on the part of India to bring back Indian cultural influence in the region which India enjoyed in the past. In recent years India has attempted to strengthen cultural ties with the Gulf countries by signing and renewing the existing cultural exchange programmes. India signed an Executive Programme for Cultural Cooperation for 2007-2010 in 2007. An Executive Programme for the Cultural and Information Exchanges between India and Kuwait was signed for the years 2009-2011 in April 2009. India signed an MoU on Cultural Cooperation with Oman in July 2010 for a period of five years. Cooperation in the field of education is an emerging area of cooperation between India and the Gulf region. Under the Education Exchange Programme 2009-2011, signed between India and Kuwait, both the countries have agreed to exchange information on studies and researches in the fields of education and learning and exchange specialists in the fields of general education, adult education, special-needs education, and social and psychological services. An MoU on education was signed between India and Oman in December 2007 which encourages cooperation between the two countries through visits of academics, officials and students from universities and academic institutions, organising seminars, scientific programmes and training courses, and exchange of books scientific documents and library materials. India has also pledged to assist Saudi Arabia in setting up an ICT Centre of Excellence as well as institutes of higher learning, involving both education and research in the field of technology. India and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum on higher education in the year 2006 which calls for exchange of teaching faculty and students, encourage direct scientific and educational communications among the institutions and exchange of delegations between the two countries. Protecting interests of diaspora: Protecting the interest of the five million strong Indian diaspora has been an important element of India’s policy priorities in the Gulf. The Indian maids working in the households are in the most vulnerable situations as they are not covered under the local labour laws. India has taken up the issue with the governments of the region and has appealed for the safety and security of the Indian house maids in the region. India has signed labour agreements with the Gulf countries which call for protecting the workers from exploitation by the employers (like sexual harassment, physical abuse, holding the payment, overtime work without extra incentives etc.), checking the illegal and unauthorised recruiting agencies and unhealthy working and living conditions. The Indian diaspora in the Gulf is a major source of foreign currency. According to the World Bank report on the Remittances and Migration, India is the top remittance receiving country in the world with US$ 55 billion of remittance in 2010.11 The Reserve Bank of India estimates that for the period of 2006-07 to 2009-10, the Gulf region accounted for an average of 27 per cent of the total remittance inflows to India. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are the major source countries for the remittance. In the year 2008-09, the remittances from the Gulf reached US$ 14, 430 millions constituting 30.7 per cent of the total remittances received during that financial year surpassing that of the North America.1 Gulf Reciprocates India’s Look West policy has received the required and necessary reciprocation from the Gulf. Impressed by the economic development of India and the growing stature of the country in the region and beyond, the Gulf countries have looked upon India as a responsible and trusted player. The GCC countries have adopted a ‘Look East’ policy focusing on India and China – two major Asian giants. The rise of Asia in general and India in particular has impressed the Gulf countries that have started trusting India and its increasing profile. A number of leaders from the Gulf have also visited India in recognition of the importance they attach to the country. The visit of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 2006 to New Delhi was a landmark visit as it improved the bilateral relations between the two countries. Since then a number of heads of States and high level delegations have paid visits to India and have openly expressed their desire to improve their relationship with India. For them India has emerged as a reliable partner beyond trade and business.

### US Withdrawal Now

#### US withdrawing now

Weibin 12 [(Zhao, Research Fellow for the Center on China-America Defense Relations (CCADR) at the PLA Academy of Military Science) “Converging and Conflicting Interests in the Middle East” Oct 17, 2012] AT

The political upheavals in the Arab world have not settled down, leading to a number of uncertainties. Strategic configuration in the Middle East is changing dramatically. Owing to the US decision to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, the rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, the failure to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the impotence in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, and an economic crisis, there is a perception of US decline in and disengagement from the region. Middle-East countries, especially US traditional allies, are trying to introduce other external forces to reduce the risk of reliance on the US. As its economy develops rapidly, China increasingly depends on oil from the Middle East and wants to play a greater role in the region. When the hegemonic power and the rising power meet in the Middle East, their various interests may converge or conflict with each other.

### Relations K2 ISIS and Shipping

#### Sustained cooperation key to solve ISIS and maritime threats

Wong 11/10 [Joy Wong, journalist “Int'l cooperation needed to enhance security in Gulf and Indo-Pacific: Dr Maliki” Cyber Pioneer, Nov 10, 2014] AT

As the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific saw changes in the global order and the rise of new security challenges, it was imperative that all states, including major powers like the United States, cooperate and work together collectively to promote regional security and stability. Minister of State for Defence Dr Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman made this point when he spoke at the Simultaneous Special Session on the topic "Regional security in the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific", at the inaugural India Global Forum on 9 Nov. Noting that present security challenges were increasingly transnational and complex, Dr Maliki identified two key issues in the region and beyond which required close international cooperation - the threat of terrorism and maritime security challenges such as piracy. "The latest manifestation of violence and extremism is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which has plagued the Middle East. The threat of ISIS is of particular concern," said Dr Maliki. Not only could ISIS potentially sustain their efforts for a prolonged period based on the rich oil resources in the territories they occupy, they are also able to effectively recruit followers from around the world to join their efforts and to extend their linkages to other religious militant groups - through the sophisticated use of social media. Dr Maliki expressed his concern on trained and further radicalised foreign fighters, who might return to their home countries and endanger innocent lives. He said: "Singapore, though some 7,000km away from the Middle East, is also not immune to the ISIS threat. As part of our ongoing efforts to combat terrorism, Singapore will be contributing to the multinational coalition effort against the ISIS. "We will also be working with other countries to combat this threat by sharing information on the ISIS and on returning jihadists, and stemming the flow on terrorist financing. The transnational nature of this threat requires all countries to work together to curb the export of terrorism to our region." Similarly, piracy and maritime terrorism - which typically manifested in lucrative sea routes of which the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific had plenty of - was the other key challenge that required international cooperation to deal with effectively. "Maritime security challenges cannot be solved by any one nation, no matter how well resourced," Dr Maliki said. "Promoting stability in the Persian Gulf, maintaining freedom of the seas, protecting the sea lines of communication, and choke points such as the Strait of Malacca, are important economic and security interests for all nations." One way to strengthen practical cooperation was for militaries to exercise together to build capabilities and enhance inter-operability, said Dr Maliki. He added that exercises such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/Military Medicine Exercise held in Brunei last year and the upcoming ADMM-Plus Counter-Terrorism/Maritime Security Exercise would allow the region to better respond to armed robbery and piracy in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Dr Maliki also noted that Singapore welcomed India's greater participation and leadership role in the region. "As a close friend of India, Singapore looks forward to continue working with India to forge peace and prosperity for Asia and beyond," he said. Themed India 2014: New Opportunities for a New Government and held over two days from 9 Nov, the Forum focused on economic and security issues related to India's rise as a regional power and the policy outlook of the new Indian government. Participants included the Indian political leadership and senior government officials, as well as business leaders and policymakers from over 20 countries in the region and beyond.

#### Safe shipping routes key to the global economy and the survival of billions

Mitropoulos 5 [(Efthimios, Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations) World Maritime Day Parallel Event, 11/15, International Maritime Organization]

We hoped to kick-start moves towards creating a far broader awareness that a healthy and successful shipping industry has ramifications that reach far beyond the industry itself. Global economic prosperity is dependent on trade and trade, in turn, is dependent on a safe and secure transport network. Shipping is the most important part of that global network, although it is rarely acknowledged as such, and seldom given the credit it deserves. Indeed, I have long come to the sad conclusion that the contribution made by the shipping industry - and, in particular, by those who work hard, both on board ships and ashore, to make it safer and more environmentally friendly - is greatly undervalued by the public at large. You may have noticed that I used the word "sad" to brand my conclusion. I am sorry to say that there is another word I might suggest as more fitting to characterize the situation and that is the word "unfair" - in capital letters! I think it is worth pausing for a moment to consider just how vital the contribution of ships and shipping actually is. More than 90 per cent of global trade is reportedly carried by sea; over the last four decades, total seaborne trade estimates have nearly quadrupled, from less than 6 thousand billion tonne-miles in 1965 to 25 thousand billion tonne-miles in 2003; and, according to UN figures, the operation of merchant ships in the same year contributed about US$380 billion in freight rates within the global economy, equivalent to about 5 per cent of total world trade. This year, the shipping industry is expected to transport 6.6 billion tonnes of cargo. If you consider this figure vis-a-vis the 6.4 billion population of the world, you will realize that this works out at more than one tonne of cargo for every man, woman and child on the face of the planet - even more for the richer nations. As seaborne trade continues to expand, it also brings benefits for consumers throughout the world. The transport cost element in the price of consumer goods varies from product to product and is estimated to account for around 2 per cent of the shelf price of a television set and only around 1.2 per cent of a kilo of coffee. Thanks to the growing efficiency of shipping as a mode of transport and to increased economic liberalization, the prospects for the industry's further growth continue to be strong. Shipping is truly the lynchpin of the global economy. Without shipping, intercontinental trade, the bulk transport of raw materials and the import and export of affordable food and manufactured goods would simply not be possible. Shipping makes the world go round and, so, let us be in no doubt about its broader significance. To put it in simple terms, as I have done before on a number of occasions during the campaign initiated at IMO to encourage all those involved in shipping to pay more attention to its public perception, without international shipping half the world would starve and the other half would freeze.

#### ISIS results in nuclear terror attacks

Plame 9/26 [(Valerie, former career covert CIA operations officer, Plame worked to protect U.S. national security and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) “Nuclear terrorism: Most immediate and extreme threat to global security” The hill 09/26/14] AT

Achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons is one of the U.N.’s longstanding objectives, one it has failed to prioritize. It’s no surprise that the security discussions this year were overshadowed by the plans of 10 member states to dismantle and defeat the Islamic State group, especially as their assault on radical Sunni resistance and aggression toward U.S. and British journalists continues to grow. Yet this mounting violence and instability pales in comparison to what could be wrought by nuclear-armed terrorists. We know that the Islamic State group has the means and motive to attain weapons of mass destruction. They have an appetite for shocking demonstrations and indiscriminate killing, and have already seized low-grade nuclear material from a facility in Mosul. They are acquiring the ability to build radioactive dirty bombs that could cause major health and economic damage. With reports of escalating funding and recruitment of citizens from every continent, and ties to radicals in nuclear weapons-states such as Pakistan, it is increasingly conceivable that weapons-grade materials – or even a ready-made nuclear device – could fall into their hands. If that happens, they would not hesitate to use them – possibly at a cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. There are more than 16,000 nuclear weapons in the world and enough highly-enriched uranium and plutonium to make hundreds of thousands more. We can do our best to prevent isolated incidents in which terrorists buy, build or steal them – but those efforts are stop-gap at best, and we won’t know if we missed something until it’s too late. Nuclear terrorism is all but inevitable unless we work quickly and urgently to secure all nuclear materials and eradicate all nuclear weapons. To eliminate the risk we have to drain the swamp. This will not be easy. The world faces many dangerous and evolving challenges, and tensions between Russian and the West cannot be ignored. But we must not allow the crisis of the day to overshadow the enormity of the nuclear threat. With plans to defeat the Islamic State group that may take years and the next U.S. presidential election on the horizon, President Obama is running short of time to set us on the path to Global Zero.

### ---ISIS = Terrorist Haven

#### ISIS created the world’s largest terrorist safe haven – it’s the largest risk of nuclear terrorism

Bunn 14, 7/11/14 - Matthew Bunn, a professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, is a former adviser on nonproliferation in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, where he focused on control of nuclear weapons and materials (Matthew, “ISIS Seizes Nuclear Material—but That’s Not the Reason to Worry” 7/11

But while this particular uranium is not much of a worry, the larger picture is starting to make me bite my nails a bit. The Islamic State now controls a big chunk of territory, hundreds of millions of dollars, and thousands of armed troops – and it has made clear that its ambitions are global. Its statement declaring itself the caliphate promised by Allah was an explicit invitation to violent Islamic extremists from all over the world to join them. Like the Taliban’s Afghanistan before 9/11, the Islamic State may become a safe haven for people from other groups and countries to train and plot complex attacks. Having such a haven where the government is not going to interfere makes a huge difference in terrorists’ ability to put together a really complicated plot – from something like 9/11 to a plot to make a nuclear bomb. Let’s not forget that al Qaeda has repeatedly sought to get the kind of nuclear material that really could be put together into a nuclear bomb, and the expertise to do that job. The Islamic State or others taking advantage of its territory may well renew that effort. That’s all the more reason to accelerate the effort to ensure that all the world’s potential nuclear bomb material is effectively secured – and to be grateful that past efforts eliminated such material from Iraq long before the Islamic State came on the scene.

### ---A2 US solves ISIS

#### American ISIS strategy doesn’t solve

Anderson 15 [(retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a civilian advisor in Iraq and Afghanistan) “Containing the Middle Eastern conflict: The danger of long-term mutation” Jan 15, 2015] AT

The Obama administration has settled on a near tem containment strategy for the self-styled Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. In the long term, it hopes to create proxies that will eventually destroy the “Caliphate” that has taken over of northern Syria and Iraq by waging a long term war of attrition against Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi and his minions and the Assad regime in Syria. The national leadership has stated that it is deliberately embarking on a long war of attrition. From a purely intellectual standpoint, that may seem like a rational approach. There is one major danger here: the longer wars last, the more they tend to mutate in ways that their planners could not foresee. The Thirty Years war is an example that seems relevant because it was largely a confused religious conflict as is the current crisis in the Middle East. It began as an attempt by the Catholic Holy Roman Empire to stop the spread of Protestantism into southern Germany. Like the current conflict, it featured non-state actors as well as established monarchies. By the time it ended, much of central Europe had been depopulated, Catholic France was on the Protestant side, and tiny Sweden was a European superpower. The Peace of Westphalia was a series of treaties that ended the war and created the nation-state system that lasted until the Cold War ended. That system was designed to ensure such a holocaust did not happen again; when the Iron Curtain came down, the system broke down and non-state actors are now wild cards again. This war is ripe for the kind of mutations that spun the Thirty Years War out of control. The first potential for mutation is in the area of recruiting and training proxies. We Americans have a mixed record in this area. We were successful in supporting an anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan, but that eventually mutated into al Qaeda and the Taliban. We didn’t understand what we were dealing with, and created a couple of monsters; that is real mutation. Our adventures in Nicaragua supported the pro- American Contras and resulted in a peace where the anti-American Sandinistas eventually won control democratically and are now courting the Russians openly. Using proxies means that control is lost. If the proxy goes bad, unintended consequences such as the mutation of the conflict follow. A second problem is our vacillation regarding the Assad regime in Syria. We want to destroy the Islamic State, but we also want to topple Assad with some of the afore-mentioned proxy forces. If we are bad at managing proxies, we are terrible at regime change. We have an almost one-hundred percent record of failure in organizing such things going back to the fifties. Iran, Vietnam, Iraq, and Libya all eventually ended up causing worse problems through the coups and revolutions that replaced the troublesome regimes than the regimes originally posed. What could possibly go wrong here? Another gene that may cause mutation is Iran. Iran was the big winner in our last Iraqi adventure. Without losing a single combatant, Iran got a friendly fellow Shiite government out of what was formerly its greatest enemy. In this conflict, it is helping to prop up both the current Iraqi and Syrian regimes. It is also making up much of the money it is losing to western sanctions by dumping its products on the Iraqi market, thus putting many Iraqi farmers and businessmen, Shiite and Sunni alike, out of business. Even if the Islamic State is defeated, our greatest regional problem will emerge even stronger at our expense. The final wild card is American public opinion. Although there is current anger about Islamic State atrocities, the American people are results oriented. They instinctively avoid long term, open ended conflicts that have no clear end states. If bombs are still dropping on an unbowed Islamic State with no decisive effect by the next election, there will very likely be hell to pay at the polls. When the effects of these four variables are combined, the whole impact is very likely to be greater than the sum of its parts there is a nine in ten chance that the strategy will go off course, perhaps in several different directions. The ideal hoped for outcome would be stable and democratic governments in Syria and Iraq that do not include the Baathists or the Islamists. With the likelihood of mutation of the conflict at ninety percent or more, the chances of a happy ending are virtually nil. Otto Von Bismarck, Germany’s Iron Chancellor, was a master at breaking his wars down into bite-size portions and insulating them against the factors that could cause those wars to mutate. Bismarck also had a brilliant military partner in General Von Moltke in ensuring the forceful implementation of the Chancellor’s strategic vision. There are no “Bismarckian” genes in the current national security leadership and American military promotion system isn’t producing any Von Moltkes. The only sure bet, is this conflict will be protracted.

### ---A2 ISIS Inevitable

#### ISIS decline is imminent and possible – sustained cooperation is key

Sisco 15 [(Jim, former recon Marine and naval intelligence officer and is currently the president of ENODO Global, a business intelligence firm that focuses on population-centric analysis to solve complex social problems in dynamic cultural environments) “The coming fall of the house of ISIS”] AT

The chinks in ISIS’s armor are already starting to appear and it is only a matter of time before ISIS is defeated. ISIS’s initial popularity and ability to defeat its adversaries and acquire territory are attributed to several factors. The most important of which was a lack of governance in the region and the Syrian and Iraqi governments’ inability to deliver basic services. When ISIS initially took over territories in Syria and Iraq they delivered basic services, governance, and justice—although extreme—to many ungoverned regions. ISIS was able to immediately fill a void created by the ongoing civil war in Syria and a Shiite dominated Iraq Government that neglected the Sunni tribes. ISIS was able to play upon the population’s sympathies and desires and win the “hearts and minds” of the populations in territories they concurred. Unlike al-Qaeda, whose philosophy is to create a global movement without acquiring vast territories, ISIS’s philosophy is to create an Islamic Caliphate. In order to achieve its objective, ISIS will need to maintain captured territory within existing states, provide basic goods and services and administer governance and justice to the populations in these controlled areas. ISIS lacks the capacity and ability to do so and is increasingly relying on fear and violence to maintain control of the areas they currently occupy. As opposition to ISIS increases, so does the level of brutality that ISIS imposes on the population, which will eventually be the cause of its demise. We are already seeing parts of the controlled areas push back in Syria and Iraq. The Egyptian born leader of the ISIS’s police force known as the deputy “emir” of the al-Hesbah force in Syria was recently found beheaded with a cigarette in his mouth. It is not know who committed the act, but residents stated the commander of the group was responsible for numerous beheadings and banned smoking in public. In Iraq, ISIS prohibited Sunnis from participating in the annual celebration of the birth of the prophet Muhammad. Examples of ISIS’s increasing violence against Sunnis in Iraq include the execution of 15 men of the al-Jumaila tribe and a public execution of men, women and children of the Albu Nimr tribe. The executions in Iraq were in response to the burning of ISIS flags and Sunni opposition to ISIS oppression. As ISIS increases its brutality, opposition will grow and eventually lead to its demise. With this understanding, the U.S. and coalition partners should design a population-centric strategy and implement a strategic communications plan that counters ISIS activities and propaganda. By delivering basic goods and services to the populations and communicating more effectively to those directly or indirectly controlled by ISIS, the U.S. and countries opposing ISIS’s advance can accelerate the shrinking of ISIS’s influence and ultimately the demise of ISIS.

### Relations K2 Oil Shocks

#### Relations shift traffic out from the Strait of Hormuz

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

Besides this, both the countries can work and enhance their strategic engagementsxxviii at a higher level. Second, UAE, including other Gulf countries as well, should diplomatically ‘de-bracket’ India from Pakistan. India has outgrown from its regional setup; its trillion plus economy, billion plus market, growing defence capabilities, particularly naval power, science and technology prowess, particularly ICT, medical science, biotechnology, vibrant ‘knowledge community’, emerging modern English speaking middle class, liberal-secular ethos backed by independent judiciary and its constitutional capability of co- existence with diverse culture, caste, communities and ethics, converts India into a powerful ‘geo-political’ force. Energy Engagements - Indo-GCC Gas Pipeline ￼￼UAE is now India’s fourth largest oil supplier; India resources around 14 MMT oil annually, which is expected to grow further, particularly after cutting of the Iranian share. Looking at the growing future relationships, engagements in hydrocarbons field needs to be more robust and strategically sustainable. UAE’s oil deposits, sitting at 8.8 per cent of the total global deposit, are inexhaustible for the coming 100 years. This opens India’s window for long- term energy engagement with the UAE. UAE should offer India oil acreages. Indian companies such as OVL, IOL and Reliance Petrochemicals have enough expertise to assist, train, and finance and own oil projects in UAE. Other significant area where India and UAE can engage is building a ￼joint subsea gas pipelines. On the pattern of India and Oman,xxix India and UAE can also think of either extending the Dolphin Project up to India or the Indo- Omani pipeline may be converted into Joint Indo-GCC Gas Pipeline.xxx Qatar, which has 3rd largest gas deposits may also join the group. This can potentially open opportunities for Iran to join the Indo-GCC Pipeline later. India’s domestic gas pipelines which connects the western coast to the ￼eastern coast, can convert the Joint Indo-GCC Gas Pipeline into a vehicle of targeting the East Asian gas market, converting/making India’s eastern coast as a the ‘GCC energy-LNG gateway’ to East Asian economies. This will help reduce not only the marine pollution, congestion at the Strait of Hormuz but also open up the Asian gas market to the Gulf countries, which find tough to sell to the western market due to saturation as well as tough competition with Russia.

#### Trade through the Strait of Hormuz is dangerous – attack is coming now and will cause oil shocks

Howland 4 [(Jonathan, editorial assistant at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs) “Hazardous Seas: Maritime Sector Vulnerable to Devastating Terrorist Attacks” Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 4/1/4]

Iran gained de facto control of the Straits of Hormuz by acquiring the three tiny islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb in the early 1990s. As the only maritime access point to Persian Gulf oil, Hormuz has been described as the single most important waterway in the world. It is estimated that 13 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) pass through the two-mile wide inbound and outbound channels of the strait providing 40 percent of the world's oil supply. Over the last decade, Iran has begun an aggressive military buildup campaign in the Straits. MiG-29 "Fulcrum" fighters, Su-24 "Fencer" attack planes, and a Beriev A-50 "Mainstay" airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, have all been shifted to airfields near the coastal city of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran. Anti-ship cruise missiles have reportedly been sighted on the island's shoreline. In 2002, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme ruler, warned, "If they [Western nations] do not receive oil, their factories will come to a halt." In December of 2001, Senator Bill Nelson (DFla.) stated, "mark my words...sooner or later [a] terrorist is going to try to sink a tanker in the Straits of Hormuz, and when that occurs, and that free flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf ends, you're going to have another great energy crisis." Neal Adams noted, "If something happens in this location, there is no alternative supply route (into the Persian Gulf). Fourteen million barrels will go off the market." Saudi Arabia is the only member of the Oil Producing Exporting Countries (OPEC) alliance capable of producing an emergency surge capacity in the event of another oil crisis. However, that two million bpd capability falls well shy of the 14 million bpd that would be removed from the world market if the Straits of Hormuz were temporarily out of service. Moreover, the emergency surge capability of Saudi Arabia is geographically reliant upon access to the world market through the Straits of Hormuz.

#### Safe shipping routes key to the global economy and the survival of billions

Mitropoulos 5 [(Efthimios, Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations) World Maritime Day Parallel Event, 11/15, International Maritime Organization]

We hoped to kick-start moves towards creating a far broader awareness that a healthy and successful shipping industry has ramifications that reach far beyond the industry itself. Global economic prosperity is dependent on trade and trade, in turn, is dependent on a safe and secure transport network. Shipping is the most important part of that global network, although it is rarely acknowledged as such, and seldom given the credit it deserves. Indeed, I have long come to the sad conclusion that the contribution made by the shipping industry - and, in particular, by those who work hard, both on board ships and ashore, to make it safer and more environmentally friendly - is greatly undervalued by the public at large. You may have noticed that I used the word "sad" to brand my conclusion. I am sorry to say that there is another word I might suggest as more fitting to characterize the situation and that is the word "unfair" - in capital letters! I think it is worth pausing for a moment to consider just how vital the contribution of ships and shipping actually is. More than 90 per cent of global trade is reportedly carried by sea; over the last four decades, total seaborne trade estimates have nearly quadrupled, from less than 6 thousand billion tonne-miles in 1965 to 25 thousand billion tonne-miles in 2003; and, according to UN figures, the operation of merchant ships in the same year contributed about US$380 billion in freight rates within the global economy, equivalent to about 5 per cent of total world trade. This year, the shipping industry is expected to transport 6.6 billion tonnes of cargo. If you consider this figure vis-a-vis the 6.4 billion population of the world, you will realize that this works out at more than one tonne of cargo for every man, woman and child on the face of the planet - even more for the richer nations. As seaborne trade continues to expand, it also brings benefits for consumers throughout the world. The transport cost element in the price of consumer goods varies from product to product and is estimated to account for around 2 per cent of the shelf price of a television set and only around 1.2 per cent of a kilo of coffee. Thanks to the growing efficiency of shipping as a mode of transport and to increased economic liberalization, the prospects for the industry's further growth continue to be strong. Shipping is truly the lynchpin of the global economy. Without shipping, intercontinental trade, the bulk transport of raw materials and the import and export of affordable food and manufactured goods would simply not be possible. Shipping makes the world go round and, so, let us be in no doubt about its broader significance. To put it in simple terms, as I have done before on a number of occasions during the campaign initiated at IMO to encourage all those involved in shipping to pay more attention to its public perception, without international shipping half the world would starve and the other half would freeze.

#### Oil shocks cause extinction

Lendman 7 [(Steven, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization. “Resource Wars - Can We Survive Them?,” Rense.com, 6-6-7, pg. http://www.rense.com/general76/resrouce.htm]

With the world's energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and "peak oil" near or approaching, "security" for America means assuring a sustainable supply of what we can't do without. It [which] includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. That means energy's partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, wars, ecological recklessness, and now an extremist US administration willing to risk Armageddon for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New "Great Game" and Perils From It The new "Great Game's" begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn't oil. This time, it's the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today's weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. At stake is more than oil. It's planet earth with survival of all life on it issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planet's ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone's paying attention. They'd better be because beyond the point of no return, there's no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones." Under a worst case scenario, it's more dire than that. There may be nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. The threat is real and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy's "quarantine" line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

### Relations K2 Clean Energy

#### Nuclear power

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

Indo-GCC Gas Pipeline will engage multiple partners; hence give India a better leverage to manipulate the energy politics. Nuclear Hobnob ￼￼UAE is the first Arab Gulf country that obtained a clean chit to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes and in 2009 it established the Emirates Nuclear Energy Cooperation (ENEC) to deliver safe, clean and efficient nuclear ￼energy to the country. Although South Korea’s KEPCO firm bagged all contracts, India’s clean non-proliferation records allow it to establish a credible nuclear partnership with the UAE and assist it through its rich experiences and manpower services.xxxiii Another area where India and UAE can cooperate and work together in future is on thorium-based nuclear technology. Both the countries want to meet sizeable portion of their power through nuclear sources; however, both are deficient in natural uranium. Looking at India’s third generation nuclear plan, which is based on converting silica into thorium by developing fast breeder reactors, India and UAE can cooperate with each other as both have ￼abundant silica at their beaches. xxxiv Solar, Tidal and Wind- Three Non-conventional Alliance ￼￼Under the increasing pressure of climate change and the urge to developing alternative energy sources and save oil for export, almost all the Gulf countries have promoted ‘clean’ and ‘green’ energy programmes. Besides hydrocarbons, solar, tidal and wind energy are other natural sources of energy ‘gifts’ to this region. Similar to other Gulf countries, UAE has also embarked on ￼developing alternative energy sources and has given abundant emphasis on developing all three forms of energy sources. For instance, under ‘green decree’, UAE has launched a 12 billion dirham Mohammad bin Rashid al Maktoum Solar Park, which will eventually produce 1000 megawatts of power. Abu Dhabi has launched one of the largest solar missions is the MASDAR city project. The UAE government has also established an Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) unit, while silica is a good source of geo-thermal energy. In all these fields, India and UAE can share their expertise and resources. Indian companies such as LANCO and Indo-Solar are working together in UAE and negotiations with India’s TERI (Energy Research Institute) are also going on. A better and more coordinated pro-active policy in non-conventional sources of energy can promote joint ventures as India has both natural resources and expertises.

### Relations Solve War

#### Relations manage Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shia conflicts

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

India’s Balancing Act in the Region – Building Trust among Arabs and Persians Since India has deep historical, political, economic and cultural relationships with almost all the countries of West Asia, it can play a key role in resolving and minimising the ‘trust deficit’ among all these nations. Looking at the multiplicity of India’s own society, the Indian model can provide a suitable solution or model to these countries passing through a high phase of transformation. Coexistence, secularism and liberal democratic setup may be helpful in reducing as well as minimising the acrimony arising in the form of Shia-Sunni divide, Arabs versus Persians and inter-tribal conflicts. India is the second-largest home to Muslims in the world, with the second-largest Shia population after Iran. Its system has well absorbed as well as handled not only the different religious groups but also ethnicities, races and regional diversities.

#### That escalates to full-scale Middle East war

UPI 13 11/12/13 [United Press International, “Analysts: Accord with Iran could ease Sunni-Shiite bloodshed,” Nov. 12, 2013 at 2:23 PM, pg. http://www.upi.com/Top\_News/Special/2013/11/12/Analysts-Accord-with-Iran-could-ease-Sunni-Shiite-bloodshed/UPI-55331384284185/

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Nov. 12 (UPI) -- There's more riding on a U.S. reconciliation with Iran than just convincing Tehran to scale back its murky and widely feared nuclear program, analysts say. An accord with Tehran could do a lot to ease the swelling conflict between the Muslim world's mainstream Sunni sect, led by Saudi Arabia, and the breakaway Shiites led by Iran, that's become the central issue in the bloodletting in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and threatens the stability of the entire Middle East. The religious rift dates back to the dynastic dispute triggered by the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. Quiescent for centuries, it has flared into violence in recent years, particularly with the turbulent birth of the radical Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. This new confrontation in a dispute that goes back 14 centuries has come to define the modern-day rivalry between Saudi Arabia, which as the birthplace of Islam and guardian of its holiest shrines, considers itself the heart of the Islamic world, and the upstart Islamic Republic, for dominance of the region. The growing sectarianism that now marks the 30-month-old civil war in Syria and the worsening slaughter in Iraq is spilling over into Lebanon, threatening to ignite a new civil war, this time between the Sunni extremists of al Qaida and the Shiite warriors of Lebanon's Hezbollah. The Syrian war is the first conflict that has thrust al Qaida and Hezbollah, Iran's highly prized Arab ally Lebanese, into direct conflict. At least one U.S. commentator has suggested these two religion- and ideology-driven protagonists be left alone to savage each other, allowing the Americans to get rid of two of its relentless tormentors. Constraining Iran's nuclear ambitions is the declared primary objective of the negotiations between the Western powers and Iran, which is also the principal backer of Syria's embattled President Bashar Assad. But as international affairs commentator David Gardner observes, "two other prizes such a deal could unlock are enlisting Iran's help in addressing the most unmanageable conflicts of the Middle East, and starting to turn back the tide of sectarian poison coursing through the region... "Detente with Iran could eventually persuade Tehran to elbow aside the Assads -- now almost totally dependent for their survival on the Islamic Republic -- and unlock a transition out of Syria's misery. "But getting Iran inside the diplomatic tent could also make it easier to manage, if not resolve, a host of other regional problems," such as the increasingly sectarian bloodletting in Iraq and Lebanon, observed the Beirut-based Gardner.

#### Middle east war causes extinction

Russell 9 James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### Strategic interests draw in global powers

Kapila 9 (Subhash, Royal British Army Staff College, MA Defense Science – Madras U., PhD Strategic Studies – Allahabad U., Consultant in Strategic Affairs – South Asia Analysis Group, South Asia Analysis Group Paper # 3114, “MIDDLE EAST 2009: POLITICAL DYNAMICS STIRRED BY UNITED STATES”

More than any other strategic regions of the globe, the Middle East in the 21st Century presents the dubious prospect of being the most conflict-prone region globally. Global armed conflicts or strategic jostling can arise at any moment in this region not only because of intra-regional rivalries but more for reasons connected to energy security, control of strategic choke points and nuclear and WMD proliferation. Besides these major issues the propensity of major conservative Islamic countries not to be pro-active in controlling or liquidating Islamic Jihadi impulses to proliferate to threaten US and the West, are another complicating feature.

### Relations Solve Iran

#### Relations solve GCC-Iran conflict

Mohamed 14 [(Omar Mahmood Mohamed) “India-GCC ties can boost regional stability” Gulf News June 6, 2014] AT

On a regional level, Iran continues to fund various proxies and participate directly or indirectly in various acts of terrorism and sabotage. Any future conflict between Iran and the GCC will be a huge blow to India’s rising energy needs — either through a spike in energy prices or through the complete stoppage of energy flows for a variety of reasons. Further, an aspect less focused on will be the negative impact on the millions of Indian expatriates living in the GCC, who will surely also be victims of such a conflict — either by being forced to return home or by being affected directly as victims. India should use its relationship with Iran to increase stability and perhaps even play the role of a mediator between the GCC and Tehran. This is a region where realpolitik is the order of the day with no room for vague and unfounded idealism. India should take a stronger stance to protect its interests.

### Indo-Pak War Advantage

#### GCC relations solve Indo-Pak war

Bhatnagar 10 [(Zahid Shahab Ahmed, University of New England (Australia) and the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, Costa Rica) Stuti Bhatnagar, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India)) “Gulf States and the Conflict between India and Pakistan” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 2, 259-291] AT

SAARC = South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

The dynamics of the relationship between India and the Arab Gulf States have changed over the years and have gradually entered an era of growing cooperation. The relationship has emerged from its traditional trade oriented focus to an all- round politico strategic partnership. India’s growing economic and defence prowess is further attracting GCC investment and collaboration. India as a nation and the South Asian region has now become an economic and political partner. The relationship between India and Pakistan can also be examined in this new light. Along with India, the Arab Gulf states have a strong economic, political and cultural link with Pakistan. Thus, there appears to be a convergence of interests between India and Pakistan in establishing a close partnership with the GCC. In striving for cooperation, it is also possible that the Gulf States act as a buffer between India and Pakistan. Perhaps as demonstrated by the Franco-German cooperation which accelerated the process of European integration, a similar phenomenon could be seen in the South Asian region. Economic cooperation between the Arab Gulf and India and Pakistan could aid in regional cooperation and a move towards resolving the conflict between India and Pakistan. In an environment of global economic interdependence, both India and Pakistan stand to gain from stronger relations with the Gulf. The GCC countries have in the past expressed concern over the hostility between India and Pakistan and have urged the two countries to resolve the conflict amicably. During much of the cold war era, the Gulf States were wary of India and supported Pakistan in the conflict. Since the end of the cold war, there is a changing geopolitical dynamics in both the regions. Bilateral strategic pacts will help both India and the Gulf countries. The Gulf States play an important role in the OIC and other regional organizations like the Arab League and their political support for India is crucial.1 In 1999, at the height of the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan the GCC foreign ministers issued a joint communiqué. It said ...the GCC called on the two neighbouring countries to resort to reason and prudence in solving the problems between them by peaceful means, avoiding force and the inevitable human and material losses for both sides. The communiqué praised Pakistan’s stand and called on the UN to intervene to end the fighting and by enhancing UN Military observer force now in Kashmir.”2 However the changing global political scenario and an improvement in Indo-Pak relations have warranted a change in GCC attitudes too. Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Pakistani politics has also reduced and the GCC as a whole is willing to take a balanced position in the conflict.

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GCC for Peace between India and Pakistan There was a period of high tension between India and Pakistan during 2001-02, resulting in a massive troop mobilization along the border on both sides. The international community particularly the GCC was alarmed due to these developments. At the end of the consultative summit of the member states of the GCC in 2002, the Secretary General of the organization, Abdul Rahman Al- Attiyeh, urged both India and Pakistan to settle their disputes through a peaceful dialogue process; “The GCC leaders expressed their deep concern over the dangerous situation in the subcontinent and urged India and Pakistan to show maximum restraint and return to the positive atmosphere they had in the past”.2 Later in June 2002, at the GCC foreign ministers meeting, the Omani representative Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah stressed the GCC’s dedication to resolving disputes between India and Pakistan.3 In 2004, at a meeting between the GCC officials with President of Pakistan in Islamabad, Sheikh Al Sabah from Kuwait cited the “progress in Pakistan-India relations as a positive development for the region. The foreign minister reiterated Kuwait’s position that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved in accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions”.1 Shifting focus from political relations, one news item is worth mentioning here, which is with regard to the imbalance of trade between India and Pakistan in the fiscal year of 2007- 08. The report mentioned that “Pakistan’s trade imbalance with India was at $894 million in first 10 months”2. Bilateral trade between the two countries has reduced in comparison to previous years as investors in both countries are unhappy with the instability in contemporary bilateral relations and security ties. However, it is important to highlight that the unofficial India-Pakistan trade through third countries, mostly through the Gulf countries, is estimated at $10 billion. Considering this fact, it is important to realize that the Gulf countries can act as a buffer for India-Pakistan economic development and the peace process can be sustained by encouraging expansion of bilateral trade (official and unofficial) and composite dialogue process. In times of insecurity or instability between India and Pakistan, there is a disruption in direct communication at the state and civil society levels. With the Gulf countries opening the doors for indirect Indo-Pak cooperation, at least the process of economic development through bilateral trade and peace process at the civil society level (track II) will remain intact. There is another issue with regard to trade between India and Pakistan, which is Pakistan’s refusal to give the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India, even after signing the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). Pakistan’s refusal is a blow to India which had assumed that ratification of SAFTA would automatically lead to the extension of MFN as the agreement envisages a duty-free trading area with SAARC countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and Bhutan) by 2018.1 As this is against the SAFTA rules therefore India could exercise the option of filing a case against Pakistan at the dispute settlement body2 of SAFTA. An attempt by any of the Gulf States to mediate on Kashmir is likely to be interpreted by India as a hostile act or interference in her internal matters. With the signing of the Simla Agreement in 19723, the Indian government has taken the position that Kashmir is an internal matter and all outstanding issues with Pakistan will be resolved on a bilateral basis. The rejection of all outside interventions and mediation with respect to Kashmir has been the cornerstone of Indian foreign policy since the 1970s. There is no indication that this will change any time soon, despite the plight of the Kashmiri population. However, considering the religious link between the GCC and Pakistan, the former’s mediating role to directly resolve the Kashmir dispute could also lead to hurting the GCC-India relations. Also India might also consider the GCC role as religiously biased. The 2007 official statistics by the central banks in both India and Pakistan depicts that the bilateral trade between both countries and the GCC bloc is approximately $36 billion. It includes $25 billion between India and the GCC and $11 billion between Pakistan and the GCC.4 There has been a series of meetings between the officials from the GCC countries with India and Pakistan to sign Free Trade Agreements (FTA). Considering the trade- relations of the Gulf countries with India and Pakistan, it will be of a great significance if the latter help to establish the Indo-Pak Trade Commission for the Gulf Countries. There could also be a possibility of inter-regional agreement on free trade between GCC and SAARC which will lead to improvement in relationships at the inter-regional level as well as simultaneous economic development in South Asia. This way it will be easier to quickly implement trade initiatives.

## Relations – ME War Frontlines

### ME War – A2 Self-Preservation

#### Middle East war escalates – perceived lack of redlines means both sides have incentives to escalate, even if the outcome objectively decreases risk of survival – that’s Russell

#### Self-preservation is exactly why leaders go to war – in response to hostile threats there’s popular pressure on leaders to escalate – leaders go to war for POLITICAL preservation

#### Self-preservation also motivates unconventional pre-emptive strikes by weaker states that can’t win a conventional war causing WMD war – that’s Russell

#### Their evidence doesn’t assume religious, ideological, and ethnic motives to go to war – empirically proven by Sunni-Shiite, Arab-Persian, and Muslim-Jewish conflicts that aren’t just self-preservation – that’s UPI

### A2 Rationality

#### Rationality isn’t enough – extinction is likely

Shmuel Bar 13, director of studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel, February 2013, “The Dangers of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast,” Hoover Policy Review, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/139416>

Even ideologically, or religiously, highly charged leaderships may be aware of the dangers inherent in nuclear war and behave rationally. However, such awareness and rational decision-making processes are a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Nuclear confrontation may not be the result of some irrational but premeditated decision by leaders to initiate a nuclear strike, but of faulty intelligence, command, and control in escalatory situations. In such situations, it appears that the command and control structures that may develop in new nuclear states in the Middle East are likely to exacerbate the dangers inherent in escalation and brinkmanship, and to result ultimately in perennial nuclear instability or even nuclear war.

### Piracy = Terror

#### Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda are dependent on the pirates for their activity- Pirates are the key internal link to the union of the two groups.

Mauro 11, Ryan. National Security Analyst. Assyrian International News Agency. “Maritime Jihad.” August 2011.

**The U.S. commander overseeing Africa**, General Carter Ham, **confirms that the Al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia, al-Shabaab, is making money from piracy off the coast of East Africa**. **He predicts that Al-Qaeda will directly become involved with the Somali pirates if the problem is not tackled**. Pirate activity sharply increased in 2008, coinciding with advances by al-Shabaab. **The partnership between** the **pirates and terrorists** **is** usually not **one of** ideological affinity, but of **business** **and** sometimes, **coercion**. For example, in February**, a**l-Shabaab members forced a group of pirates to give them 20 percent of what they earn from ransoms. "They demanded we allow six of their fighters to board each of our hijacked ships. We have not left our houses…Worse, we are constantly receiving threatening text messages," one pirate said. In April 2008, a group of Somali pirates got paid a $1.2 million ransom to let a Spanish fishing vessel and 26 hostages go free. Al-Shabaab received five percent of the payment. Predictably, such payments to the pirates encouraged them to continue their profitable practices. There have been dozens of hijackings, hostage-takings and raids since, appeasing the pirates and indirectly financing terrorists. In April 2009, former ambassador to Ethiopia and expert on East Africa, David H. Shinn, said that al-Shabaab sometimes receives a protection fee from the pirates of 5 to 10 percent. If the group trains the pirates, it earns 20 percent. If the Al-Qaeda affiliate finances the entire operation, the commission is as high as 50 percent. In July 2009, Somali officials said that **al-Shabaab was hiring pirates to smuggle in members of Al-Qaeda to the country**. It was said that up to 1,000 foreign jihadists had been brought in that year. In some cases, the jihadists view the pirates as soldiers defending Islam. In 2008, a leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula said to the Somali pirates, "[T]ake caution and prepare yourselves…Increase your strikes against the Crusaders at sea and in Djibouti." A spokesman for al-Shabaab praised them for "protecting the coast against the enemies of Allah." Another group tied to Al-Qaeda, the Ras Kamboni Brigades, said they are "part of the Mujahideen" even if they are unsavory "money-seekers." According to Jane's Intelligence Review, the **pirates and terrorists work together in arms trafficking,** and the Somali pirates are helping al-Shabaab develop maritime capabilities. Al-Shabaab is using hijacked cargo ships to train its operatives in their use. This poses a serious threat to maritime traffic, and a successful attack would have a major economic impact. The Somali Prime Minister made the point in March, "Why bother with a small plane when you can capture a tanker?".

### A2 Piracy Solves Toxic Dumping

#### Dumping is inevitable – they moved elsewhere

Abdullahi 9 [“Al Jazeera English, October 11, 2008 Title: “Toxic waste behind Somali piracy” Author: Najad Abdullahi] AT

It should be pointed out that both the IUUs and waste dumping are happening in other African countries. Ivory Coast is a victim of major international toxic dumping. It is said that acts of piracy are actually acts of desperation, and, as in the case of Somalia, what is one man’s pirate is another man’s Coast Guard.

#### Toxic waste prevention is just the pirates’ excuse – not their actual goal

Knaup 8 [(Horand Knaup in Mombasa, Kenya) “Prelude to Piracy: The Poor Fishermen of Somalia” Spiegel News Dec 4] AT

Fishing was never a thriving business in Somalia. Somalis are not enthusiastic fish eaters, and the bulk of their catch was traditionally exported. But today there is little left of what was already a relatively small and unprofitable industry. Fish processing, especially for export, has ceased to exist. There is no reliable transportation and there are no longer any functioning refrigeration facilities in the country, nor are there any ships left that could dock in Mogadishu. Somali fishermen have another problem: toxic waste. Initially dumped on land, toxic waste was increasingly dumped at sea after the collapse of the regime of former President Siad Barre in 1991. Because the country has no coast guard, for the past 20 years the Somali coastline has had no protection against European ships dumping waste at sea. Although hard evidence was rare, there have been periodic and mysterious incidents. In early 2002, tens of thousands of dead fish washed ashore at Merca, south of Mogadishu. The causes remain unclear. In the spring of 2004, fishermen spotted two large containers floating in the water near Bosaso. Whether they were deliberately tossed overboard or accidentally fell of a container ship in rough seas is unclear. The Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, which also reached the African coast, unearthed dozens of containers of toxic waste and deposited the waste along the Somali coast. According to a United Nations report, many coastal residents suffered "acute respiratory infections, heavy coughing, bleeding gums and mouth, abdominal haemorrhages, unusual skin rashes, and even death." Experts and environmentalists have long been aware of the problem. In 2006, a team of specialists sent to the region to investigate discovered nine toxic waste sites along 700 kilometers (435 miles) of coastline in southern Somalia. The UN envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, said last October that the UN has "reliable information that European and Asian companies are dumping toxic waste, including nuclear waste, off the Somali coastline." An Excuse for the Pirates In Mombasa, Kenya, pirate expert Andrew Mwangura complains "that toxic waste has been dumped in Somalia for a long time," and that the international community is looking on and "doing nothing about it," thereby giving the pirates "a convenient excuse to legitimize their actions." The words of UN Envoy Ould-Abdallah were confirmed only a few days later, when leaking containers of toxic waste were washed ashore in Harardhere, about 200 kilometers (124 miles) south of Mogadishu. Animals in the area contracted unusual diseases, and coastal residents suffered coughing and vomiting attacks. The lack of scruples displayed by foreigners using Somali waters to dump their toxic waste is not all that surprising: proper waste disposal in Europe costs about 400 times as much as illegal dumping in Somalia. The extent of ocean dumping of toxic waste is just as poorly documented as the claims of adverse effects on fish populations off the coast. Speculation abounds, and yet there are no reliable studies from the last 20 years. The fact is, however, that Somali fishermen, for various reasons, have been catching fewer and fewer fish in their nets for years. While the fishermen complained quietly, the members of another profession -- the pirate trade -- have been quick to claim the plight of the fishermen as their own. The Somali pirates have repeatedly argued that they were forced into piracy by the demise of fishing and the practice of dumping toxic waste at sea. But the truth is that only a small fraction of traditional fishermen have switched to piracy. When the recently hijacked supertanker Sirius Star dropped anchor off Harardhere, former army General Mohamed Nureh Abdulle told the BBC that the hijackers were unknown, and that they had not attempted to establish contact with the coastal population. Elsewhere along the coast, it is often unknown men -- not former local fishermen -- who are guarding the ships and waiting for ransom money. Attractive Piracy Nevertheless, toxic waste and illegal foreign fishing are convenient arguments for the pirates. "The Somali coastline has been destroyed, and we believe this money is nothing compared to the devastation that we have seen on the seas," said Januna Ali Jama, a spokesman for the pirate group that is still waiting for its ransom for the MV Faina, a Ukrainian vessel carrying tanks and military hardware. Pirate life is attractive. The profits are immense, even though the men carrying out the hijackings keep only about 30 percent of the ransom money. Of the remainder, 20 percent goes to the bosses, 30 percent is paid in bribes to government officials and 20 percent is set aside for future actions. The pirates are quick to accept losses. Even though a number of pirates are now in prison in Paris, in the Kenyan port city of Mombasa and in Bosaso, Somalia's main port, and although the international community has sent a small armada of warships to Somalia, the hijackers are getting more and more audacious, targeting supertankers and ships transporting weapons, luxury yachts and chemical tankers. In what was apparently a coordinated effort, on Tuesday night they attempted to attack five ships simultaneously in waters east of Somalia. A short time earlier, they had attacked the luxury cruise ship MS Nautica, with more than 1,000 passengers on board.

#### Pirates cause more devastating ocean disasters

ITF 13 [(International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) is an international trade union federation of transport workers' unions) “The impact of piracy: seafarers, shipping industry,economy, environment” Safety for Seas Jun 14] AT

Seafarers are on the frontline of the piracy problem. All seafarers transiting the Gulf of Aden and Northern Indian Ocean, have to live with the risk of attack. When ships are attacked by pirates, crews suffer the stress of being fired upon with guns and rocket propelled grenades and those captured can be held hostage for months. Following a piracy attack those involved can be seriously affected by post traumatic stress. Indications are that pirates' treatment of the crew is worsening, with some seafarers having been held in solitary confinement and subjected to other cruelty. For the shipping industry, costs are soaring. Operators now face rising insurance premiums for a high risk area that now covers most of the Indian Ocean and one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Other costs include installing preventative measures and protection on board, employing private security personnel, as well as ransom payments. Then there is the wider economic impact of piracy. Ship owners are finding it increasingly hard to justify putting seafarers at risk. They are also struggling to find crews that are willing to transit the area. As the situation worsens a blockade of the area becomes more likely. A ban would mean all ships having to sail around the Horn of Africa. This would add several days to most voyages, would push up transport costs, would see oil prices skyrocket and would have a huge impact on the already fragile world economy. If the attacks move further into the Gulf, oil supplies worldwide may be severely affected. There is a real risk of an environmental catastrophe. The rocket-propelled grenades used by many pirates are capable of doing enough damage to the hull of a tanker to cause serious marine pollution or a fatal explosion with consequences similar to those last year in the Gulf of Mexico.

#### Accusations of dumping are false

Piracy Report 11 [(Cites multiple stakeholders in Somalian dumping controversy, including Campaign Director in Greenpeace’s Italian Office; Bashir Yussuf Barre, spokesperson for the fishermen of Banadir; Commodore Michiel B Hijmans, former commander of NATO’s anti-piracy mission Ocean Shield;and Somalia Report news source) “Toxic Dumping: Pirate Excuse or Ongoing Abuse? Wealth of Historical Evidence, But Little Proof Today” 8/4/2011] AT

While hard proof of historical abuse exists, the situation today is murkier, as the security situation means few groups actually gain access to take water samples or investigate suspect containers. Coastal communities say that while toxic dumping decreased for a while, the arrival of foreign navies in 2008 to tackle piracy set the process in motion again. Many fishermen accuse NATO and the European Union of using their navies to protect vessels engaged in dumping from pirates. “After the tsunami that enveloped the coast of Somalia, we have registered a significant drop in our catches,” Bashir Yussuf Barre, spokesman for the fishermen of Banadir, told Somalia Report. “Two things are possible here: first there has been this issue of toxic waste disposal into our waters, and we believe as fishermen this is the biggest contributor to the drop in our stocks. Some western multinational companies are using our waters to dump some dangerous and poisonous toxic waste, thus reducing fishing activities. The other issue is that there is a growing concern all over the world that sea products are decreasing due to adverse climatic conditions.” Another fisherman, based in Hobyo, said he had seen evidence with his own eyes. “A few weeks ago, three big unidentified containers washed onto our seashore, the next day we saw a number of dead fish along the shore,” Mohamed Hirre told Somalia Report. “That means that illegal dumping is continuing unabated in Somalia ... we will only witness the reduction of our fish stocks in the next few years if the world doesn’t protect our sea.” Alessandro Gianni, Campaign Director in Greenpeace’s Italian office, acknowledges they have no programs in Somalia due to security, and thus it is hard to prove anything in the current climate. However, he points to signs in Italy that efforts are still ongoing to use Somalia as a rubbish dump. “We know that last summer the Italian Customs blocked some containers loaded with 45 tons of car scraps in the harbour of Gioia Tauro,” he told Somalia Report. “According to a press release issued by the customs authorities, the waste – declared as automotive ‘spare parts’ - was bound to Somalia.” Ecoterra Intl, a marine monitoring group that also tracks piracy, says it has evidence that foreign vessels are still using Somalia’s un-policed waters to dump a variety of nasty goods. But the group, which says it is working on court cases, refused to reveal any of its proof when contacted by Somalia Report. The case against As for the foreign navies, they dismiss out of hand allegations that they are shielding nefarious dumping vessels, or that any wrongdoing is taking place anywhere in the areas they patrol. “We have seen absolutely no evidence of such activity at all. There has been some of this many years ago, but not any more in the last years,” Commodore Michiel B Hijmans, former commander of NATO’s anti-piracy mission Ocean Shield, told Somalia Report before he handed over his responsibilities to his successor in June. “I am afraid it is indeed just an excuse used to misinform, and by that to mislead, the Somali people and also some in the international community,” he added. Nick Nuttall, spokesman for UNEP, said that a multi-agency team took water samples after the tsunami, but was unable to turn up any evidence of significant water pollution. He said his feeling was that toxic dumping was a “historical phenomenon”. However, he did admit that the chaotic nature of the situation in Somali meant that no proper studies had been done, and said nobody had “ever gotten to the bottom of these allegations”. “This is a concern that dates back over two decades and UNEP some time ago was concerned that there might be illegal hazardous waste being taken to Somalia,” he told Somalia Report. “But, we have been unable in the intervening years to follow that up, in part because of security reasons and difficulties in getting a really top scientific team in to spend what would require some time to really carry out full assessments.” One of the cornerstone "proof" documents was a report created by Mahdi Gedi Qayad who traveled to the region in May and June of 1997, talked to local leaders, walked on the beach and wrote a simple 6 page report that found no evidence of toxic waste dumping other than the verbal testimony of the locals. The report was not released to the public but was often cited as United Nations proof of toxic dumping when in fact no proof was provided. The aftermath of the 2004 tsunami also provided more "proof" in the form of containers, debris and industrial items that were labeled as evidence of toxic dumping but again no scientific connection between toxicity and these containers were created. 'Suspect' containers As shown by Hirre’s testimony, delivered by telephone earlier this year, reports still pop up that suspect containers have washed up, particularly around Hobyo. However, part of the problem is that local communities seem to treat any flotsam (floating wreckage of a cargo or ship) or jetsam (part of a ship or cargo thrown overboard in times of distress) that arrives on their beaches as proof of toxic dumping. At one point, Somalia Report was promised a picture of a waste container. When it arrived, it turned out to be nothing more than a navigation buoy. Somalia Report sent a correspondent to Hobyo to look at the containers and take pictures of them. Our reporter was told there were at least five containers, but he was only able to view three during his visit due to insecurity (at one point he was kidnapped by a local militia). Each container he was shown had been there for at least two years, and Hobyo residents told him they had not seen anything new wash up since. The containers our reporter viewed on the beaches were for the most part empty, and looked as though they had been in the water a long time before washing up. Equally, there was nothing to suggest that their contents had ever been dangerous. We sent pictures of the containers to Glen Forbes, who served in the Royal Navy for over three decades and now runs OCEANUSLive, a site aimed at improving the safety of seamen through communication. Forbes said it was “very unlikely they would have been used for the transportation of toxic waste”. “They appear to be jetsam (possibly flotsam),” he told Somalia Report. “They would have made very poor containers.” However, Forbes said that the containers would need to undergo toxicology analysis to be absolutely sure of their origins.

### A2 No ISIS Threat

#### They’re right – ISIS doesn’t threaten the US directly – but it is a threat as a conduit for nuclear weapons for other terrorist groups which they haven’t answered

#### Their evidence doesn’t assume the discovery of a laptop with nuclear attack plans – that’s Plame

#### Their deflation of the ISIS threat is offense for us

Linker 15 [(Damon, senior correspondent at TheWeek.com and a consulting editor at the University of Pennsylvania Press) “How Liberals Missed the True Threat of ISIS” The Week Feb 18] AT

But really: Is this even remotely controversial? Of course not. Virtually every single American believes that killing is wrong, and that killing someone over religious differences is indefensible, beyond the pale of civilization, an act of madness, insanity, and the purest barbarism. There are no protests supporting Hicks. No organizations forming to encourage others to gun down Muslims. Now let’s think about ISIS. The Islamic State is an organization devoted to instituting the most literalistic, draconian form of Muslim fundamentalism imaginable. It not only permits but positively insists on imposing severe punishments for a long list of moral and theological crimes; the punishments include slavery, lashes for drunkenness and fornication, stoning for adultery, and amputation for theft. It considers crucifixion a fitting punishment for those deemed enemies of Islam. Homosexuals are regularly hurled to their deaths from the roofs of buildings, with the executions filmed and promoted online. As the world knows all too well, the group also delights in beheading, on video, any infidel or apostate who fails to show adequate level of “submission” to the Islamic State. (This would include the 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians who were beheaded on a Libyan beach this past weekend.) As Wood explains, all of this grows out of ISIS’s goal of establishing a caliphate modeled on the military conquests of Islam’s founding 1,400 years ago. It is a vision of politics as a brutal theocracy in a state of constant war. It even denies the legitimacy of fixed borders and views both its victories and defeats, including a forthcoming bloody battle between the caliphate and the “army of Rome,” as hastening the end of the world. ISIS, in sum, is an apocalyptic death cult, “the realization of a dystopian alternative reality,” as Wood aptly puts it, “in which David Koresh or Jim Jones survived to wield absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but some 8 million.” That’s pretty chilling. But here’s something even worse: Tens of thousands of foreign Muslims are thought to have immigrated to the Islamic State. Recruits hail from France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Holland, Australia, Indonesia, the United States, and many other places. Many have come to fight, and many intend to die. [The Atlantic] Think about that: tens of thousands living in countries spread across the globe, many of them in free societies, have heard about this group, its aims, and its actions, and they have responded not with horror but with an enthusiasm so intense that it has motivated them to leave their homes to join the battle. In the context of America today, where most people (even those who consider themselves religious) devote their lives to the preeminently liberal goals of making money, winning social approval, entertaining themselves with technological toys, and avoiding death at all costs, such behavior sounds an awful lot like mass psychosis. But is it? On the contrary, it is the behavior of people who are eager to devote their lives to a very different set of profoundly illiberal ideals. Ideals like honor. Like fighting and dying for a noble cause. Like severely punishing and killing those who offend the One True God (Allah) and his Prophet (Mohammed). Like submitting oneself to a divinely sanctioned way of life. Like playing a leading role in the sacred drama of the Last Days. Obama was right: this is not entirely unlike the motives behind the Crusades (which of course were known in their day as Christian Holy Wars). But of course the First Crusade was launched over 900 years ago. The European Wars of Religion came to an end over 350 years ago. The intervening centuries have seen real if halting progress in the effort to create a less savage, less cruel, more civilized, more peaceful, more humane world. Which isn’t to say there haven’t been setbacks and rearguard actions to revive older, harsher ways of life and synthesize them with the modern state. Fascism, especially in its German (National Socialist) variant, may have been the most potent. Wood is wise to conclude his article by quoting Orwell on its appeal: Whereas Socialism, and even capitalism in a more grudging way, have said to people, “I offer you a good time,” Hitler has said to them, “I offer you struggle, danger, and death,” and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet. We ought not to underrate its emotional appeal. [The Atlantic] Nor should we deny the yawning moral gap that separates such an outlook from the way the vast run of contemporary Americans view themselves and the meaning of their lives. Recognizing that gap doesn’t have to become cause for the self-congratulation of which Americans are so inordinately fond and which the president and many liberals seem so eager to short-circuit, with their keen focus on exposing double standards and highlighting the dangers of rendering harsh judgments. It merely requires that we acknowledge the truth about ourselves and the profoundly different character of our Islamist enemies.

### A2 Mearsheimer 14

#### Their Mearsheimer evidence assumes US intervention to stop WMD acquisition; but the US is withdrawing – that’s Weibin. Terrorists can steal nukes – ISIS has ties to multiple rogue groups in nuclear weapons states – that’s Plame.

### Yes Al Qaeda Threat

#### AQAP is a threat

Kugelman 1/14 [Michael, Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2015, “The Terror Threat From al Qaeda,” http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/01/14/the-terror-threat-from-al-qaeda/AKG]

No wonder the U.S. government has considered AQAP as the most dangerous terror threat to the West—more dangerous, even, than Islamic State, which has never staged an attack in the West. Writing this week for New York Review of Books, the Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid noted how AQAP–like its parent organization–emphasizes the “far enemy” (the West), while Islamic State is more focused on the “near enemy” in the Middle East. Yet “the phenomenal growth” of Islamic State, he wrote, “has distracted Western intelligence from the continued threat of al-Qaeda,” particularly AQAP. Despite an intensive drone war in Yemen, where the group is based, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is far from diminished. Video surfaced last year of its leaders meeting in the open and vowing to strike the United States. It’s worth noting that the entire al Qaeda franchise remains strong. It boasts powerful affiliates in the Middle East and North Africa and counts as close allies some of the most vicious jihadist groups in South and Central Asia. The Pakistani Taliban (which staged the massacre at a Peshawar school last month), Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network (which regularly carries out attacks in Afghanistan), Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan all have deep ties to al-Qaeda. Nearly all of them have staged attacks on Western targets. And several months ago, al Qaeda launched a new South Asia affiliate. In a New Yorker interview last year, President Barack Obama famously described al-Qaeda as a “jayvee team” of jihadists. But its claim of responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attacks underscores that al Qaeda remains a potent, and lethal, organization.

### AQ Bioterror

#### AQAP will use bioweapons – new advancements have removed tech and expertise barriers – disease spreads globally and causes extinction

Rose and Bernier 2/24 [Patrick, PhD in Microbiology and Immunology from Oregon Health and Science University and Former Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Health and Homeland Security, and Adam, Counterterrorism Expert and Analyst for Gryphon Scientific, 2015, “DIY Bioterrorism Part II: The Proliferation of Bioterrorism Through Synthetic Biology,” http://www.cbrneportal.com/diy-bioterrorism-part-ii-the-proliferation-of-bioterrorism-through-synthetic-biology/AKG]

In the past decade the cost/expertise assertion has become less accurate. Despite the lack of biological attacks, there are a number of very dangerous and motivated organizations that have or are actively pursuing biological weapons. The largest and most outspoken organization has been the global Al Qaeda network, whose leaders have frequently and passionately called for the development (or purchase) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The principal message from Al Qaeda Central and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has included the call to use biological WMDs to terrorize Western nations. Al Qaeda has had a particular focus on biological and nuclear weapons because of their potential for greatest harm. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Anwar al-Awlaki have all called for attacks using biological weapons, going so far as to say that Muslims everywhere should seek to kill Westerners wherever possible and that obtaining WMDs is the responsibility of all Muslims. Before the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had spent significant funds on building a bio-laboratory and had begun collecting scientists from around the world; however, the Afghanistan invasion and subsequent global War on Terrorism is thought to have disrupted their capabilities and killed or captured many of their assets. Despite the physical setbacks, this disruption does not appear to have changed the aggressive attitude towards obtaining WMDs (e.g., more recently U.S. Intelligence has been concerned about AQAP attempting to make Ricin). The emergence of synthetic biology and DIYbio has increased the likelihood that Al Qaeda will succeed in developing biological WMDs. The low cost and significantly reduced level of necessary expertise may change how many non-state actors view biological weapons as a worthwhile investment. This is not to say that suddenly anyone can make a weapon or that it is easy. To the contrary making an effective biological weapon will still be difficult, only much easier and cheaper than it has been in the past. The rapid advancements of synthetic biology could be a game changer, giving organizations currently pursuing biological weapons more options, and encouraging other organizations to reconsider their worth. Because the bar for attaining biological weapons has been lowered and is likely to continue to be lowered as more advances in biological technology are made, it is important that the international community begin to formulate policy that protects advances in science that acts to prevent the intentional misuse of synthetic biology. Disregard for this consideration will be costly. A successful attack with a potent biological weapon, where no pharmaceutical interventions might exist, will be deadly and the impact of such an attack will reverberate around the globe because biological weapons are not bound by international borders.

### Al Shabaab Terror

#### Al-Shabab is a threat now – radicalization and global operations mean high risk of an attack

Masi 2/24 [Alessandria, World News Reporter for the International Business Times, 2015, “Al-Shabab Threat To US, EU Bolstered By Widespread Terror Network, Ties To Al Qaeda,” http://www.ibtimes.com/al-shabab-threat-us-eu-bolstered-widespread-terror-network-ties-al-qaeda-1825834/AKG]

For the first time, Somalia-based terrorist organization al-Shabab has shifted its goals from carrying out attacks in neighboring East African countries to targets in the west. For a decade, the group was, at worst, a threat to the region, but it has now emerged as a new threat to the European Union and the United States. In a video released through the group’s media office on Sunday, the East African terrorist group urged its supporters in the West to carry out lone-wolf attacks, specifically at the Mall of America in Minnesota. The call for individualized violence from al-Shabab presents a double-barreled threat -- The group has a deeply rooted network of cells of Somali communities in the west, and al-Shabab’s closest ally is al Qaeda in The Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemen-based branch of al Qaeda considered to be the group most capable of directly attacking the West. “Al-Shabab has been transforming and the West is a victim of its relative success,” said Dr. J. Peter Pham, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Over the past decade, al-Shabab’s strategy has evolved from a militia advocating Somali nationalism working to expel foreign powers, to declaring an Islamic Emirate in Somalia. In 2007, at least a dozen African countries formed the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a United Nations-backed coalition, funded and trained in part by the U.S. and France, to combat the militant group in Somalia. Nearly eight years later, al-Shabab’s power on the ground within Somalia has severely decreased and it has evolved into a more widespread, sporadic threat. “Al-Shabab has been politically marginalized and is unlikely to regain its strength as a conventional military force,” Bronwyn Bruton, deputy director at the Atlantic Council's Africa Center, wrote in a Soufan Group IntelBrief in November. “Its ‘mosquito-bite’ campaign of suicide bombings, IEDs, and assassinations will continue to embarrass the government, drawing attention to its many weaknesses.” In addition to its continued operations in Somalia, al-Shabab has revamped its global outreach. Drawing from AQAP’s strategy, it has turned away from governance to smaller, more frequent attacks outside the country. “Its military defeat has hastened its transformation into a terrorist group. It’s no longer tied to the land so more radical leaders within al-Shabab that have been in the ascendency have pushed out more local [leaders]… Those with the more transnational ambitions have risen to the top,” Pham said. “Now that they’re no longer tied to have to defend territory and govern it, they’ve actually grown.” Over the last two years, al-Shabab has been able to carry out large attacks outside Somalia. Last year, the group made international headlines when at least four gunmen attacked the Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 67 people and injuring over 175 others. In Sunday’s video, the group called on supporters in Somali communities to attack malls in the West, specifically Minnesota, home to one of the largest Somali communities and one of the biggest malls in the U.S, the Mall of America. “What we have here is an open solicitation to these sympathizers, who maybe because of the changing security situation on the ground in East Africa may not be able to get to Somalia to join al-Shabab, to carry out lone-wolf attacks,” Pham said. Al-Shabab has maintained a steady stream of incoming fighters almost exclusively from Somali communities in the West for years. There was a “sharp increase” in recruitment for al-Shabab from Somali communities in Europe in 2007, particularly from the U.K. and Scandinavian countries with heavy populations of Somali refugees. The group has also recruited Somali-Americans from Ohio, California, Virginia -- Washington D.C. specifically -- New Jersey, and New York, according to the Anti-Defamation League. In 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Somalia-born American resident Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame for providing “material support” to both AQAP and al-Shabab. Last September, several U.S. hellfire missiles reportedly targeted and killed al-Shabab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane. “The development of networks in Europe, Canada, and the United States has potentially given al-Shabab the capability to mount terrorist attacks in the West,” according to “Eurojihad,” a recently published book on radicalization patterns in Europe.

### Yes Nuke Terror

#### Delivery is easy and terrorists empirically can steal nukes

McKinzie 4 [(Kishore Kuchibhotla, NYU Langone Medical Center, Skirball Institute of Biomolecular Medicine and Matthew McKinzie, Senior Scientist, Land & Wildlife Program and Director, Nuclear Program) “Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Accidents in South Asia” Stimson Center Report, February 01] AT

Widespread availability of radioactive materials worldwide makes the threat of radiological terrorism plausible.19 The use of radioactive materials in medicine and industry has been globalized. Radioactive materials are stored and used throughout India and Pakistan for cancer therapy, food irradiation, and medical product sterilization. The same materials that save or improve lives on a daily basis can threaten the public well being, if used by terrorist groups. From publicly available information, we have put together a small sample of the known locations where radioactive sources are used for beneficial purposes in India and Pakistan (Figure 4). As can be seen, they are spread throughout both countries and have varying levels of security. Many of these sources have been produced in the region, but some are imported from abroad. There are many private and public suppliers of radioactive materials and each year, many of these sources are lost and can no longer be tracked. In the United States and European Union, over 370 sources are lost on an annual basis. Thousands have been lost from countries that were once part of the Soviet Union and have yet to be recovered. Additionally, there have been 643 recorded incidents of nuclear smuggling, 80 of which involved the use of radioactive materials with malevolent intent, such as extortion, bribery, and murder.20 Based on data available from the IAEA, India has reported several cases of stolen, and lost sources over the last few years. There have been twenty-five reported cases of missing radioactive materials. Of these, thirteen have never been recovered and 52 percent have occurred by theft.21 Nearly 10,000 radioactive sources are used throughout India (Table 3) of which about 400 are particularly worrisome. Comparable data from Pakistan are not publicly available. The efficacy of existing radiological regulatory practices in India and Pakistan remains opaque to outside analysts. Typically, only one or two radiation safety officers control each source in hospitals, research laboratories, and industrial plants.22 Security practices are sometimes deficient. On August 17, 2003, the Times of India reported that individuals in Jamshedpur, India stole small gauges filled with Co-60.23 These deficiencies are by no means confined to India or Pakistan. The US Department of Energy has compiled a list of recommendations to upgrade security at US facilities, including the following measures: • Establish a national RDD protection level • Develop a national threat policy • Initiate development of a national source tracking system • Develop an integrated national response strategy for rapid recovery of unsecured sources • Develop an integrated national strategy for disposition of unsecured sources • Enhance coordination and communication among governmental agencies • Continue coordination with the IAEA24 Every country that possesses poorly guarded, RDD-“usable” radiological materials has a responsibility to improve public safety and to guard against radiological terrorism. Terrorist Detonation of a Low-Yield Nuclear Weapon This section posits scenarios involving the detonation of a low-yield nuclear weapon. There are five basic nuclear weapons effects. “Blast and shock effects are the primary damage- producing mechanisms for soft targets such as cities and are often the only effective mechanism for destroying underground structures such as missile silos.”25 Immediately after a nuclear explosion, a high-pressure wave moves from ground zero outwards. This wave is usually reflected off the ground creating a secondary blast wave. “Overpressure” is a key measurement of the strength of the blast wave and can be defined as “the pressure in excess of the normal atmospheric value.”26 Thermal effects are responsible for producing burns and eye injuries and could also lead to the ignition of combustible materials. Fire damage from a nuclear detonation has historically been viewed by the United States military as difficult to quantify but may result in up to five times the amount of damage from nuclear blast. The fourth effect is radiation. There are two types of radiation: initial radiation, which is emitted within the first minute after a detonation, and residual radiation, which is emitted thereafter. Residual radiation leads to the “fallout” effect. Finally, there is the electromagnetic pulse effect. This effect occurs at the moment of nuclear detonation. It can be thought of as a very strong electrical disturbance akin to an extremely powerful, fast, and expansive bolt of lightning. This effect will be discussed in greater detail below.27 Electromagnetic Pulse – An Invisible Effect Simulations help visualize the physical and health damage that would result from nuclear blasts. Here we describe an easily overlooked weapons effect, electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMP is a short but extremely powerful electrical disturbance, akin to a very strong and very fast bolt of lightning. It disables electronics and communications equipment almost instantaneously. It has two primary modes of damage: physical damage, such as shorts and burnouts, and temporary operational instabilities, such as power loss and fluctuation. The EMP is particularly devastating to advanced electronics, such as computers, servers, avionics equipment, and other technologies. Older technologies, such as motors and vacuum tubes, are less susceptible. EMP effects can devastate civilian infrastructure. As a Pentagon EMP expert has noted, “The EMP robustness of the civilian infrastructure of the United States can be summarized...[as being] entirely non-existent. Our civilian telephone, electricity, broadband communications, and electrical plants are all naked”.28 Moreover, in the United States, 95 percent of military communication routes through civilian systems.29 EMP effects can also severely hamper military command, control, communications and intelligence. Referring to battlefield operations in the event of a low-yield nuclear weapon, a Marine Corps officer writes that, “The Marine Corps...will have problems with the EMP...The command control systems will be knocked out. The generals and their staff will not be able to talk to their front line troops and they will not be able to receive instructions from higher headquarters in the United States.”30 The EMP effect is not limited to a high-yield weapon. At low yields, the EMP effect can also be extremely intense, as this effect is only weakly dependent on yield. Although there is a 100,000 percent increase in weapon yield from a one KT device to a ten-megaton device, the maximum EMP effect only increases by twenty-five percent.31 Using basic EMP calculations, we have been able to show that the EMP effects from a low-yield surface burst would far outdistance the blast and fire damage. Although the blast would destroy an area of approximately one square kilometer, the EMP from the nuclear detonation would be twenty-five times as large. Most of the electronics and communications capacity in this region would be ruined. If a nuclear weapon detonated near the Gateway of India in Mumbai (see scenario below), the blast effects would not reach out to the Mumbai stock exchange, but the EMP effect would be devastating. The greatest EMP effects would occur within the twenty-five square kilometers surrounding the blast, but even out to almost 100 square kilometers, the EMP damage would be significant. Post-detonation complications would be severe. Electronics and communication systems may be inoperable. Power grids may be affected in an area even outside the city limits. If this were to occur, communication among and between leaders could be compromised, as would be their transportation. With planes and helicopters using advanced avionics and with air trafficking systems affected, it is unclear whether transportation would be feasible. It took the United States and Soviet Union decades to harden military nodes against EMP, and they are still susceptible to considerable damage. Just as importantly, US civilian systems are fully unprotected against such an attack. Fissile Material Availability The severe damage caused by a nuclear weapon necessitates an examination of how non- state actors might acquire such a capability. Although estimates vary, the production of a functional nuclear weapon may require only a few kilograms of plutonium or about fifteen to twenty-five kg of uranium. Reports of theft or unaccounted for nuclear material are widespread and have recently been compiled by Stanford University’s Institute for International Studies (IIS). The Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO) has reported that about “forty kilograms of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium have been stolen from poorly protected nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union during the last decade.”32 Although most of this material has since been retrieved, there still remains two kilograms of highly enriched uranium that is unaccounted for. A researcher at the IIS argues that “this is the tip of the iceberg” and that more than ten times that amount might actually be missing. In 1998, the Russian Federal Security Services (FSB) thwarted a plan by nuclear facility employees to divert 18.5 kg of HEU.33 Had this not occurred, there would have been almost enough fissile material to produce a nuclear weapon. There are no binding IAEA standards of protection, accountancy, and security for weapon-grade material, and most states would be reluctant to accept intrusive foreign assistance to upgrade existing practices Stolen nuclear material can reach its destination by many different routes. Stanford University’s DSTO monitors trafficking routes, and as can be seen, these routes snake through Central Asia toward South Asia (Figure 5). An instance of nuclear terrorism involving HEU or plutonium would have very grave consequences. The likelihood of this eventuality is perhaps less than the likelihood of radiological terrorism involving the use of a dirty bomb, but the consequences would obviously be far greater. More scientific skills would be needed to produce a nuclear weapon utilizing stolen HEU, and the material handling challenges associated with a plutonium bomb would be quite severe. Nonetheless, the possibility of nuclear terrorism using HEU or plutonium cannot be discounted in South Asia or elsewhere. We therefore analyze two scenarios based on the detonation of a five-kiloton yield device in Mumbai and a similar-sized nuclear weapon detonated in Islamabad.

### Terror - Improvised Weapons

#### Even improvised weapons cause mass casualties and global war

Vladimir Z. Dvorkin 12 Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat,"

Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.¶ Severe consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby. The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device. Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause violent protests in the Muslim world. Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

### A2 Keck – No AQ

#### Al-Qaeda is alive – they have strong links to ISIS now – their evidence was written well before ISIS became a threat

#### Their evidence concedes a real terror threat and that delivery is possible

Keck 3/17 [Zachary Keck, associate editor of The Diplomat, 3/17/14, Al Qaeda's Brand is Dead, nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/al-qaedas-brand-dead-10059]

One of the exceptions to this model is Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian who unsuccessfully tried to down a commercial airplane flying to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. Abdulmutallab had been in Yemen studying Arabic when he decided to join the international jihad. After making contact with AQAP, the group built him a specially designed underwear bomb that would not be detected by airport security. Thus, the group did devote some resources to the attack—namely, building the bomb and possibly financing Abdulmutallab’s airfare—but it wasn’t willing to sacrifice any of its own members to attacking the U.S. Furthermore, the original impetus for the attack came from Abdulmutallab, who contacted the group on his own initiative. Another exception to AQAP’s usual model came in 2010, when the group attempted to ship two cargo bombs to Chicago. Tipped off by Saudi intelligence, the packages were discovered before the bombs exploded. Unlike the previous attacks, the initial impetus to launch this attack didn’t come from outside the group. Still, the amount of resources AQAP devoted to the attack were minimal, a fact that the group publicly bragged about. While these events demonstrate that AQAP does pose some threat to the U.S. homeland, they hardly suggest the group is modeling itself off Al Qaeda’s ideology. In contrast to the limited resources it has devoted to attacking the United States, the group has spent the bulk of its energies on waging war against the Yemeni government. This has at times included launching conventional style attacks in south Yemen, and holding territory, which they have tried to govern. Clearly, then, AQAP is far more invested in attacking the near enemy, and only casually interested in attacks on the far enemy. All the other Al Qaeda affiliates have focused exclusively on trying to overthrow local regimes and establishing Sharia governments in their place—which is a direct refutation to Al Qaeda’s ideology. This cannot be attributed entirely to a lack of viable options for attacking the West. For years now Somali Americans have traveled to Somalia to join al-Shabaab in its fight for control over that country. [6]According to U.S. intelligence estimates [6], the group counted at least fifty U.S.-passport holders as members in 2011, and as many as twenty today. Al-Shabaab leaders could have directed any one of these members to return to the United States to carry out attacks there given the ease with which they could gain entry into America.

### Russia – Yes Escalation

#### Ukraine crisis proves miscalc is possible

International News 3/17 [(News agency, cites Secretary of State John Kerry; Rebecca E. Johnson, executive director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament and Diplomacy; Ira Helfand, co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War; Tilman A. Ruff, co-chair, International Steering Group and Australian Board member of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) “US-Russia standoff over Ukraine may trigger nuclear attack” March 17, 2014] AT

Secretary of State John Kerry told US legislators early this week that if the dispute results in punitive sanctions against Russia, things could “get ugly fast” and go “in multiple directions. ”Perhaps one such direction could lead to a nuclear impasse between the two big powers. According to a state agency news report from Moscow, Russia has threatened to stop honouring its arms treaty commitments, and more importantly, to block U.S. military inspections of nuclear weapons, if Washington decides to suspend military cooperation with Moscow. These mostly bilateral treaties between the United States and Russia include the 1994 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the 2010 new START, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and the 1970 international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A nuclear tug-of-war between the two big powers is tinged in irony because post-Soviet Ukraine undertook one of the world’s most successful nuclear disarmament programmes when it agreed to destroy all its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Dr. Rebecca E. Johnson, executive director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament and Diplomacy, told IPS, “Clearly the situation between Ukraine and Russia is deeply worrying. “Without going into the politics of the situation on the ground, as I don’t have the kind of regional expertise for that, this is not a place for issuing nuclear threats or scoring nuclear points,” she said. “I’ve been disgusted to see some British and French representatives try to use Ukraine’s crisis to justify retaining nuclear weapons in perpetuity.” Russia is not directly threatening to attack Ukraine with nuclear weapons, and no one believes it would be useful for the United States and countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to threaten Russia with a nuclear attack, no matter what they do, said Johnson. Ukraine, which was once armed with the third largest nuclear arsenal after the United States and Russia, and possessed more nukes than France, Britain and China, dismantled and shipped its weapons to Russia for destruction beginning in 1994. Dr. Ira Helfand, co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), said Ukraine is commendable in being one of the few states to have given up its nuclear weapons peacefully, and the people of Ukraine should not have to fear nuclear weapons ravaging their country. “Any war involves a terrible and lasting human toll, risks spreading and harming people’s health in the region and beyond,” he warned. In a statement released last week, IPPNW said it underscores the absolute imperative to avoid the possibility of use of nuclear weapons. “This danger exists with any armed conflict involving nuclear armed states or alliances, which could escalate in uncontrollable, unintended and unforeseeable ways,” it warned. Dr Tilman A. Ruff, co-chair, International Steering Group and Australian Board member of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, told IPS the current agreements (e.g. START, New START and INF) are probably most important in that they demonstrate that verified reductions and elimination of whole classes of nuclear weapons are feasible, and hopefully reduce the risk of nuclear war between Russia and the United States. However, continuing massive nuclear arsenals on both sides; the retention of almost 1,800 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert missiles, ready to be launched within minutes; the aggressive eastward expansion of NATO, contrary to what Russian leaders were promised; and the rapid escalation of tension over recent events in Ukraine demonstrate the Cold War has not been firmly laid to rest. “Any confrontation between nuclear-armed states runs the risk of escalating to the use of nuclear weapons, whether by inadvertence, accident, or bad decision-making,” said Dr Ruff, who is also an associate professor at the Nossal Institute for Global Health, School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne. He said currently all the nuclear-armed states are massively investing in keeping and modernising their nuclear arsenals, and show no serious commitment to disarm, as they are legally bound to do. As long as nuclear weapons exist and are deployed, and policies countenance their possible use, the danger they will be used is real and present. “The dangerous and unstable situation in Ukraine highlights this starkly, and should dispel any notion that nuclear danger ended 20 years ago with apparent end of the Cold War,” he said. Dr Johnson told IPS Russian and US nuclear weapons in the region are demonstrably not contributing to deterrence. “If anything, their presence complicates the current dangers, with the attendant risks of crisis instability and potential military or nuclear escalation or miscalculations, though I’d hope no one would be mad enough to actually use them,” she said.

### A2 Generic Russia Defense

#### Russia war is possible – perception of vital interests on both sides will cause escalation. Their evidence is based on a credible deterrent relationship – a nuclear attack is seen as an attack, so a credible deterrent would require US retaliation – their evidence doesn’t assume the US actually believing Russia attacks them

#### High stakes doesn’t solve – it only increases the risk of miscalc since the US thinks it’s under full-scale attack

## Remittances Adv

### Indian poverty

#### Indian poverty strengthens ISIS – that causes terrorist attacks in India

Arunima 14 [(reporter for IBN) “Terror group ISIS using Indian Mujahideen to recruit poor Muslims in Kerala, TN, J&K: Sources”IBN Aug 26, 2014] AT

Even as the whole of Iraq and Syria cower under ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) threat, central security agencies in India say that the terror group may be spreading its tentacles in India. Sources told CNN-IBN on Tuesday that the terror outfit, which has already killed thousands in Iraq and Syria in a deadly pursuit to establish an Islamic Caliphate, is recruiting poor Muslims in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Jammu and Kashmir. The security agencies say that more than 100 Indian men could have already joined the ISIS in Iraq. The terror group is radicalising poor Muslims through online videos, they say. The sources add that an Indian Mujahideen man wanted by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) could be recruiting for the ISIS and that these recruits could be used to strike terror in India once the war in Iraq and Syria ends. The NIA is currently preparing a dossier on ISIS activities in India. It all began when four Kalyan boys took a trip to Iraq and then disappeared. Soon similar reports started pouring in from families in Jammu and Kashmir and Tamil Nadu. Most disappearences were preceded by a letter begging forgiveness from the family and expressing a desire to join the cause of jihad and fighting to save Islam. According to the NIA, the recruitment drive has been on for at least a year now. ISIS is currently fighting in Iraq and Syria but its idea of a greater Islamic Caliphate includes India and several videos exhorting Indian Muslims to join the cause have been uploaded on YouTube. Investigators say that the man behind the digital mask could be Indian Mujahideen's Sultan Abdul Kadir Armar, a resident of Bhatkal in Karnataka. With recent arrests of Indian Mujahideen terrorists, Indian agencies were upbeat about their fight against terror but the worry now is that if Indians have indeed joined the ISIS, they might use the new techniques and weapons to strike terror in India.

### Economy I/L

#### Empirics prove – remittances avoid downturn

Saraf 13 [(Radhika, journalist) “Remittances breathe life into economy as World Bank data shows India received $69billion in 2012” DailyMail April 20, 2013] AT

Indians settled abroad have emerged as saviours of a slowdown-hit Indian economy as well as an increasingly cash-strapped national exchequer. According to data released by the World Bank on Friday, India is the largest recipient of remittances in the world, netting $69 billion (Rs 3.72 lakh crore) in 2012. These remittances are nothing less than manna from heaven for the Indian economy, which is faced with a widening current account deficit (CAD). Ajit Ranade, chief economist at the Aditya Birla Group, is of the view that the remittances from abroad would help India bridge the current account deficit. "We are in a situation in which the current account deficit is worrisome. It is at 5 per cent at the moment and the estimate for next year is about 4 per cent. Any form of income that would help us bridge this is most welcome."Remittances, which are basically the income generated through the export of labour, are therefore crucial," he said. Crisil chief economist D K Joshi said: "The CAD would be much higher if remittances weren't forthcoming. Even when the global financial crisis hit, remittances remained stable. "Stability of remittances depends on where the money comes from and the economic situation in that country. "Although not too much is coming from Europe, if the slowdown persists for a long time, this could affect remittances as employment opportunities could decrease." Overseas affairs minister Vayalar Ravi expressed satisfaction over the fact that remittances have been steadily rising in the past few years. "India received $66.13 billion in remittances in 2011-12 while in 2010-11, the amount was $55.62 billion. As you can see, even during the global economic crisis, the remittances from abroad continued increasing," Ravi said. The minister also said the government has taken a number of steps to encourage this inflow of funds. Listing initiatives to simplify remittances to India, the Union minister said: "Banks have been encouraged to bring improvements in infrastructure and extending the scope of electronic payment mechanism for inter-city settlements between the banks in India so as to reduce the cost of NRI remittances." The government has also advised the banks to examine the feasibility of setting up centralised remittance receiving centres for efficiency and better customer service. "Further, they may identify remittances as an independent business segment and resort to latest technology for handling large volume at lower cost and explore tie-ups with more correspondent banks at existing and new centres," Ravi told Mail Today. Even though remittances have a largely positive impact on the macroeconomic health of a country, they do lead to tensions and imbalances at the local level. Nowhere is this more evident than in Ravi's home state of Kerala, which is estimated to account for nearly 27 per cent of all remittances in the country. "Remittances could have a negative impact in localised settings. For instance, in Kerala, they have caused land prices to shoot up. But the positive effect they have from a macroeconomic standpoint, greatly outweigh the harm they might cause locally," Ranade sai.

### Generic Econ I/L

#### Remittances are a significant portion of domestic product

Chisti 7 [(Muzaffar, Director of MPI's office at New York University School of Law) “The Rise in Remittances to India: A Closer Look” Migration Policy FEBRUARY 1, 2007] AT

It is generally assumed that in a large economy like India's, the impact of remittances is negligible. But, compared with some important economic and fiscal indicators, their relative importance is significant. Today, remittances represent 3.08 percent of the country's GDP — a sharp rise from 0.7 percent in 1990-1991 (see Table 1). In 2005-2006, remittances were higher than the US$23.6 billion in revenues from India's software exports, which is particularly impressive since software exports increased 33 percent that year. In 2004-2005, the state and federal governments in India combined spent less money on education than India received in remittances (see Table 2), according to the figures available from India's Ministry of Finance. And, in the same year, combined state and federal government expenditures on health care came to less than half of the remittance flow (see Table 3). The impact of remittances is more pronounced in parts of the country that have experienced higher volumes of emigration. In the southern state of Kerala, for example, remittances constitute 22 percent of the state domestic product. Experts on Kerala's economy found that per capita income in Kerala is much higher than the national figure because of remittances. Including remittances, Kerala's per capita income in 2002-2003 was 60 percent higher than the national figure, and 34 percent higher excluding remittances.

### Balance of Payment Scenario

#### Remittances are counter-cyclical – they buffer balance of payments and GCC countries are key

Chandrasekhar 13 [(C.P. professor of economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) “The remittance buffer” The Hindu April 27, 2013] AT

The World Bank reported recently that remittance flows to developing countries had crossed the $400 billion mark in 2012. With 215 million international migrants across the world, a majority of whom are from developing countries, this should not be surprising. India has once again turned out to be the leading recipient of remittances, accounting for $69 billion in 2012, which is substantially ahead of that for the other major player in terms of population and geography, China, with $60 billion (Chart 1). The next in line was Philippines and then Mexico, with a much smaller $24 and $23 billion respectively. The significance of these remittances even for an economy like India should not be discounted. While it amounted to just 3.7 per cent of the country’s dollar GDP in 2012 (as compared with 47 per cent in the case of Tajikistan), it covered as much two-fifths of the merchandise trade deficit recorded that year. For a country faced with a widening trade deficit that has pushed the current account deficit to record levels, that is no small comfort. What is remarkable is the steady trend that remittances show, when compared to the extreme volatility of flows of foreign direct investment, portfolio capital and external debt, especially in recent years (Chart 2). Other then for a slight fall in 2009, when the world was steeped in the Great Recession, global flows of remittances have been rising consistently since 1990, with signs of acceleration after the turn of the century. India has been a leading beneficiary of this trend because, unlike many other countries that rely on remittances from unskilled and/or semi-skilled migrants, it has in recent years combined that stream of inflows (originating largely from the Gulf countries) with a significant inflow of remittances from highly skilled workers (originating largely in the US and Europe). The sources of India’s remittances have shifted over time. Immediately after the oil shocks of the 1970s, the short-term migration trail was dominated by the flow of masons, carpenters, and unskilled workers drawn by the construction boom in West Asia. Migration to other parts of the globe, especially its developed centres like the United States and the United Kingdom, consisted of permanent migrants, who retained most of their savings in their countries of residence. Short-term migrants often had their families at home to maintain and chose to transfer their savings home, being attracted by the higher interest rates and driven by the need to accumulate their savings to support them when they return. The transformation that has taken place in the sources of remittances over the last decade and a half is that while West Asia has remained an important source in absolute terms, its share in total remittances has fallen substantially. According to a 2010 study by the Reserve Bank of India, region-wise, the Gulf Countries accounted for 31 per cent of the total remittances to India in 2008-09, followed by North America (29 per cent) and Europe (20 per cent). The latter two accounted for nearly half the total. This shift in the sources of remittances was partly the result of the impact that the software services export boom had on the nature of Indian migration to the United States and Europe. In the United States, for example, the flow of software and IT services workers required to provide onsite services to clients of Indian firms under the HI B visa provision, increased substantially. These workers, who were paid a full salary or a substantial allowance while resident in the US, saved and transferred a significant share of their earnings either to support families at home or retain them as savings in the home country. Thus, explaining the remittances surge, which has sustained itself through the oil shock years and into the IT export years, is not difficult. The puzzle relates to the question why this surge did not lose steam in the wake of the financial and real economy crises that engulfed both North America and West Asia during 2008. In fact things seem to be getting even better. The World Bank projects that the growth rate of remittance flows to developing countries, which decelerated to 5.3 per cent in 2012, would accelerate to 8.8 per cent during 2013-15 to touch $515 billion in 2015. But nobody is complaining, whether it be in India or eslewhere. Thanks to this resilience, remittances have been and remain a major source of strength for the Indian economy, serving as a buffer for a deteriorating balance of payments. This is a factor that needs to be given more importance when assessing India’s economic performance.

#### That threatens India’s economy

Ashworth 14 [(David Ashworth, Memec's chief executive) Why India’s trade balance impacts investors, Market Realist 11-25-2014] AT

According to the latest budget for fiscal year 2015, the government outlined 324,636 rupees, or ~ $53.2 billion, as central government assistance for state and union territory plans under revenue expenditure. This is the highest expenditure for the government under planned expenditure. It’s also the highest expenditure overall if we don’t count debt servicing. Subsidies under non-plan expenditure are the second biggest expenditure overall. They’re higher under the non-plan head—not including interest payments and the prepayment premium. The government plans to spend 260,658 rupees, or ~ $42.7 billion, in fiscal year 2015. Earning revenue Revenues mainly come from two sources: Revenue receipts Capital receipts Revenue receipts include tax and non-tax revenue. Capital receipts include debt and non-debt receipts. Tax revenue is the Indian government’s main revenue source. Non-tax revenue refers to money that’s received from surpluses from public companies, external grants, and interest received on loans. Debt receipts mainly refer to the government’s market loans and short-term borrowings. Non-debt receipts include cash received from miscellaneous sources and recoveries from loans and advances. Revenue receipts contribute to the government’s revenue the most. For fiscal year 2015, it’s estimated that revenue receipts will contribute over 66% of the overall receipts. Market borrowings are the government’s largest source of funds—461,205 rupees, or ~ $75.6 billion. Corporation tax and income tax are next at 451,005 and 284,266 rupees, or ~$74 billion and ~$46.6 billion, respectively. The current government intends to contain the fiscal deficit at 4.1% of the gross domestic product (or GDP) for fiscal year 2015. Although it remains to be seen whether India’s government achieves this stretched target, there’s little doubt that improvement in India’s fiscal situation will bode well for investors in exchange-traded funds (or ETFs) like the WisdomTree India Earnings Fund (EPI), the iShares MSCI India ETF (INDA), the iShares S&P India Nifty 50 Index Fund (INDY), the PowerShares India Portfolio (PIN), and the iPath MSCI India Index ETN (INP). Trade balance is another important indicator. In the next part of this series, we’ll discuss India’s trade situation. In today’s globalized world, most nations are trading with each other. As a result, it’s important to look at a country’s trade balances. Trade balances account for a significant portion of a country’s current account. Like other “balance” indicators, trade can either be in surplus when exports are more than imports or in deficit when the situation is reversed. Although surplus and deficit situations have pros and cons depending on the state of a nation’s business cycle, usually a continuous or increasing deficit situation is a concern. According to an economic survey in 2013–2014, India’s share in the world’s exports and imports was 1.7% and 2.5%, respectively, in 2013. Although this is an increase from 0.7% and 0.8% of world exports and imports in 2000, the increase has been very gradual. India’s rank among the top exporters in the world increased from 31st in 2000 to 19th in 2013. Among importers, India was ranked 26th in 2000. It was ranked 12th in 2013. Why India has a trade deficit India has a trade deficit mainly because of high import growth. Crude oil accounts for most of the imports at ~40%. More vehicle purchases also increased the demand for fuel. As a result, India’s imports continued to grow. Also, with crude oil accounting for the majority of imports, India has been susceptible to changes in oil prices. Exports haven’t kept pace with the increasing imports. The global economic slowdown affected India’s major export destinations. Exports’ value continued to fall. Currently, India has a business-friendly prime minister—Narendra Modi. India’s businesses are expected to get a boost. Businesses ranging from software service companies—like Infosys (INFY)—to financial institutions—like ICICI Bank (IBN) and HDFC Bank (HDB)—will benefit. Exchange-traded funds (or ETFs)—like the WisdomTree India Earnings Fund (EPI) and the PowerShares India Portfolio (PIN)—will also benefit. In the next part of this series, we’ll discuss India’s main exports and imports. We’ll also analyze its top trading partners. Other major exports that aren’t displayed in the above chart include cotton, iron, steel, apparel, and clothing accessories. India’s main imports Mineral fuels, oils, waxes, and bituminous substances and precious metals and stones, natural or cultured pearls, and imitation jewelry are the two main imports. They account for more than 50% of India’s imported goods. Other main imports are plastics, animal or vegetable fats and oils, medical and surgical instruments, and fertilizers. India’s top trading partners From April through June, India’s top trading partners were China, the United Arab Emirates (or UAE), and the US. Its top ten trading partners accounted for more than 46% of the total trade during that period. For fiscal year 2013, China overtook UAE as India’s biggest trading partner. It had $65.8 billion in trade. India had the largest trade deficit with China in 2013. Its trade deficit was $36.2 billion. Among its top ten trading partners in the year, India maintained a trade surplus with four countries—the US, UAE, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The global economy is improving—except in Europe and Japan. They’re still facing headwinds. However, the recovery is still fragile. Until the economy stabilizes, it will be important to monitor India’s trade balance.

### ---More Remittances Stuff

#### Remittance slowdown threatens Indian balance of payment

Nayak 13 [(Gayatri Nayak, ET Bureau) “ET in the classroom: Why remittances are important for India” The Economic Times Apr 11, 2013] AT

India's robust remittance inflows were always taken for granted. But with the current-account deficit touching a record on the back of rising imports and dividend and interest outflows, these private transfers are turning to be crucial for India's balance of payments. What are remittances? These are payments sent by Indians abroad to relatives back home. Remittances are essentially meant for maintenance of the recipient household, but a recent RBI survey shows that a substantial part of these inflows get invested in stocks, bonds, fixed deposits and and real estate. From a balance-of-payments perspective, remittances are permanent foreign currency inflows and help finance the current account, unlike NRI deposits which are repatriable. How much remittances does India receive? India is the largest recipient of worker remittances in the world. In financial year 2012, it received $66 billion, according to the RBI. Remittances form about 22-23 % of the country's foreign exchange reserves. Why have they been flat? One reason is the general slowdown in the global economy resulting in slower worker migration as well as lower incomes. But unlike many of its neighbours (Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal), India does not rely heavily on remittances to fund its growth. Why is this development worrisome? Remittances are an important source of foreign exchange in India's balance of payments. And this slowdown in remittances, perceived to be a more reliable and stable source of inflows, has impacted the current account deficit, which has touched a record 6.7% of the GDP during the quarter ended December 2012.

### India Econ Impact

#### Economic growth is the key internal link to decreasing hostility and mitigating Indo-Pak conflict

Mamoon 8 and Murshed 08 Dawood Mamoon, Netherlands Fellowship holder at the Institute of Social Studies, Professor of the economics of conflict and peace at the Institute of Social Studies and S. Syed Mansoob Murshed, Professor of international economics at the Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, UK, “On the Conflict Mitigating Effects of Trade: The India-Pakistan Case,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 25. April 2008)

In order to further check the conclusions drawn from our VECM results in table 2, we generated 6 different forecast schedules from 6 co-integrating VECMs as a simulation exercise to predict how conflict would be affected by changes in its determinants. Note that the data on Fatal are only up to 2002. Thus the one year forecasts are generated for Fatal for 2003 period. Figure 6 shows the forecast graphs. Graph 1a, 1b and 1c suggest that if military expenditures in both countries would remain at its current high levels, along with trade with the outside world at their 2002 levels, a slight deterioration in democracy scores will have a significant effect on the rise in hostility. However, if India is able to export or import more, this would at least put a check on any rise in the severity of conflict and hostilities would adjust to some average level. Any decline in Indian trade will enhance hostilities. The current low levels of bilateral trade between Pakistan and India is conflict enhancing, so more trade with increased exports by both sides to each other should be encouraged. More access to Pakistani markets on the Indian side may not lead to conflict mitigation if Pakistan is not able to also export more to India. A rise in education expenditure puts a check on hostilities, as seen in Graph 1e. Graph 1f is the standard representation of India-Pakistan conflict, and not only best fits historical trends but also explain the rationale behind recent India-Pakistan peace initiatives with decreasing hostilities when not only India but Pakistan also has had economic growth rates as high as 7% per annum. The forecasts suggest that conflict will rise, even if there is a significant increase in combined democracy scores, if growth rates plummet. Both Pakistan and India have seen many such years, when hostilities between both countries rose significantly when at least one of the countries is performing poorly, but were channeling more resources on the military as a proportion of their GDPs. The forecasts favour the liberal peace over the democratic peace. Thus one may look at current peace talks between both countries with optimism as both are performing well on the economic front and channeling fewer resources on the military as a proportion of national income, while at the same time having a divergent set of political institutions, though recently Pakistan has edged towards greater democracy with elections in February 2008. Pg. 14-15

## ME War Impact Frontlines

### U – Unstable Now

#### The lack of an overarching stabilizing force in the Middle East guarantees unending war, violence, and escalatory instability – experts agree – it’s try or die for the aff

Fishman 15 [(alex, journalist) “Military Intelligence Foresees Escalated Conflict For Israel in 2015” Ynet news 1/7/2015] AT

The Middle East is expected to be very bad place in which to live over the coming year—perhaps one of the worst and most dangerous places in the world. When Military Intelligence puts its feelers out across the borders —in the direction of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and North Africa—it sees and describes a world gripped by social decay, a world that is crumbling politically and becoming increasingly poor. The chronic economic crisis that is affecting the Arab Spring countries, and continues to worsen in light of the falling oil prices, is accelerating the internal disintegration of major countries such as Syria, Libya and Iraq, and could undermine stabilizing regimes like Iran and Egypt. In Saudi Arabia alone, which is seen as a stable country, unemployment among the young will reach 30 percent in the coming year. No wonder there are so many Saudis in the global jihad organizations. Many more young individuals will fail to find their place in the Muslim societies, resulting in the rise of many more radical movements around Israel and the spilling by Muslims of a lot more Muslim blood in relation to previous years. And this tidal wave of violence could spill over into Israel. If there is a nightmarish scenario that's going to keep MI officials awake at night in 2015 it's the possibility that they won't be able to locate this tidal wave as it begins to form. This gloomy outlook, in the drier and more professional terminology of the MI researchers, is the bottom line of the comprehensive document MI's Research Department submitted recently to senior General Staff officials in the traditional ceremony known as MI's Annual Assessment—a regular ritual designed to present the army chiefs and political leadership with a forecast outlining the expected political and military developments in the coming year. This intelligence assessment, consisting essentially of a series of potential threats to which answers must be found, is supposed to serve as the foundation for the State of Israel's security-economic-political work plan for the year to come. This time, however, this gloomy forecast will fall on the shoulders of a new government, a new cabinet, a new chief of staff and perhaps a new defense minister too, making the situation even more worrisome. The Middle East, after all, is not going to wait until the summer, until a new Israeli government settles in. The uncertainty, instability and volatility of the events taking place could shake the region without warning. It's no wonder then that MI officials themselves are saying today that an intelligence assessment for an entire year is excessively pretentious. They say they can offer an assessment with a high degree of certainty only for the first few months of 2015. Chief of staff-elect Gadi Eisenkot sits today in the temporary office set aside for incoming army chiefs on the 15th floor of the Defense Ministry tower. There's a good chance that he will have to take responsibility for everything for a few months, at least. A new government, and perhaps a new defense minister, will need time before figuring things out and starting to adopt long-term decisions. Until then, Eisenkot will be the only one to offer continuity in terms of security readiness. He will also have to act as mentor for the new group until it gets comfortable in its seats. He is very familiar with MI's assessment, having been party to its preparation. Now, he's racking his brains: How do we construct a wall of security to prevent the madness that is gripping the Middle East—and is likely to get worse throughout 2015— from spilling over into our house? The Landlord's Vanished Every MI assessment begins with an overview of the regional picture from the perspective of the world powers. The bottom line here is a very simple one: The Middle East of today has no international landlord. There's no single element that maintains the balance, that facilitates international collaboration to preserve peace of sorts in the region. Vladimir Putin's Russia is making every effort to increase its influence in the Middle East by means of a firm foothold in Syria. The United States, which for years enjoyed a free hand in the Middle East as a soloist, doesn't make a move these days without coalitions. In Syria, it's an Arab coalition;; in Iraq, a Western coalition. Without a coalition behind him, Barack Obama would not have gotten involved with Islamic State and wouldn't have come down from the fence to help the more moderate Sunni forces in Syria and the Kurds in Iraq. The Russians, who have come to the aid of the Syrians in several key battles against the rebels, have despaired with the Syrian Army. Syrian and Iranian experts, working shoulder to shoulder in Syria, have already come to the conclusion that the Syrian Army is not going to deliver the goods and stop the tide. They are trying therefore—with the Americans getting dragged along—to work towards a compromise solution between the rebels and Bashar Assad's regime that would lead to a division of powers in the country. This isn't stopping the Russians from continuing every week to deliver a shipload of arms for the Syrian Army—from bullets for Kalashnikovs and through to heavy rockets—to the port of Tartus. Greater Syria no longer exists. The accepted term these days is Assad's "Little Syria," which controls 20-30 percent of the country. The remainder comprises independent cantons that are fighting against one another. Israel's part in the story is the Golan Heights. The price Israel is paying for providing humanitarian aid to the Free Syrian Army rebels is the deployment of these moderate Sunni groups over a large portion of the Golan Heights, facing into Syria. They create a buffer and physically prevent elements such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State from spilling over into the Israeli side of the Golan Heights. North of Quneitra lie a number of Druze villages that serve as hotbeds for hostile actions against Israel on the Golan Heights. The units operating there are backed by Hezbollah and the Syrian Army. One of them is under the command of the son of Imad Mughniyeh, who oversaw Hezbollah's terror activities abroad and was assassinated by Israel in 2008. A second group is under the command of another familiar face—Samir Kuntar, who spent decades in an Israeli prison before being released in return for the bodies of Israeli soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, who were captured by Hezbollah. And by the way, the chemical weapons issue in Syria will remain unresolved in 2015 too. The body dealing with Syria's chemical disarmament, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has yet to close the file. There is reason to believe that the Assad regime is still concealing chemical agents. The Iranian front presents a complex picture too. We won't know before the summer if Iran and the United States are going to sign an agreement on the nuclear issue. MI officials believe today that such an agreement would be bad for Israel. On the one hand, it would allow for a more accurate assessment vis-à-vis Hezbollah's future conduct along Israel's northern border;; on the other, if Iran doesn't sign an agreement with the West and fails to shake off the global sanctions, it could spiral out of control. Disappointment with President Hassan Rouhani and continuing economic despair could see a return to power in Tehran of the Revolutionary Guard. These are dramatic processes that could have an immediate effect on the northern border—but no one can foresee them today. At least two more issues will determine the face of 2015 in the Middle East—the Israeli elections and the impact the falling oil prices has on the oil exporters in the region. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sates are believed to have accumulated sufficient financial reserves to allow them to get through the crisis in one piece. In contrast, the price crisis could bring down the regimes in Iran, Iraq and Libya and lead to further anarchy. The Russians, too, could change their tune in the Middle East in light of the dramatic decline in oil revenues and turn more aggressive, in an effort to combat what they perceive as an American plot to destroy them. A Ray of Light in the Dark MI's assessment also deals with the issue of the disintegration of the nation states. Libya is divided into three states—Cyrenaica in the east, Tripolitania in the west, and Fezzan in the largely desert south. Sudan has split in two. Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Somalia are falling apart. The process, MI officials say, could spread to other countries and deepen in those crumbling already now. Islamic State elements—political not military, for the time being—are in Jordan's Ma'an region. In the Sinai Peninsula, the Ansar Bait al-Maqdis organization, which was once linked with al-Qaeda, recently pledged allegiance to Islamic State. Since the declaration, the Israel Defense Forces' Southern Command has been readying for the group's first terror attack against Israel from the Sinai. The emir of Islamic State, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi, announced a few weeks ago that Israel was one of the organization's targets. The global Jihad, in all its various forms, continues to run rampant through the Middle East and Africa. It's in the Sinai, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen. Osama bin-Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who came from Egypt, has—unlike his predecessor—a Middle Eastern agenda with Israel at its center. MI officials speak of four camps in the Middle East that are fighting one another. The first is the radical-Shia axis that includes Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and the Houthis in Yemen. This axis is currently trying to embrace Hamas. In the past two weeks alone, senior Iranian officials have announced plans to begin providing military aid to Hamas in the West Bank. The second axis is the moderate camp—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Qatar, too, has recently joined this group, albeit in part only, after the Saudis coerced the Qataris into reaching an understanding with the Egyptians. This understanding between Qatar and Egypt is particularly significant for Israel. It could delay or prevent a conflagration along the Gaza border. This alliance could distance the Iranians from Hamas and give another boost to the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority. This process will undoubtedly encounter resistance from global jihad elements and rogue organizations in Gaza. In the last few days alone, we've twice received proof of efforts to drag Israel and Hamas into another round of hostilities—a rocket fired in the direction of the Eshkol region by global jihadis and sniper fire in the southern section of the Strip from an unidentified organization. Hamas, which can see the Qatari money and reconstruction of Gaza on the horizon, is making every effort to prevent the global jihad groups and rogue organizations from acting against Israel. The Qatari-Egyptian partnership, still in its infancy, may in 2015 turn out to be a ray of light in the darkness of the relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Israel is now keeping a close eye on Mahmoud Abbas' moves and efforts to present a request to establish a Palestinian state within two years to the UN Security Council. If Abbas does so after January, he'll have a majority for the decision, and the event will take on different dimensions. Tensions between Israel and the Palestinians will increase and could lead to deterioration in the security situation. Deterioration in the security situation between Israel and the Palestinians, or between Israel and Gaza, is a realistic option in 2015. Hamas now has 30 percent of the rocket capabilities it had on the eve of Operation Protective Edge—a 5-10 percent improvement since the ceasefire. While the defensive tunnels in Shujaiya and Khan Younis are undergoing renovations and rebuilding, there are no signs meanwhile of new tunnels leading into Israeli territory. Israel has proof that Hamas has purchased cement from more than 8,000 homeowners in Gaza who received the building material from the United Nations, in cooperation with Israel, in order to repair their homes. The third camp is the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. They are in Gaza, Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Syria. MI's assessment doesn't rule out the possibility that the protest rallies will return again to the public squares in Jordan and Egypt, as the chances of stabilizing the economies in the Arab states are very low. The fourth camp in the Jihadist-Sunni one—Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis and their offshoots. All four of these camps are at war with one another on the playing field of the Middle East. Israel, meanwhile, is the observer that sometimes gets hit with a ricochet from the fighting. Get Ready for a Cyber Assault The MI assessment also points to a change in the enemy's perceptions, vis-à-vis its use of force. Both Hezbollah and Hamas have dropped their projectile-based defensive and attrition tactics in favor of offensive methods and close-quarter hostilities with the use of forces operating inside Israeli territory. The goal is also to create the image of victory and undermine the resolve of Israel's citizens. This change was clearly evident during the course of Operation Protective Edge, in terms of the tunnel tactics and the establishment of the special units for carrying out operations inside Israel. At the same time, both Hezbollah and Hamas are focusing on striking at Israel with precise weapons—cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and sophisticated rockets. One of the lessons the two organizations learned from Operation Protective Edge concerns the introduction of short-range missiles with large warheads that can destroy structures near the border—a move perceived during the fighting in Gaza as an essential element in terms of breaking the enemy's spirit. And indeed, Hezbollah has acquired Borkan missiles, which have a range of just 4-5 kilometers but are armed with a huge warhead. The new military doctrine that Israel will face also involves the decentralization of the military forces it will encounter, with no clear-cut target or two on the other side that if taken out could leave the enemy unbalanced. The duration of the hostilities, too, is a crucial factor from the point of view of the enemy, which will try to spark more prolonged military campaigns.

#### Massive instability is escalating now – try or die for the aff

Caracciolo 14 [(Lucio, ) “The never-ending escalation in Middle Eastern chaos” 3 Settembre 2014] AT

History never repeats itself and the current clash between Israel and Hamas is unlike previous ones, this also because the regional scenario has changed and the Middle East is disintegrating. It looked the like the same old story: Hamas provokes, Israel reacts. Intense rocket fire from Gaza, initially against Israeli border settlements and then its main cities, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv included, then planes bearing the Star of David dropping “intelligent” missiles on Gaza killing dozens of civilians, followed by Tsahal punitive expeditions and boots on the ground in the Strip, only to return to base within a couple of weeks. And, all this, with everyone ready to start over after an appropriate interval. But is the current conflict really a repetition of the tragic refrain written by the leading players ever since the December 2008 crisis? Not really. It is the context that has changed and power relations within the Palestinian ruling elites (so to speak) and Israel’s leadership are shifting rapidly. Let us first analyse the context. The Greater Middle East is disintegrating. From North Africa to the Levant and Afghanistan, it has become quite a challenge to find something that looks like a state or even a telephone number to use to hurl threats or even negotiate a comprise. The “Arab Springs” and Saudi-branded counterinsurgencies have not, for the moment, resulted in a new equilibrium, but rather war, poverty and instability. Paradigms of this Land of Chaos are the Egyptian coup with the ongoing attempt to drown the Muslim Brotherhood in blood, Libya’s disintegration, the permanent massacre taking place on ruins of Syria, as well as the eternal civil war in Iraq with the recent re-emergence of Sunni tribes and Saddam’s widowers, together with ISIS jihadists, the inventors of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s improbable “caliphate.” In the backdrop there is the risk that Jordan too, engulfed by so many seismic waves, may end up collapsing. Finally there are the three most important questions. For how long and in what manner will Saudi Arabia resist, while it struggles to regain control over “its own” jihadists and other agents unleashed against al-Asad’s regime and al-Maliki’s Iraqi Shiites – as well as committed to liquidating members of the Muslim Brotherhood wherever they may be - all on the eve of an extremely delicate succession to the throne? What will happen to the plan set in motion by Iran – or by some of its leaders – to fully legitimately return to the international stage by sacrificing its nuclear ambitions on the altar of an agreement with the United States? And consequently, will Obama stick to plans to withdraw from the Middle East, or will he be obliged to go back on his word in order to not lose what remains of America’s credibility in the region and the world? As far as Palestine is concerned, repercussions of the regional tsunami have had a strategic consequence. Both its historic leaderships are in agony and that is why they have had to invent an improbable national unity “government.” Mahmoud Abbas had been reduced to the role of acting as Netanyahu’s policeman, and for this reason has been rewarded and cosseted by both Europeans and Americans. However, the pax cisgiordana of recent years, culminating with the 2012 record (zero Israeli deaths in Judea and Samaria), was undermined by the recent murder of three Israeli teenagers and the reprisals that followed. In this event, what emerged was the crisis experienced by Hamas, which has lost control of hundreds of small jihadist groups or even “lone wolves” acting on their own but capable of influencing the agendas of others, Israel included. The horrendous murders of Eyal Yifrah, Gilad Shaar and Naftali Fraenkel was instantly blamed on Hamas by Netanyahu. That, to say the least, was a simplification. The crime was probably committed by killers belonging to the Hebron-based Qawasameh tribe, which, for some time, has been carrying out attacks in order to discredit Hamas’ leadership every time it attempts to gain a degree of international legitimacy. This is a splinter group, not one of Gaza’s divided leadership’s military units. The reprisal against the Gaza Strip will not therefore lead to lasting results, since the one thousand jihadist clans are not missile targets. It will, on the contrary, encourage the radicalisation of other young Palestinians. It is a never-ending escalation, but a changing one. With every provocation and reprisal, the game of violence and counter-violence becomes more risky. The crisis may be quelled, perhaps even for a lengthy period, but not resolved. Until very recently, Netanyahu did not seem worried about this shift. On the contrary, in internal debates he saluted it as confirmation of the unreliability of Gaza’s “terrorists” just recently described as men of “government” in his pathetic embrace with Mahmoud Abbas and what remains of Fatah. Nowadays the Israeli prime minister risks having to deal with the unforeseen effects of the Machiavellism with which he, just like his predecessors, thought they could end the Palestinian match by setting one factions against the other. After attempting to maintain a low profile in reprisals against Hamas, pressure from public opinion, distressed by the continuous air strikes, is encouraging him to aim higher. The extreme right is accusing him of passiveness, the government coalition is losing support (Avigdor Lieberman) and the man who aspires to succeed him, Naftali Bennett, is sharpening his weapons. The result? Forty thousand reservists mobilised and a new partial ground campaign inside Gaza. With what objective? A radical solution should envisage a reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, impossible without a bloodbath and significant losses, also among Israeli soldiers. And then, the last thing Jerusalem wants is to once again be burdened with the responsibility of that inferno from which Sharon managed to escape almost a decade ago. History does not repeat itself, at best it rhymes. It deceives. All the participants believe they are following a script and even if they should wish to, they cannot. Inside and all around their homes people have started to run around at breakneck speed. No one knows where they are running to, least of all those who think they know.

#### ME instability high

Heath 15 [(Andre) “MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT: Tensions Escalating” Jan 15, 2015] AT

Iran's revolutionary guards' corps (IRGC) has confirmed that one of its senior commanders, general Mohammad Ali Allahdadi (or Dadi), has been killed by an Israeli strike on the Syrian sector of the Golan Heights. The air raid, which also killed six members of Lebanon's Shiite Hezbollah group, occurred near Syria's Quneitra border crossing with Israel. "Following the Zionist aggressions against the resistance in Syria, General Mohammad Allahdadi, a former commander of the Sarollah Brigade of the Revolutionary Guard, was martyred along with Jihad Moughniyah and three others in the same car," the Dana news website said. The senior commander was recently reassigned to support Shiite militias in Syria fighting with President Bashar al-Assad against the opposition to the regime. The Israeli strike killed a commander from Hezbollah, Abu Issa, and the son of the group's late military leader Imad Mughniyeh. It came just days after Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said frequent Israeli strikes in Syria were tantamount to a major aggression which called for a strong response. The Hezbollah-run al-Manar news channel said the Israeli attack suggested "the enemy has gone crazy because of Hezbollah's growing capabilities and it could lead to a costly adventure that will put the Middle East at stake". Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif condemned the attack "of the Zionist regime as well as all acts of terror". - IB Times. IDF Prepares for Hezbollah's 'Invasion' The IDF Artillery Corps performed an extended drill to prepare for possible war coming from Israel's northern border, with video of the exercise posted on Tuesday - the same day that Hezbollah terrorist chief Hassan Nasrallah threatened to conquer the Galilee. Golan Force Deputy Commander Lt. Col. Guy Markizeno broke down the drill which took place on the Golan Heights, explaining that it simulated fighting against Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon. He noted that the drill included practice with covering fire meant to allow troops to advance rapidly, and was conducted with the participation of the Namer (Leopard) Batallion of the Golan Formation. Markizeno stated that after the drill, the Namer Batallion returned to the northern Jerusalem neighborhood of Kalandiya, an area wrought with Arab rioting and frequent terrorism, where it has been deployed. Nasrallah reiterated the Tuesday threats on Thursday in yet another interview, saying Hezbollah is ready to fight a new war against Israel. Hezbollah fighters "must be prepared", he said. "When the resistance (Hezbollah) leadership...asks you (fighters)...to enter into Galilee, that means the resistance must be ready to enter into Galilee and to go even beyond the Galilee." In making his threats, Nasrallah said his Iran-proxy terrorist organization has highly advanced missiles - Hezbollah is estimated to have missile stores ten times larger and more power than those of Hamas in Gaza. Asked about Hezbollah's arsenal, Nasrallah said the group had "all (the weapons) you can imagine...and in great quantities." He added: "We are now stronger than we ever were as a resistance movement." He specified that Hezbollah has had Iranian Fateh-110 missiles, which have a minimum range of 200 kilometers (125 miles) that place all of Israel under its reach, "since 2006." The IDF has assessed that like Hamas, Hezbollah likely is also digging terror tunnels into Israel so as to attack, but Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon (Likud) on Tuesday tried to play down the threat, claiming there is no evidence of such tunnels at the moment. - Israel National News. Coup feared in Yemen as rebels fire on PM's convoy, seize media Yemen's Information Minister warned Monday of an attempted coup after clashes broke out near the presidential palace and rebels fired on the motorcade of Prime Minister Khaled Bahah, driving him into hiding. "This story is developing so quickly ... We may have a new Yemen by the end of the day, maybe a new system altogether," Information Minister Nadia Sakkaf told Al Jazeera. Sakkaf told The Associated Press that the new outbreak of fighting "is a step toward a coup and it is targeting the state's legitimacy." A U.S. official said the United States was monitoring the violence and had sufficient military power nearby to evacuate its embassy "on short notice" if needed, CNN reports. The information minister also told Al Jazeera that no group controlled the capital, Sanaa, and that even the army was split, noting "some in uniform that don't obey their superior. The prime minister's motorcade came under fire as he was leaving President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi's house for a meeting with a political group for the rebel Shiite Houthis. Bahah was unharmed, but is now in hiding, CNN reports. At least two people have been killed and 14 wounded, medical sources said, the BBC reports. The Houthis' TV channel, al-Maseera, meanwhile, claimed that the fighting broke out after government troops fired on a rebel patrol. Rebel fighters also took over Yemen state television and its official SABA news agency, according to the information minister. Reuters reported that civilians had fled the area around the presidential palace. Sakkaf said she was worried that in the chaos "al-Qaeda or other terror organisations will use the lack of order and target anybody." "Oh God! There are bodies on street, not too many, but still..." well-known Yemeni activist Hisham Al-Omeisy wrote on Twitter. "Advise staying indoors, too many guns on streey & likely shot in confusion or crossfire." Rebels took over the capital, Sanaa, in a campaign in September that saw them advancing across large parts of the country. Under a deal backed by the United Nationsl, The Houthis signed an agreement with President Hadi that called for them to withdraw from Sanaa after a new unity government was formed. In reality, they have never left and instead increased their presence in the mainly Sunni central and western parts of Yemen. which stretches across the southern strip of the Arabian Peninsula where the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden meet. The rebels took control of the northwestern region of Sadaa during an uprising in 2011 that drove longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh from office. Many believe deposed Saleh has orchestrated their campaign. The violence began early Monday, with witnesses saying heavy machine gun fire could be heard as artillery shells fell around the presidential palace. Civilians in the area fled as columns of black smoke rose over the palace. The fighting caused a number of casualties as ambulance sirens wailed throughout Sanaa. A Yemeni military official, speaking to the AP on condition of anonymity as he wasn't authorized to brief journalists, said the Houthis provoked the attack by approaching military positions in the area and setting up their own checkpoints. Hadi doesn't live at the palace, but his home nearby quickly was surrounded by additional soldiers and tanks amid sporadic gunfire, witnesses said. Schools located near the clashes also closed as Houthi rebels manned checkpoints throughout the city. Many families remained trapped in their homes. "People are leaving on foot, searching for safety," resident Tarfa al-Moamani said. Sakkaf later told the AP that Hadi reached a cease-fire with Houthi rebels, though that apparently disintegrated into further gunfire. Prime Minister Khaled Bahah's convoy also came under fire after leaving Hadi's home for a meeting with a Houthi representative, Sakkaf said. It wasn't clear whether Bahah was wounded. Foreign ambassadors also appeared to be attempting to negotiate an end to the fighting. "Working to promote cease-fire and political negotiations," a message on British Ambassador Jane Marriott's Twitter account read. "Challenging times. And all most Yemenis want is food and a job." The spark of the latest spasm of violence appears to be rooted in the Houthis' rejection of a draft constitution that divides the country into six federal regions. On Saturday, the Houthis kidnapped one of Hadi's top aides to disrupt a meeting scheduled for the same day that was to work on the new constitution. Monday's battle comes a day after Hadi chaired a meeting in which he demanded the army defend Sanaa, SABA reported. It wasn't clear whether Hadi, who has made similar calls in the past, was issuing a new order for security services to take back control of Sanaa from the Houthis. Hadi and Houthis accuse each other of not implementing a U.N.- brokered peace deal calling for Hadi to form a new national unity government and reform the country's government agencies as Houthis withdraw their fighters from cities they seized. Houthis also demand integration of their militias into Yemen's armed forces and security apparatus, something Hadi strongly opposes. Houthis also accuse Hadi of financing and harboring al-Qaeda militants. Hadi's government says the Houthis use the accusation as an excuse to seize more territory. Hadi was elected as a president in 2012 after a popular revolt toppled Saleh, who is a Zaydi, a branch of Shiite Islam that exists almost solely in Yemen. Houthis, who are Zayidis, represent about 30 percent of Yemen's population. Saleh waged six-year-war against Houthis that ended in a cease-fire in 2010. Now, however, the old foes appear to have joined forces to challenge Yemen's traditional power players, including top generals, tribal alliances and the Islamist Islah party, the Muslim Brotherhood's branch in the country. The U.N. Security Council last year put Saleh on a sanctions list, along with two Shiite leaders, for destabilizing the country. Saleh's representatives have denied the allegations. Security officials, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters, said they believed tribal fighters loyal to Saleh were racing into Sanaa to back the Houthis in the fighting. Yemen, the Arab world's poorest country, is also home to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, considered by the U.S. to be the most dangerous arm of the terror group. That group has said it directed the recent attack against the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris "as revenge for the honor" of Islam's prophet Mohammed.The U.S. has carried out a campaign of drone strikes in the country targeting suspected militants. Civilian casualties from those strikes have angered Yemenis. - USA Today.

### U – Sectarian Conflicts Now

#### Sectarian conflicts increasing now

Bashir 14 [(Dwight Bashir, Deputy Director for Policy and Research, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom) “The Escalating Shi’a-Sunni Conflict: Assessing the Role of State Actors” Stimson Center October 28th, 2014] AT

In the second of four conferences on an increasing Shi'a-Shia divide in the middle east, from Iraq to Syria, Lebanon to the Gulf, and even Egypt, violence between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims is on the rise. While non-state actors, such as ISIS, are advancing a sectarian agenda, some governments in the Middle East are also using the conflict to achieve political gain and encourage religious intolerance. The Stimson Center hosted a panel of experts who discussed the role of states actors in the rise in tensions. This was the second in a series of discussions on sectarianism in the Middle East. Dwight Bashir, Deputy Director for Policy and Research at the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, provided comments from a human rights perspective. Dr. Bashir started by outlining the correlation between freedom of religious expression and belief and stability. He then focused on countries where state policies and practices have contributed to the rise of sectarianism and intolerance. Saudi Arabia, a country unique in restricting public religious expression to its interpretation of Sunni Islam, was the first example. Dr. Bashir pointed to two aspects of government policy that have been underplayed: the education system and the mosques. These were identified as essential drivers of sectarianism. He also pointed to the steady discriminatory policy of detaining Shi'a minorities in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and the alarming death sentence issued in October against Nimr Al Nimr, a well-known Shi'a critic of the government. He mentioned the use of counterterrorism laws to crush dissent and minorities. Turning to Iran, the policy there has been a steady one for years whereby the minority Sunnis population's ability to practice their beliefs has always been limited by the government. A recent trend has been the arrest and detention of Sunnis on the sole basis of their beliefs. Bahrain was also examined as an alarming example because it is seeing the rise of extremism and sectarianism. The role of states, either through allowing and providing a space for incendiary rhetoric or not holding those who incite violence to account, cannot be overstated. If this trend continues, societies that never had sectarian issues will most probably be faced with conflict. Najib Ghadbian, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Arkansas, focused on how the Shi'a-Sunni conflict is being played out in Syria. Prior to 2011, there was no such conflict in Syria. Rather, the key divide is between the Alawite minority and the Sunni majority. According to Dr. Ghadbian, the Sunni-Shi'a discourse initially came from Saudi Arabia with a prominent sheikh (Arour) emphasizing jihadism against the brutality of the Assad regime. This also illustrates the role of the media and satellites stations, which have a significant role to play in exacerbating the Shi'a-Sunni conflict. The true turning point according to Dr. Ghadbian however occurred in 2012 with the formation of the Syrian Coalition, which was recognized by many countries, while the Assad regime was mainly supported by Iran, the Maliki government and Hezbollah. He also acknowledged the rise of religiosity among Sunni fighters in Syria, which has taken a Salafist coloring. This is due to the fact that the Salafist discourse is very simplistic and is the easiest option to turn to when faced with the realities of war. In his concluding remarks, Dr. Ghabian suggested that the only way to curb and contain this sectarian divide would be through a political solution, where the question of regional players must be addressed. In his view, the Geneva talks failed precisely because Iran not included. In the discussion segment, there was recognition that the rise of ISIS has ignited an internal Sunni debate, which has led many countries to curb and crack down on sectarian discourse, albeit sometimes in the interest of the leadership's political survival. An important point was made on the U.S. needing to pursue a more consistent policy in the Middle East by converging its values and interests. The view being that the more consistent the policy, the more positive the image of the U.S. would be in the region. On the issue of possible solutions to the current crises, the speakers agreed on the need of holding governments to account and in the case of Syria, enforcing a political solution at the behest of the international community.

### Heg Decline 🡪 War

#### Heg decline causes war – need a new stabilizing force

Singh 11 Michael Singh, managing director of The Washington Institute and a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council.. “What has really changed in the Middle East?”. Shadow Government. September 22, 2011. Shadow Government Blog @ Foreign Policy

Third, and most troubling, the Middle East is likely to be a more dangerous and volatile region in the future. For the past several decades, a relatively stable regional order has prevailed, centered around Arab-Israeli peace treaties and close ties between the United States and the major Arab states and Turkey. The region was not conflict-free by any means, and Iran, Iraq, and various transnational groups sought to challenge the status quo, albeit largely unsuccessfully. Now, however, the United States appears less able or willing to exercise influence in the region, and the leaders and regimes who guarded over the regional order are gone or under pressure. Sensing either the need or opportunity to act autonomously, states like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are increasingly bold, and all are well-armed and aspire to regional leadership. Egypt, once stabilized, may join this group. While interstate conflict is not inevitable by any means, the risk of it has increased and the potential brakes on it have deteriorated. Looming over all of this is Iran's quest for a nuclear weapon, which would shift any contest for regional primacy into overdrive.

### A2 US Heg Solves

#### US Heg in the middle east doesn’t solve

Prashad 15 [(vijay, professor of international studies at Trinity College) “The New Arab Cold War: U.S. Policy Sows Conflict, Unrest Across the Middle East and North Africa” Jan 6, 2015] AT

AARON MATÉ: From the crisis in Ukraine, we turn now to turmoil across North Africa and the Middle East. And like in Ukraine, American policy past and present has played a major role in sowing conflict and unrest. Libya faces its worst crisis since the U.S.-backed ouster of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The country is run by two different governments, each with their own parliaments and armies. In between are several other militant groups, including a branch of the Islamic State that took credit for a deadly attack on a Tripoli hotel last week. The U.N. mission in Libya is trying to hold unity talks between the two main warring factions. The U.N. mission chief recently warned Libya faces "total chaos" if the talks fail. BERNARDINO LEÓN: The general impression is that the country is very close to total chaos, and that if they miss this opportunity, it’s very difficult to imagine that there will be a situation in the country that will allow easily to start a new process. AMY GOODMAN: In neighboring Egypt, at least 18 civilian protesters were killed late last month while marking the fourth anniversary of the revolution that ousted Hosni Mubarak. It was the worst killing of protesters since General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi became president last June. Sisi’s regime has banned protests, continued a crackdown on political opponents. The ￼U.S. renewed U.S. military aid last year after a brief pause following the 2013 coup. On Monday, an Egyptian court confirmed the mass death sentences of nearly 200 supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, the party of ousted President Mohamed Morsi. The crackdown has extended to journalists. On Monday, Al Jazeera reporter Peter Greste spoke out from Cyprus after being released from prison and deported. Greste had spent 400 days behind bars with two Al Jazeera colleagues. PETER GRESTE: Look, I can’t tell you how relieved I am at being free. I mean, I really didn’t expect it. We were settling in for a period of months behind prison and for the retrial. And so, to be out now, today, with just a few minutes’ notice, really, is just, just extraordinary. But I also feel incredible angst about my colleagues, leaving them behind. AMY GOODMAN: Peter Greste’s colleague, Egyptian-Canadian Mohamed Fahmy, appears close to release and deportation after renouncing his Egyptian citizenship. The fate of the third Al Jazeera prisoner, Baher Mohamed, is unclear, as he is an Egyptian citizen. Meanwhile, Iraq is coming off its deadliest month in years. The United Nations says over 1,375 people were killed in January. In an interview last week, outgoing Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the U.S. might need to send noncombat troops to Iraq for the ongoing campaign against the Islamic State. AARON MATÉ: In Syria, the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the U.S. has backed off its calls for the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad. Despite training opposition fighters, U.S. actions in Syria now target the Islamic State, not the Assad government it once threatened to strike. As the U.S. wages its bombing campaign against ISIS, the militant group continues to kill foreign hostages, most recently two Japanese nationals. In Syria’s neighbor, Lebanon, Hezbollah and Israel exchanged fire last week in one of their most violent clashes since the 2006 war. The incident was followed days later by a Washington Post report that the CIA and its Israeli counterpart, the Mossad, assassinated a senior Hezbollah leader seven years ago this month. The killing of Imad Mughniyah raises a number of legal issues, as well as the potential for reprisals from Hezbollah. AMY GOODMAN: Seven years after that joint assassination, relations between President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are reportedly at their lowest point to date. White House officials have criticized Netanyahu for a planned trip to the U.S. next month to address a joint session of Congress on Iran. To the south, President Obama led a large delegation to Saudi Arabia last month following the death of King Abdullah. Obama’s trip was seen as a major display of U.S. support for the Saudi kingdom despite its poor record on human rights at home and abroad. In an interview on CNN, President Obama defended the U.S. partnership with Saudi Arabia and his decision not to raise human rights concerns during his trip. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: Sometimes we have to balance our need to￼speak to them about human rights issues with immediate concerns that we have in terms of countering terrorism or dealing with regional stability. AMY GOODMAN: To the south of Saudi Arabia is Yemen, where uncertainty prevails following the resignation of President Abdu Hadi last month. Houthi rebels have controlled the capital Sana’a since launching an offensive in September. They have set a deadline of today to seize power unless the political crisis is resolved. The Houthis appear to have major backing from Ali Abdullah Saleh, the longtime U.S.-backed president ousted by the popular uprising in 2011. Amidst the crisis, the U.S. continues a drone war inside Yemen targeting al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, which has grown deadlier in recent years and took credit for the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris. Well, to discuss the state of the Middle East and the U.S. role in ongoing conflicts, we’re joined by Vijay Prashad, a professor of international studies at Trinity College, author of several books, including Arab Spring, Libyan Winter and, most recently, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South. His new piece for The Hindu is called "The Architects of West Asia’s Chaos." Professor Vijay Prashad, welcome to Democracy Now! Why don’t we talk about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu coming to not the White House, not invited by the White House, but by—represented by the opposition to the White House in Congress, the House speaker, John Boehner? He’s going to be addressing a joint session of Congress. VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, I mean, this has been a drama for several years, the so-called Netanyahu-Obama clash. This is not the first time that Prime Minister Netanyahu has decided to snub U.S. President Obama. This is not the first time that the Republicans have invited him to speak in Congress against the wishes of the White House. But I think there is a little too much being made of this particular event—and a little too little at the same time. It’s a little too much because I think there’s been, over the course of the last several months, a return to a sort of stable set of alliances that the United States has had for decades—in other words, lining up again with its major allies, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and now Saudi Arabia and American-backed Egypt. These pillars of stability have asserted themselves in the region. It’s no secret that Mr. Obama has put a lot in terms of, you know, working with the Saudis in the region. So, I think, in that sense, too much is made of the clash with Netanyahu. There is a stability of U.S. and Israeli interests, and they’re going forward together on the ground. There’s too little made of this because, unfortunately, this kind of clash that Mr. Netanyahu is setting up is going to bring up the problem of solving the dispute with Iran. To my mind, there is no way forward in the Middle East unless there is some rapprochement with Iran, not only from the United States, but also Saudi Arabia. And so, Mr. Netanyahu’s high-stakes game of coming to the U.S. Congress is going to muddy the attempt to create some rapprochement for one of the major contradictions in West Asia. AARON MATÉ: And going to Israel’s north, to Lebanon, can you talk about this violence￼that erupted last week—two Israeli soldiers, one Spanish peacekeeper were killed—and then, days later, this revelation that the U.S. and Israel collaborated on a 2008 assassination of a senior Hezbollah figure in Damascus, in Syria? VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, Aaron, you know, the problem in Syria has been grave: over 200,000 people dead, much of Syria destroyed, no sign of a political solution, increased audacity by the Islamic State and by Jabhat al-Nusra and other al-Qaeda-backed groups inside Syria. In this context, over the past almost two years, Israel has repeatedly struck against Hezbollah targets inside Syria. You know, there was a strike late last year in Damascus airport over apparent—a load of rockets that were coming in to resupply Hezbollah, perhaps from Iran. Just a few weeks ago, in the Quneitra area up in the mountains in Syria, Israel struck a car, killing an Iranian general and a 20-year-old Hezbollah fighter by the name of Jihad Mughniyeh. When this attack happened, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech saying, you know, Hezbollah is going to respond now, finally, after so many provocations. And so, what Hezbollah did was they didn’t attack across the blue line, which is the U.N.- mandated border between Israel and Lebanon, but they attacked in the Shebaa Farms, which is an area of Lebanon that Israel has occupied. In other words, it was a calculated attack inside the Shebaa region. Israel responded across the blue line, killing a Spanish peacekeeper. But within hours of the retaliation from Israel, Hezbollah contacted the U.N. peacekeepers and said that they are done with their attack on Israel, and now the status quo can come back. In other words, there have been provocations, but in a sense Hezbollah has been fairly disciplined in its retaliation. Nobody wants a war at this time between Hezbollah and Israel. It would complicate matters too greatly in the region. As it is, Jabhat al-Nusra is sitting at the borders of Lebanon, threatening to enter, threatening to create more chaos in that country. So nobody wants a war. Fortunately, this particular episode ended, you know, with—well, not peace, but the calm that was there before. Of course, it wasn’t a very good thing that right after that what was revealed by The Washington Post and by Newsweek essentially validated what people in Hezbollah had known for a long time, which is that the father of the boy, the 20-year-old killed in Quneitra, Jihad Mughniyeh, his father, Imad Mughniyah, a major military chief of Hezbollah, had been killed in a massive car bomb in 2008 in Damascus, a bomb that was positioned by the Americans. It was triggered by the Israelis. This is not the first major car bomb that the Americans have used against Hezbollah. That was perhaps in 1985 in the attempted assassination of Hezbollah spiritual leader Mohammad Fadlallah. That was in Beirut in 1985. Fadlallah survived that attack, but 80 civilians died. So there has been a pattern of provocation. And fortunately, for now, this has not escalated into full-blown war. AARON MATÉ: But the issues that this raises, the U.S. using a car bombing in a country where it’s not at war, in Syria, seven years ago, can you talk about the legal issues here? And also, do you see the potential for reprisals from Hezbollah? VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, firstly, Aaron, as I said, this is not the first time that the United￼States has used a car bomb against Hezbollah when it has not been itself at war. In 1985, the bombing in Beirut was an enormous car bomb. It was placed by American intelligence and British intelligence. So there has been a pattern of utilizing this kind of assassination strategy against Hezbollah targets—not only Hezbollah targets, by the way, but also inside Iran against the nuclear—people associated with the nuclear program. There were a series of assassinations two years ago, you know, relatively unexplained. This has, of course, got major legal ramifications. You know, the United States was not at war. The United States utilized Jordan, the kingdom of Jordan, to have the car bomb driven through. It associated with Israel in this strike. Of course, there is a different standard for the goose and a different standard for the gander. There has been no real international questioning of what has happened. There’s been no real outrage. I’m not surprised that at the Security Council this question wasn’t raised about using, you know, this kind of violence. Meanwhile, in 2005, you know, Mr. Hariri was killed inside Beirut, major politician in Lebanon, and there’s been a huge U.N. process of trying to uncover who killed Mr. Hariri. Here, CIA officials are directly saying that they conducted an assassination in Damascus, and there’s been absolutely no condemnation of it. AMY GOODMAN: Professor Prashad, we only have two minutes, and we wanted to deal with President Obama’s trip to Saudi Arabia, the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, and Yemen and Libya. Start with Saudi Arabia, very quickly, and move on from there. VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, you know, the United States has begun to put a lot of eggs into the Saudi basket, hoping that Saudi Arabia is going to have stabilized the situation vis-à-vis the Islamic State, stabilized the situation in North Africa. I personally think this is a very myopic approach. I think the approach should be to create rapprochement between the different parties to the various conflicts, to bring Saudi Arabia and Iran together. But on the other hand, I think the Obama administration is, you know, trying to play both sides against the middle—on the one side, giving Saudi Arabia complete carte blanche, and on the other side, I suppose, keeping the talks with Iran going at a very mute level. Libya is a victim of this Arab Cold War, where the regional entities are utilizing Libya as a battleground for their own particular, you know, forward policy, whether it’s Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on one side, or Turkey and Qatar, on the other. I mean, the West is largely absent from Libya, having used that as a laboratory to prove that it can conduct a military strike and create a good outcome. In fact, the opposite is demonstrated. The West is entirely absent. And as you know, the American Embassy is no longer in Libya. The American Embassy to Libya is based in Malta. And there’s no emphasis from the West to try to once again bring parties together. It is a very dangerous situation, which is why the U.N. envoy has repeatedly said over the course of several months that we are near total chaos inside Libya. It’s a real scandal, and I wish there was more reporting, more care, about what’s happening to a country that was destroyed by a war prosecuted by NATO. AMY GOODMAN: And finally, the U.S. drone strikes in Yemen? VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, you know, it’s clear to people who observe Yemen that until the U.S. drone strikes, until the U.S. invasion of Iraq, al-Qaeda had been largely vanquished in Yemen. And it was because of Abdullah Saleh, his own vendetta against the Zaidi people— AMY GOODMAN: We have five seconds. VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, to put it like this, the drone strikes don’t seem to be having the kind of impact that the government says they have. They seem to be having the opposite impact. It’s too bad that there’s been no reassessment of the strategy of assassinating people and meanwhile killing a very large number of civilians.

### Short Cards

#### War in the Middle East is comparatively most probable and has the highest magnitude

Ferguson 7 – Professor of History @ Harvard University Niall, The Telegraph 6/17

For some time I have been warning that the next great global conflict will begin in the Middle East, just as the two world wars had their origins in eastern Europe. The lethal combination of ethnic disintegration, economic volatility and an empire in decline (in this case, the United States) makes an upward spiral of violence hard to avoid. Add to that the demographic pressures due to high Muslim birth-rates, the money generated by vast deposits of oil and natural gas, and the risk that the most revolutionary power in the region will soon possess nuclear weapons, and you have a recipe for Armageddon.

### Syria Escalates

#### Syria escalates globally

Bacik 11 Gokahn Bacik. “Vying for Syria: Will the Cold War really end this time?”. October 16, 2011. Today’s Zaman

Russia and China recently vetoed a draft resolution before the UN Security Council concerning the Syrian regime. Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the UN, opined that the draft resolution amounts to a proposal for an intervention, and that would be the wrong message to send to the world. For Churkin, there is a “philosophy of confrontation” behind the draft resolution. This term is a perfect description of one of the most interesting polarizations of the post-Cold War era. Syria has become the center of a new kind of bipolar competition. States like the US, the UK, Germany and Turkey constitute the first pole, and the rival pole is composed of states such as China, Russia, Lebanon and Iran, and several other non-state regional actors such as Hezbollah. In the context of this polarization, Syria has a unique position in the Arab Spring, inasmuch as it has the potential to trigger a regional chain of events. So far, the Arab Spring has not sprung to other states in the form of political conflict. But the Syrian question may yet spark a transnational conflict because the fate of Syria will generate existential outcomes for other states.

# A2 Counterplan

## A2 Generic CP

### EITC CP

#### Doesn’t solve – migrant workers aren’t legal citizens of the Gulf countries, so they can’t receive a tax credit.

#### Won’t solve labor exploitation – it’s not just money but overall working conditions

#### This is virtually the status quo – taxes are extremely low now so tax credits can’t solve poverty

The Economist 14 [Economist Intelligence Unit, March 31, “The Business Environment in Gulf Co-operation Council Countries,” Http://www.economistinsights.com/sites/default/files/MERCK%20-%20The%20Business%20environment%20in%20GCC%20countries%20WEB\_2.pdf]

As Mr Soussa puts it, in GCC countries “people are often happier with their leaders than are citizens in a number of western democracies.” Governments control massive revenue from fossil fuel production and disperse this revenue to citizens using various channels, including subsidised goods and services, high salaries to public-sector workers, and in some cases direct payments. Nor are citizens the only beneficiaries. Total tax as a percentage of profits in all the GCC countries except Oman is below 15%, making these fi ve states among the seven lowest tax jurisdictions globally. Even Oman’s 22% total tax rate leaves it well placed globally. This explains why the GCC states lead the world in the Ease of Doing Business’s “Paying Taxes” category; indeed, the UAE ranks number one in the world. The response of the region’s governments to the recent financial and political challenges has been, as far as possible, to spend their way out of trouble rather than rely on underlying institutional and economic strengths. Since 2010 every GCC country has seen substantial public sector wage increases. Oman, where over half of all employees are in the private sector, has seen several increases in the minimum wage. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have handed out substantial cash grants directly to citizens. Meanwhile, most GCC states, and in particular Saudi Arabia, have also seen significant increases in infrastructure spending.

### UBI CP

Pretty much the squo

Won’t apply to migrant workers

Won’t solve labor exploitation

Gov spending DA

#### This is the status quo

The Economist 14 [Economist Intelligence Unit, March 31, “The Business Environment in Gulf Co-operation Council Countries,” Http://www.economistinsights.com/sites/default/files/MERCK%20-%20The%20Business%20environment%20in%20GCC%20countries%20WEB\_2.pdf]

As Mr Soussa puts it, in GCC countries “people are often happier with their leaders than are citizens in a number of western democracies.” Governments control massive revenue from fossil fuel production and disperse this revenue to citizens using various channels, including subsidised goods and services, high salaries to public-sector workers, and in some cases direct payments. Nor are citizens the only beneficiaries. Total tax as a percentage of profits in all the GCC countries except Oman is below 15%, making these fi ve states among the seven lowest tax jurisdictions globally. Even Oman’s 22% total tax rate leaves it well placed globally. This explains why the GCC states lead the world in the Ease of Doing Business’s “Paying Taxes” category; indeed, the UAE ranks number one in the world. The response of the region’s governments to the recent financial and political challenges has been, as far as possible, to spend their way out of trouble rather than rely on underlying institutional and economic strengths. Since 2010 every GCC country has seen substantial public sector wage increases. Oman, where over half of all employees are in the private sector, has seen several increases in the minimum wage. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have handed out substantial cash grants directly to citizens. Meanwhile, most GCC states, and in particular Saudi Arabia, have also seen significant increases in infrastructure spending.

#### The counterplan doesn’t apply to migrant workers since they aren’t citizens of the countries they live in and don’t have permanent residence – can’t solve either advantage

#### The CP is unsustainable

Samman 10 [Richard Shediac (Partner), and Hatem Samman (Director, Ideation Center). "Meeting the Employment Challenge in the GCC The Need for a Holistic Strategy." Insight, Ideation Center. Booz&Co (leading global management consulting firm) 2010] AJ

Given the promise of lifelong government employment in the GCC, there has been little incentive for these countries to establish social safety nets, including wide-ranging unemployment benefits, for those who are out of work. The social safety benefits that exist (mostly cash handouts) are hampered by a mind-set among policymakers that social welfare is most important as a form of sustenance for the disadvantaged, rather than as a way of getting them to return to the workforce. Not surprising, given this mind-set, government-funded training centers lack resources (including skilled staff and applicable data) and aren’t very good at helping the unemployed develop marketable skills. These problems are further exacerbated by few employment-stimulating opportunities and entrepreneurial incentives, such as microfinance facilities. Thus, a vicious circle ensues; with no real incentive for the unemployed to return to work, the demand for cash assistance grows. Yet the assistance that is available has not kept pace with the rise in the cost of living or with the increasing number of unemployed. All this suggests that the approach to social welfare is unsustainable— especially given that GCC populations are in effect shareholders of a finite resource (hydrocarbons), and a growing workforce means faster depletion and fewer potential benefits per capita. This is another reason why the private sector needs to play a bigger role in job creation: There is only so much the government will be able to do.

### Wage Subsidy CP

#### Solvency deficit – the Gulf countries have extremely low tax rates now – no way to fund the counterplan

#### This is the status quo, doesn’t solve, and links to the spending disad

IMF 14 [(Executive Review Board of the International Monetary Fund) “Annual Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors” IMF, October 25, 2014] AT

Internationally, wage subsidies have been found to be useful to assist workers from disadvantaged backgrounds in building job skills. Wage subsidies are often provided on a temporary basis, and targeted at certain categories of youth from disadvantaged backgrounds as the employment experience allows the acquisition of job skills and boosts labor productivity. Evidence from OECD countries suggests significant positive employment effects from wage subsidies when these are directed to firms that also offer job training (Betcherman et al, 2007). 46. In the GCC, wage subsidies are used not only to support the acquisition of job skills, but also to narrow the wage differential between nationals and foreign workers. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, wage subsidies for nationals provide temporary support for nationals as they build skills that are relevant for the private 32 sector. In Kuwait, wage subsidies take the form of permanent allowances that are provided to all privately employed nationals, and are considered to have been effective in reducing the wage differential between nationals and foreign workers in the private sector. In GCC countries where wage subsidies are temporary and wage differentials are large, employers often have an incentive to terminate employment once the subsidy period is over. 47. Generalized wage subsidies are expensive, but well-targeted and temporary wage subsidies can provide a cost-effective alternative to public employment. International experience shows that the cost of using a generalized wage subsidy to create new jobs can be a multiple of the wages paid to the new employees (Box 7). However, this may still be less than the cost of creating public sector jobs due to crowding-out effects. Given the large wage differentials in the GCC, wage subsidies may need to be larger than in other countries. Therefore, providing subsidies on a temporary basis and careful targeting will be essential to contain costs.

#### Doesn’t solve the perception of abuse – employers are still paying extremely poor wages which makes the jobs less popular

#### Doesn’t solve the spillover effect – the plan affects more workers so it’s more likely to solve relations

Devinatz 13 [Victor G. Devinatz (Department of Management and Quantitative Methods, Illinois State University). “The Significance of the Living Wage for US Workers in the Early Twenty-First Century.” Employ Respons Rights J (2013) 25:125–134. 24 March 2013] AJ

Living wage statutes also lead to an upward ripple effect meaning that when the lowest paid workers in a company receive raises, higher wage employees will obtain increases as well. Such upward pressure on wages occurs for reasons of equity and for maintaining sufficient wage differentials. Furthermore, wage increases might be given to other low-wage workers employed by the company who are in the same occupational classification as the low-wage workers covered by the living wage ordinance even though they are not working under the city contract. Finally, other employers in the same geographical area, although not affected by the ordinance, may boost wages to effectively compete for comparable employees in the labor market, an economic phenomenon also referred to as a spill-over effect. Paul Osterman’s research on the living wage campaign conducted in the lower Rio Grande Valley in Texas indicated that of every 100 people receiving wage raises due to the implementation of a living wage ordinance, an additional 39 benefit from increased wages due to the ripple or spill-over effects (Luce 2004, p. 191).

#### Wage subsidies increase unemployment – you misread economics and Australia proves

Mitchell 1/2 [Billy Mitchell, Professor in Economics and Director of the Centre of Full Employment and Equity “Friday lay day – wage subsidies do not work,” Economic Outlook, 1/2/2015] AZ

Wage subsidies do not work, do not work, do not work How many more lessons do the supply-siders need? As the newly-elected conservative Federal Government in Australia was elected in September 2013 it started to hack into public spending and the unemployment rate has risen sharply since. It is now higher than at the peak of the GFC upturn. To cover its tracks it claimed that it was prioritising the creation of jobs through a wage subsidy scheme known as –Restart – which provided financial incentives of up to $A10,000 for up to two years to any firm that employed an unemployed person who was above 50 years of age and who had been on income support for more than 6 months. The workers had to be “employed for at least 30 hours per week” to attract the full subsidy. The Government allocated $524.8 million over four years to the scheme and projected that 32,000 workers would be employed per year for each of the years of the funding as a result of the initiative. The scheme was introduced on July 1, 2014. Official data from the Senate estimates show that in the first five months of the scheme just 510 unemployed workers have been given jobs under the scheme of the 175,000 Australians who are eligible. The official estimates suggest that “the program could fall 95 per cent short of the government’s target.” Wage subsidies typically fail and are an inferior way of stimulating employment. They are motivated by the flawed idea that mass unemployment is the result of excessive real wages relative to productivity and if the wage that the firm has to pay is cut – either directly, by the workers accepting a lower wage or indirectly, by the government paying some of the wage – then firms will employ more workers. Two obvious points are overlooked, which always conspire to undermine such wage subsidy schemes. First, firms will not employ workers no matter how ‘cheap’ they become if the output that the workers might produce cannot be sold. Firms do not produce to generate infinite stores of inventory. Second, firms might try to substitute subsidised workers for non-subsidised workers as long as the subsidy is in place, which renders any net employment effect negligible. In this case, there also appears to be no substitution occurring because firms are laying workers off generally as total spending is weak. The better public policy way to increase employment is to create jobs directly via large scale public employment schemes. There is a litany of failed wage subsidy schemes. See this article from Joseph Stiglitz (January 1, 2015) – The politics of economic stupidity – where he says: The malaise afflicting today’s global economy might be best reflected in two simple slogans: “It’s the politics, stupid” and “Demand, demand, demand” … The near-global stagnation witnessed in 2014 is man-made. It is the result of politics and policies in several major economies.

#### Wage subsidies deincentivize growth and reinforce inequality

Standing 11 [Guy Standing, “Responding to the Crisis: economic stabilization grants,” Policy and Politics Volume 39, No. 1, 2011] AZ

Many economists have argued in favour of marginal employment subsidies, the leading advocate being the Nobel Prize winner, Edmund Phelps (I997).Yet they are inefficient and contribute to protectionism via the backdoor (for a critique, see Standing, 2002: chapter 9). Evaluations of previous schemes show very high deadweight and substitution effects - over 95% for Ireland’s Employment Incentive Scheme in the 1980s, for instance (Betcherman and Islam, 200]: 319). Schemes of this sort also produce moral and immoral hazards. One is what I have called auntie effects. Suddenly, auntie is employed. at a very low wage no doubt, and an application is in the post to obtain the subsidy. In the Netherlands, a wage subsidy was introduced for firms if they had suffered a 30% sales decline over two months. This could induce firms to make sure their sales decline passed the 30% threshold. Another drawback is the unfairness of subsidies given for new jobs, or to new firms. Why should a firm that expands now be given a subsidy when another has been providing jobs for many years? After all, if the subsidy works as claimed, it will lower production costs for the newer firm, thus weakening the position of the older firm. It may even jeopardise the survival prospects of the older firm, which might be the more productive. This would be neither fair nor economically sensible. Subsidies benefit middle-income and higher-income groups disproportionately and ‘leakages’ are notoriously high. In other words, the boost to W demand is less than implied by the sum spent on them. This is partly because the more affluent have a relatively low average and marginal propensity to consume, and partly because this group has an above-average propensity to spend on imported goods and services. So, to give a net boost to the national economy, the gross sum must be much larger. In sum, subsidies (and industrial policy) fail all the policy stress tests. They are ineffective in raising aggregate demand and employment; they are inefficient, distorting resource allocation; they do nothing to alleviate uncertainty: and they are inegalitarian, benefiting the better off rather than the poor.

## A2 Advantage CP

### A2 Standard Contracts

#### No solvency

Sambidge 14 [(andy, journalist) “Gulf ministers urged to improve labour law protection” 24 November 2014] AT

“GCC countries should join the growing number of countries worldwide that are extending full protection of their labour laws to domestic workers, including a minimum wage, a weekly rest day, the right to organise, and social benefits.” Human Rights Watch said the GCC has discussed a potential region-wide standard employment contract for domestic workers. Recent media reports suggest that the GCC is also considering establishing a body to coordinate policies on hiring domestic workers that would consist of recruitment agency and government representatives. “Standard contracts are not a substitute for labour law reform, and taken alone do not meet the standards in the ILO Domestic Workers Convention,” said Sharan Burrow, general secretary of the ITUC. “The GCC should work in closer coordination with – not separately from – countries of origin to develop labour migration policies that fully respect the human and labour rights of migrants.”

# Country PIC/Add-ons

## Generic

### 1AR Generic A2 Country PIC

#### 1. Unified policy is key – anything else causes competition which kills cooperation

Poudel 14 [(Kishor Kumar Poudel, journalist) “SAARC govts should recognize migration as a big issue: MFA Coordinator” 22 November 2014] AT

As the South Asian region is a major hub of the migrant workers for destination countries, especially the Gulf countries and Malaysia, Gois says governments of the region need to prepare a common agenda for the protection of their workers who are facing various problems in the destination countries due to a lack of protection measures. Responding to whether competition among countries of the region would get in the way of cooperation, Gois clarifies that competition is not a new thing but that it should be done in a healthy manner. So the governments of the region must reach consensus over a common minimum standard in term of wages, facilities, etc, he says.

#### 2. The plan tanks relations with the country that doesn’t implement a full living wage – A) it’ll be perceived as a holdout that refuses to accept labor standards; and B) Workers will choose countries that pay higher wages which destroys the strongest component of relations

#### This means any relations impact for the country they PIC out of outweighs the disad – they DESTROY relations which is the CONTROLLING IMPACT for Middle East stability

#### 3. GCC is a BLOC – a disad to the part is a disad to the whole since it prevents effective cooperation with the region as a whole – only ALL the countries ensures India engages for REGIONAL interests rather than interests of PARTICULAR countries which don’t solve Middle East war

## UAE

### 1AR Pirates

#### Relations are at a critical juncture – economic relations based on labor are key to relations between the UAE and India specifically

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

In the last couple of years India has been trying to regain international clout in West Asia and this has resulted in an increasing number of visits of the Foreign Minister to Egypt, Jordan, UAE (United Arab Emirates), Israel and also Palestine.i Likewise, the Indian Defence Minister also undertook visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar.ii This clearly shows that India’s strategic orientation is being redefined in the Gulf region. While India has engaged a number of countries in the region, it has nurtured special relations with the UAE because it has been the largest trading partner as well as a strategically important country. Indian expatriate workers also list the UAE as a relatively labour friendly country in terms of wages, facilities, freedom and the annual leave. UAE had assumed the chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) immediately after India and, therefore, greater understanding was developed on the maritime issues also. With shrinking markets in Europe and the US, UAE is increasingly looking towards India for exports and investment. In less than six months, India and the UAE have exchanged four high level bilateral visits and almost all visits underpinned the significance of economic and strategic engagements between the two countries. A host of factors such as deep historical links, culture, economy, polity, security and changing geo- strategic and maritime environment helped bring the two nations closer. On his visit to India on 15-16 May this year, the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abduallah Zayed bin Al Nayahan, described India as an ‘ally and cherished neighbour’ and said that UAE would like to have a ‘strong presence’ in the Indian market in the future. Besides this, he also acknowledged the need for working together with India on some of the pressing regional issues such as stabilising Afghanistan, combating maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden as well as stabilising Somaliaiv and religious and sectarian faultlines emerging in the West Asian countries.

#### UAE-India relations solve piracy-terror networks between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab

Hussain 12 [(Zakir, Research Fellow, at Indian Council of World Affairs) “India and the United Arab Emirates: Growing Engagements” Indian Council of World Affairs June 24] AT

Although both countries have signed defence cooperation agreements in 2006, it needs fine-tuning, particularly on two policy-dimensions: one, a real time assistance and cooperation by sharing information and providing necessary support to the Indian Navy to check the growing and expanding menace of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which is equally fatal to the oil- exporting Gulf rentier economies.xxvi Besides, the presence of the Indian Navy can also effectively handle the growing nexus between pirates and the terror outfits, particularly between the Somali-based al Shabab and the al Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) of Yemen. UAE could consider giving the Indian Navy logistic supports such as refuelling, deployment, providing bases during emergency as well as enabling Indian Navy to evacuate its large diaspora community during crisis period.xxvii India can assist and train the UAE crew in counter-terrorism, disaster relief management, rescue and search operations, etc.

#### Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda network causes an attack on the US

Zarif 11—(Maseh Zarif, deputy director and Iran research Team Lead for the American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project July, 2, 2011, Terror Partnership: AQAP and Shabaab http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/maseh-zarif-terror-partnership-shabaab-aqap-july-2-2011)

The terrorist threat to America from the Gulf of Aden is metastasizing as the most dangerous al Qaeda affiliate, Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), appears to be partnering with Somalia-based militant Islamist group al Shabaab in attacking the West. On June 23, an American drone strike targeted two senior al Shabaab leaders in Qandal, outside the al Shabaab-controlled southern port city of Kismayo.[1] Somalia’s defense minister said on July 1 that U.S. military forces retrieved the two men; it is unclear whether they were killed in the strike.[2] The identities of the militants have not been released, but a senior American military official said that they had “direct ties” to Anwar al Awlaki, the Yemeni-American radical cleric who has been operational within AQAP.[3] The official added, “They were planning operations outside of Somalia.”[4] The reported links between Awlaki—whose primary focus has been on attacking the American homeland—and the al Shabaab leaders targeted in the strike suggest that AQAP and al Shabaab have established operational ties. Such an alliance would enable the two groups to leverage their joint resources, including AQAP’s bomb-making expertise and al Shabaab’s recruitment and hosting of militants from the West, to conduct spectacular attacks in the West. Both AQAP and al Shabaab have demonstrated the ability to plan and launch terrorist attacks outside their safe havens. AQAP has launched two significant operations against the United States—the 2009 Christmas Day attack and the October 2010 parcel plot. AQAP continues to target America and has benefited from Yemen’s recent unrest and state fragmentation.[5] Al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab is waging an insurgency in Somalia against the United Nations-backed Transitional Federal Government and African Union troops in a bid to expand its operating space. It currently controls large regions in the country and operates in the capital, Mogadishu. The organization has demonstrated the desire and the ability to export terror beyond Somalia’s borders. It has in the past threatened the United States and embraced al Qaeda’s global ideology.[6] The group executed its first attack outside of Somalia in July 2010 when it bombed a restaurant and rugby club in Kampala, Uganda, killing 76 people.[7] Al Shabaab may also have been involved in the June 2011 suicide bombing in Abuja, Nigeria.[8] It continues to explore targets outside Somalia.[9]

#### Terrorism causes extinction

Barrett et al 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

## Oman

### 1AR Top Level

#### Expatriates with Oman are key to strategic relations that solve middle east stability and spill over to GCC relations

Aneja [(Atul, journalist) “Pranab for elevating India-Oman relations to “strategic” level” The Hindu] AT

MUSCAT: External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee has advocated elevating India-Oman ties to a “strategic” level. Mr. Mukherjee said this during his meeting with Oman’s Deputy Prime Minister Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmood Al Said. Both sides expressed a shared concern for enhancing security and stability in the region. They identified information technology, telecommunications, oil and gas as key areas for deepening ties. India is looking for Omani participation in the development of infrastructure and petrochemicals. Mr. Mukherjee also held talks with his Omani counterpart Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah. The Minister said the Persian Gulf area was of “critical importance” to India. The two leaders also discussed the road map for adding strategic content to the |India-Oman relationship. As part of India’s move to give a fresh direction to ties with countries in West Asia, Mr. Mukherjee on Sunday began a two-day brainstorming session with 21 Ambassadors posted in the region. Mr. Mukherjee began the closed-door session with opening remarks where he outlined New Delhi’s priorities in the region, a diplomatic source told The Hindu on condition of anonymity. Some of the envoys then made separate presentations on 11 specific subjects. These included the West Asia peace process and developments related to Palestinian territories, where tensions between rival factions Fatah and Hamas have been growing. Other issues that were on the agenda included Iran, the resurgence of Islam in the region, the situation in Somalia and the crisis in Darfur. Mr. Mukherjee was also briefed about the scope for enhancing cooperation with the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League. Oil-rich Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates constitute the GCC. The GCC is India’s single most important source of energy. Ambassador to Oman, Anil Wadhwa, earlier pointed out that trade between India and the countries comprising West Asia and North Africa had risen to $34 billion. Welfare of expatriates Community issues relating to the welfare of millions of expatriate workers residing in the Gulf countries have emerged as a focal area during the two-day session. While their remittances have contributed significantly to India’s economic resurgence, there have been growing concerns about their living and working conditions in the host countries. On the economic side, the scope for opening new Indian banks, expansion of civil aviation links, and advancing tie-ups in the fields of science and technology, education and defence have also come up for discussions. Mr. Mukherjee jointly inaugurated with his Omani counterpart, Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah, a new chancery complex inside the Indian embassy.

#### Indian expatriates in Oman are key to strategic cooperation which also solves other impacts

13 [“India and Oman Relations” February 2013] AT

The Sultanate of Oman is a strategic partner in the Gulf and an important interlocutor in the bilateral, AGCC and OIC contexts. Oman also accords a high priority to its ties with India. India and Oman are linked by geography, history and culture. Both countries enjoy warm and cordial relations, which can be ascribed to historical maritime trade linkages, intimacy of the royal family with India and the seminal role of the Indian expatriate community in the building of Oman, which is acknowledged by the Omani Government. Recent Bilateral Visits: From India:  Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh - November 2008  Minister of Overseas Indian Affairs Shri Vayalar Ravi- June 2009  Former President of India Dr. A P J Abdul Kalam November 2009  Minister for New & Renewable Energy Dr. Farooq Abdullah - January, 2010  Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Shashi Tharoor - February, 2010  Minister of Defence Shri A K. Antony - May 2010  Minister of Commerce & Industry Shri Anand Sharma, - September 2010  Minister of State for Corporate and Minority Affairs Shri Salman Khurshid - November 2010  Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission Dr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia – December 2010  Minister of State for External Affairs Shri E. Ahamed – June 2011  National Security Adviser, Shri Shiv Shankar Menon- March 3-5, 2012  Minister of State for External Affairs, Shri E. Ahamed-January 2012 and November 7-8, 2012  Minister of Overseas Indian Affairs Shri Vayalar Ravi-March 6-8, 2012 and November 13, 2012 From Oman:  Deputy Prime Minister for the Council of Ministers of Oman Sayyid Fahd bin Mehmoud Al Said - December 2007.  Minister of Tourism of Oman Dr. Rajiha bint Abdul Ameer bin Ali - April 2008  Minister of Oil & Gas Dr. Mohammed bin Hamad al Rumhi -May 2009.  Minister of Commerce & Industry Maqbool Ali Sultan - September, 2009  Chairman of the State Council Yahya Bin Mahfoudh Al Mantheri - December 2009  Minister of National Economy and Deputy Chairman of the Financial Affairs and Energy Resources Ahmed bin Abdulnabi Macki - July 2010  Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah - October 2010  Minister of Commerce & Industry Maqbool Ali Sultan – January 2011  Minister Responsible for Defence Affairs Sayyid Badr bin Saud al Busaidi- December 2011  Minister of Agriculture & Fisheries Dr. Fuad bin Ja’afar bin Mohammed al Sajwani – March 2012  Chairman of Tender Board of Oman Dr. Rasheed bin Al Safi bin Khamis Al Huraibi – February 2012  Chairman of the State Financial and Administrative Audit Institution (SFAI) Sheikh Nasser bin Hilal al Mawali – May 2012  Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah – November 2, 2012 .Some prominent existing bilateral agreements are: MoUs on Combating Crime, Cooperation in Agriculture, Civil Aviation, Cooperation between the State Audit Institution of Oman and the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Avoidance of Double Taxation, Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection, Treaty of Extradition, MoU on Manpower, MoU on Joint Investment Fund and MoU on Cultural Cooperation, etc. India awaits the visit of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Bin Said Al Said to receive the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding. During the visit of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Muscat from 8-9 November 2008, it was agreed that the historical bilateral ties should be transformed into a strategic partnership. Pursuant to the decision, in December 2010, the Higher Committee on Economic Cooperation, led by Mohammed bin Al Zubair, Adviser to HM the Sultan for Economic Planning and Dr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission signed its report which identifies nine areas of cooperation i.e. agriculture, health care, infrastructure, tourism, chemicals & fertilizers, education, oil & gas, power and mining. Annual Strategic Consultative Group Meetings were started at the Secretary -level in 2003 to provide a forum for open and frank exchange of views on bilateral, regional and international issues.

### Oman Expats Key

#### Indian expatriates are important in Oman

Pradhan 9 [(Samir, economics specialist based in the UAE. Previously, he served as a senior consultant, macroeconomics research at Tanween,a leading consultancy in Doha, Qatar. Before that, he was senior researcher, GCC economics and Gulf-Asia programmes at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai/ UAE, the leading think tank of the Gulf region) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

There are around 600,000 Indians in Oman, constituting the largest expatriate community in the country. Coming from all parts of India, they include skilled workers and technicians, and professionals such as doctors, engineers, bankers, finance experts, and managers, with many holding middle and senior management positions in the corporate sector. Several Indians also hold major positions in Omani government departments and public undertakings: there are around 2,000 Indian doctors working in the country. The contribution of Indians to the development of Oman, particularly in the fields of commerce, healthcare, education, horticulture, finance, construction and communication is widely acknowledged. A number of persons of Indian origin have been granted Omani nationality, and some of them have received high awards from the Omani government (Indian Embassy 2008).

#### Expatriates are key

13 [“India and Oman Relations” February 2013] AT

Indian Community in Oman  Indian community is the largest expatriate community in the Sultanate of Oman spread over the entire spectrum of professions. As per the Ministry of Manpower statistics, as of January 2012, the number of Indian expatriates in Oman is 7,18,252 and the number of Indian workers in Oman is 581,832. There are many Indian professionals occupying key positions in Omani government and private sector. Indian nationals in Oman are well-known for their hard work and dedication. Thousands of them are working as doctors, engineers, chartered accountants, teachers, lecturers, nurses, managers, etc. It is estimated that around 2,000 Indian doctors work in Oman in Government hospitals and in clinics in the private sector. There are also some 30 Indian academics in the Sultan Qaboos University's various departments and faculties. 19 Indian Schools, with CBSE affiliation, are functioning in Oman. The contribution of Indian workers - both in the skilled class and semi- and un-skilled classes- to the development of Oman is highly acknowledged by the Omani Government. It is estimated that 70% of the Indians in Oman are blue-collar workers.  Outstanding contributions of Indians and People of Indian Origin in Oman to the strengthening of our bilateral relations have been recognized by the Government of India through Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards. The Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awardees from Oman are: Shri Kanaksi Khimji (2003), Dr. P. Mohamed Ali (2004), P.N.C. Menon (2009), S.K. Virmani (2010), and Sh. Kiran Asher (2012).  There are 19 Indian schools offering CBSE syllabus catering to the educational needs of more than 42,000 Indian children. To accommodate the growing number of school going children of Indian expatriates, some of the schools in Muscat have started evening batches. The Schools are distributed in different cities like Muscat (Indian School Muscat, Darsait, Wadi Kabir, Seeb, Al Ghubra, Mabella), Nizwa, Muladha, Sohar, Sur, Salalah, Ibri, Ibra, Jalan, Rustaq, Khasab, Buraimi, Thumrait and Massirah. The Board of Directors is the governing body of Indian Schools in Oman and includes Embassy representative. Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan has, during January 2013, set up the Modern International School with CBSE ( I ) syllabus, in Muscat.  As per the provision of the MoU on Manpower signed during the Prime Minister’s visit to Oman (November 8, 2008), an India-Oman Joint Working Group was set up which has held three annual meetings. The last meeting was held in Mumbai during September 2012. Several labour related issues like standardized Model Employment Contract, payment of salary through banks, retention of passport by employers, exchange of information with regard to illegal recruitment and human trafficking, etc. were discussed in these meetings.

## Qatar

### 1AR Qatar TL

#### Qatar-India relations resulting from Indian expatriates solves regional stability, piracy, and WMD terrorism, and is a model for strategic cooperation

Jazr 10 [(article from STRATEGIC AFFAIRS magazine, an outfit of CASS-India) “Qatar-India relations:Full of potentialities” March 2010 issue of STRATEGIC AFFAIRS magazine, an outfit of CASS-India] AT

India's engagement in West Asia-Gulf region has attained importance in the recent years owing to a variety of geo- economic, geo- strategic and geo- political factors. Apart from its critical dependence on energy supplies, India's huge diaspora presence in the region and the critical economic and social capital value contributions have been immense to the West Asia-Gulf Region. India's economic contributions of skilled and semi- skilled human resources have been of immense investment in these countries where human technical capital has been most scarce. The West Asia-Gulf Region has been of critical strategic importance for the energy flows from the region and the critical jeopardy of the rising threats of nuclear and missile proliferation, maritime terrorism, piracy, failed states in East Africa. The past decade has witnessed the impact of spiraling energy prices coupled with finite reserves, the critical vulnerability of the supply-demand factors, the rise of radical terrorism and the targeting of the hydrocarbon resources by radical groups for disruption of supplies; the clandestine maritime transit of weapons of mass destruction into the region and the escalation of nuclear and missile proliferation that has critical stakes of regional stability. Qatar is located in a critical geography of the Gulf Region that abounds the Saudi peninsular and the Iranian state. Given its immense energy resources and the geo-strategic location astride the sea-lanes of communication, Qatar has deftly handed its foreign policy and diplomacy;; balancing Saudi and Iranian pressures. It has managed the regional power rivalry. Its alliance with the United States hosting US forward presence and advocacy of various regional peace efforts have been vital constructs of its grand strategy. Qatar has been coveting strategic engagement with a host of extra-regional powers to bolster its regional strategic predicament that has been 'between and betwixt' of Saudi Arabia and Iran. The United States has been the single “hegemonic” power that has underwritten Gulf Security all these years. US forward presence has been substantive and has under-girded Qatari security providing extended deterrence to the small states of the Gulf Cooperation Council especially to Qatar . Diplomatic initiatives Qatar has been an important hub for the various global economic engagements of the World Trade Organization viz: the Doha Rounds. In fact, Qatar had in recent years been hosting its flagship defence expositions viz: Doha International Defence Maritime Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX) since 2008 and the present one to be hosted in March 2010 is the second in the series. DIMDEX has brought the convergence of several extra-regional powers in defence expositions and summitry of the defence leadership of the participant countries. Major participant countries have been the United States, United Kingdom, France, India, Australia, Oman, Turkey and Pakistan etc. In view of the gathering momentum of the Gulf crisis with Iran, Qatar's foreign policy, diplomacy and security strategy has been to seek optimal strategic assurances and support from several powers within the region and outside. Recent Qatari diplomatic initiatives have seen the close engagement with Iran and also the engagement with the US. Besides these two main powers, Qatar had been engaging with China, France and India for various important inputs adding into its sinews, strategic strength and purpose. India-Qatari ties The India-Qatari strategic engagement is based on the Qatari interests to engage India as a big market for its natural gas. Qatar's RasGas has entered into a 25- year agreement for the annual shipping 7.5 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas to terminals in Dahej in Gujarat and in Kochi. Qatar rescued India by supplying 1.5 million tons of more LNG on a short-term contract basis to recommence the energy production in the Dabhol power plant in Maharashtra. This premier economic agreement is pivoted on the security arrangements that Qatar looks up to India provide for in terms of Joint training exercises, training of personnel and maritime cooperation. The India-Qatar security cooperation was inaugurated by the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2008 November . The agreements with the Emirate of Qatar envisioned the issues of maritime security among others while the agreement on security and law enforcement covers issues like common threat perceptions and sharing of intelligence and cooperation to combat money laundering and transnational crime. The defence and security agreements had committed India as the most substantial security provider to Qatar based on the reciprocity of Qatar's ability to meet India's energy needs of Liquefied Natural Gas thereby India being one of Qatar's largest trading partners. The proximity of India's geo-strategic location enabling it to be a major security partner;; the India- Qatar agreements envisage for New Delhi's commitment to protect Qatar's assets and interests from external threats. The scope of the agreement is just short of committing the stationing of Indian armed forces in the region. The Indian security guarantee adds to the US commitment to Qatar. The Indian commitment includes a substantive naval security guarantee that would secure the offshore assets of Qatar and also provides for the joint venture in production of weapons and military equipment. The maritime cooperation agreement provides India with a strategic naval base in the Gulf region. India has an autonomous role in maritime security in the region and the Gulf of Aden where the Combined Task Force 150 operates (CTF-150). The India-Qatar maritime security initiative provides India and Qatar with a convergence of Indian naval power with Qatari naval forces to combat the variety of maritime asymmetric threats of terrorism, piracy and securing the offshore oil installations. It thus brings India into the Gulf Region with a secure access agreement. Thus Qatar was the first country in the Middle East to sign such a pact with India in 2008. The Qatari interest in India could have stemmed from the ability of the Indian Navy to undertake the Operation Sukoon-a humanitarian maritime operation that was able to rescue over 1495 Indians, Sri Lankans and Nepalis from Lebanon at the height of the 2006 Israel- Lebanon Hezbollah War. Also, Operation Sukoon saw the deployment of the INS Mumbai, Brahmaputra, Betwa and Shakti, that swung into action and rescued the stranded to the Southeast Lebanese port of Larnaca. The India-Qatari strategic engagement has a number of issues for prospective consideration and serves as an exemplar model for similar agreements with the Gulf Cooperation States. The strategic convergence is based on the following factors. Firstly, the high- stakes of the Gulf- Arabian peninsular rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran had diminished the strategic autonomy of the Gulf States like Qatar resulting in the quest for security guarantees from the extra-regional powers like the United States, United Kingdom, and France. India's role and capacity in the Gulf security dynamics comes in the form of capacity-building based on cooperative and convergent security concerns vis- à-vis the competitive security dynamics that is played with the involvement of the western powers lead by the United States. Qatar's choice of India as the third party stakeholder for security guarantees besides the US and the regional powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran provide an important dimension of the regional balancing process. Secondly, India's capabilities and naval operational prowess is formidable with the￼advantage of its near proximity compared with China as also the United States. India's economic contribution to the Qatari economy and the scientific-technical prowess enhances India's role as a capacity-builder of Qatar's civilian economy particularly in the hydrocarbon development sector, petro-chemical industries, the services sector etc. Thirdly, India is better positioned to aid the defence industrialization of Qatar in the area of manufacture of military hardware and the training of the Qatari armed forces in various operational missions and also in develop capacities for coercive, humanitarian missions of the Qatari armed forces in encountering and tackling a variety of threats like maritime asymmetric threats and other non- traditional threats. The defence and security agreements provide for a two- phase engagement in which India builds the capacity for Qatar and provides the training capacities that leads to operational versatility.￼￼The second phase would be the interoperability that India would develop with Qatar that would result in Indian-Qatari maritime engagement and cooperative security. Fourthly, India and Qatar would gain immensely from synergies in intelligence cooperation that could be in the areas of maritime security, counter-terrorism cooperation. India could also add capacity to Qatari intelligence services and also engage in joint intelligence operations that would have implications in tracking and interdiction of the covert transfer of technologies and components of weapons of mass destruction. Qatar being an important commercial hub like Dubai would be the target of covert transits of WMD technologies, components and subassemblies that would transit through its territory. Qatari intelligence capacity needs to be fine tuned and enhanced for such contingencies, besides the sea-traffic in the region is￼known to be dense that tracking vessels that has potential cargo of WMD has to be maintained with vigil. Fifthly, the Indian Navy could be a better strategic partner in a region of contested rivalries, with the substantial upgradation of ties between India and Saudi Arabia. New avenues The existing ties with Qatar provide new vistas in cooperative and convergent maritime security in a region that has the perils of terrorism, piracy, and the covert transit of WMD. Indian operational capability and robustness in VBSS (Visit, Board Search and Seize) operations and the capability to play an autonomous role outside the US- NATO CTF-150, 151 is yet another important asset that leverages in favor of Qatar . Sixthly, India should proactively envision a robust participation of the GCC States lead by Qatar and Oman in its envisioned maritime security engagement viz Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).￼IONS would be the optimal leveraging platform that would build a cooperative benign framework of inter-regional maritime relations that not only enhances India's proaction in maritime security in the region, but for a better way offset prospective Chinese-Pakistani forays into the Gulf Region that should be anticipated in the coming years-given India's engagement in the region. Seventhly, India should consolidate its present access in the Gulf of Aden with its forward basing of air and possible some modest forward presence of naval assets that is intended for anti- piracy operations as symbolic forward presence that stakes India's presence and also bolsters its operational capacity. Such a forward presence would enhance the Indian- Qatari engagement and could serve the basis for India's benign naval exercises with Qatar, Oman and other Gulf Cooperation Council States. In summation, the India-Qatari strategic rendezvous has come at a time that enhances India's energy security profile;; stabilizes its profile in the Gulf- Arabian Peninsula region that is now rife with conflict. India's non-intrusive role and the penchant for capacity-building has provided it with an enhanced profile in the Gulf Region that has been reinforced with its high-end skilled social capital of its Diaspora serves to cement an important strategic access and partnership in a region that would critically shape India and its strategic neighborhood.

#### Terrorism causes extinction

Barrett et al 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

#### Middle east war causes extinction

Russell 9 James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

### Qatar Climate

#### Relations are key to climate change mitigation

Jha 12 [(Saurav, studied economics at Presidency College, Calcutta, and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He writes and researches on global energy issues and clean energy development in Asia) “India, Qatar Broaden Ties Beyond Energy Trade” World Politics Review April 27, 2012] AT

Beyond relying on nuclear and solar energy, India's climate change mitigation strategy envisions a major switch from oil to less-carbon-intensive natural gas, especially in the transportation sector. For the better part of the past 10 years, New Delhi envisioned Iran as the key international partner in executing this strategy. But given the geopolitical issues surrounding Iran's nuclear program and India's lingering security concerns over a route traversing Pakistan, New Delhi is now looking to Qatar to fill that role, at least for the near-to-medium term. The fact that Qatar has an operational gas-liquefaction terminal -- Iran's is still under construction, with Indian support -- is also a factor in this decision. India already has locked in supplies of 7.5 million metric tons per annum (mmtpa) of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatari RasGas and has been looking to boost this by an additional 3 mmtpa for the past year. Hamad's recent visit is believed to have resolved a disagreement over pricing that had held up a deal. The Qatari minister of energy and industry, Mohammed Bin Saleh Al-Sada, also reportedly assured Indian officials recently that the ongoing negotiations between RasGas and Indian importers will be made a priority. India is now reportedly looking to take overall gas imports from Qatar to the 15 mmtpa level by 2015-2016, a move that will considerably boost overall bilateral trade, which stood at $4.6 billion in 2010, up from $1.2 billion in 2005. India also imported 5.6 million tons of crude oil from Qatar in 2010-2011.

### Qatar World Cup

#### Plan preserves Qatar’s hosting the 2022 world cup

Dorsey 12/29 [(James, reporter) “Gulf human rights declaration increases heat on Qatar to act on migrant workers’ rights” Hurriyet daily news dec 29, 2014] AT

The 2022 committee’s standards stress equal treatment of workers. A report to the foundation by migration scholar Ray Jureidini said “it is not entirely certain how the comparative wage differences have been derived or why.” The report recommended the introduction of a minimum wage to eliminate discriminatory wage policies as part of an effort to ensure Qatar’s competitiveness. “If Qatar wishes to have wage rates of migrant workers set by supply and demand in a local labor market, then it will need to lift the current kafala sponsorship system, allow workers to change employers without sponsor approval [as is now the case in Bahrain], allow collective bargaining to take place that will establish wage rates, terms and conditions of all occupations filled by non-Qataris in the country,” Mr. Jureidini said. A similar recommendation was made by the United Nations Special Rapporteur for migrants’ human rights. With the executive committee of FIFA meeting in Morocco, a member of the committee, Thomas Zwanziger, warned the world soccer body could deprive Qatar of its World Cup hosting rights if the Gulf state failed to implement recommendations that included the creation of a minimum wage for each category of construction worker made by a Qatar- sponsored review of its labor legislation by British-based law firm DLA Piper. The review called for far-reaching reforms, including the abolition of the kafala system and proposed the establishment of an independent commission to oversee the reform process. “The Qataris have to establish by the March 10, 2015 deadline the independent commission proposed by the Piper report that would regularly control human rights on World Cup construction sites and monitor progress. ... We had hoped that we would take a big step forward with the Piper report because we were under the impression that the Qataris understood ... Unfortunately, almost nothing has happened until today. I strongly doubt the will to change something of the Qataris,” German publication Sport Bild quoted Mr. Zwanziger as saying. Mr. Zwanziger said in case of a Qatari failure to meet the March deadline “I would expect that a national association would request that the 209-member associations withdraw the World Cup from Qatar at the FIFA Congress in late May in Zurich.” Qatar has been slow in acting on pledges it has made, as well as recommendations, in a slew of reports published in recent years. Qatari officials said a reform of the country’s labor law was likely by the end of this.

## Bahrain

### 1AR Bahrain Key

#### Bahrain’s key to larger India-Gulf economic cooperation

BEDB 12 [(Bahrain Economic Development Board, cites Kamal bin Ahmed, Minister of Transportation and Acting Chief Executive of the EDB) “HRH The Crown Prince Leads Bahrain Business Delegation to India” Manama, Economic Development Board 28 May 2012] AT

Speaking about the upcoming visit, Kamal bin Ahmed, Minister of Transportation and Acting Chief Executive of the EDB, said: “Bahrain and India share strong business relations: Bahrain currently hosts more than 120 Indian firms, and Indian nationals are the largest expatriate community in Bahrain. As Indian firms continue to expand internationally, Bahrain’s low cost of doing business, highly skilled local workforce and access to the GCC market mean that it can provide an excellent location from which these firms can access the fast-growing Gulf market, which is worth over a trillion dollars.” The visit will provide an opportunity to boost links between Bahrain and India, who have always maintained a friendly & stable relationship. As part of the roadshow, the EDB has organised a series of one-to-one meetings with members of the private sector and business community. The high level talks will also include discussions on the proposed Free Trade Agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council & India. The delegation accompanying the Crown Prince includes representatives of the Bahrain Economic Development Board, Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Mumtalakat (Bahrain's investment arm holding company for the Kingdom's non-oil and gas strategic assets).

#### A full shift to Gulf relations is key – India-Gulf relations are decreasing now; only a massive and sustained shift can solve that

## Saudi Arabia

### 1AR Saudi – Terror

note – see “indo-pak war good GSU” for more impacts”

#### Saudi-India relations key to counter-terror coop and ends Pakistan support of militants

Wright 12 [(Tom, writer for India Real Time) “Saudi Arabia Uses India to Balance Pakistan” The Wall Street Journal India, Oct 23, 2012] AT

More evidence is emerging that Saudi Arabia is deepening its cooperation with India in cracking down on terrorism suspects, an important trend that has implications for Pakistan’s bilateral relationship with Riyadh. Pakistan is Saudi Arabia’s traditional ally in South Asia. Both are Islamic countries with majority Sunni populations. Saudi money has fueled the construction of hard-line religious schools in Pakistan that have helped foster Islamist militancy. But Saudi Arabia also has been moving closer to India, Pakistan’s nemesis in the region. The latest sign came this week as Indian authorities confirmed Saudi Arabia had extradited Fasih Mehmood, an alleged member of Indian Mujahideen, a local militant outfit. India earlier this year had sought an international arrest warrant for Mr. Mehmood, who is from Bihar and is wanted in connection with an attack in 2010 on a tourist bus in New Delhi and a stadium in Bangalore. Earlier in October, Saudi Arabia extradited A. Rayees, another alleged Indian militant. India’s Home Ministry said both men, who are in Indian custody, were not contactable. Mr. Mehmood’s family have denied he is guilty of any crime. The two extraditions have built on a trend begun in June, when Saudi Arabia extradited Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari, an alleged Indian member of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based group blamed for the 2008 militant attacks on Mumbai that killed over 160 people. India and Saudi Arabia signed an extradition treaty in 2010, one of a series of recent steps aimed at strengthening ties. That came after a landmark visit to India by King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud in 2006, the first in decades. There are many theories for why Saudi is cooperating more closely with India. Some observers view Saudi policy as driven by worries about the inability of Pakistan to control its militant proxies. Those anxieties have heightened in recent years as militants have increasingly attacked Pakistani government and military targets. “There’s a genuine concern in the Saudi establishment that things may get out of hand,” said Naresh Chandra, chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board. Talat Masood, a retired Pakistan army general, says Saudi Arabia, once itself a source of funds for Pakistan-based militant groups, now views its closer relationship with India as a way of forcing Pakistan to moderate its support for these groups. “The Saudi relationship is no longer a monopoly of Pakistan,” Mr. Masood said.

#### Nuclear power plants would have been targeted

Raman 08 – Director of the Institute For Topical Studies [B. Raman (Additional Secretary (retired ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, “MUMBAI TERRORIST STRIKE: THE ANTI-ISRAELI ANGLE,” INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR, PAPER NO. 476, 4-Dec-2008

9. As mentioned in my book titled “Terrorism---Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow” (www.lancerpublishers.com ), in a travel advisory on its Hebrew language Web site, posted on December 13,2006, Israel's Foreign Ministry had said: "Within the framework of al Qaeda's terror threats in India, there is now a concrete threat focusing on the Goa region where multitudes of visitors, including Israelis, gather ... in late December. Israel's Counter-Terrorism Authority has recommended that Israeli citizens stay away from sites in Goa popular with Westerners and Israelis over the next few weeks." 10. On December 15, 2006, DEBKA, a non-governmental Israeli think-tank, which disseminates information and analyses relating to terrorism, posted the following comments on its web site (www.debka.com): "Information has reached Jerusalem that al Qaeda is in an advanced stage of preparing coordinated attacks on the big, end-of-year seasonal parties held by Western and Israeli tourists in the Indian province. Israeli travelers are advised to cancel their trips to Goa or at least stay away from the big parties. Some 4,000 Israelis have booked flights to India for the winter season. They will be joining the thousands living there. A standing terror warning is still in force for Egyptian Sinai and Turkey." 11. Ever since the terrorist strikes by pro-Al Qaeda Jemmah Islamiya (JI) in the Indonesian tourist resort of Bali in October, 2002, and again in October, 2005, the Indian security agencies in their plans for strengthening physical security have been taking into account the vulnerability of the Indian tourism infrastructure---and particularly in places such as Goa. A greater physical security alert is maintained in places such as Goa, even in the absence of specific information of a planned terrorist strike. 12. There was a greater alert during 2006 following the reported arrest on March 11, 206, of Tarique Jalal alias Tarique Batlo, a Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen cadre, from the Margoa railway station. It was reported that one kg of RDX, two Russian-made hand-grenades, two electronic detonators, two cameras and a mobile phone were seized from him. This was followed by the arrest on March 30, 2006, at Jelenabad in Gulbarga, Karnataka, of Shamim Ahmad, a suspected activist of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who was reportedly a resident of Goa. An AK-47, two hand grenades, a mobile phone, maps of dams and power grid installations in Andhra Pradesh, some audio-video cassettes and printed material in Urdu were reportedly seized from him. These arrests indicated the possibility of the presence of sleeper cells of Pakistani and Kashmiri jihadi terrorist organisations in Goa---not necessarily for organising terrorist strikes in Goa itself, but for providing back-up support to jihadi terrorist strikes in other parts of India. 13. In the beginning of November, 2006, the Goa police reportedly sought reinforcements of para-military forces to enable them to provide effective security during the International Film Festival at Goa and during the holiday season. Their reported threat perceptions particularly related to the LET and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), both Pakistani jihadi terrorist organisations aligned with Al Qaeda in the International Islamic Front (IIF). 14. Media reports dated November 2, 2006, had quoted Shri D. K. Sawant, Superintendent of Police, North Goa, as saying: "There is no specific threat to IFFI (the international film festival). The police department is taking major precautions as the intelligence agencies have indicated a possible threat of suicide bombing which can target pubs, Army camps and nuclear plants." He was referring to threat possibilities all over India and not specifically in Goa.

#### The impact is worse than nuclear war

Niman 01 [Michael I. Niman “Meltdown Terrorism: The New Nuclear Nightmare,” Hightimes.com, December 5th, 2001]

Nuclear power plants house over a thousand times as much radiation as would be released during the explosion of an atomic bomb. And this release would be quick. Greenpeace nuclear consultant Dr. Helmut Hirsh estimates that such a collision would cause a meltdown in less than one hour. Unlike mechanical failure, which often unwinds over hours, allowing for efforts at regional evacuation, the quick meltdown brought on by a terrorist attack would result in far more fatalities. The general consensus among experts is that this scenario would result in at least 100,000 immediate deaths and possibly millions of subsequent cancer related deaths. The radioactive fallout would also render New York’s northern suburbs, and possibly, depending on weather conditions, the city itself, uninhabitable for decades. The economic fallout would have simultaneously destroyed the economies of every western nation. The ghostly image of an empty, dead, slowly decaying carcass of New York City, of a dark skyline, of traffic less bridges and highways, would forever stand as a monument to the triumph of terror. This would be our ultimate nightmare. It’s not the World War Three scenario we all grew up with: mutually assured total destruction – over in one night. No. We’d have to live with this one. We’d have to watch our friends and families die in the shadow of the empty city.

## Kuwait

### 1AR Kuwait

#### Kuwait is key to larger Gulf relations and regional stability and Indian relations are key – South African relations prove

KUNA 14 [(Kuwait News, cites South African Ambassador Delarey Van Tonder) “Kuwait plays strategic role in Gulf region stability - S. African envoy” 06/05/2014] AT

Kuwait is a strategic role player in security and stability in the Gulf region, as well as in international energy security, the South African Ambassador said on Tuesday. Delarey Van Tonder made the remark on the occasion of the 20-year anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between two countries. Since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between South Africa and Kuwait in the mid-1990s, bilateral relations have remained cordial and solid, he told KUNA in an interview. "Kuwait performs a most constructive role as an investor on our continent and specifically South Africa where it continues to contribute to the socio economic and infrastructure development of my country," he pointed out. "We have concluded strategic bilateral agreements and a substantial number of agreements are under consideration including the establishment of a Bilateral Joint Committee which will further consolidate and strengthen bilateral political and economic cooperation." On South Africa's relations with the Gulf States, Tonder said that these ties have also expanded significantly since the establishment of South Africa's democratic order in 1994. "Not only is the Gulf region a substantial source of South Africa's petrochemical and crude oil requirements, the GCC countries and particularly Kuwait have become a major market for South African products especially agricultural exports, a source of tourism and investment and home to a sizeable South African expatriate community," he added. He further said that several South African companies in the construction and engineering sectors have successfully executed major projects in the region, especially in the defence and petrochemical sectors. Although trade and commercial relations between South Africa and Kuwait can be further expanded, Kuwait maintains a positive role as an investor with significant investment by the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) in South Africa. Kuwait's IFA Hotels and Resorts, Al-Kharafi Group and KAPIC have also invested beneficially in South Africa and the wider Southern Africa region. "The State of Kuwait has left a positive footprint on our continent as an investment partner by contributing to Africa's sustainable socio economic development, especially through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) and by its continued humanitarian support during emergencies and national disasters affecting human security on our continent," he noted. "The historic visit of former President Nelson Mandela to the State of Kuwait in 1995 added a special dimension to our bilateral relations and impacted positively on Kuwait's constructive involvement in the economic development of the African Continent," the Ambassador said. He added that His Highness the Amir, during his tenure as Kuwait's Foreign Minister, played a pivotal and visionary role in developing and implementing Kuwait's Africa Policy. Since then regular high level bilateral and multilateral engagements between the two countries have contributed to strengthen cooperation in the political, economic, security and cultural spheres. South Africa holds Kuwait in the highest esteem for successfully hosting the Africa Arab Summit in 2013 and for His Highness the Amir's strategic leadership in resolving conflict and promoting regional unity and cohesion.

# A2 Disad/NC

## Econ

### Doesn’t turn relations

#### Unemployment is not a link turn – the advantage is about relations, not economics

#### Perception – the minimum wage is PERCEIVED as a pro-human rights policy – the actual consequences are irrelevant since it’s a symbolic measure, and they have no evidence unemployment effects would be perceived

#### Desire – labor sending countries explicitly demanded the GCC to raise wages and staked relations on it – even if wages make things worse for expatriates, the labor senders can’t go back on an internationally binding action they’ve already taken and ask the GCC to take back the wage increases – that’s Youha

#### I control uniqueness – relations are being cut off now – only a risk the aff makes things better

#### Scope – the plan benefits most workers; even if it hurts some, the overall relationship will be stronger

### TL Answers

#### Glazov says companies can afford to their workers a living wage since they have high profits – the plan doesn’t force cuts

#### Companies have inflexible labor demand but barely enough to labor to cover it – that’s Coulom – the 2022 World Cup’s construction requirements means they can’t unemploy more workers

#### Labor-sending countries are banning labor exports now which would disemploy all migrant workers, but a minimum wage ensures they continue sending labor

Youha 14 [(Ali Al Youha, MSc in global governance and diplomacy from Oxford University and a BA in economics from Boston College) “Gulf labor policies need context” Al-Monitor Feb 17] AT

While the GCC states are not exempt from the need to manage labor conditions, Western institutions should examine the GCC's internal labor dilemmas. They need to rigorously and holistically assess ongoing GCC state policy efforts to control labor practices within their markets. Therefore, multilateral cooperation and genuine dialogue should be prioritized, rather than politically framing the GCC region as the face of labor exploitation. Issues over protections, a standard minimum wage and labor-import bans have often been the inevitable outcomes of ongoing struggles between GCC states and Asian LSCs. GCC countries ban labor importation from major Asian suppliers when these LSCs violate strict labor and immigration laws Other LSCs, like the Philippine and Indonesian governments, also imposed labor-export bans on Saudi Arabia for failing to address violations of domestic workers’ rights and minimum wage requirements. This particular tension is expected to continue, given the increasing labor and minimum wage standards demanded by Asian LSCs, and has shaped diplomatic relations and produced criticism from rights groups.

#### Higher public sector wages relative to the private sector depresses productivity – increasing private sector wages creates competition and causes GCC economic development, which solves all their impacts

Coulom 13 [Michael Coulom. “Employment and Entitlement in the GCC: A World-systems analysis of disrupted development.” International Affairs, Working Paper Series # 20 | November 2013, American University of Beirut] AJ

Public sector employment in the GCC is also popular because it requires few advanced skills, yet begets salaries higher than that of the public sector—unsurprisingly, the GCC public sector is notoriously underproductive Labor productivity has in fact declined since the 1980s in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite the fact that 44% of Saudi Arabia’s budget is devoted towards paying state salaries and other GCC states are increasing salaries�77 Higher salaries for less demanding work have produced what ESCWA calls a “private-public wage gap”, a phenomenon that “price[s] nationals out of the private market and weaken[s] incentives to acquire the education that market economies demand”78 The labor market of the burgeoning private sector reflects this trend� Despite impressive growth, most private sector salaries are low and working conditions are poor� Most private employment is intended for expatriates, and job quality has declined since the 1980s, as low-skill labourers (often from Asia) have replaced mid-skill labourers (often from the Arab region)� Since the 1980s, the growth elasticity of employment has been high, meaning that for every percentage point of GDP growth, the labour force has grown by more than 1 per cent This might have to do with a growing role of very labour-intensive sectors like construction and personal services The private sector has developed and financially profited off of a non-national labor market at the expense of job quality National attitudes now reflect this trend so that private sector employment is equated not only with lower salaries but also lower prestige� In Saudi Arabia the difference in salary between nationals and non-nationals is drastic; the average Saudi makes US$800 a month while the average expatriate makes $270� Furthermore, a Saudi employed in the civil service can expect to make an average of $2,100 per month�80 Declining productivity and lack of incentive to participate in the private sector collectively discourage national employment in the private sector, thereby producing dependency on the state and hindering economic and social development� Poor migration policies, employment and entitlement programs have eroded local capacity for technological development by discouraging nationals from pursuing higher education or advanced skills training necessary for private sector employment� With near certain employment in the public sector and refusal to accept lower salaries in the private sector, “students prefer to study religion, literature and arts or social sciences rather than the more demanding courses in engineering, medicine, teaching or business studies which should lead to more job opportunities�”81 As a result, Maroun et al� found that “there is an abundance of certain specializations that are not aligned with private-sector demand”� Qatar and the UAE in particular are making significant investments in the education of their youth, hoping that in the near future they will achieve relatively balanced labor markets, as well as the long sought after knowledge economy� Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), a graduate level research institution, stands out as the most likely institution to fill the regional deficit of scientists and innovators, however�82 State funds can support KAUST and other research institutions like it for several years while pulling in the best and brightest students from the Gulf� Without significant government entitlement reform, a shrinking of the public sector, and revision of the public-private wage gap, however, it seems unlikely that GCC nationals will have any incentive to pursue advanced degrees in the technological or scientific fields necessary for satisficing the regional relative labor shortage� The question remains then who will fill KAUST’s classrooms and laboratories� The combination of all of these factors—cheap foreign labor, national entitlement programs, an untrained labor force—heavily impacts development of core-like industries in the GCC� ESCWA found that “Even banks, which are among the most modern and profitable businesses in GCC countries tend to operate on old technological systems”�83 Rodney Wilson, in his article The Development of Islamic Finance in the GCC, questions the long-term sustainability of Gulf-based Islamic financial institutions� Wilson argues that Islamic banks are still dependent on non-Islamic banks to co-arrange major accounts in an agreement where the Islamic institution ensures that all transactions are compliant with shariah law while the secular institution provides the skills and expertise necessary for managing large accounts� 84 Although these relationships are beneficial for Gulf-based IFSs at the moment, they may prove dangerous in the future� In their article “Searching for the Mecca of Islamic Finance”, Bassens et al� find that IFSs in the Gulf have plenty of reason to be wary of London in particular, considered the IFS hub outside of the Gulf: Although it has only two IFS headquarters of the top 100 firms (i�e� the headquarters of the European Islamic Investment Bank and HSBC Amanah), the city ranks third in terms of site service and total connectivity� This observation is in line with the intentions of the British government and Islamic finance stakeholders to make London the international centre of Islamic finance�85 Without the ability to continually modernize and keep up productivity, the IFS sector of the GCC will quickly fall behind and be replaced by more productive competitors in different parts of the world� This demonstrates one of Wallerstein’s final points on the core-peripheral labor hierarchy—what is a core-like process today will become a peripheral process tomorrow�”86 A well-educated workforce—in turn reliant on significant educational incentives—is the only way to encourage long-term continual modernization and core-like development� The obvious conclusion that one arrives at is that the GCC is stuck in a semi-peripheral position in the global labor hierarchy� Despite achieving “considerable mid-range diversification”, productive output is stagnating� There exists little to no internal capacity for advancing the financial and educational fields, leaving the knowledge economy unobtainable� The GCC can restart development and produce a majority core-like economy by tackling three intertwined issues: 1) unproductive labor policy, 2) unsustainable state entitlement programs, and 3) limited incentives for advanced skills training.

### A2 No Enforcement

#### The plan is enforceable which solves

Piper 14 DLA Piper, global law firm operating through various separate and distinct legal entities, "MIGRANT LABOUR IN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR IN THE STATE OF QATAR", April 2014

13.18 Consideration should be given to introducing a minimum wage. We recommend that the State of Qatar, in consultation with States of Origin, undertakes an expert evaluation of the appropriate Relevant Minimum Wage 34 rates for each type of construction worker in Qatar which an employer would be required to pay. This requirement should be clearly stated in the Bilateral Treaties as well as provided in the Migrant Worker Model Employment Contact appended to them, and should be legally binding on all employers operating in the construction sector in Qatar. There should be civil and criminal sanctions for non-compliance with this requirement, with the right of an appropriate inspection of records to demonstrate compliance with these obligations, and an inspector should undertake regular spot-checks. 13.19 Sanctions for employers' / sponsors' failure to pay wages. We recommend that in the event of proven failure to pay wages by any employer / sponsor , that employer / sponsor should automatically be disqualified from objecting to a transfer of employment or exit visa being granted, or should have an appropriate short period of time in which he must prove that the wages have been paid. The default position should be that the transfer will be granted, and in the event of repeat offences of failure to pay such employer / sponsor should be disqualified from being a sponsor. 13.20 Preventing undue delay for payment of wages. We recommend that the payment process in respect of projects ultimately funded by the State of Qatar needs revisiting to ensure that there is no undue delay which would impact upon the payment of wages to migrant workers through Sub-Contracting entities, or be used as an excuse for delay in payment. We also recommend introducing appropriate sanctions for late payment throughout the chain of contracting, for example suspension of contracts and financial penalties provided for in the contract for the Lead Contractor in the event of late payment of wages, reduction of payment period in all contracts from 90 to 60 days, Lead Contractors should be under an obligation to pay their Sub-Contractors promptly and these obligations should be reflected in all contracts in the supply chain. 13.21 Monitoring of payment of wages electronically. We recommend that the State of Qatar should give consideration to implementing a scheme whereby payment of migrant worker wages is monitored electronically by, or in conjunction with, the Qatar Central Bank.

### A2 Unemployment DA

#### No unemployment- labor shortages mean businesses will absorb the cost

Coulom 13 [Michael Coulom. “Employment and Entitlement in the GCC: A World-systems analysis of disrupted development.” International Affairs, Working Paper Series # 20 | November 2013, American University of Beirut] AJ

The GCC labor market and subsequent unequal exchange are driven by the region’s unique demographic makeup, namely its small national population and increasingly large non-national population With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Oman, “foreigners form a majority of the population in all of the GCC states”, and make up about 90% of the population in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates42 Even in Saudi Arabia, a nation of 27 million, 84 million residents are non-nationals (see Figures 2, 3) 43 The extreme imbalance between nationals and non- nationals is attributable to two different types of labor shortages The first, an absolute shortage, means that the state’s indigenous population is too small to realize its full productive potential and to meet human resource needs44 The states of the GCC have sought to ameliorate this problem with relatively open immigration policies for migrant workers.

### A2 Hours Cut

#### Cut hours are actually a good thing – employees who work fewer hours make MORE money and live better lives

Hamza 14 [Sara Hamza, graduate student at University of Tennessee – Knoxville, “Migrant Labor in the Arabian Gulf,” University of Tennessee Honors Program, May 2014] **AZ**

Construction workers in GCC states and other laborers in the service sector are forced to work long days, lasting up to 12 hours each day, with only one day of rest each week. The Dubai Labor Force survey shows the disparity of working hours between nationals and migrant workers. In every sector surveyed, non-nationals worked more total hours per week than nationals (United Arab Emirates Government 2009, Table 28). 4.1% of nationals worked more than 60 hours each week, while 30.4% of non-nationals worked more than 60 hours each week (UAE Government 2009, Table 23). In the construction sector alone, 22.1% work more than 60 hours a week, while only 4% of those working in public administration and defense and 10.5% of federal and local government employees average over 60 hours each week (UAE Government 2009, Table 25 and 26). When looking at average hours per week, non-national construction workers average 51.8 hours while nationals in the public administration average 40 hours a week (UAE Government 2009, Table 29). Not only are the working hours much higher for non-nationals, especially in the construction sector, but the Labor Force Survey also indicated that employees of the sectors that average more hours make less money. In a distribution of paid employees who worked more than 48 hours per week by level of monthly wages, 64.7% of service workers make less than 1,300 AED each month ($354). On the other hand, 41% of legislators and senior officials who work more than 48 hours a week make between 8,000 and 17,999 AED per month ($2,178 - $4,901) (UAE Government 2009, Table 41).

### Wage Equalization

#### Public-private wage gap decreases incentives for skills development and hinders growth – equalizing wages and unemployment are good

Coulom 13 [Michael Coulom. “Employment and Entitlement in the GCC: A World-systems analysis of disrupted development.” International Affairs, Working Paper Series # 20 | November 2013, American University of Beirut] AJ

Public sector employment in the GCC is also popular because it requires few advanced skills, yet begets salaries higher than that of the public sector—unsurprisingly, the GCC public sector is notoriously underproductive� Labor productivity has in fact declined since the 1980s in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite the fact that 44% of Saudi Arabia’s budget is devoted towards paying state salaries and other GCC states are increasing salaries�77 Higher salaries for less demanding work have produced what ESCWA calls a “private-public wage gap”, a phenomenon that “price[s] nationals out of the private market and weaken[s] incentives to acquire the education that market economies demand�”78 The labor market of the burgeoning private sector reflects this trend� Despite impressive growth, most private sector salaries are low and working conditions are poor� Most private employment is intended for expatriates, and job quality has declined since the 1980s, as low-skill labourers (often from Asia) have replaced mid-skill labourers (often from the Arab region)� Since the 1980s, the growth elasticity of employment has been high, meaning that for every percentage point of GDP growth, the labour force has grown by more than 1 per cent� This might have to do with a growing role of very labour-intensive sectors like construction and personal services�79 The private sector has developed and financially profited off of a non-national labor market at the expense of job quality� National attitudes now reflect this trend so that private sector employment is equated not only with lower salaries but also lower prestige� In Saudi Arabia the difference in salary between nationals and non-nationals is drastic; 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#### No unemployment- labor shortages mean businesses will absorb the cost

Coulom 13 [Michael Coulom. “Employment and Entitlement in the GCC: A World-systems analysis of disrupted development.” International Affairs, Working Paper Series # 20 | November 2013, American University of Beirut] AJ

The GCC labor market and subsequent unequal exchange are driven by the region’s unique demographic makeup, namely its small national population and increasingly large non-national population� With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Oman, “foreigners form a majority of the population in all of the GCC states”, and make up about 90% of the population in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates�42 Even in Saudi Arabia, a nation of 27 million, 8�4 million residents are non-nationals (see Figures 2, 3)�43 The extreme imbalance between nationals and non- nationals is attributable to two different types of labor shortages� The first, an absolute shortage, means that the state’s indigenous population is too small to realize its full productive potential and to meet human resource needs�44 The states of the GCC have sought to ameliorate this problem with relatively open immigration policies for migrant workers.

### Middle Class Key

#### Strong GCC middle class spurs change – key to their impacts

Ajami 08 [Kshetri, Nir and Riad Ajami (2008) Institutional Reforms in the Gulf Cooperation Council Economies: A Conceptual Framework,‖ Journal of International Management, 14(3), 300-318] AJ

GCC economies are also characterized by a symbiosis of political and economic elites (Sabri, 2001; Schlumberger, 2000). Experts argue that a genuinely entrepreneurial class, which is lacking in the region, would be the single most important force for change in the Middle East, pulling along all others in its wake‖ (Zakaria, 2004). GCC economies' reform arguably will have far-reaching implications for not only their own populations but also the entire global economy‖ (De Boer and Turner, 2007). Concepts and theory building are lacking on the nature of institutions and institutional changes in the GCC region. To more fully understand institutional reforms in the region, we draw upon institutional theory. The underlying notion in this paper is that a free enterprise economy with a strong rule of law and property rights is likely to benefit not only the GCC society but also the global economy. We make two contributions to the literature in this article. First, we extend institutional theory to the context and limit of the GCC region. Second, we provide insights into the pattern of institutional changes, which has been an important but under-examined issue (Campbell, 2004). Note that institutions arguably have a higher propensity to change when they are characterized by contradictions which create conflicting and irreconcilable incentives and motivations (Campbell, 2004, p. 186). Nowhere is this characteristic more evident than in the GCC region. In addition to the theoretical contribution, policy makers and managers can gain in multiple ways by a deeper and richer understanding of GCC region's institutions. An understanding of the formative dynamics of the attitudes and priorities of GCC leaders could help Western policy makers devise strategies to bring desired institutional changes. Second, a deeper understanding of the functioning of GCC decision makers, as they mediate institutional reforms in the region through their attitudes and priorities, both economic and political, is of profound interests to managers.

## A2 US Heg Decline

### India-UAE K2 Heg

#### Indian influence in the Gulf doesn’t trade off with US regional interests

Pant 9 [(Harsh, professor specializing in International Relations Theory, Security Studies, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Asia-Pacific Security, South Asian Politics at King’s college in London) “Looking Beyond Tehran: India’s Rising Stakes in the Gulf” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

Finally, the US remains the predominant player in the Gulf despite some of the recent setbacks. India’s ties with the US have dramatically expanded in the last few years and this has already emerged as a significant factor in shaping Indian foreign policy towards the Gulf. The most visible manifestation of this has been India’s attempt to recalibrate its ties with Iran. The shadow of the US will loom large over Indian foreign policy in the years to come especially if the conflict between the US and Iran gets intensified. India is trying hard to project itself as a responsible nuclear power, especially after the signing of the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the US. It will be very reluctant to challenge US non-proliferation priorities in the Gulf that views Iranian nuclear program as a major challenge. It is in India’s interest now that nuclear proliferation in its neighborhood is contained. Meanwhile, a deeper engagement with the Arab Gulf states will also blunt the criticism that Indian foreign policy has become too obsessed with the US and its foreign policy agenda. India is looking beyond its old approach as it seems to have reached a turning point in its relations with the Gulf States. The revival of trade and investment between the Gulf and India, featuring large movements of goods and capital, is founded on the search for energy sufficiency, a new security landscape and very rapid economic growth. Though there has been no articulation of a broader Gulf or a Middle East policy by India, it can no longer rely on its past approach to the region that has become not only outdated but is thoroughly inadequate to meet the complex challenges of the future. As a consequence, India is now focusing on a pragmatic engagement with all sides and has tried to shed its covertly ideological approach towards the region. Most countries in the Gulf are also now seeking comprehensive partnerships with India based on a recognition and appreciation for India’s role in shaping the emerging regional and global order. The challenge for the two sides now is to sustain the present momentum.

#### Pradhan says US hegemonic strategy can’t solve the middle east alone – multiple warrants---

#### A. Turmoil in Iraq – exacerbated by ISIS and the US’s failure to contain the threat before it escalated

#### B. Perception of an Israel-centric foreign policy angers other Middle East nations – even if the US protects Israel it can’t solve the Gulf

#### C. Exclusive leadership overstretches the US and isn’t acceptable to all Middle East nations

#### D. There’s a PERCEPTION of heg decline – regimes no longer feel safe in the US umbrella

#### Only India fill-in solves

## A2 NC

### Promise Breaking

#### Lack of a minimum wage allows labor recruiters to break their contracts with laborers – a minimum wage standardizes expectations which solves

Koirala 13 [(Shashwat, Univ of Chicago Undergraduate Law Review) “THE FAILURES OF QATAR’S LABOR LAWS TO PROTECT MIGRANT WORKERS’ RIGHTS” March 3, 2013] AT

The first problem regarding the livelihood of the migrant workers is related to wages. In Qatar, these workers’ wages typically range from $8 to $11 per day, but sometimes this number can dip down to $6.75.[12] These wages are often less than what they were promised when they were recruited.[13] More importantly, these wages are often inadequate for the subsistence of the worker. Qatar’s wage determining mechanism is also flawed. Qatar’s Labor Ministry notes that a labor contract between the employer and the migrant worker may be signed either in the worker’s home country or when he enters Qatar. In either case, the representatives of both countries must approve the contract. However, no guidelines on possible minimum wage rates are made available to either party.[14] Moreover, even if a certain wage was promised to the workers, employers often make unexpected deductions to that promised wage by levying the burden of costs like bedding and health care on the workers, even though Qatari laws don’t allow such deductions.[15]

#### Prefer on specificity – libertarianism doesn’t apply when promise-breaking causes contract slavery

Goldthorpe 12 Rebecca Goldthorpe, Mapping Global Racisms Project (2012- ). Young Researcher’s Working Papers Archive, "Racialisation in the United Arab Emirates", CERS Working Paper, 2012

Market liberalism that functions in capitalist societies, such as the UAE, supposedly promotes freedom and self-regulation, whereby workers perceive themselves as commodities to which they can sell their labour (Bales and Robbins 2001; Polanyi 2001). Yet in the UAE, this is not always the case in employment, as employers often have control over workers particularly in the racialised construction sector. ‘Contract slavery’ is extremely common in the building sector whereby contracts include false promises in order to attract migrants from developing nations into slavery through employment (Bales 1999; HRW 2006). In reality, these contracts restrict freedom and are used as a tool to ‘trap’ foreign migrant workers. An economic perspective suggests capitalism and globalisation has prohibited enslavement in wealthier countries such as the UAE, exploiting migrant workers from developing nations in order to make profits. This is similar to Marxist perspectives that understand race through the economic structure and argue racism is intrinsically connected with capitalism. However, solely economic arguments fail to recognise the racialised elements whereby race pre determines success. Examples of contract slavery that promote racialisation, in the constructions sector, are eminent in the ‘Kafala System’.

#### Not Universalizable – promise-breaking makes the entire practice of truth-telling completely inconceivable – outweighs since the total impossible of such a world is a stronger constraint

#### Limits Autonomy – laborers form life-plans based on contracts, and are coerced into accepting exploitation, which turns their offense since it assumes workers freely choose labor contracts.

#### Lack of basic needs precludes meaningful agency and freedom since people can’t reason or act freely when they’re starving – it’s a much stronger violation

## A2 Satire

### 1AR Satire Add-on

#### Dubai is building the world’s largest human rights violation in the world. If they don’t have Indian expatriates, they won’t be able to do it.

The Onion 15 [(Marxist news source) “Dubai Unveils Plans For World’s Largest Human Rights Violation” The Onion ISSUE 51•06 • Feb 10, 2015] AT

DUBAI—Calling it the most ambitious project of its kind ever undertaken, officials from Dubai’s Department of Economic Development announced Tuesday the emirate’s plans to construct the world’s largest human rights violation. Set to begin later this month, the project, dubbed Saqr Ganzeer, or “Chained Falcon,” will reportedly take as long as 10 years to complete and make use of more than 250,000 foreign workers from the Indian subcontinent and other parts of Asia. It is expected to easily surpass all previous record holders, towering over every other abuse of rights in the wealthy Middle Eastern city. “With this bold new endeavor, we will create the biggest deprivation of basic human dignity the world has ever seen,” said DED deputy director Jamal Al Falasi, who according to reports was selected to oversee the project after successfully managing several of Dubai’s smaller violations of individuals’ freedoms. “None of the others will even come close. Once completed, it will be recognized everywhere as a symbol of Dubai and everything our city stands for.” Emirati sources expressed confidence that before it is even finished, Saqr Ganzeer will generate a “huge splash” in the international community, easily overshadowing human rights offenses in countries like Sudan, North Korea, Syria, China, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which they said will look miniscule in comparison. International observers agreed that as soon as the project is underway, Dubai’s claim to the title of world’s greatest human rights infringement will likely be measured and officially certified by several independent organizations. Bangladeshi laborer Tajuddin Rahman, one of tens of thousands who was lured to the emirate for the monumental exploitation of fundamental liberties, told reporters that while he knows it won’t be easy toiling for countless hours on the project, he hopes his family back home will be proud of his sacrifice. “It really is humbling to be part of an undertaking this historic in scope,” said Rahman, who explained he’s eager to begin working on the project, as he needs to start funneling all his wages to his labor contractor for the next several years to pay back the cost of funding his travel to the UAE. “It will take many years to complete, so I realize I might not be around long enough to see it finished.” “I only hope that when this is done, people will take notice,” he added.

# Kritik Blocks

## Security---TL

### TL R/C and US Imperialism [1:15]

#### IR is a SCIENCE - its goal is to predict action, not to make metaphysical theories that lack real-world validity. You should use EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE to test theories

Kang 3 [(David, Associate Professor of Government and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College) “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 165–180] At

International relations scholars must take seriously the possibility that different regions of the world might indeed be different. Relatedly, critiques of this claim as somehow fundamentally exceptionalist misunderstand the nature of scholarly inquiry. It is good social science to be open to the possibility that evidence may not fit a theory, just as it is possible to note difference without resorting to caricature—a trap into which Acharya falls when criticizing some of my assertions as having an “exceptionalist ring” (p. 162). An example of how progressive research might occur is perhaps best demonstrated through a comparison of scholarship on Asian development with scholarship on Asian international relations. According to a number of criteria—theoretical sophistication, attention to the empirical record, and impact on the wider ªeld of social science—the study of Asian international relations lags far behind. A brief review of the intellectual history of Asia conªrms this observation. Beginning in the late 1970s, scholars of Asian development challenged their colleagues in the ªelds of economics, political science, and sociology to move beyond the long-standing dichotomy between a neoclassical free market and a centrally planned economy in their study of economic development. Chalmers Johnson, for example, was particularly forceful when arguing that Japan’s economic growth ªt into neither category.2 And as Stephan Haggard has written, “Spearheaded by scholars outside the mainstream of North American economics, this work began by underlining empirical anomalies: the myriad ways in which the East Asian cases failed to conform to the neoclassical view.”3 In the 1980s, as Japan’s economic rise continued, and South Korea and Taiwan became successful developers (i.e., newly industrialized countries, or NICs), the debate over the explanation for their success intensiªed. The dependent variable in all three cases was startlingly clear: Each was experiencing economic development that was historically unprecedented by world standards in both its pace and its depth.4 The issue was how to explain this growth. The debate began by focusing on whether state intervention was central to the NICs’ economic success—the “state versus the market” debate.5 In surprisingly little time, it became obvious that the common variable was extensive government intervention into the market. This finding made clear the need to recast the standard debate between the virtues of a neoclassical free market versus a centrally planned economy. Twenty years later, the study of Asian development and the high theoretical standards that this scholarship has established have forced scholars to face a myriad of new ideas and issues. The concept of a “developmental state” has become part of the canon in political economy.6 New developments in microeconomics, sociology, and anthropology have underscored the role of institutions in East Asia’s economic performance. Scholars no longer view markets as the frictionless intersection of supply and demand curves. Instead markets are being reinterpreted as complexes of principal-agent relationships in which problems of imperfect and asymmetric information, contracting, and credibil ity are ubiquitous.7 The smooth functioning of markets requires more than getting policies, incentives, and prices right. Also needed are public and private institutions that facilitate market exchange—from the legal system and a clear delineation of property rights, to the public provision of information, to informal institutions that build trust.8 Scholars continue to probe the relationship between development and politics, corruption, the international system, and the role of history.9 As Haggard writes, “In the 1990s, intellectual developments . . . provided earlier insights on government intervention with microfoundations that made them legitimate to the economics profession.”10 The continuing debate over Asian development has generated more than its share of controversy.11 Almost nowhere in this debate, however, do arguments about whether or not Asia is “exceptional” play a role, and most scholars take Asia’s empirical realities on their own terms. They pay close attention to measuring the independent and dependent variables, and they are open to the potential ramifications of their findings for social science theory. Exploring how institutions affect markets, and in particular the impact of Asian governments and the organization of Asian business on economic growth, is an ongoing process that involves careful attention to both theory and evidence. By comparison, the study of Asian international relations is still in its initial stages. But if scholars in the field of political economy can do it, so too can scholars in the field of international relations.

#### 1AC Fishman evidence is based on empirical research and expert consensus that proves Middle East war and instability is coming – this is much stronger evidence than their broad, vague theories and means it’s try or die for security discourse to shift the frame

#### Indian relations solves US imperialism

Pradhan 11 [(PK, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi) “GCC-Iran Rivalry and Strategic Challenges for India in the Gulf” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 6, No. 1, January–March 2011, 45-57] AT

The USA is comfortable with growing Indian ties with the GCC countries, but the long-term implications and sustainability of the present circumstances remain hazy. India realizes the importance of Iran as a big neighbour, a major regional player, important for India’s energy security, etc. India is open for a strategic partnership with Tehran if circumstances dictate it in future. India cannot fully support the US policies in the region, nor can it completely oppose them. India would require the support of the USA in the region to further its own interests.20 There are a number of prospective areas of cooperation between the two countries in the region, such as protection of the sea lanes, maritime policing, counterterrorism, energy security, etc. Strategically, USA would be happy to have India on its side against Iran. But there remain a number of differences between India and the USA over the war on terror, approach to religious extremism, and the elevation of nonproliferation above all other geopolitical considerations.21 India also disapproves of the US invasion of Iraq and that country’s current policies and sanctions against Iran. India’s interests will continue to be at variance with the USA also because of its long historical and cultural links with the region and because India’s security directly depends on developments in the region. India’s dilemma would be to strike a balance between its historical interests and growing demands of its relations with the USA.22 It remains a challenge for India to devise a long-term policy so as to balance its own interests in the region, keeping in mind key regional players and the USA.

#### Perm do both – net benefit is threats real

#### Perm do the aff and the alt in other instances

#### Finding one underlying explanation that universally motivates Middle Eastern actors is exactly the reductionist/orientialist approach to IR they critique – it ignores contingent circumstances in favor of one-size-fits-all assumptions about their behavior and motivations to explain their actions

#### Prefer proximate causes over broad root causes

Moore 4 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come.

#### Strategically deploying security discourse overcomes mutual enmity in the context of the Middle East

Bilgin 2000 [(Pinar, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) “Inventing Middle Easts? The making of regions through security discourses” 13-16 August 1998] AT

As emphasised in the introduction, the argument put forward in this paper is that the answers peoples of the region (this part of the world formerly known as the Middle East) give to the questions Who are we? and Which region do we belong to? are very important in terms of what they do with their future. Through the creation of a regional identity and strengthening the sense of belonging, for instance, cooperation and interdependence may take root. They may choose to define insecurity as their common enemy by way of conceiving themselves as part of a 'security complex'. [105] In the remainder of the paper I will discuss how viewing this group of states as a 'security complex' may constitute a first step on the way to saw the seeds of regionalism towards the establishment of a 'security community'. Barry Buzan, in People, States and Fear introduced the concept of 'security complex' as an analytical tool when studying security. His contention was that when conceptualising the regional level, one should do away with territoriality and voluntarism (which turned out to be problematic as seen in the first two parts of this paper) but emphasise the present patterns of amity and enmity. This, argues Buzan, would enable the analyst to treat a group of states together in a 'security complex', i.e. as an intermediate level between the levels of states and the international system, whether or not those states recognise themselves to be operating as part of one whole. Accordingly, he defines a 'security complex' as 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.' [106] By way of this definition, Buzan re-introduces the role of external actors when he argues that a Middle Eastern security complex might exist whether indigenous actors recognise it or not. [107] It is in this sense that the 'security complex' as an analytical tool is useful in bringing together a group of states to show their securities are interdependent upon one another's policies. Coming to see the fact that their securities are interdependent and that they have to cooperate towards achieving stable security might constitute a first, but nevetheless crucial step towards sawing the seeds of regionalism in the 'Middle East'. However, although external actors' (including analysts) view (and perhaps encouragement and support) is important, what is also very important is the creation of a distinct identity within the construct -regardless of what we come to call it, a 'security complex' or a 'region'- if it is to become a 'security community' in Karl Deutsch's terms. Deutsch and his associates defined a security community as 'one in which where there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each either physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.' [108] As Wæver also indicates, security complex as a concept does not contain the standards for change towards a security community. Rather security complex is an analytical tool for analysing the processes and explaining the dynamics of security in a given area; it does not show or attempt to change the quality of relationships at a given time within a given area. [109] Still, given the lack of enthusiasm for regionalism (as a way of establishing security) in the 'Middle East', the 'Middle Eastern security complex' as a concept is a good place for the analyst to start with. Some Arab regimes and non-governmental organisations may not include Iran, Israel and Turkey in their definitions of the region they live in; Turkey and Israel, on the other hand may view themselves as belonging to Europe rather than the 'Middle East'. Nevertheless, when viewed in security terms, they are all parts of a Middle Eastern (in)security complex; they all take each other into account when making their calculations, especially when it comes to buying military equipment. Then, although the concept of security complex in itself may not involve standards for change, as Wæver has rightly pointed out, to convince regional actors that they are all involved within the same security complex may arguably be a first step towards the creation of a security community. A second step might be taken when they begin to see themselves not as victims of each other (or the past) but of insecurity which has to be overcome through cooperative efforts. [110] A third step may be the creation of security regimes on a number of issue areas, as Ken Booth has suggested, so that a complex web of different regimes would help establish and maintain security in this part of the world. This may allow the co-existence of all these four visions presented above; each helping address the issues they are most concerned with. The involvement of non-governmental organisations may also help bring out issues that are not usually met by states' policies. In the long-run, with possible spill-over effects, these security regimes may contribute towards building a security community. [111] Viewed from the lens of Critical Security Studies, it is the issues of water, food, population, productivity, environment, and education in addition to those of arms proliferation, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction, and expansionist regimes, that are the main problems in the region; for it is these very issues that cause insecurity for peoples lives. Hence the Critical Security Studies call to understand and practice security at different levels in reference to multiple referents (subjects of security) and by way of multiple agents (actors that act for security, i.e. social movements, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, individuals as well as states). Our understanding and practices of security, then, should be informed by a view of security that is cognisant of the complexities involved in human affairs. The insecurity in the 'Middle East' attests well to this.

### FW cards

#### It’s better to compare differing actions, not methods

Rorty 80 [(Richard) “Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 53, No. 6. (Aug.,1980), pp. 717+719-738.] RMT

So a second characterization of pragmatism might go like this: there is no epistemological difference between truth about what ought to be and truth about what is, nor any meta- physical difference between facts and values, nor any methodological difference between morality and science. Even non- pragmatists think Plato was wrong to think of moral philosophy as discovering the essence of goodness, and ill and Kant wrong in trying to reduce moral choice to rule. But every reason for saying that they were wrong is a reason for thinking the epistemological tradition wrong in looking for the essence of science and in trying to reduce rationality to rule. For the pragmatists, the pattern of all inquiry -- scientific as well as moral -- is deliberation concerning the relative attractions of various concrete alternatives. The idea that in science or philosophy we can substitute "method" for deliberation between alternative results of speculation is just wishful thinking. It is like the idea that the morally wise man resolves his dilemmas by consulting his memory of the Idea of the Good, or by looking up the relevant article of the moral law. It is the myth that rationality consists in being constrained by rule. According to this Platonic myth, the life of reason is not the life of Socratic conversation but an illuminated state of consciousness in which one never needs to ask if one has exhausted the possible descriptions of, or explanations for, the situation. One simply arrives at true beliefs by obeying mechanical procedures.

#### Even if they win framework – security is best seen as a pragmatic act, not socially constructed

Balzacq 10 [Thierry, “Constructivism and Securitization Studies”,Forthcoming in Myriam Dunn Cavelty & Victor Mauer, eds., Handbook of Security Studies (London: Routledge). May 2010] RMT

There are difficulties with this formulation, however. The upshot is that security cannot be wholly self-referential; instead, it frequently executes a kind of reference – though this might be partial or biased (Nightingale and Cromby 2002: 705). Further, the claim that security is a speech act may be intuitively strong, but it is theoretically restrictive and methodologically unfruitful. In fact, what has often been taken to be the result of the performative use of the concept security does not follow from that assumption. Rather, securitization results from other unarticulated assumptions about security’s symbolic power. In other words, securitization is a pragmatic act, i.e.: a sustained argumentative practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to curb it. Thus, the CS view can be called philosophical, while the pragmatic approach to securitization is termed sociological. Conceptually, the two models were developed in parallel, the former in Denmark, and the latter in Belgium, France, and the UK. Yet, given intensive cross- fertilizations, the boundaries between these perspectives are now porous, and sometimes authors seem to move from one model to another, without further clarification. However, differences between the two persist that account for the differences in how security problems are examined. Put starkly, in the CS model, philosophical speculations often triumph over sociological insights, which are at best accorded cosmetic status. By contrast, in the second model, sociological elements subsume philosophical premises. Whereas the philosophical model prefers poststructuralist methods, the sociological view proposes a pluralist approach to securitization wherein discourse analysis and process tracing work together.

### Science/Specificity

#### Indian regional power mediates conflicts – prefer our empirical approach over vague theories

Bercovitch 2000 [(Jacob, Professor of International Relations at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand) “Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2000, pp. 145-165] AT

Mixed mediation teams most often con- sisted of representatives of national govern- ments. Hence, of 355 mandates that were held by states, no less than 80 were con- ducted by groups of government officials. Only few teams consisting of different IGOs were asked to mediate. Teams made up of IGO and government diplomats were more frequent. If we look at the effectiveness of the mediation attempts, quasi-multilateral attempts tend to be more effective than single-actor interventions. This might be due to the increasing credibility that a multi-actor mediation team has. If we summarize the number of mediations with more than two mediators, the success rate is well above 50%. If we now turn our attention to the identity of the mediators, it becomes quickly obvious that some states dominate inter- national mediation. Table IV summarizes the number of times that certain nation states were selected on the market for con- flict managers. Unsurprisingly, Table IV demonstrates that the USA was one of the most active con- flict managers during the Cold War. This has not changed much since the end of the Cold War. If conflict parties turn to a state to settle their conflict, the chance that the USA will be chosen is approximately one in three. This clear result is a first indication that either the hegemony or the reputation variable has to be rather important in our subsequent statistical tests. It should also be noted that the role of the Soviet Union on the international mediation market was less prominent. This might reflect a combination of the trustworthiness attributed to democ- racies, and the power to enforce agreements. The prominent mediatory role India plays is most likely a consequence of regional hegemony in which no regional conflict is conceivable without an intervention by the most powerful actor. In line with our remarks on colony, France and Great Britain were often involved in settling international disputes. This is in contrast to another per- manent member of the Security Council, China, which only became active in inter- national diplomacy after Nixon’s visit and the subsequent political opening. Whether the pronounced trade orientation in the Chinese foreign policy is accompanied by an active peace diplomacy in the long run cannot be said from the data analyzed here. It should also be noted that Spain is com- pletely and Portugal nearly completely absent in the mediator market. This indicates that the pure status of an ex-colonial power might not be a sufficiently convincing attribute in the mediator market.

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We believe that some of these results have important implications for our under- standing of international conflict management. First, while the results partly support hegemony theory (Lake, 1994), the analysis also demonstrates that international conflict management is not only influenced by power considerations. Although the Superpowers of the Cold War era and other permanent members of the Security Council are very much more likely to become active in an international conflict, the USA is not the sole dominating force in this market. Second, the analysis demonstrates the need for a more rigorous study of international conflict management which is still largely characterized by ad hoc theories and casual empirical illustrations. Our article has attempted to hone home the message that even a very simplistic expected-utility model is able to offer major theoretical implications. On a methodological level, the analysis shows how a comparison between traditional OLS regression analysis and the more adequate event count models can lead to interesting theoretical insights. Our results open up interesting avenues for further research. One immediate question is the interconnection between specific conflict characteristics and the selection of international mediators. We do not yet know the circumstances under which the conflict parties agree to a mediation at all and then, once this initial choice is made, to a multilateral rather than a unilateral form of conflict management. The preliminary evidence suggests that small states are only likely to receive mandates if the more powerful mediators have not been successful (Marquis and Schneider 1996). Yet, the eagerness of at least some states to receive such a risky mandate demonstrates again that a political economy framework is a powerful tool for the systematic analysis of international conflict management.

#### IR is a SCIENCE - its goal is to predict action, not to make metaphysical theories that lack real-world validity. You should use EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE to test theories

Kang 3 [(David, Associate Professor of Government and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College) “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 165–180] At

International relations scholars must take seriously the possibility that different regions of the world might indeed be different. Relatedly, critiques of this claim as somehow fundamentally exceptionalist misunderstand the nature of scholarly inquiry. It is good social science to be open to the possibility that evidence may not fit a theory, just as it is possible to note difference without resorting to caricature—a trap into which Acharya falls when criticizing some of my assertions as having an “exceptionalist ring” (p. 162). An example of how progressive research might occur is perhaps best demonstrated through a comparison of scholarship on Asian development with scholarship on Asian international relations. According to a number of criteria—theoretical sophistication, attention to the empirical record, and impact on the wider ªeld of social science—the study of Asian international relations lags far behind. A brief review of the intellectual history of Asia conªrms this observation. Beginning in the late 1970s, scholars of Asian development challenged their colleagues in the ªelds of economics, political science, and sociology to move beyond the long-standing dichotomy between a neoclassical free market and a centrally planned economy in their study of economic development. Chalmers Johnson, for example, was particularly forceful when arguing that Japan’s economic growth ªt into neither category.2 And as Stephan Haggard has written, “Spearheaded by scholars outside the mainstream of North American economics, this work began by underlining empirical anomalies: the myriad ways in which the East Asian cases failed to conform to the neoclassical view.”3 In the 1980s, as Japan’s economic rise continued, and South Korea and Taiwan became successful developers (i.e., newly industrialized countries, or NICs), the debate over the explanation for their success intensiªed. The dependent variable in all three cases was startlingly clear: Each was experiencing economic development that was historically unprecedented by world standards in both its pace and its depth.4 The issue was how to explain this growth. The debate began by focusing on whether state intervention was central to the NICs’ economic success—the “state versus the market” debate.5 In surprisingly little time, it became obvious that the common variable was extensive government intervention into the market. This finding made clear the need to recast the standard debate between the virtues of a neoclassical free market versus a centrally planned economy. Twenty years later, the study of Asian development and the high theoretical standards that this scholarship has established have forced scholars to face a myriad of new ideas and issues. The concept of a “developmental state” has become part of the canon in political economy.6 New developments in microeconomics, sociology, and anthropology have underscored the role of institutions in East Asia’s economic performance. Scholars no longer view markets as the frictionless intersection of supply and demand curves. Instead markets are being reinterpreted as complexes of principal-agent relationships in which problems of imperfect and asymmetric information, contracting, and credibil ity are ubiquitous.7 The smooth functioning of markets requires more than getting policies, incentives, and prices right. Also needed are public and private institutions that facilitate market exchange—from the legal system and a clear delineation of property rights, to the public provision of information, to informal institutions that build trust.8 Scholars continue to probe the relationship between development and politics, corruption, the international system, and the role of history.9 As Haggard writes, “In the 1990s, intellectual developments . . . provided earlier insights on government intervention with microfoundations that made them legitimate to the economics profession.”10 The continuing debate over Asian development has generated more than its share of controversy.11 Almost nowhere in this debate, however, do arguments about whether or not Asia is “exceptional” play a role, and most scholars take Asia’s empirical realities on their own terms. They pay close attention to measuring the independent and dependent variables, and they are open to the potential ramifications of their findings for social science theory. Exploring how institutions affect markets, and in particular the impact of Asian governments and the organization of Asian business on economic growth, is an ongoing process that involves careful attention to both theory and evidence. By comparison, the study of Asian international relations is still in its initial stages. But if scholars in the field of political economy can do it, so too can scholars in the field of international relations.

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#### The aff has specific empirical evidence that in the context of the Middle East, threats are real and the plan will reduce them – prefer these predictions over the neg’s broad explanations of violence

PRICE 98 (RICHARD PRICE is a former prof in the Department of Anthropology at Yale University. Later, he moved to Johns Hopkins University to found the Department of Anthropology, where he served three terms as chair. A decade of freelance teaching (University of Minnesota, Stanford University, Princeton University, University of Florida, Universidade Federal da Bahia), ensued. This article is co-authored with CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT – Monash University – European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 1998 via SAGE Publications – http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/PriceReusSmithCriticalInternatlTheoryConstructivism.pdf)

One of the central departures of critical international theory from positivism is the view that we cannot escape the interpretive moment. As George (1994: 24) argues, ‘the world is always an interpreted “thing”, and it is always interpreted in conditions of disagreement and conflict, to one degree or another’. For this reason, ‘there can be no common body of observational or tested data that we can turn to for a neutral, objective knowledge of the world. There can be no ultimate knowledge, for example, that actually corresponds to reality per se.’ This proposition has been endorsed wholeheartedly by constructivists, who are at pains to deny the possibility of making ‘Big-T’ Truth claims about the world and studiously avoid attributing such status to their findings. This having been said, after undertaking sustained empirical analyses of aspects of world politics constructivists do make ‘small-t’ truth claims about the subjects they have investigated. That is, they claim to have arrived at logical and empirically plausible interpretations of actions, events or processes, and they appeal to the weight of evidence to sustain such claims. While admitting that their claims are always contingent and partial interpretations of a complex world, Price (1995, 1997) claims that his genealogy provides the best account to date to make sense of anomalies surrounding the use of chemical weapons, and Reus-Smit (1997) claims that a culturalist perspective offers the best explanation of institutional differences between historical societies of states. Do such claims contradict the interpretive ethos of critical international theory? For two reasons, we argue that they do not. First, the interpretive ethos of critical international theory is driven, in large measure, by a normative rejection of totalizing discourses, of general theoretical frameworks that privilege certain perspectives over others. One searches constructivist scholarship in vain, though, for such discourses. With the possible exception of Wendt’s problematic flirtation with general systemic theory and professed commitment to ‘science’, constructivist research is at its best when and because it is question driven, with self-consciously contingent claims made specifically in relation to particular phenomena, at a particular time, based on particular evidence, and always open to alternative interpretations. Second, the rejection of totalizing discourses based on ‘big-T’ Truth claims does not foreclose the possibility, or even the inevitability, of making ‘small-t’ truth claims. In fact, we would argue that as soon as one observes and interacts in the world such claims are unavoidable, either as a person engaged in everyday life or as a scholar. As Nietzsche pointed out long ago, we cannot help putting forth truth claims about the world. The individual who does not cannot act, and the genuinely unhypocritical relativist who cannot struggles for something to say and write. In short, if constructivists are not advancing totalizing discourses, and if making ‘small-t’ truth claims is inevitable if one is to talk about how the world works, then it is no more likely that constructivism per se violates the interpretive ethos of critical international theory than does critical theory itself.

#### The aff is true in specific contexts – broad theories beg the question and fail to explain phenomena

Owen 2 (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

### No Root Cause

#### There are multiple root causes, but strong diplomatic relations solve – it’s a universal conflict suppressor.

Skoll 15 [(Skoll Global Threats Fund; members include Annie Maxwell, White House Fellow, working in the Office of Vice President Biden; Jane Bloch, advanced efforts to price carbon and promote caps on greenhouse gases at the Energy Foundation; Courtney Colburn, Administrative Assistant at the Jim Joseph Foundation and intern at Amnesty International) “Middle East Conflict”] AT

The Arab Awakening has raised hopes that a new era of positive change may be emerging in the Middle East. However, there also exists an unusually high risk of conflict and instability, as Syria is engulfed in civil war, the Iranian nuclear crisis reaches a point of reckoning, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict enters a new and uncertain phase, and the regional security order disintegrates. In the longer-term, chronic socioeconomic problems related to youth unemployment and food and water insecurity, exacerbated by climate change, will continue to challenge even the most stable regimes. Addressing these threats will require action on multiple fronts, none more important than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which continues to stymie effective regional cooperation. In transitioning countries, initiatives are required to stabilize the political situation and address the drivers of socioeconomic crisis that could derail progress towards democratization. More broadly in the region, there is a need for building cross-border capacity to address a set of rapidly emerging common challenges, such as disease management and water, energy, and food security. Finally, it is imperative to track the fast-changing security environment and establish new patterns of diplomatic engagement that help to reinforce, rather than undermine, the above goals.

#### Even if they win a root cause claim, any effects of that cause can be managed by strong Indian peacekeeping so the aff still solves the impacts. Also, any risk there’s another root cause means kritik can’t solve violence but the aff does

#### No one root cause of Middle East and addressing cooperation means we can make predictions

Beyerle and Ibish 11 [(Shaazka, international educator, writer, and researcher on people power) “The War in Libya and the "Arab Spring””] AT

Why has there been such a flowering of revolt in the Arab world in North Africa and the Middle East in the past few months? Is there a common root cause to protests and revolts, whether ultimately successful in creating less-oppressive regimes, in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere? In listening to what people in the Middle East say, there is not a single root cause but a constellation of related grievances that people shared—involving poverty, endemic corruption, a rotting system, few opportunities for youth, growing anger over the denial of basic freedom, and an overall sense of being robbed of human dignity—and as importantly, the regimes were seen as the causes or sources of them. Though largely ignored or dismissed in policy circles, there has been ongoing citizen dissent in the Middle East during the previous decade. Mary King, the "mother" of modern nonviolent scholarship, writes, "Tunisia and Egypt’s upheavals were years in the making, as are all national nonviolent revolutions that I’ve studied." In Egypt, the April 6, 2008, general strike (Facebook Revolution) was organized by youth who formed the April 6 movement. The anti-corruption campaign, Shayfeen.com (meaning "we see you"), spawned the Egyptians Against Corruption movement. As well, the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights had been actively studying civil resistance and engaging in nonviolent actions well before 2011. It's playing an important role in the country's nonviolent uprising, which is experiencing severe repression with the help of Saudi forces, while the Western reaction, including the U.S., has been reserved. In May 2006, a group of young men and women, communicating through text messages, launched the “Orange Movement” against political corruption in Kuwait. Their nonviolent tactics, including leafleting the parliament, enlisted public support and participation, resulted in early parliamentary elections in which legislation to change electoral districts (to prevent corruption) became a major campaign issue and was later adopted. The chances for success are greater through civil resistance rather than violent struggle. Groundbreaking research by Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth found that "from 1900 to 2006, 35 percent to 40 percent of authoritarian regimes that faced major nonviolent uprisings had become democracies five years after the campaign ended, even if the campaigns failed to cause immediate regime change. For the nonviolent campaigns that succeeded, the figure increases to well over 50 percent...Nonviolent resistance is about finding and exploiting points of leverage in one’s own society. Every dictatorship has vulnerabilities, and every society can find them." Is the impulse to challenge repressive regimes likely to spread to other countries in the region and, if so, which ones? Predictions are a game of sorts. Rather than predict, it's possible to ascertain where the underlying potential exists by recognizing the building blocks of civil resistance, such as: cooperation and new alliances at the grass-roots; ongoing small-scale or even low-risk, larger scale expressions of citizen dissent (both on the ground and digitally); common grievances among citizens; and a shared awareness of everyday concerns that are linked to the regime's impunity, denial of freedoms, corruption, mismanagement, and role in economic and social injustice. One can also look below the surface. Is the dissent spontaneous and limited to high-risk street demonstrations or is there evidence of organization among people and groups? Peter Ackerman, a scholar of nonviolent movements for over 30 years, has distilled three principles for success: nonviolent discipline, unity of people and goals, and strategic planning. I'd add a fourth factor, particularly if a regime is repressive and violent—anticipating crackdowns, creating an array of nonviolent tactics (e.g. dilemma actions and low-risk mass actions that are more difficult to repress), and developing strategies to make repression backfire by using it to delegitimize the oppressors, transform public and international outrage into active support for the movement, and shift the loyalties of those within the regime who don't approve of such harsh measures against peaceful citizens.

<continues>

So clearly there are root causes that are common, and rather vague, often nonideological, goals that are common as well. But of course there are differences too. Because of their sectarian and ethnic heterogeneity, Iraq and Lebanon have their own dynamics and probably won't be part of this wave of uprisings, even though a very interesting, but somewhat unrelated, movement is beginning in Lebanon. Bahrain has become almost entirely a sectarian conflict, which might have been avoidable, but due to the gross miscalculations of the government and their Gulf allies, especially Saudi Arabia, and their paranoia about Iranian intentions towards the island kingdom (Iran has a full territorial claim on Bahrain that it has never formally renounced), it has already become virtually a proxy conflict between all the Sunni Arabs of the Gulf and the Shiites of the region, unfortunately led by Iran. In both Libya and Yemen, there is the threat of national disintegration and, potentially, failed-state status. So in all cases, there are unique challenges. But, as I say, there are many common grievances and ambitions that Arabs throughout the region clearly share and that are motivating the “Arab Spring.”

#### Finding one underlying explanation that universally motivates Middle Eastern actors is exactly the reductionist/orientialist approach to IR they critique – it ignores contingent circumstances in favor of one-size-fits-all assumptions about their behavior and motivations to explain their actions

#### No root cause of war – we should address the circumstances that allow underlying aggressions to be expressed

Moore 4 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come.

### No Threat Construction

#### The plan text turns their kritik – even if it constructs threats, it provides a PEACEFUL SOLUTION that avoids the need to go to war

#### Threats real – strong incentives against inflation

Ravenal 9 [(earl, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget) “What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1 (2009) 21-75]

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.¶ This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rationality in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more parochial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circumstances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### Security Good [Bilgin]

#### Strategically deploying security discourse overcomes mutual enmity in the context of the Middle East

Bilgin 2000 [(Pinar, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) “Inventing Middle Easts? The making of regions through security discourses” 13-16 August 1998] AT

As emphasised in the introduction, the argument put forward in this paper is that the answers peoples of the region (this part of the world formerly known as the Middle East) give to the questions Who are we? and Which region do we belong to? are very important in terms of what they do with their future. Through the creation of a regional identity and strengthening the sense of belonging, for instance, cooperation and interdependence may take root. They may choose to define insecurity as their common enemy by way of conceiving themselves as part of a 'security complex'. [105] In the remainder of the paper I will discuss how viewing this group of states as a 'security complex' may constitute a first step on the way to saw the seeds of regionalism towards the establishment of a 'security community'. Barry Buzan, in People, States and Fear introduced the concept of 'security complex' as an analytical tool when studying security. His contention was that when conceptualising the regional level, one should do away with territoriality and voluntarism (which turned out to be problematic as seen in the first two parts of this paper) but emphasise the present patterns of amity and enmity. This, argues Buzan, would enable the analyst to treat a group of states together in a 'security complex', i.e. as an intermediate level between the levels of states and the international system, whether or not those states recognise themselves to be operating as part of one whole. Accordingly, he defines a 'security complex' as 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.' [106] By way of this definition, Buzan re-introduces the role of external actors when he argues that a Middle Eastern security complex might exist whether indigenous actors recognise it or not. [107] It is in this sense that the 'security complex' as an analytical tool is useful in bringing together a group of states to show their securities are interdependent upon one another's policies. Coming to see the fact that their securities are interdependent and that they have to cooperate towards achieving stable security might constitute a first, but nevetheless crucial step towards sawing the seeds of regionalism in the 'Middle East'. However, although external actors' (including analysts) view (and perhaps encouragement and support) is important, what is also very important is the creation of a distinct identity within the construct -regardless of what we come to call it, a 'security complex' or a 'region'- if it is to become a 'security community' in Karl Deutsch's terms. Deutsch and his associates defined a security community as 'one in which where there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each either physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.' [108] As Wæver also indicates, security complex as a concept does not contain the standards for change towards a security community. Rather security complex is an analytical tool for analysing the processes and explaining the dynamics of security in a given area; it does not show or attempt to change the quality of relationships at a given time within a given area. [109] Still, given the lack of enthusiasm for regionalism (as a way of establishing security) in the 'Middle East', the 'Middle Eastern security complex' as a concept is a good place for the analyst to start with. Some Arab regimes and non-governmental organisations may not include Iran, Israel and Turkey in their definitions of the region they live in; Turkey and Israel, on the other hand may view themselves as belonging to Europe rather than the 'Middle East'. Nevertheless, when viewed in security terms, they are all parts of a Middle Eastern (in)security complex; they all take each other into account when making their calculations, especially when it comes to buying military equipment. Then, although the concept of security complex in itself may not involve standards for change, as Wæver has rightly pointed out, to convince regional actors that they are all involved within the same security complex may arguably be a first step towards the creation of a security community. A second step might be taken when they begin to see themselves not as victims of each other (or the past) but of insecurity which has to be overcome through cooperative efforts. [110] A third step may be the creation of security regimes on a number of issue areas, as Ken Booth has suggested, so that a complex web of different regimes would help establish and maintain security in this part of the world. This may allow the co-existence of all these four visions presented above; each helping address the issues they are most concerned with. The involvement of non-governmental organisations may also help bring out issues that are not usually met by states' policies. In the long-run, with possible spill-over effects, these security regimes may contribute towards building a security community. [111] Viewed from the lens of Critical Security Studies, it is the issues of water, food, population, productivity, environment, and education in addition to those of arms proliferation, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction, and expansionist regimes, that are the main problems in the region; for it is these very issues that cause insecurity for peoples lives. Hence the Critical Security Studies call to understand and practice security at different levels in reference to multiple referents (subjects of security) and by way of multiple agents (actors that act for security, i.e. social movements, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, individuals as well as states). Our understanding and practices of security, then, should be informed by a view of security that is cognisant of the complexities involved in human affairs. The insecurity in the 'Middle East' attests well to this.

### Misc TL Material

#### They assume responses to security reps is pre-determined, but they’re actually dependent on perspective

Shim 14 (David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen – As part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. Routledge Book Publication –Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing – p.24-25)

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them. Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other. However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

#### Their kritik is missing an internal link, its impact story relies on everyone being unable to form their own opinions which is independently bad because it encourages harmful *manipulation*

#### Rep determinism is especially true in the context of terror

Perkoski 10 [(Evan, Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Departmental Honors in Government) “Rethinking Repression: Exploring the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism in Spain” Wesleyan College, 2010] AT

Combating terrorism is one of the most pressing and difficult issues facing modern governments. Nations around the world, ranging from the most developed to those struggling to exist, are forced to contend with domestic and international terrorist organizations that strive to alter the current political framework. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet to defeating terrorism; policies that were successfully implemented by one nation have utterly failed in another. The general nature of terrorism and terrorist groups present even more problems: governments are dealt crippling disadvantages as terrorists enjoy the luxuries of maneuverability, blending in with civilians, informational advantages and minor resource needs. Amnesty, conciliation, repression, restriction: all are forms of counterterrorism strategies that are available to states. But which policies – or combination of policies – should states choose? An examination of modern history shows that states often attempt a variety of strategies, mixing conciliation with repression, or restriction with discriminate violence. I argue that legal, nonviolent forms of counterterrorism are the most effective at reducing the frequency of terrorist attacks. More precisely, arrests, restrictive policies that make it harder for terrorist to carry out attacks, and judicial policies that increase the punishment for terrorism are the most effective counterterrorist measures. Conciliatory policies can also be effective when there is no public involvement or referendum; for example, a general amnesty policy will be effective, but a regional referendum may cause terrorists to increase attacks in an attempt to 5 influence civilian and government voting behavior. These findings suggest that government legitimacy is more important to deterring terrorism than previously believed. Overall, the results from my study show that counterterrorism policies are most effective when they abide by preexisting legal boundaries, and that fighting fire with fire – in other words, fighting terrorist violence with state violence – can either instigate further terrorist attacks or simply be insignificant. Central Question The goal of this thesis is to provide a quantitative assessment of the relative ability of counterterrorist tactics to reduce the likelihood of terrorist incidents. This information is largely missing from modern political science literature, but its value cannot be underestimated. Understanding the most effective means to combat terrorism would be enormously helpful to modern governments facing threats from non-state actors. There are four main categories of counterterrorism tactics: conciliation, repression, restriction, and legal reform (Miller 2007). Conciliation generally includes amnesty policies and regional political referendums. Repression incorporates the violent methods of counterterrorism such as bombing group headquarters and camps and assassinating terrorist leaders. Restriction refers to methods that make it difficult for terrorists to plan and carry out attacks; these include arresting terrorist suspects, and hardening important targets (e.g. rerouting traffic away form government buildings). Lastly, legal reform is often used in conjunction with other policies. For example, legal reform can be implemented to increase police 6 powers. Another example is altering domestic law to increase political representation.

#### If scholars don’t make predictions, elites base policy on biases and pathologies which is worse

Fitzsimmons, 07 (Michael, Washington DC defense analyst, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06-07, online)

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng— ing. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision— makers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur— prise, in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

## Security---Specifics

### A2 Terror link

#### Winning the war on terror shifts the frame away from terror

Krebs 13– Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: Explaining the Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” University of Minnesota, 8/30/13, Online)

Contemporaries and historians have often blamed the errors and tragedies of US policy during the Cold War—from military brinkmanship and imprudent intervention to alliance with rapacious autocrats and brutal rebels to an inflated defense budget—on the “Cold War consensus.” By this account, an ideological and policy consensus so took hold by 1948 that alternatives to militarized global containment could not get a hearing. That consensus dragged the United States into the disastrous Vietnam War, and it unraveled only amidst the trauma of Vietnam in the late 1960s.1 This story of the Cold War consensus’ rise and fall appears to fit well with a well-established and intuitive theory of change in major foreign policy ideas and discourses. That theory avers that large-scale shocks, often unexpected military defeats, unsettle settled minds and discredit dominant ideas with respect to national security policy and thus are crucial drivers of change.2 This article shows that the standard history of the Cold War consensus is wrong and develops an alternative theoretical architecture to explain its consolidation and collapse. It points toward a reinterpretation of major puzzles of the Cold War, but it also has substantial theoretical stakes: how we explain fundamental change in the national security arena and in other policy domains as well. Scholars have long invoked the Cold War consensus, but they have failed to study it rigorously. This article attempts to do so by conceptualizing the Cold War consensus as a dominant public narrative of national security and by tracking that narrative via a content analysis of foreign affairs editorials. The consensus’ history then looks quite different: the zone of narrative agreement was narrower than many believe; this narrow Cold War narrative did not achieve dominance—that is, the consensus did not coalesce—until well into the 1950s; it began to erode before the Americanization of the Vietnam War in 1965; and a new dominant narrative (or consensus) did not take its place. How to explain the Cold War narrative’s rise to dominance and its subsequent fall from that perch? The answer cannot lie simply with the shifting realities of global politics: the narrative was most dominant precisely when the communist bloc was becoming more diverse—that is, when the consensus was least apropos—and no new consensus took its place in the 1960s. This article points rather to the surprising domestic politics surrounding triumph and frustration on Cold War battlefields. In a nutshell, the argument is that the politics of protracted military failure impede change in the national security narrative in whose terms government officials had legitimated the mission, while victory generates space for unorthodox ideas to penetrate. Dominant narratives of national security, such as the Cold War consensus, depict the protagonists and the setting of security competition, and they define the range of sustainable policy options. They endure as long as leading political and cultural elites continue to reproduce them, and their dominance erodes when elites publicly challenge key tenets. However, early on in an uncertain and protracted military campaign, battlefield setbacks give both doves (war opponents) and hawks (war supporters) in the opposition incentives to criticize the war’s conduct while reaffirming the underlying narrative. While opposition doves pull their rhetorical punches to avoid bearing the political costs of wartime criticism, opposition hawks are moved by the prospect of gain, but the effect is the same: to blunt the scope of wartime critique and to bolster the underlying narrative of national security. In contrast, victory creates a political opening for its “owners” to advance an alternative: riding a political high, they can argue that, as a result of their wise and resolute policies, the world has changed, that a different narrative is now more apposite. In short, this article argues that, when it comes to public narratives of national security, the conventional wisdom has it backwards: military failure promotes the consolidation or continuation of narrative dominance, while victory opens space for narrative challenge. Applying this theoretical argument to the two signal events of the first half of the Cold War, I show how the frustrations of the Korean War facilitated the Cold War narrative’s rise to dominance, while the triumph of the Cuban Missile Crisis made possible the consensus’ breakdown before the upheaval of Vietnam. The high costs of the Korean War might have undermined the Cold War globalism in whose name the United States had waged the war. But leading Republican opponents, who supported the war but opposed its globalist logic, insisted that the war had resulted from the fact that the Truman administration’s battle against communism had not been global enough. They thus helped consolidate the global Cold War that they feared would yield an imperial presidency and an imposing national-security state. The Cuban Missile Crisis, seen at the time as a one-sided triumph for John F. Kennedy, paradoxically created political space for the young president to deviate publicly from the previously dominant narrative, from the Cold War consensus. Kennedy had long privately articulated a more sophisticated view of the Soviet Union’s ambitions, the diversity of communist regimes, and the superpowers’ shared interests, but only after his great victory did he feel free to articulate publicly the narrative foundation for détente. Hawkish opponents drew precisely the opposite lesson: that the crisis was proof of the wisdom of the Cold War narrative’s core propositions. As a result, no new national security narrative emerged as dominant in the crisis’ wake. Documenting and explaining the rise and fall of the Cold War narrative is intrinsically important, as it speaks to enduring questions of the Cold War—from the origins of America’s national-security state to the conditions of possibility for détente to the drivers of the US intervention in Vietnam. But the Cold War consensus is also an important case. Hardly questioned narratives often structure national debates over security and foreign policy for a time. We know them by shorthand expressions that encapsulate their portraits of the protagonists, scene, and action of a global drama: the civilizing mission of liberal empire, the Nazi obsession with “living space,” the Gaullist vision of French restoration and grandeur, the communist faith in capitalist aggression and imperialism, the Iranian Revolutionary regime’s Great and Little Satans, the Israeli discourse of “no partner for peace,” and most recently the War on Terror. These constitute what the historian Ernest May once termed the “axiomatic” dimension of foreign policy: the “broad formulation that fixes priorities and provides standards by which the appropriate choices among alternatives may be made.”3 Scholars have devoted the lion’s share of their attention, however, to what May called the “calculated”: the level of effort expended, the scope of targets, the means states employ. Even Legro, in his important work on states’ ideas about international society, focuses on collective “causal beliefs” about the “effective means for achieving interests” in international politics.4 The narrative underpinnings of policy debate have received far less attention, yet are arguably more important. Through its examination of the Cold War consensus, this article suggests rethinking conventional theories of change in foreign policy—and perhaps in other arenas too.

#### More ev – beating terrorism is the best way to shift the frame

Krebs 11– Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” pp. 1-2, 3/7/11, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gpa/globalnotes/Krebs,%20MIRC%202011\_final.pdf)

When it comes to many political phenomena, including the dominant discourses and ideas that underpin the making of foreign policy, the prevailing view is that inertia is the norm and that substantial innovation comes only in the wake of massive policy failure. Failure may not itself dictate the new path, but it discredits dominant ideas, reworks power structures, and shakes up stagnant organizations. When it comes to political language, however, a common view is that changeability is the norm: politicians adopt and jettison formulations as they see fit, maneuvering according to the political winds. This paper argues that these familiar perspectives both have it wrong when it comes to the rise and fall of dominant narratives of national security. First, such narratives exhibit far more stability than the realist view suggests, and they are marked by discontinuities, rather than continuous flux. Among scholars, there is growing awareness of the ways in which language structures politics and shapes contestation,1 which would be impossible if it were not often relatively stable.2 Second, the politics of failure trump its psychology. As a result, even substantial foreign policy failure is not likely to prompt a narrative revolution. In fact, policy success, more than failure, can open space for change in dominant narratives. These claims are provocative, but they nicely fit the history of the so-called Cold War consensus, as the paper shows. Its logic legitimated US intervention in two wars widely seen as frustrating failures. Yet the Korean War did not undermine, but rather consolidated the emerging narrative. The Vietnam War, often portrayed as the moment of that narrative’s unraveling, was nothing of the sort, because the prior consensus had begun to erode well before the war’s Americanization, let alone the Tet Offensive. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, liberal Cold Warriors increasingly argued that the rules of the international game had changed, that demonstrated American power and will had finally persuaded the Soviet Union of shared interests. Narrative divergence thus preceded the Vietnam War. If anything, the war limited the extent of the liberal-left’s challenge, and it even promoted a new consensus, as long-standing conservative skeptics finally jumped fully and enthusiastically onto the internationalist wagon. What accounts for this complex mix of stability and change in the Cold War narrative, and perhaps more generally in narratives of national security? I argue that the answer lies in the social-political production of conflict outcomes. Failures of military ventures do not reveal themselves as such all at once. Early on, political opponents have incentives to hedge their rhetorical bets, critique the war from the terrain of the dominant narrative, and thus reproduce or at best emend that narrative—as did conservative nationalists during Korea and liberal internationalists during Vietnam. Military failure provides the impetus for a challenge to the dominant security narrative, but its politics deprive alternatives of powerful advocates. In contrast, even though military success does not provide actors with strong reasons to challenge the underlying narratives, it does create conducive political conditions if they are so inclined: success can be interpreted as proving the wisdom of the status quo, but it can also can be interpreted as having been so successful as to require a new framework. Indeed, some liberals made precisely this argument after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Success, however, legitimates alternatives without delegitimizing the status quo, and the result, therefore, is not the establishment of a new dominant narrative, but rather the collapse of consensus.

### A2 Desire for Control

#### Global war and security discourse results from lack of clearly defined strategic imperatives incentives – the aff creates a strategic framework in the Middle East, which solves

David Chandler **9**, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster, War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of `Global War', Security Dialogue 2009; 40; 243

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to ‘motorized partisans’, in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of ‘global war’ have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with ‘global war’ thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines ‘global’ war today. Very few studies of the ‘war on terror’ start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the ‘war on terror’ (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are ‘scaled up’ from the international to the global.¶ Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire The alternative reading of ‘global war’ rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the lack of political stakes and strategic structuring of the international sphere rather than frameworks for asserting global domination. We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the ‘war on terror’ campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. There would appear to be a direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping and structuring interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome. In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and arbitrary interventions as states and international institutions use the lack of strategic imperatives to construct their own meaning through intervention. As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains:¶ war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz’s classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. . . . War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most ‘efficient’ way of finding one. The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to ‘war’. In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are freed from strategic necessities and whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against ‘real enemies’. The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests.

### A2 Realism Bad

#### The 1AC is not realist – it recognizes ways traditional competitors, India and the GCC, can find areas of cooperation to achieve shared objectives

### A2 Justifies US Imperialism/Intervention

#### Indian regional dominance will replace the imperialist US policies they kritik – the relations advantage is a massive link turn

Pradhan 11 [(PK, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi) “GCC-Iran Rivalry and Strategic Challenges for India in the Gulf” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 6, No. 1, January–March 2011, 45-57] AT

The USA is comfortable with growing Indian ties with the GCC countries, but the long-term implications and sustainability of the present circumstances remain hazy. India realizes the importance of Iran as a big neighbour, a major regional player, important for India’s energy security, etc. India is open for a strategic partnership with Tehran if circumstances dictate it in future. India cannot fully support the US policies in the region, nor can it completely oppose them. India would require the support of the USA in the region to further its own interests.20 There are a number of prospective areas of cooperation between the two countries in the region, such as protection of the sea lanes, maritime policing, counterterrorism, energy security, etc. Strategically, USA would be happy to have India on its side against Iran. But there remain a number of differences between India and the USA over the war on terror, approach to religious extremism, and the elevation of nonproliferation above all other geopolitical considerations.21 India also disapproves of the US invasion of Iraq and that country’s current policies and sanctions against Iran. India’s interests will continue to be at variance with the USA also because of its long historical and cultural links with the region and because India’s security directly depends on developments in the region. India’s dilemma would be to strike a balance between its historical interests and growing demands of its relations with the USA.22 It remains a challenge for India to devise a long-term policy so as to balance its own interests in the region, keeping in mind key regional players and the USA.

### A2 Imperialism

#### 1AC Pradhan is a link turn – India is perceived as neutral and non-interfering, replacing the US approach of imposing Western values on the Middle East which decreases imperialism

#### Prefer REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS – it allows local interests to decide what’s best; arguments to the contrary replicate the imperial strategy of Western intellectuals judging what’s best for the Middle East

#### The aff uses INDIAN regional influence which is benign, their ev assumes US influence

Mohamed 14 [(Omar Mahmood Mohamed) “India-GCC ties can boost regional stability” Gulf News June 6, 2014] AT

During these times of uncertainty and faltering alliances, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been left in a conundrum. The perceived diminishing role of the US in the region has raised a few eyebrows with the GCC contemplating new partnerships to help secure its own safety. What better alternative than to encourage and persuade the states that rely on and are most affected by any conflict the GCC may find itself in? These troubles provide a country like India with the opportunity to expand its role as a strategic and military partner in the region. The GCC can and should use to its advantage the shared interests between India and the US to further strengthen stability in the region and secure oil transit routes. One of the biggest and most positive aspects of this old friendship is the fact that unlike western nations, India has never sought to dominate or forcefully intervene in the local politics of the GCC and till today continues to maintain a non- intrusive policy.

### A2 Orientalism

#### Said’s thesis is a criticism of Western authors depictions of the Middle East… the 1AC draws from INDIAN authors NOT western ones

#### The Middle East impact cards aren’t about the nature of Islam, Arabs, or Muslims – it describes STRATEGIC FACTORS that make war likely that would logically apply to ANY OTHER GROUP OF PEOPLE in a similar geopolitical circumstance

#### Said’s wrong – ignores massive amounts of scholarship, twists data, uses Orientalist discourse himself, kills academic scholarship, and Orientalism doesn’t cause otherization

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The critics did not deny that Western culture and scholarship in the past has included ethnocentric, racist, or anti-Islamic components, but argued that these had been greatly exaggerated, to the point of being made universal. Out of more than 60,000 works on the Middle East published in Europe and the United States, he chose only those needed in order to prove his case that there was a discourse which he termed Orientalism. In order to arrive at this conclusion he ignored much evidence critical to the historical documentation of research and literature, material which would have supported the opposite position.[19] His choices, as Kramer writes, rejected "all discrimination between genres and disregarded all extant hierarchies of knowledge." This was particularly true regarding Said's deliberate conflation of Middle Eastern studies as a research discipline and the popular, artistic, or literary perspedctive of the Orient. It also disregarded the key question of which were the field's main texts and which were those purely on the margins.[20] This approach led Said to ignore several leading researchers who had a decisive influence on Middle Eastern studies. For example, there is his almost complete ignoring of Ignaz Goldziher's work--which made an undeniable contribution to the study of Islam--since his persona contradicts Said's claims. Said chose to attack Goldziher's criticism of anthropomorphism in the Koran as supposed proof of his negative attitude toward Islam, while Goldziher himself felt great respect for Islam and had even attacked Ernest Renan for his racist conceptions.[21] Malcolm Kerr, for example, criticized Said's ignorance of the role and importance of Arab-American Middle East researchers, who played an important role in the field and could not easily be labeled anti-Arab or anti-Islamic. Reina Lewis and Joan Miller argued that Said ignored women's voices which, they maintained, contradicted the monolithically masculine representation which Said wished to present.[22] Said's selectivity enabled him to paint scholarship of the Middle East as an essentialist, racist, and unchangeable phenomenon, whereas the evidence he ignored would have proven that the Western understanding and representation of the Middle East--especially of the Arabs and Islam--had become quite rich and multi-faceted over the years. Many scholars and literary figures were actually enamored with the residents of the Middle East, and the "Orientalist discourse" was not nearly as dominant as Said would have his readers believe, as few examples among many would show. British literary figures and activists, like Wilfred Scawen Blunt, actively sought to improve the lot of the Arabs. Traveler and M.P. David Urquhart promoted Ottoman Turkey as a partner for Christian Europe. Marmaduke Pickthall, a famous convert to Islam and a translator of the Koran, looked to Turkey for the formation of a modernist Islam. Finally, Cambridge Persian scholar E.G. Browne wrote in favor of the Iranian revolution of 1906-1911 and published articles against Curzon. These examples demonstrate the existence of discourses on the Middle East other than that characterized by Said.[23] Moreover, a number of researchers have demonstrated that though Islam was perceived as Europe's enemy in the Middle Ages, even then it had already gained respect and appreciation in the fields of science and philosophy, to the point of even idealizing it as a philosopher's religion.[24] A prominent example of the complexity of the Western perspective on Islam is the attitude of the Enlightenment movement in the eighteenth century, which Said perceives as the parent of modern Orientalism. True, some attacked Islam as a part of their rational, secular perception which criticized unenlightened religiosity--parallel arguments were simultaneously made by them against Christianity and Judaism. Moreover, at times it was clear that their criticism of Islam was actually a camouflaged criticism of Christianity. Yet, other contemporary writers viewed Islam as a rational religion closer to the ideas of the Enlightenment than Christianity. They saw it as a religion balanced between a commitment to morality and an acknowledgement of the basic needs of man, as opposed to Christianity's distorted attitude toward sex. There were among them, too, people who spoke admiringly of Islam and its tolerance of minorities, and juxtaposed it with Christian fanaticism. An important factor in shaping the complex perspective of Oriental studies in the nineteenth century was the entry of Jewish researchers into the field. They brought a deep knowledge of Judaism to a comparative study of Islam. Unlike some Christian researchers of Islam, they had no missionary approach or nostalgia for the Crusades or much interest in the political aspects of the contemporary "Eastern Question." For these Jewish scholars, Islam did not represent the same kind of religious challenge to Judaism that it did to Christianity, and therefore they were free of most of the prejudices that tripped up many Christian scholars. On the contrary, many Jewish researchers evolved an almost romantic approach toward Islam. They emphasized its tolerant attitude toward the Jews, as opposed to Medieval Europe and the rising anti-Semitism of the nineteenth century. Some of them tended to portray Jewish history in Muslim lands as a continuous golden age.[25] They stood somewhere between the two worlds, as Jews with histories both Middle Eastern and European, contrary to Said's portrayal of unflagging European ethnocentrism. It was thus convenient for Said to leave them out of his one-dimensional portrayal of the Orientalist discourse. Middle Eastern Jews present a problem for the Saidian Orient-Occident dichotomy. He deals with this by pointedly connecting "Oriental Jews" with Palestinians when writing of Israeli (i.e., Western) discrimination. That the Jewish concept of peoplehood spans the West and the East is perhaps too threatening to the dichotomy so central to his theory.[26] The argument that the Occident (or actually Europe prior to the twentieth century) primarily defined itself in opposition to the Orient may be questioned as over-simplifying and essentialist. According to Keith Windschuttle, Europeans identify themselves as joint heirs of classical Greece and Christianity, each tempered by the fluxes of medieval scholasticism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the Enlightenment, and modernism. In other words, Western identity is overwhelmingly defined by historical references to its earlier selves rather than by geographical comparisons with others. To claim otherwise is to deny the central thrust of Western education for the past one thousand years.[27] Conversely, the argument that Islam was the ultimate "other" in Western culture, may be challenged as well. Christian theology and doctrine emerged to a large degree as an antithesis to Judaism. Likewise, in popular culture the image of the Jew was much more frightening than that of the Muslim. It can be argued that the number of explicit anti-Jewish tracts--theological or political--throughout western history was probably higher than those devoted to Islam. The point here is not made to win the race of victimhood, but rather to argue that the picture of defining the "self" and the "other" in European culture was much more complex than the one Said presented; the "Orient" was not necessarily the defining "other" of the Occidental self. In the final analysis, then, contrary to what Said would have his readers believe, his idea of "Orientalism" is exaggerated and fails to encompass the entirety of how the West understood and conceived Islam; just as it cannot be said that because of anti-Semitism, all of European thought was hostile toward Jews, is it not true that the West viewed the Middle East in a closed circle of interpretation disconnected from other historical developments. New ideas that surfaced in intercultural contact undermined a priori assumptions time after **time.** Prejudices and stereotypes were endemic but never shaped into an unchangeable united discourseon the Middle East. In reality, academics who led the discourse often took the lead in undermining prejudices. Said, concluded Bayly Winder, did to Western scholars of Islam exactly what he accused them of doing to the Middle East.[28] Said's disregard of the scope and complexity of research on Islam and the Middle East motivated Rodinson to comment that Said was not familiar enough with the main body of scholarly research on the Middle East.[29] However, Said's disregarding of this scholarship does not appear to result from a lack of familiarity, but rather from a political agenda, and the proof of this is that he continued to make his arguments regarding the monolithic character of Middle Eastern studies years after publishing this criticism. In order to demonstrate the nature of scholarship as an instrument of domination Said excoriates scholars of the Middle East for dividing into categories, classifying, indexing, and documenting "everything in sight (and out of sight)."[30] Does this, asks the Syrian philosopher Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, imply something vicious or is it simply characteristic of all scientific academic work, essential for a proper understanding of human societies and cultures altogether?[31] Thus, Said's condemnation of the generalizations made by Western scholars of the Middle East and his insistence that they study the Arabs and Muslims as individuals made some of his Arab critics wonder if this meant that it was impossible or unnecessary to study collective entities. If the inclusion of Marx in Orientalism comes from his lack of attention to individual cases, added James Clifford rhetorically, perhaps it is simply impossible to form social or cultural theory, and perhaps there is no room for research fields such as sociology?[32] Said's over-generalized and non-historic conception of "Orientalism" is at its most radical when he writes that "every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was a racist, and imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric."[33] According to Nikki Keddie, who was praised by Said and who found positive points in his book, this argument generally encourages people to believe Westerners have no right to study the Middle East and insists that only Muslims and Arabs can investigate correctly Middle Eastern history.[34] Even the doyen of Middle Eastern scholarship of the Middle East, Albert Hourani, a Christian Arab like Said, shared the feeling that the book might lend support to a Muslim counter-attack based on the idea that no one understands Islam better than Muslims.[35] While Said denied that this was his intention,[36] the actual text of the book and the conclusion of many readers belie this assertion. Moreover, disqualifying all researchers who come outside the examined group--in every area of the world--would put an end to all serious academic research. It also neglects the fact that outside researchers may have certain advantages, since as an outsider the scholar might be free from the myths or preconceptions which insiders share. Said also raises a doubt as to whether anyone can study (in his words, "represent") any subject in any manner other than in an entirely subjective way, which is determined by the culture of the scholar-observer. He believes that the unknown, the exotic, and the foreign have always been perceived, assimilated, and represented in these terms. This leads him to doubt that any scholarship can even come close to the truth, or in his words, "whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any or all representations, because they are representations," are so intertwined with the institutions, language, and culture of the representer to render the truth impossible.[37] The obvious conclusion from this argument, as Winder and al-Azm show, is that according to Said, "Orientalism" is inevitable since such distortions are inevitable. If one accepts this argument, however, as al-Azm suggests, this only means the West was merely doing what all cultures must do: examine other cultures through the concepts and frameworks it already holds.[38] If this is true, Winder explains, that everyone who sees the "other" distorts it, then the West is no different from other cultures, including Islamic culture, which also has a distorted perspective of the "other." If indeed, Winder wonders, Said demands that Westerners should be better, does he not accept that they have a certain supremacy, a certain mission that makes them superior? Or should different criteria apply to the West simply because it was more "successful" than other societies? Thus, Said himself is promoting a clearly "Orientalist" perspective**,** accepting and forgiving the "weakness" of Middle Eastern society. "Westerners," claims Winder, "are not better, but Western science, including ‘Orientalism,' is self-bettering in that it is self-corrective."[39] By determining that all "representations" of the other are by definition distortions, Said is saying that people can only study themselves, that only Muslims can properly "represent" Islam. In our experience this has led to a crippling timidity amongst non-Muslim or non-Arab students. While it is good scholarship to control for bias, Said's influence has made students chary of writing about Islam and the Arabs from a point of view not necessarily shared by the objects of their research. They give more weight to an Arab or Islamic viewpoint and are fearful of developing an opinion of their own. ORIENTAL STUDIES AND IMPERIALISM Said's selectivity drove him to ignore the important intellectual achievement of the German and Hungarian scholars of the Middle East. According to his argument, "the major steps in Oriental scholarship were first taken in either Britain and France [sic], then elaborated upon by Germans."[40] There is no historical basis for this argument. The main reason for his ignoring research in these countries is that an accurate assessment of it would have undermined his central argument that Orientalism was integrally linked to imperialism as an expression of the nexus between knowledge and power, and therefore that Orientalists wished to gain knowledge of the Orient in order to control it. To support his claims, Said even back-dated the development of British and French imperialism in the Middle East to the seventeenth century, which is clearly a historical error. Considering German leadership in Oriental studies, it is unlikely that they took much from British and French scholars. No doubt, agrees Bernard Lewis, some of the scholars of the Middle East served imperialism or gained from it. Yet as an explanation of academic research of the Islamic world as a whole, this argument is flawed. If the effort to gain power through knowledge is the main or only motive, why did the study of Arabic and Islam in Europe begin hundred of years before Western imperialism in the Middle East had appeared even as an ambition? Why did these studies blossom in European countries that didn't take part in the European domination effort? Why did scholars invest so much effort in trying to decipher or study the monuments of the ancient East which had no political value and were forgotten even by the local people? The importance of the German and Hungarian scholars was tremendous in terms of their contribution to Middle East scholarship, even though they were not residents of countries with any imperialist interest in the region, and therefore the connection between power and knowledge did not exist in this case, sums up Lewis. [41] Said also ignored the fact that many scholars opposed imperialism, and therefore the connection he creates between their academic works and imperialism is forced. Edmond Burke, like Said, criticizes Oriental studies scholars who at the start of the twentieth century dealt with minor issues: "studies on obscure manuscripts, folk traits, rural sufism and popular religion," instead of dealing with topics he considered to be more important, such as study of the national movements that developed in the region.[42] Yet again, if these scholars were so "impractical," then obviously their studies had to do more with a search for knowledge rather than an effort to help imperialism. Ironically, if they had been as Said and Burke would have them, they would have focused on precisely the issues Burke criticizes them for ignoring. It appears then that many of Said's "Orientalists" actually pursued knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Said cannot have it both ways, complaining that scholars of Islam and the Middle East dealt with the trivial and at the same time asserting they were agents of imperialistic domination. In addition if there were any researchers who participated in an "academic effort to embalm Islam," to use Said's words, these were the Germans, but this was not because of imperialism. This was rather due to their more comprehensive approach to the study of cultures, which they applied to their own society as well. It is very likely, writes Emmanuel Sivan, that if the Germans had been involved in the imperialist effort, they would have been more conscious of Islam being a living and dynamic tradition. Actually, the British and the French, who imitated the Germans, could not afford to be pure classicists because of their country's imperialist demands. They studied Islam as a living civilization. Sivan concludes that the reality of the situation was much more complicated and ironic than that presented by Said.[43] While Said disregarded German Middle Eastern studies scholars because they were not connected to imperialism, if he had taken the time to examine their work, he would have discovered that many saw Islam and the Middle East in all its variety, without essentializing.[44] Al-Azm raises another issue, namely, the problematic cause and effect connection that Said makes between Orientalism as a cultural-social phenomenon and imperialism. It is impossible to avoid the impression, al-Azm remarks, that for Said the presence of observers, administrators, and intruders in the Middle East--such as Napoleon, Cromer, and Balfour--had become inevitable and actually was caused by literary and intellectual Orientalism. Therefore, according to Said, we can understand better the political inclinations and the aspirations of European imperialists if we turn to literary figures, among them Barth?lemy d'Herbelot and Dante Alighieri, rather than if we actually explore strategic and economical interests.[45] Another difficulty in Said's approach of connecting academic research to imperialism lays, according to Halliday, in the assumption that if ideas come to the world in circumstances of domination or even directly in the service of the dominator, they are not valid. Yet according the Halliday, trying to subdue a land requires producing as accurate an image as possible of it. For example, French ethnographers serving French imperialism in North Africa did not necessarily produce worthless research, as Said would have his readers believe. On the contrary, in order for the studies of those academic researchers to serve the French, they had to be accurate. "To put it bluntly," writes Halliday, "if you want to rob a bank, you would be well advised to have a pretty accurate map if its layout....."[46] An ironic twist to the connection between political establishments and scholarship was visible after Martin Kramer's fierce attack against the American academy for identifying with Said's Orientalism critique. Kramer argued that Middle Eastern studies were so compromised by Said's world view that they should no longer receive U.S. government aid. Said's supporters, who in the past had attacked the connection between academic research and the political establishment, were quite alarmed at the notion. In effect they were arguing that the large amounts of monies their institutions took from the government did not undermine their intellectual independence, even as many of them characterized U.S. policy as imperialistic. Clearly, they do not really believe that a connection with the political establishment, even an "imperialistic" one, has any effect on their own research. Yet if that is so, then government funding does not necessarily influence academic discourse. If this is true of today, it might well be true of the past as well, despite Said's critique.

### A2 Intervention R/C

#### Intervention’s not the root cause

Clifton 14 [(Jim, CEO of Gallup, an organizational consulting and public opinion research firm. He created the Gallup World Poll, designed to give the world’s 6 billion citizens a voice in virtually all key global issues) “The Root Cause of Bloodshed in the Middle East?” Quality Digest 8/25] AT

The Middle East has collapsed into a state of chaos, conflict, and suffering that was unimaginable and unforeseen just four years ago. Hardly any experts or institutions predicted the wars and revolutions that have engulfed the region, and those same experts who missed the coming catastrophe continue to struggle for answers as to why it’s all happening. One explanation is that the Muslim world is rising up against U.S. and Western oppression. Just after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, I read plenty of publications that said Muslims were so angry with the United States and the West that many of them wished death upon us. Well, not long after 9/11, Gallup conducted in-depth polling of the 10 most populous Muslim-majority countries, making up 80 percent of the global Muslim population. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being “strongly agree,” only 7 percent responded “5” to the question of whether 9/11 was morally justified. The same small percentage also strongly agreed when asked if they viewed the United States unfavorably. I’m not sure that the general anti-U.S., anti-West feeling is much of an explanation based on these responses. Another explanation is that the United States destabilized the region when it invaded Iraq and detonated simmering conflicts that had been suppressed by Saddam Hussein. Yet another explanation is that the Middle East is in the midst of a massive religious war—that the driving force behind the conflicts is an ancient Sunni–Shiite battle, with one side simply trying to wipe out the other. Maybe. But does the United States’ invasion of Iraq or religious war explain the Arab Spring uprisings, which have truly destabilized the region? Remember, the Arab Spring began in Tunisia when food vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire. Bouazizi didn't yell, “Death to America,” or “U.S. out of Iraq,” or “Allahu Akbar.” He cried out, “I just want to work!” With those words, he set off a revolution that experts say was aimed at oppressive regimes and political and economic corruption, and which was rooted in a deep desire for democracy. Of course, the Arab Spring has now turned into an Arab Winter—or more like an Arab Nightmare, perhaps, with Hosni Mubarak removed from Egypt, then replaced by an elected Muslim Brotherhood, which was then overthrown by a military takeover; Colonel Gadhafi overthrown in Libya, which has now collapsed into tribal chaos; a horrific Syrian civil war; instability in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon; and on and on. Add to all of this chaos the brutal and bloody battle between Israel and Hamas. Sure, experts can pick from any number of explanations for all of this unrest. Maybe some of them make sense. But here’s an explanation you don’t hear very often, that is likely the root cause of the entire meltdown in the Middle East: no customers.

#### Their link assumes US intervention – but Indian intervention is benign

Paranjpe 9 [(Shikant, Professor and Head, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Pune, Pune 411007, India ) FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIC THEORY STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY, SOUTH AFRICA” (11 & 12 JUNE 2009)] AT

The first part of the framework focuses on the fundamental question of the survival of the nation-state wherein national security was the primary concern. As an answer to the question, ‘How is security maintained in a state of anarchy (?)’, the Western view has focused on the role of power.3 It held that in order to maintain security, and thereby order, primary attention was to be given to the establishment and preservation of power in international relations. To organize peace in such an anarchic system of international relations, the problem of distribution of power had to be addressed. The distribution of power had to be such that individual states would be persuaded not to use force to alter the status quo. The Indian approach to the question of security is not structured in the same framework as that of the western countries. The fundamental question which India asks herself is not how to maintain security in a state of anarchy in international relations; the question instead is: how is peace maintained in a society of nation-states? The answer revolves around two fundamental principles / dimensions:4 one, the recognition that in any conflictual situation the roots of conflict need to be tackled (conflict resolution, not conflict management); and two, the need to resolve conflict without recourse to violence. The first is a long-term perspective and includes the consideration of the social, political, economic, and other aspects of conflict. It presumes that conflicts are a product of tensions emanating in social, political and economic areas that ultimately escalate into military conflict. The latter is a more short-term view that looks at the means of pacific settlement of disputes. India thus rejects the balance of power approach to security and looks at the world through the conceptual lenses of a cooperative society. It rejects the balance of power or the deterrence approach as a status quoist one. It roots its approach in development policies, and thus assumes and demands a possibility of change in the existing order and as such takes a revisionist perspective. This can be seen in various fields: in the economic field it was articulated as a demand for a new economic order, in the political field it found expression in support to national liberation struggles and in the social field it was reflected in the demand for social justice. A governing image that seeks to project peace policy with the agenda of development as a base appears to confront the demands of legitimacy of the use of force that India accepts in the real world. In real terms, this dichotomy is visible in the Indian position at two levels, global and regional. The global position rejects the power approach and seeks international governance on the basis of a structure of peace grounded in development. At the regional level, the basis of a structure of peace uses the logic of the regional state system wherein ‘order’ is a product of hierarchal power structure.5 This is the base of the second part of the framework. It is also this simultaneous application of the two frameworks with their governing images that presents a dichotomy of approach. This second set is rooted in a realist / neorealist framework of analysis that is focused on the role of power. It holds that in order to maintain security and thereby order, primary attention was to be given to the establishment and preservation of power in international relations.6 This dichotomy, however, is neither duplicity nor a state of confusion for the regional dimension seeks to incorporate principles of economic and political development through such approaches as “Panchsheel”. That the Nehru approach accepted the necessity of national defence but sought to under play it is perceived in his query “Why shout it out?”7 The vision that India has sought to project through the Nehru years and which has endured in Indian foreign policy even today rested on such ideological precepts as anti-imperialism, liberal internationalism and Gandhism. At a theoretical level, India would be closer to the liberal institutionalists who accept the key assumptions of the utility of military power and at the same time insist upon the utility of institutions as a framework of cooperation.

### Peacekeeping Good

#### Strong empirical evidence that peacekeeping solves war

Heldt 4 [(BIRGER, Associate Professor, Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2003.) “Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004” folke bernadotte academy publications] AT

The discussion so far has assessed whether there is a causal link from the number of armed conflicts to the number of peacekeeping operations. One may also assess if there is a link in the opposite direction. A cursory examination of the trends in Figure V suggests that the number of intrastate armed conflicts starts to drop as the number of peacekeeping operations increases by the mid-1990s. While the causes of civil war are complex (cf. Collier et al, 2003), the pattern suggests that peacekeeping has been effective in preventing new as well as the reemergence of old conflicts. This observation is in line with some recent statistical studies (e.g., Doyle & Sambanis, 2006) that have confirmed that peacekeeping operations positively contribute to the duration of post-civil war peace. The question of the conditions under which peacekeeping operations are established has been discussed from many perspectives.9 Some scholars stress the major powers’ interests, and in this tradition it has been claimed that UN operations are established in countries where the permanent members of the UN Security Council have national interests. A related approach highlights “imperialistic motives” in that UN operations are alleged to be deployed in countries where the major powers have interests in raw materials. Other approaches emphasise the importance of an interest in establishing democratic regimes. Another major strand of thought claims that it is not outside countries’ interests that are important, but rather the needs—in terms of war casualties and conflict durability—of the war-torn countries, and thus altruism rather than egoism on the part of the great powers. Still other approaches are based on the claimed importance of, e.g., a “CNN effect”, the presence of a peace agreement, the type of conflict, and the number of warring parties. While such competing claims and hypotheses are common, there has been little research on the extent to which they are accurate in general or whether they apply only to individual cases. A rare exception is Gilligan & Stedman (2003), who examine the conditions under which the UN establishes peacekeeping operations in civil wars. The study thus excludes operations that are launched in advance of anticipated civil wars, and does not include non-UN-led operations. For civil wars that were active after 1988, the study finds a positive relationship between on the one hand civil war duration and number of casualties, and on the other hand the probability of a UN operation. This finding supports the argument that it is need rather than great power interests that conditions UN decisions. The UN does thus not avoid serious (in terms of casualties) or intractable (in terms of duration) conflicts, but rather focuses on them. The study also reports that neither conflict type, level of democracy in the war-torn country, its population size nor its colonial history has any impact, while war-torn countries’ military strength is inversely related to the probability of a UN operation. Moreover, and all else equal, the UN is least prone to establish operations in Asia, followed by Africa, and most prone to establish operations in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America in mentioned order. An intriguing element of this set of findings is the regional differences: the finding that something about some regions makes them more or less likely to allow/require the UN to establish peacekeeping operations. What is it about these regions that may explain this pattern? Gilligan & Stedman (2003) offer a series of speculations on this matter. A possible explanation is differences in the presence of elaborate regional interstate organisations. Europe and the Americas have strong regional organisations (International Peace Academy, 2002) with strong mandates, while Africa has a weaker organisational structure with many sub-regional organisations and Asia has virtually none (Ibid.). The relationship between low-level UN activity in operations and weak regional organisation may appear puzzling, but it may to some extent reflect that regional consensus and pressure are required for the UN Security Council to be able and willing to establish peacekeeping operations, or even for a conflict to reach the UN agenda. It is important to remember that if regional actors have been very active as peacekeepers, then we may simply observe less need for—and thus less—UN peacekeeping. Consequently, we need more research to settle the question of whether Africa or any other region has for some reason received less attention than other regions, or whether the need for UN peacekeeping has in fact been lower than in other regions. Another important issue to remember is that the study by Gilligan & Stedman ends in the late 1990s. Had the study covered also 2000–2004, it is possible that the observation of a comparative lesser attention to Africa may not have been obvious. After 1999 (when Gilligan & Stedman’s study ends) there is actually a surge in UN attention towards Africa, while there is meanwhile no similar increase in—but rather a declining number of—conflicts in Africa (cf. Harbom, 2004). From 1989 to 2004 Africa received a large part of the UN’s peacekeeping resources, and this applies in particular to the period 2000–2004.10 By December 2004, Africa received 75% (UN operations in general) and 80% (UN operations in intrastate conflicts) of all peacekeeping personnel (Heldt, 2005). The past decade is actually one of a UN focus on Africa. It is meanwhile important to remember that by late 2004 some 45% of the UN peacekeepers in Africa do come from African countries. In a sense, although under UN flag and with UN financing, Africa is still carrying out its own peacekeeping.

### India Peacekeeping

#### Indian approach to security solves their kritik and doesn’t link – it’s anti-imperialist, rejects the power-projection approach, and addresses root causes instead of externalizing threats

Paranjpe 9 [(Shikant, Professor and Head, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Pune, Pune 411007, India ) FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIC THEORY STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY, SOUTH AFRICA” (11 & 12 JUNE 2009)] AT

The first part of the framework focuses on the fundamental question of the survival of the nation-state wherein national security was the primary concern. As an answer to the question, ‘How is security maintained in a state of anarchy (?)’, the Western view has focused on the role of power.3 It held that in order to maintain security, and thereby order, primary attention was to be given to the establishment and preservation of power in international relations. To organize peace in such an anarchic system of international relations, the problem of distribution of power had to be addressed. The distribution of power had to be such that individual states would be persuaded not to use force to alter the status quo. The Indian approach to the question of security is not structured in the same framework as that of the western countries. The fundamental question which India asks herself is not how to maintain security in a state of anarchy in international relations; the question instead is: how is peace maintained in a society of nation-states? The answer revolves around two fundamental principles / dimensions:4 one, the recognition that in any conflictual situation the roots of conflict need to be tackled (conflict resolution, not conflict management); and two, the need to resolve conflict without recourse to violence. The first is a long-term perspective and includes the consideration of the social, political, economic, and other aspects of conflict. It presumes that conflicts are a product of tensions emanating in social, political and economic areas that ultimately escalate into military conflict. The latter is a more short-term view that looks at the means of pacific settlement of disputes. India thus rejects the balance of power approach to security and looks at the world through the conceptual lenses of a cooperative society. It rejects the balance of power or the deterrence approach as a status quoist one. It roots its approach in development policies, and thus assumes and demands a possibility of change in the existing order and as such takes a revisionist perspective. This can be seen in various fields: in the economic field it was articulated as a demand for a new economic order, in the political field it found expression in support to national liberation struggles and in the social field it was reflected in the demand for social justice. A governing image that seeks to project peace policy with the agenda of development as a base appears to confront the demands of legitimacy of the use of force that India accepts in the real world. In real terms, this dichotomy is visible in the Indian position at two levels, global and regional. The global position rejects the power approach and seeks international governance on the basis of a structure of peace grounded in development. At the regional level, the basis of a structure of peace uses the logic of the regional state system wherein ‘order’ is a product of hierarchal power structure.5 This is the base of the second part of the framework. It is also this simultaneous application of the two frameworks with their governing images that presents a dichotomy of approach. This second set is rooted in a realist / neorealist framework of analysis that is focused on the role of power. It holds that in order to maintain security and thereby order, primary attention was to be given to the establishment and preservation of power in international relations.6 This dichotomy, however, is neither duplicity nor a state of confusion for the regional dimension seeks to incorporate principles of economic and political development through such approaches as “Panchsheel”. That the Nehru approach accepted the necessity of national defence but sought to under play it is perceived in his query “Why shout it out?”7 The vision that India has sought to project through the Nehru years and which has endured in Indian foreign policy even today rested on such ideological precepts as anti-imperialism, liberal internationalism and Gandhism. At a theoretical level, India would be closer to the liberal institutionalists who accept the key assumptions of the utility of military power and at the same time insist upon the utility of institutions as a framework of cooperation.

## Security---Tricks/Framing

### Tricks OV

#### Their tricks draw on several independent theories – they have no explanation how the alt solves this so even if I link to these tricks they’re non-unique

### A2 Jackson – Rational Impact Calc

#### This argument is OFFENSIVE in the context of the Middle East – it speaks from the insulated position of the US, which doesn’t face major security threats – they ignore the Middle East which faces frequent and severe security threats from terror and conflict

### A2 Taleb and Blythe Complexity

#### This goes aff – says conventional policymaking fails to account for low probability/high impact risks, which are important – my aff specifically accounts for this while their kritik deflates it – a low risk of the aff’s big impacts means you vote aff

#### Indian conflict mediation solves – it allows unpredictable events to be channeled in ways that don’t cause conflict through mutual resolution

### A2 Cosmo

#### The aff isn’t nationalist so this doesn’t apply – their alt also can’t resolve national borders and identities so this is non-unique

#### Aff turns cosmo – it creates relations and cooperation that overcomes myopic nationalist perspectives

### A2 Fem IR/War-Peace Dichotomy

#### Aff doesn’t dichotomize war and peace – it sees peace as a goal that constantly has to worked towards through relations

## Terror Talk

### Terror Security Good

#### Nuclear terrorism makes every impact inevitable and turns their offense – securitizing it is crucial to draw attention to the issue and force a political response

Saga Foundation 2008, envisions a world free from the catastrophic ¶ effects of the use of nuclear weapons, 2008, “Nuclear Terrorism: Local Effects, Global Consequences”, http://www.sagafoundation.org/SagaFoundationWhitePaperSAGAMARK7282008.pdf

Nuclear terrorism represents the most serious existential threat to the security of the United States and the world. Yet the issue has all but disappeared from view. A number of reasons underlie the lack of discussion of nuclear ¶ terrorism in the 2008 presidential campaign. It may be it has yet to draw focused attention because of the absence of any further terror attacks on the U.S. ¶ homeland since 9/11. It may be due to a belief in some quarters that a nuclear act of terrorism is a remote possibility because of the inherent difficulty of surreptitiously assembling or acquiring a nuclear weapon. And it may be that since we agree it’s a serious problem, what is there to argue about, the ¶ assumption being we must be doing everything possible to prevent it. During the ¶ 2004 presidential campaign, both President Bush and Senator John Kerry said that nuclear terrorism was the leading threat to national security. Little has changed since, except that the public’s focus has turned elsewhere. This lack of controversy is a pronounced obstacle confronting those seeking to energize the issue. Just about everyone agrees: an act of nuclear terror would be a terrible thing; it would devastate the community attacked and psychologically terrorize the rest of the nation. But there has been relatively little public and media attention to this threat – a threat that could profoundly and permanently change our way of life. The basic features of a nuclear terrorist attack are so self-evident that very little time and energy has been put into understanding just how terrible such an attack would be. Much good work has been done, but much more needs to be done in this area to ensure that the public understands the stakes involved in the effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. Understanding the dynamics of both an act of nuclear terrorism and its likely aftermath drives home the conclusion that a nuclear terrorist attack anywhere will affect everyone everywhere. In this report, ¶ the Saga Foundation seeks to redress the shortcomings in the dialogue about nuclear terrorism and consider in some detail the possible consequences and aftershocks – physical, psychological, economic – that would flow from the detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city. A better understanding of these likely consequences, we believe, will help energize the political community, from the grass roots to our national leaders, to take the steps necessary to seriously and comprehensively address this threat. While Saga strongly ¶ advocates further research, including comprehensive war-game exercises into ¶ the dynamics of a nuclear terrorist attack, our analysis and research already in existence enable us to reach a basic understanding of the widespread impact of ¶ an attack in a single location. ¶ Key Finding 3¶ Our principal conclusion is that the economic aftershocks flowing not only ¶ from a nuclear terrorist attack itself but from a predictable set of decisions a U.S. president could be expected to make in the wake of such an attack would inflict extraordinary economic damage on the nation stretching far beyond the point of ¶ attack. Beyond responding with aid to the scene of an attack, the first order of ¶ business for a president following a nuclear terrorist strike would be to determine ¶ if another strike was about to occur and to do everything possible to prevent it. ¶ Virtually all the important presidential decisions in the wake of the September 11 attacks – the suspension of all air travel; mandates to secure cockpit doors; the ¶ redesign of airport security; the dispatch of U.S. forces to Afghanistan; the ¶ institution of surveillance of terror suspects – were designed to prevent follow-on attacks. Punishing the aggressors was an important but secondary issue. In a nuclear attack scenario, presidential decisions revolving around this imperative would be taken regardless of whether another attack was planned or actually took place. Among the post-attack presidential decisions we deem highly likely: • Shutdown of freight commerce/border closures. The likelihood that a nuclear weapon would be clandestinely brought into our country would in all likelihood prompt a national initiative to seal the borders and freeze and search virtually all freight conveyances, whether trucks, ships or planes, delivering a major shock to the economy and bringing home to the entire populace the enormity of what has occurred, as stocks of basic supplies vanished almost overnight. 4 Retaliation. The president would be under enormous pressure to respond swiftly and forcefully to such an attack, even if the geographic or geopolitical point of origin was uncertain. The science of ‘nuclear forensics,’ which can enable specialists to identify the source of nuclear material ¶ used in a bomb even post-explosion, would provide some key clues as to ¶ the source of the attack. As a consequence, there would be tremendous pressure to hold someone—terror groups and their state sponsors—responsible, engendering immediate and forceful retaliation. • Suspension of civil liberties. Extraordinary concern about further nuclear attacks following an initial attack would drive a series of decisions restricting freedom of movement and conferring extraordinary powers on government agencies charged with preventing another strike. The point cannot be emphasized enough: Not the attack itself but the fear of a follow-on attack and the response to that fear would drive a set of decisions that would almost certainly bring all freight traffic to a halt, shut down the nation’s ¶ ports, empty the nation’s grocery shelves, and bring most manufacturing to a ¶ virtual standstill. Even if this shut-down were temporary, our economic system of ¶ “just-in-time inventory” would mean that basic staples would very quickly become unavailable, delivering a psychological blow to the populace and a devastating ¶ shock to national and international financial markets. We live with the possibility ¶ of a nuclear terrorist attack today, but the possibility of a future attack once the 5 first attack occurred would be deemed so much greater as to create an entirely new reality in terms of the political and economic functioning of the nation. Although preparation for disaster is an important part of any homeland security plan, we contend that the point of studying and understanding the full range of consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism is to motivate the government and the people to ensure that such an attack never happens. We are ¶ not seeking a better civil defense plan or trying to revive a “duck and cover” strategy. We are trying to clearly lay out the consequences of failure so that the necessary steps are taken with the necessary energy and urgency. New Nuclear Danger Nearly two decades after the end of the Cold War, America needs a refresher course in the dangers of nuclear weapons. Jonathan Schell, author of ¶ The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger, pointed out in a recent ¶ interview that “People thought that when the Cold War ended, nuclear danger ended, too. … We have a whole generation having grown up without having been told the ABCs of this issue.” That the Cold War-era nuclear scenario – a life ending spasm of attack and counter-attack that would entomb the globe in a nuclear firestorm – has faded with the easing of superpower rivalry in no way has eliminated the nuclear threat from our world. The threat remains, but changed or transformed. This is because of the rise of an extremely violent form of terrorism, whether operating independently or with clandestine state sponsorship, which may not fall subject to the traditional strictures of deterrence, has removed the largest historical barriers to nuclear attack. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wanted to unleash their nuclear weapons on the other; they were prepared to do so in the extremely unlikely event that it became necessary, and both sides were well aware that an ¶ attack by one side on the other would bring about a certain and devastating response. In his book, At the Abyss, former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas C. ¶ Reed writes of the impact the Cuban missile crisis had on U.S. and Soviet ¶ leaders who contemplated the catastrophe that could have resulted from a ¶ nuclear exchange. From that point forward, according to Reed, “the possibility of nuclear war changed from a policy option to a dreaded disaster.” In contrast, terror groups have made it clear they see no moral constraint to using such weapons against the ‘infidel’ West in general and the United States in particular. As a shadowy, non-state entity, a terror group would not have to ¶ worry about massive retaliation, since there is little in the way of terrorist infrastructure, military might or population to retaliate against. This invulnerability to traditional deterrence might change should we be able to determine that a ¶ state sponsor provided the nuclear material or weapon, or otherwise supported a ¶ terrorist nuclear attack. But a nation so implicated could always claim such ¶ weapons were stolen or lost, undermining the justification for a massive U.S. and ¶ allied military response. Proof might be very difficult to establish. 7 The major constraint confronting terror groups is access to nuclear ¶ weapons themselves. The standard view that a terrorist group would be hard ¶ pressed to steal an intact nuclear weapon may need to be revisited in light of the ¶ incident last year in which a half dozen U.S. thermonuclear weapons were ¶ inadvertently strapped to the wings of an Air Force B-52 bomber and flown from ¶ North Dakota to Louisiana. An internal Pentagon investigation concluded that Air ¶ Force security systems protecting the nuclear weapons under its guardianship ¶ need to be significantly enhanced. In response, Defense Secretary Robert Gates ¶ ordered a top-to-bottom revamping of nuclear weapons security procedures and, ¶ eventually, replaced the Air Force senior leadership. Overseas, there are ¶ concerns about hundreds of small, easily transportable tactical nuclear weapons ¶ deployed by the Soviet Union and never fully accounted for since the end of the ¶ Cold War. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is seen as particularly vulnerable to the possibility of theft or diversion through an insider job. ¶ Of substantially greater concern is the possibility that terrorists could ¶ obtain through theft, bribery or diversion a critical mass of plutonium or highly ¶ enriched uranium – most likely the former – and use the material to fashion a ¶ crude but devastating homemade nuclear weapon. Research reactors in dozens ¶ of countries around the world, on hospital grounds and university campuses with ¶ inadequate security, use highly enriched uranium which, if stolen, would be safe ¶ for terrorists to transport and difficult for security officials to find because it puts ¶ off almost no radioactive signal. 8¶ The experts continue to debate the question of how easy it would be for a ¶ terror group, once it obtained this fissile material, to engineer a nuclear weapon. ¶ Some say it would be relatively easy, citing the simple “gun type” bomb used in ¶ the U.S. attack on Hiroshima in August 1945. The weapon design was sufficiently ¶ simple and reliable that it was used in the attack without having been tested. The ¶ more complex “implosion type” bomb dropped on Nagasaki used a design tested ¶ in the New Mexico desert earlier that year. ¶ There is also a debate about the chances of a so-called rogue state ¶ turning over a complete nuclear weapon to a terror group. Some consider this ¶ possibility highly unlikely, pointing out that these states seek nuclear weapons for ¶ their own power and prestige, and as a deterrent to more powerful adversaries. ¶ Leaders of these states would be unlikely to give up control of a nuclear weapon ¶ to an unpredictable terror group whose use of it in an attack might hold dire ¶ consequences for the state that provided the weapon. Nevertheless, the ¶ possibility of such a deliberate or unauthorized diversion, or of the theft of a ¶ complete weapon through an ‘inside job’ in a state where security procedures are ¶ more lax than in the United States and Russia, cannot be ruled out. ¶ In June 2008, new concern about the availability of bomb designs ¶ surfaced when a report by David Albright of the Institute for Science and ¶ International Security disclosed that U.S. and allied intelligence officials had traced computerized blueprints of a compact, portable nuclear weapon to the ¶ nuclear technology-smuggling network of Pakistan’s Abdul Qadeer Khan, 9¶ designer of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon and leader – until his arrest – of a black ¶ market arms technology smuggling operation. The blueprints have been traced to ¶ the computers of Khan allies in Switzerland, Dubai, Malaysia and Thailand, and ¶ an investigation continues to determine who may have received copies of these ¶ weapons designs. Because of their small size, the weapons are regarded as ¶ highly desirable for terrorists. ¶ Albright told the Associated Press that the design found on the Khan ¶ network’s computers had previously been thought to be the exclusive province of ¶ nuclear powers. The intelligence discoveries raise the possibility that a ¶ sophisticated weapons design was leaked to unknown parties. “It is a very ¶ different category of information, and it's very dangerous," Albright told AP. ¶ “There are no other designs out there. There is very little information of this ¶ quality out there outside of the nuclear weapons states.” The storage of this ¶ bomb design in easily distributed computer files raises a particular concern about ¶ whether and with whom these blueprints were shared. ¶ The relative security of U.S. nuclear material has led experts to conclude ¶ that the most likely scenario for a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States ¶ would be for the weapon, or the weapon components, to be smuggled in to the ¶ United States from overseas. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports ¶ that since 1993 there have been some 1,900 nuclear-related smuggling ¶ incidents. Of those, about 19 involved attempts to smuggle fissile material that ¶ could be used to fashion a nuclear weapon or a radiation dispersion device. That 10¶ is one reason behind the growing concern about the security of U.S. ports and it ¶ was the reason behind Rand’s decision to use the port of Long Beach, Calif., as ¶ the setting for a 2004 war game exercise posing a hypothetical terrorist nuclear ¶ weapon exploding in a shipping container at dockside. To date, this report ¶ represents the most detailed publicly available examination of the consequences ¶ – physical, psychological, economic – of a terrorist nuclear attack. But Rand itself ¶ acknowledged that much more needs to be done: ¶ A devastating attack would send social and economic aftershocks ¶ cascading through multiple sectors long after the initial strike was over. ¶ While much analysis has been done on the possible short-term effects of ¶ an attack of this magnitude, no work has investigated longer-term ¶ implications. Exploratory efforts to do so are needed. Over time, the ¶ economic effects of the catastrophe are likely to spread far beyond the ¶ initial attack, reaching a nationwide and even international scale. ¶ Dislocation would face two particularly difficult challenges: keeping the ¶ global shipping supply chain operating and restoring orderly economic ¶ relationships. ¶ Rand’s Charles Meade, who participated in the Long Beach scenario ¶ study, strongly urges the next administration to launch a detailed study of what ¶ he calls the “system-wide impacts” of nuclear terrorism. “The problem is large ¶ and uncertain,” Meade says, “and it’s not clear who has ownership over finding a ¶ solution.” ¶ Life and Death at Ground Zero ¶ A great deal of work has been done on the probable impact of a terrorist ¶ attack involving a nuclear weapon with an explosive force of about ten kilotons, 11¶ or somewhat less than that of the Hiroshima bomb. Most assume that a terrorist ¶ nuclear weapon would be detonated at ground level. The good news in such a ¶ scenario is that the interference of buildings and terrain would reduce the ¶ diameter of the area of total devastation compared to an air-burst weapon of the ¶ kind used on Japan in World War II and posited for military attacks on population ¶ centers ever since. The bad news is that a ground-level detonation would kick up ¶ an enormous amount of dust and debris irradiated by the blast, greatly increasing ¶ the amount of fallout resulting from the explosion. Much discussion has focused ¶ on port inspections and on solving the difficult technical problem of how to ¶ automate the scanning of all incoming cargo, since today less than 10 percent of ¶ cargo arriving on U.S. shores is physically inspected or electronically scanned. ¶ The U.S. Department of Energy has devoted much effort to its Nuclear ¶ Emergency Support Teams, or NEST, trained to arrive rapidly at the scene of a ¶ nuclear threat event, such as the discovery of a smuggled nuclear weapon. While ¶ we support these efforts, it is important to understand that once a nuclear ¶ weapon arrives on U.S. shores, it can devastate a city without the cargo even ¶ leaving the ship or passing through inspection. In the Long Beach scenario ¶ performed by Rand, the war game posited that inspectors had searched and ¶ discovered a terrorist nuclear device aboard a container ship, but the weapon ¶ detonated before it could be disarmed. ¶ A number of organizations and individual experts have studied the likely ¶ impact of a nuclear detonation on an American City. The scenarios vary in their 12¶ particulars. Harvard Professor Graham Allison described blast effects of a 10 ¶ kiloton device, somewhat smaller in explosive force than the bomb dropped on ¶ Hiroshima, on several U.S. cities. Rand’s Long Beach scenario posited the same ¶ size bomb. Former Senator Sam Nunn has described the impact of an attack on ¶ New York’s financial district. The University of Georgia examined the effects of a ¶ 20 kiloton bomb on New York, Chicago, Washington and Atlanta. The Pacific ¶ Northwest National Laboratory studied the effects of a 13 kiloton device. A ¶ private group called the Atomic Archive studied effects of much larger nuclear ¶ weapons. All of the studies were depressingly similar in their descriptions of ¶ catastrophic destruction and immediate fatalities running into the tens of ¶ thousands and beyond. Here, based on this and other research, is a rough ¶ sketch of the findings: ¶ Midtown Manhattan: A ten kiloton weapon detonated in Times Square ¶ would devastate much of midtown Manhattan, including the theater district, ¶ Grand Central Station, Rockefeller Center, Carnegie Hall, the Empire State ¶ Building and Madison Square Garden. ¶ Wall Street: Had the 9/11 terrorists detonated a nuclear weapon instead ¶ of crashing airplanes into the World Trade Center, Lower Manhattan and the ¶ entire financial district would have been reduced to ash and rubble, according to ¶ former Senator Nunn, head of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Survivors would be ¶ without clean water, shelter, or safe food. 13¶ San Francisco: A bomb detonated in Union Square would vaporize ¶ buildings as far as the Museum of Modern Art and would devastate with fire and ¶ destruction sections of the city including the Transamerica Building, Nob Hill, Coit ¶ Tower and the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, according to Allison’s ¶ analysis. ¶ San Jose: A bomb detonated in or near this city would devastate much of ¶ the physical infrastructure and plant floor space of Silicon Valley, one of the main ¶ engines of the U.S. economy, to say nothing of the human devastation wrought ¶ in one of the most densely populated areas of the country. ¶ Sacramento, Calif.: An attack in the area of the levees along the ¶ Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta could compromise the system that supplies ¶ fresh water to most of Northern California. ¶ Long Beach, Calif.: Rand, in its scenario study, estimated that 5,000 ¶ people would be killed immediately by the blast and that as many as 100,000 ¶ fatalities could result from fallout. Destruction of the power grid in the area would ¶ lead to widespread blackouts in the Los Angeles region. The local health care ¶ system would collapse due to damage, the overwhelming number of injured, and ¶ government-mandated evacuations. ¶ Washington, D.C.: A bomb going off at the Smithsonian Institution would ¶ destroy the White House and reduce the U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court to ¶ rubble. U.S. government officials who survived the attack would have to relocate ¶ to emergency government centers at pre-designated sites where deliberation and 14¶ decision-making could continue. Within a two-mile diameter circle of a nuclear ¶ detonation – a distance the length of the Washington Mall – little could be done. ¶ For those further away, the urge to evacuate immediately would be ¶ overwhelming, even though this might be a fatal choice, since radioactive fallout ¶ would be most intense in the initial hours and days after a detonation. Without a ¶ highly proactive government response plan, panic could well overwhelm the ¶ populace, they argue. Localizing these nuclear terror scenarios helps people envision and comprehend the unthinkable but it also creates a misleading perception that the ¶ damage from such an attack would be confined to the site of the attack itself. In ¶ considering these scenarios, former Senator Sam Nunn, who has worked for two ¶ decades to secure the world’s nuclear material, has observed that these groundzero narratives provide only the physical impact of nuclear terrorism. ¶ If you were trying to draw a circle to mark the overall impact of the blast – ¶ in social, economic, and security terms -- the circle would be the equator ¶ itself. No part of the planet would escape the impact. People everywhere ¶ would fear another blast. Travel, international trade, capital flows, ¶ commerce would initially stop, and many freedoms we have come to take ¶ for granted would quickly be eroded in the name of security. The ¶ confidence of America and the world would be shaken to the core. ¶ Economic Chain Reaction ¶ Echoing the nuclear chain reaction that sets off an atomic explosion, an ¶ economic chain reaction would follow a nuclear terrorist attack. In the immediate ¶ aftermath there would be staggering clean-up costs that would dwarf the costs ¶ involved in the post-9/11 clean-up. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 15¶ study of post-attack economic impact calculated not only physical clean-up but ¶ medical care for the wounded, the cost of lost economic activity due to ¶ destruction of businesses and to fatalities, evacuation, decontamination and ¶ reconstruction costs, and impacts to the affected region such as lost tourism ¶ revenue. The study concluded that a 13 kiloton attack on New York City would ¶ bring total costs approaching the entire U.S. gross domestic product for 2005. ¶ And the impacts would extend far beyond the region hit in an attack. The precise ¶ profile of this economic impact would depend on the attack profile and would ¶ surely involve elements that are impossible to predict. Through war-gaming and ¶ the exploration of likely decisions that would follow such an attack, however, we ¶ can arrive at an approximate understanding of what might be in store for the ¶ United States and world economies. The Saga Foundation strongly urges ¶ detailed government-funded research into this question and offers this postattack profile to stimulate discussion and to encourage more effective preventive ¶ government measures. ¶ Assurance: The first order of business for the president would be to assure the ¶ public that everything that can be done to aid the victims of the attack is being ¶ done and that everything that can be done to prevent another attack will be done. ¶ Action: Immediate post-attack security measures to prevent a potential second ¶ nuclear terrorist attack could prompt the president to order closing of all U.S. ¶ ports and borders, inspection of all inbound foreign cargo, freeze and inspection 16¶ of most freight rail and truck cargo, and mobilization of all national, state and ¶ local security personnel to assist with this massive effort. ¶ Mitigation: The shock to the economy of even a short-term freeze on commerce ¶ would bring about a temporary halt to most if not all manufacturing and would ¶ quickly empty shelves across the country of basic food supplies and other life ¶ necessities. This would then require rapid mitigation moves to enable the ¶ resumption of production and very limited importation under close inspection ¶ scrutiny. ¶ Curfews: The need to fully mobilize to respond to the scene of the attack and to ¶ take all steps necessary to avert a follow-on attack would likely require the ¶ imposition of curfews on air and ground transportation, at least for the initial days ¶ and weeks following the attack. Such restrictions would impose an economic cost ¶ of their own, beyond the cost of temporarily shutting down normal commerce. ¶ Retaliation: A tidal wave of national anger would flow from a terrorist nuclear ¶ attack, a reaction easily understandable but also dangerous in the pressure it would impose on decision-makers to take rash and possibly counterproductive action. Even if a terror group claimed responsibility for the attack, some effort ¶ would be required to determine its origin and rule out hoax claims. A significant ¶ part of this effort would entail nuclear forensics to determine the geographic ¶ origin of the fissile material used in the attack. Connected to this effort would be a ¶ sweeping effort by the U.S. National Command Authority to determine if a foreign ¶ government directed and aided the responsible group in mounting the attack. 17¶ Any firm conclusions along these lines would bring about swift and devastating ¶ retaliation. It is also likely that the president would be under overwhelming ¶ domestic pressure to respond even in the absence of absolute certainty as to ¶ responsibility for the attack. ¶ State of War: A nuclear terrorist attack would be of such magnitude as to do something that did not occur in the wake of 9/11 – place the country on an unambiguous war footing. The last time such a society-wide mobilization occurred was World War II. Today, a sudden shift to society-wide mobilization ¶ would impose major shocks on the economy whose impact would be difficult to ¶ predict. ¶ Civil Liberties: Reaction to a terrorist nuclear attack and fear of further such ¶ attacks would be so strong as to bring about pressure to impose restrictions on civil liberties of such magnitude as to potentially undermine our constitutional system of government. Unrestricted domestic surveillance, incarceration of certain individuals without charge, summary deportation of persons of concern, exercise of extraordinary presidential powers and the eclipse of judicial and congressional power would be among the possible shifts in the wake of such an attack, and a key challenge for the government and the people would be to ¶ ensure that such shifts as occurred did not become permanent. ¶ Market Stabilization: The shock to U.S. and global industrial and financial ¶ markets along with resulting off-the-scale job losses and plummeting investor ¶ confidence would require urgent presidential action even though the White 18¶ House would be confronted with the reality that its own post-attack actions were ¶ contributing to the severity of these economic problems. Government intervention ¶ in the national economy not seen since the Great Depression and World War II ¶ would likely be necessary, though it is unclear whether even dramatic ¶ government action could stand up to the enormous downward economic ¶ pressures brought on by a nuclear terrorist attack and its aftermath. ¶ Nuclear Terrorism: How Likely? ¶ Efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism have been largely non-controversial in ¶ the sense few if anyone could object to taking reasonable steps to prevent such ¶ a catastrophe. But these efforts, while laudable in markedly improving the ¶ security of a great deal of nuclear material worldwide, particularly in the former ¶ Soviet Union, have lacked a sense of urgency and a priority level commensurate ¶ with the threat. ¶ In a June 2008 speech at the Washington Institute, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ¶ the chief of intelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, said, “We must take ¶ urgent action to scoop up any nuclear material outside state control before ¶ terrorists do.” Mowatt-Larssen said that the “continuing instances of trafficking in ¶ nuclear materials means we collectively have not done enough to keep material ¶ out of the hands of terrorists. … We must urgently intensify efforts to acquire any ¶ materials that may be for sale on the illicit nuclear market.” 19¶ One reason underlying this lack of urgency is that there are some who believe that the possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack is extremely remote and who therefore see other government endeavors, whether in the homeland ¶ security arena or elsewhere, as more important. There are many ways to look at ¶ this issue, and it is an unavoidable fact that the statistical chances of a nuclear ¶ terrorist attack occurring can only be conjectured. But this much seems ¶ defensible: a terrorist or state-sponsored terrorist nuclear attack may be a statistically remote possibility, but it seems clear that it is the most likely nuclear threat that faces us today, given the end of Cold War tensions and the everpresent threat of massive retaliation as a barrier to nuclear attacks by adversary ¶ states. Billionaire investor Warren Buffett, who is handy with numbers, posits that ¶ if the probability of something catastrophic happening is 10 percent per year, that means that over a 50-year period it has a 99-and-a-half percent chance of happening. If society can reduce a threat to a 1 percent chance per year, then over that same half century there is a 60 percent chance of avoiding disaster. Research commissioned by the Saga Foundation indicates that the public ¶ does not share the view of those specialists who consider an act of nuclear ¶ terrorism to be unlikely. Focus group research by Saga indicates that people are, ¶ in some ways, more worried about nuclear terrorism than they are about the ¶ state of the U.S. economy. Nuclear terrorism would deliver a sudden, unexpected ¶ and intense shock to the nation. At the same time, these participants in Saga’s ¶ research indicated they are pessimistic about government’s ability to succeed in 20¶ mounting a comprehensive defense of the homeland, whether through border ¶ security or efforts to directly combat terror groups. They also understand that the ¶ economic shocks, even to localities far from the scene of an attack, would be ¶ profound and personal, as shocks to the supply of basic necessities combined ¶ with macro-economic impacts such as runaway inflation touched individual lives ¶ profoundly. In fashioning a more robust response to the threat of nuclear terrorism, it will be necessary to take on this pessimism, to expand programs already in place that are showing results and to design new programs that will ¶ increase confidence in the ability to thwart terror groups from obtaining these ¶ deadly weapons and put an end to state-run nuclear programs that are a danger ¶ to our security. ¶ While we cannot precisely calculate the probability of an act of nuclear ¶ terrorism, we can weigh some of the forces working toward and against this ¶ threat. Among the forces working against nuclear terrorism: ¶ • The difficulty of obtaining fissile material ¶ • The difficulty of a non-state group engineering a workable nuclear ¶ weapon ¶ • Increasing security measures to protect or eliminate existing fissile ¶ material worldwide, particularly in the former Soviet Union ¶ • Improved and expanded homeland security programs ¶ • Progress in the ongoing war on terror and continuing efforts to ¶ weaken and degrade terror groups and their terror masters 21¶ • Indications, admittedly ambiguous, suggesting that even for a ¶ radically violent terrorist group, the use of a nuclear weapon against ¶ hundreds of thousands of civilians might be considered ¶ counterproductive to the terrorist movement and therefore beyond ¶ the pale. ¶ Forces pushing us toward the possibility of an act of nuclear terror include: ¶ • A stated declaration by jihadist elements that obtaining nuclear ¶ capability is a religious duty for Islamists and clerical findings that ¶ use of such a weapon against the enemies of Islam could be ¶ justified ¶ • Continuing gaps in security of some nuclear material, particularly at ¶ research reactors ¶ • The availability of rudimentary nuclear weapon designs through ¶ open sources, growing concern that more sophisticated designs ¶ may have become available on the black market, and the possible ¶ transfer or sale of such weapons or technology directly from ¶ nuclear armed states to terror groups ¶ • Ready access by radical groups to large funding sources in the ¶ Middle East, enhanced by the rapid rise in the price of oil ¶ • Continued gaps in port and border security, both at home and ¶ abroad, exemplified by the continuing easy flow of illegal people ¶ and drugs into the United States 22¶ • The ‘needle in a haystack’ difficulty of tracking down and seizing ¶ nuclear material once it has been stolen or diverted ¶ • Growing pressure toward the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ¶ bringing with it the increased chance of nuclear material theft, sale ¶ or diversion ¶ • The unworkability of traditional deterrent models against terror ¶ groups contemplating a nuclear attack. ¶ These lists are only partial but, on balance, suggest an overall tilt in favor ¶ of the serious possibility that an act of nuclear terrorism could occur. ¶ Motivating a Response ¶ That threat of a major nuclear exchange between the United States and ¶ the former Soviet Union receded with the end of the Cold War. In its place has ¶ arisen the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is true that the physical destruction ¶ wrought by a single terrorist nuclear attack would pale in comparison to a ¶ massive nuclear exchange. But it is also true that a terrorist nuclear attack is a ¶ more probable event than the kind of global nuclear war that so concerned ¶ America during the 1980’s. The possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack is an ¶ underlying motivating factor for much of what the U.S. government is doing ¶ around the world. Whether the issue is reducing U.S. and Russian nuclear ¶ arsenals, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, securing fissile ¶ material worldwide, converting weapons-grade uranium to commercial-grade 23¶ uranium, collecting intelligence on terrorism and waging war on terror groups and ¶ their allied state sponsors, adopting divestment measures, instituting new ¶ maritime and port security codes, implementing cooperative efforts with the ¶ Proliferation Security Initiative, or adopting the US and Russian led counter ¶ nuclear terrorism cooperative efforts – all of these endeavors have as an ¶ underlying element the imperative of preventing or reducing the chances of ¶ nuclear terrorism. But the goal – preventing nuclear terror – has not been put ¶ sufficiently ‘up front’ so that the benefit of these and other policy endeavors is ¶ clear to the public.¶ As demonstrated in this report, the impacts of an act of nuclear terrorism ¶ would be catastrophic and not confined to the area of attack. Our preventive ¶ efforts, therefore, must be comprehensive. Countering the threat of nuclear ¶ terrorism requires combining elements of “soft power” such as arms control, ¶ sanctions, securing nuclear material and border security, with “hard power” such ¶ as a credible threats of force, interdicting nuclear smuggling, pressure on ¶ proliferators, continued improvements to missile defense technology, and ¶ offensive action against foreign terrorist elements. Key elements of our efforts ¶ must include: ¶ An overseas outlook ¶ • Keeping terrorist nuclear material off our shores is vital. Once a weapon ¶ enters the country we are in a needle-in-a-haystack situation. ¶ • Within 24 hours of the arrival of a container ship at the U.S. port of ¶ Charleston, S.C., for example, a smuggled nuclear weapon, hauled by 24¶ truck, could be anywhere in the eastern U.S. as far west as Omaha, ¶ Nebraska. ¶ • Key elements of the strategy must be foreign-oriented: securing nuclear ¶ material; divestment; deterring state sponsors of terrorism; arms control; ¶ interdicting nuclear smuggling; tracking terrorist financing; law ¶ enforcement. ¶ • Work to secure foreign ports, airfields and borders to prevent terrorist ¶ nuclear weapon from ever reaching our shores. Securing overseas ports ¶ is just as important to our security as is securing our own ports. ¶ Multi-pronged strategies are required. ¶ • Old political models of left/right no longer apply. The old pattern of arms ¶ controllers on one side and weapons advocates on the other no longer fits ¶ the global security picture, if it ever did. ¶ • International cooperation is key. Saga’s research shows that the public is ¶ not entirely convinced of this point, so policymakers must do better in ¶ articulating the need for international cooperation, and the benefits flowing ¶ from that cooperation. ¶ • Nunn-Lugar efforts to secure former Soviet nuclear material, and “loose ¶ nukes” in other nations, must be accelerated. ¶ • Use of force, such as the Israeli strike on the secret Syrian nuclear ¶ installation, must remain an option in a world with such real threats. ¶ A successor to deterrence. ¶ • The impermeability of terror groups to standard threats of retaliation ¶ requires alternatives to the old deterrence models that dominated Cold ¶ War strategies. ¶ • Proliferation and state sponsorship of terror remain critical problems, so ¶ some forms of state pressure, including credible threats of force, remain ¶ viable but will not work when applied to non-state terror groups. ¶ • Iran and North Korea are nation-state adversaries but North Korea and ¶ especially Iran have terror links. Our policies toward these countries must ¶ keep in mind not only the state-on-state issues but the potential for Iranian 25¶ or North Korean nuclear weapons development to increase the nuclear ¶ terror threat. ¶ • Al Qaeda is but one element of the global terror threat. Our strategies ¶ must take into account the threats posed by groups such as Hezbollah, ¶ Hamas, and FARC ¶ • “Nuclear forensics” – the ability to identify the source of fissile material in a ¶ detonated nuclear weapon – could become a key element of a new ¶ deterrence model that holds supplier states responsible for attacks. ¶ • Interdiction of illegal nuclear technology shipments under the Proliferation ¶ Security Initiative are a critical line of defense. ¶ Follow the money ¶ • The global Jihad community is awash in petro-dollars, disguised as ¶ charitable contributions. ¶ • Freezing of financial assets, divestment and denial of foreign banks’ ¶ access to U.S. monetary systems are extremely powerful sanctions which ¶ should be used as part of our terrorist prevention strategy. ¶ Success is achievable. Examples to date: ¶ • Take down of A. Q. Khan network and Libyan nuclear program. ¶ • Half of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear material is now secured and ¶ progress continues ¶ • Successful intercepts of nuclear technology under the Proliferation ¶ Security Initiative ¶ • The power of cooperation has been demonstrated most recently by ¶ Russia support of sanctions on Iran if the Tehran government continues ¶ with uranium enrichment ¶ . ¶ Trends of concern ¶ • Decline of ethnic Russian population bringing with it the potential for ¶ growing influence of radical Islamic elements in a country with a huge ¶ nuclear arsenal. 26¶ • Growing reports of attempts at nuclear smuggling ¶ • Is our intelligence up to the job? ¶ • Is the public sufficiently engaged? ¶ Conclusion ¶ The consensus on the seriousness of the threat of nuclear terrorism is noticeably out of sync with the laudable but, to date, insufficient response to the problem. More public attention, greater public activism, and more energetic ¶ government action are needed. This will require more funding. Understanding in ¶ the starkest terms possible the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism is a ¶ vital part of this effort because it will help clarify in the public mind the need to respond energetically and the payoff of doing so. It is worthwhile – but not ¶ enough – to understand what a nuclear attack would do to an American city. ¶ Such an attack would require a certain set of fairly predictable presidential ¶ decisions which would, in themselves, have the potential to devastate the national and global economies despite their well-intended purpose of preventing ¶ further nuclear terrorist attacks. Much greater effort must be expended to better ¶ understand the dynamics of presidential decision-making after a nuclear terrorist ¶ attack. A well-funded government study would help leaders and the public ¶ understand in much clearer terms the full consequences of failing to neutralize ¶ the terrorist nuclear threat. These consequences go far beyond the devastation ¶ that would be cause at the scene of an attack. The purpose of a detailed study of these consequences and the dissemination of the results to the public is not to sow panic or engage in scare-mongering; scaring ourselves to death may very ¶ well engender paralysis and a sense of helplessness. Rather, if we awaken the public to the credible threats facing us, to the enormous stakes involved and the dangers at hand, while also conveying a realistic “can do” message that underscores the opportunities for effectively dealing with this problem, the most ¶ serious threat to our security can be defeated

### A2 State Terrorism

#### Identifying one form of terrorism doesn’t prevent identifying other forms – the ONLY STANCE taken by the aff is that we should stop ISIS and pirates from killing people

### CTS Bad

#### The K is a non-falsifiable ideological conspiracy theory

Jones 11 (David Jones, Martin Smith, Senior Lecturer, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, M.L.R., Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, London, United Kingdom, “Terrorology and Methodology: A Reply to Dixit and Stump,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 34, issue 6)

In our original review we particularly took issue with the belief, held by a number of contributors to Critical Studies on Terrorism, and reflected in British and Australian university programs, that conventional terrorism research deliberately conspires both to delegitimize the critical voice and marginalize the non-Western “other.” In this regard, we found that critical theory engages in sweeping generalizations about the Western media presentation of terrorism and assumes or cherry picks facts to demonstrate political bias and a predetermined state conspiracy. Such a critical worldview again unconsciously mirrors the weakness of traditional terror studies during the Cold War, where writers like Claire Sterling in The Terror Network detected the hidden-hand of the Soviet Union behind every significant violent sub-state actor of the time. As we stated in our review, conventional and critical approaches often seem two sides of the same debased coin. More generally, the soi disant critical orientation of Critical Studies on Terrorism embraces the uncritical assumption that Western democracies have engaged in a conspiracy to demonize resistance by third world and particularly Muslim non-state actors. The critical approach thus places the assumption of the questionable and malign motivation of democratic governments (that nevertheless, and somewhat ironically, support the critical research agenda through the grant giving machinery) above conceptual precision and hypothesis testing. In the process, critical thinking problematically imports the paranoid outer reaches of the blogosphere into academia, thus legitimizing the conspiracies of hidden-hands, sinister schemes, malign forces, secret agendas, and controlling systems of power purveyed on websites like Spinwatch and Neocon Europe.

### “Terrorists” Word Good

#### The word “terrorism” avoids obfuscation

Laqueur 03 – historian, has taught at Brandeis University, Georgetown, Harvard, University of Chicago, Tel Aviv and John Hopkins university; expert in terrorism and one of the founders of its study; holocaust survivor [No end to war: terrorism in the twenty-first century

According to an old and widespread sophism, “**one** man**’s terrorist is another** man**’s freedom fighter**.” This is true in the sense that criminals and victims will seldom agree on the nature of a crime; quite frequently people do not agree about a traffic accident. It **is as true as saying that** St. Francis and **Mother Teresa had many admirers, but so** **had Hitler** and Stalin and that therefore there is not really much to choose between them. **But** there is no room for moral relativism **(or nihilism**) in a civilized society, and there are yardsticks by which to measure human actions. Eichmann and Pol Pot, even if they had sympathizers, will not be proposed for sainthood. Why the great coyness concerning the use of the word “terrorism” and “terrorists”? Why the use of ludicrous terms such as “armed struggle” or “Red Army” or “guerrilla” or “Red Brigade”?This was not always the case. The Russian revolutionaries of a century ago were far less sensitive and openly talked about their terrorist struggle. Boris Savinkov, the head of the terrorist organization of the Russian Social Revolutionaries, called his recollections, published before World War I, Memoirs of a Terrorist. It became a classic and was translated into many languages. Why should Western media eighty years later think such a choice of terms impermissible? It had, of course, to do with the change that has taken place in terrorist practice; it was one thing to plan the assassination of a dictator or a police chief, which would generate support at least on the part of some of the public. The in discriminate murder of innocent people, of small children and elderly people, does not make for good public relations. In other words, the new terrorism is different from the old, and while today’s terrorists want to practice it, they resent the label. The media were quite willing to respect their sensitivity. There have been, as always, a few exceptions when ideologues of terrorism have made no bones about their views and strategies. Thus, for instance, Sheikh Azzam bin Laden’s teacher, who has been mentioned more than once in these pages: We are terrorists, and terrorism is our friend and companion. Let the West and East know that we are terrorists and that we are terrifying as well. We shall do our best in preparation to terrorize Allah’s enemies and our own. Thus terrorism is an obligation in Allah’s religion. There is the unfortunate and often ridiculous practice in some of the media to call a spade not a spade but an agricultural implement. It is understandable that, to give but one example, international news agencies such as Reuters feel uneasy about the use of the term “terrorist” because it might offend the terrorists and perhaps even endanger their correspondents in Gaza, on the West Bank, and other parts of the world. But it would have been more honest if Steven Jukes, head of the Reuters news department, had admitted that **the use of terms such as “militants**” ‘or “activists” **to identify terrorists is motivated by fear** and perhaps also the wish not to lose customers, **rather than** the desire **to be objective** and tell the truth. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) followed a more selective policy—not using the term “terrorist” in the Middle East but feeling free to use it in other parts of the world. The Chicago Tribune decided to forgo the use of the term “terrorism” because “it is tendentious and propagandistic, and because today’s terrorist sometimes turns out tomorrow’s statesman.” By the same token, every political term could and should be dismissed as tendentious and even propagandistic, and while today’s terrorist may indeed be tomorrow’s statesman, this does not change the fact that at one stage he practiced terrorism. Reuters’s decision provoked a great deal of cynical comment: **Why not call Jack the Ripper an** **“amateur** abdominal **surgeon”** and Timothy McVeigh (of Oklahoma City fame) “a person who left a volatile cargo in a non parking zone”? Why not redefine Pol Pot a recruiter for farming work or Eichmann an activist demographer? Like Humpty Dumpty, some of the media decided that when they use a term “it means just what they choose it to mean.”But the issue is, of course, a serious one. **To call a terrorist an “activist or a “militant” is to blot out the dividing line between a suicide bomber and the active member of a trade union** or a political party or a club. **It is bound to lead to constant misunderstanding**: If an Indian journal publishes statistics about political activists killed in Jammu and Kashmir in the1990s, the figures do not refer to people who have killed but were killed: candidates in elections. If Reuters’s head office in London or that of the Chicago Tribune were destroyed in a bomb attack or if their staff male and female, would have their throats cut by a group of invaders while sitting at their desks, it is unlikely that their colleagues would call the perpetrators “activists.”

#### This definition of terrorism solves terrorism

Ganor 1 (Boaz, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, “Defining Terrorism”]

The prevalent definitions of terrorism entail difficulties, both conceptual and syntactical. It is thus not surprising that alternative concepts with more positive connotations—guerrilla movements, underground movements, national liberation movements, commandos, etc.—are often used to describe and characterize the activities of terrorist organizations. Generally these concepts are used without undue attention to the implications, but at times the use of these definitions is tendentious, grounded in a particular political viewpoint. By resorting to such tendentious definitions of terrorism, terrorist organizations and their supporters seek to gloss over the realities of terrorism, thus establishing their activities on more positive and legitimate foundations. Naturally, terms not opposed to the basic values of liberal democracies, such as “revolutionary violence,” “national liberation,” etc., carry fewer negative connotations than the term, “terrorism.” Terrorism or Revolutionary Violence? Salah Khalef (Abu Iyad) was Yasser Arafat’s deputy and one of the leaders of Fatah and Black September. He was responsible for a number of lethal attacks, including the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. In order to rationalize such actions, he used the tactic of confounding “terrorism” with “political violence,” stating, “By nature, and even on ideological grounds, I am firmly opposed to political murder and, more generally, to terrorism. Nevertheless, unlike many others, I do not confuse revolutionary violence with terrorism, or operations that constitute political acts with others that do not.”[4] Abu Iyad tries to present terrorism and political violence as two different and unconnected phenomena. The implication of this statement is that a political motive makes the activity respectable, and the end justifies the means. I will examine this point below. Terrorism or National Liberation? A rather widespread attempt to make all definitions of terrorism meaningless is to lump together terrorist activities and the struggle to achieve national liberation. Thus, for instance, the recurrently stated Syrian official position is that Syria does not assist terrorist organizations; rather, it supports national liberation movements. President Hafez el-Assad, in a November 1986 speech to the participants in the 21st Convention of Workers Unions in Syria, said the following: We have always opposed terrorism. But terrorism is one thing and a national struggle against occupation is another. We are against terrorism… Nevertheless, we support the struggle against occupation waged by national liberation movements.[5] The attempt to confound the concepts of “terrorism” and “national liberation” comes to the fore in various official pronouncements from the Arab world. For instance, the fifth Islamic summit meeting in Kuwait, at the beginning of 1987, stated in its resolutions that: The conference reiterates its absolute faith in the need to distinguish the brutal and unlawful terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals, by groups, or by states, from the legitimate struggle of oppressed and subjugated nations against foreign occupation of any kind. This struggle is sanctioned by heavenly law, by human values, and by international conventions.[6] The foreign and interior ministers of the Arab League reiterated this position at their April 1998 meeting in Cairo. In a document entitled “Arab Strategy in the Struggle against Terrorism,” they emphasized that belligerent activities aimed at “liberation and self determination” are not in the category of terrorism, whereas hostile activities against regimes or families of rulers will not be considered political attacks but rather criminal assaults.[7] Here again we notice an attempt to justify the “means” (terrorism) in terms of the “end” (national liberation). Regardless of the nature of the operation, when we speak of “liberation from the yoke of a foreign occupation” this will not be terrorism but a legitimate and justified activity. This is the source of the cliché, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” which stresses that all depends on the perspective and the worldview of the one doing the defining. The former President of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, made the following statement in April 1981, during the visit of the Libyan ruler, Muamar Qadhafi: “Imperialists have no regard either for the will of the people or the laws of history. Liberation struggles cause their indignation. They describe them as ‘terrorism’.”[8] Surprisingly, many in the Western world have accepted the mistaken assumption that terrorism and national liberation are two extremes in the scale of legitimate use of violence. The struggle for “national liberation” would appear to be the positive and justified end of this sequence, whereas terrorism is the negative and odious one. It is impossible, according to this approach, for any organization to be both a terrorist group and a movement for national liberation at the same time. In failing to understand the difference between these two concepts, many have, in effect, been caught in a semantic trap laid by the terrorist organizations and their allies. They have attempted to contend with the clichés of national liberation by resorting to odd arguments, instead of stating that when a group or organization chooses terrorism as a means, the aim of their struggle cannot be used to justify their actions (see below). Thus, for instance, Senator Jackson was quoted in Benyamin Netanyahu’s book Terrorism: How the West Can Win as saying, The idea that one person’s ‘terrorist’ is another’s ‘freedom fighter’ cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don’t blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t set out to capture and slaughter schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do . . . It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word ‘freedom’ to be associated with acts of terrorists.[9] Professor Benzion Netanyahu also assumed, a priori, that freedom fighters are incapable of perpetrating terrorist acts: For in contrast to the terrorist, no freedom fighter has ever deliberately attacked innocents. He has never deliberately killed small children, or passersby in the street, or foreign visitors, or other civilians who happen to reside in the area of conflict or are merely associated ethnically or religiously with the people of that area… The conclusion we must draw from all this is evident. Far from being a bearer of freedom, the terrorist is the carrier of oppression and enslavement . . .[10] This approach strengthens the attempt by terrorist organizations to present terrorism and the struggle for liberation as two contradictory concepts. It thus plays into the terrorists’ hands by supporting their claim that, since they are struggling to remove someone they consider a foreign occupier, they cannot be considered terrorists. The claim that a freedom fighter cannot be involved in terrorism, murder and indiscriminate killing is, of course, groundless. A terrorist organization can also be a movement of national liberation, and the concepts of “terrorist” and “freedom fighter” are not mutually contradictory. Targeting “the innocent”? Not only terrorists and their allies use the definition of terrorism to promote their own goals and needs. Politicians in countries affected by terrorism at times make political use of the definition of terrorism by attempting to emphasize its brutality. One of the prevalent ways of illustrating the cruelty and inhumanity of terrorists is to present them as harming “the innocent.” Thus, in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, Binyamin Netanyahu states that terrorism is “the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.”[11] This definition was changed in Netanyahu’s third book, Fighting Terrorism, when the phrase “the innocent” was replaced by the term “civilians”: “Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends.”[12] “Innocent” (as opposed to “civilian”) is a subjective concept, influenced by the definer’s viewpoint, and therefore must not be the basis for a definition of terrorism. The use of the concept “innocent” in defining terrorism makes the definition meaningless and turns it into a tool in the political game. The dilemma entailed by the use of the term “innocent” is amply illustrated in the following statement by Abu Iyad: As much as we repudiate any activity that endangers innocent lives, that is, against civilians in countries that are not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we feel no remorse concerning attacks against Israeli military and political elements who wage war against the Palestinian people . . . Israeli acts of vengeance usually result in high casualties among Palestinian civilians—particularly when the Israeli Air Force blindly and savagely bombs refugee camps—and it is only natural that we should respond in appropriate ways to deter the enemy from continuing its slaughter of innocent victims.”[13] Abu Iyad here clarifies that innocent victims are civilians in countries that are not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict (implying that civilians in Israel, even children and old people, are not innocent), while he describes Palestinian civilians as innocent victims. Proposing a Definition of Terrorism The question is whether it is at all possible to arrive at an exhaustive and objective definition of terrorism, which could constitute an accepted and agreed-upon foundation for academic research, as well as facilitating operations on an international scale against the perpetrators of terrorist activities. The definition proposed here states that terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims. This distinction between the target of the attack and its aims shows that the discrepancy between “terrorism” and “freedom fighting” is not a subjective difference reflecting the personal viewpoint of the definer. Rather it constitutes an essential difference, involving a clear distinction between the perpetrators’ aims and their mode of operation. As noted, an organization is defined as “terrorist” because of its mode of operation and its target of attack, whereas calling something a “struggle for liberation” has to do with the aim that the organization seeks to attain. Diagram 2 illustrates that non-conventional war (between a state and an organization), may include both terrorism and guerrilla activities on the background of different and unrelated aims. Hiding behind the guise of national liberation does not release terrorists from responsibility for their actions. Not only is it untrue that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” but it is also untrue that “the end justifies the means.” The end of national liberation may, in some cases, justify recourse to violence, in an attempt to solve the problem that led to the emergence of a particular organization in the first place. Nevertheless, the organization must still act according to the rules of war, directing its activities toward the conquest of military and security targets; in short, it must confine itself to guerrilla activities. When the organization breaks these rules and intentionally targets civilians, it becomes a terrorist organization, according to objective measures, and not according to the subjective perception of the definer. It may be difficult at times to determine whether the victim of an attack was indeed a civilian, or whether the attack was intentional. These cases could be placed under the rubric of a “gray area,” to be decided in line with the evidence and through the exercise of judicial discretion. The proposed definition may therefore be useful in the legal realm as a criterion for defining and categorizing the perpetrators’ activities. In any event, adopting the proposed definition of terrorism will considerably reduce the “gray area” to a few marginal cases. Defining States’ Involvement in Terrorism **Continues…** supporting terrorism – terrorist organizations often rely on the assistance of a sympathetic civilian population. An effective instrument in the limitation of terrorist activity is to undermine the ability of the organization to obtain support, assistance, and aid from this population. A definition of terrorism could be helpful here too by determining new rules of the game in both the local and the international sphere. Any organization contemplating the use of terrorism to attain its political aims will have to risk losing its legitimacy, even with the population that supports its aims. Public relations – a definition that separates terrorism out from other violent actions will enable the initiation of an international campaign designed to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist organizations, curtail support for them, and galvanize a united international front against them. In order to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist activity (usually stemming from the tendency of various countries to identify with some of the aims of terrorist organizations), terrorist activity must be distinguished from guerrilla activity, as two forms of violent struggle reflecting different levels of illegitimacy. The Attitude of Terrorist Organizations Toward the Definition The definition of terrorism does not require that the terrorist organizations themselves accept it as such. Nevertheless, reaching international agreement will be easier the more objective the definition, and the more the definition takes into account the demands and viewpoints of terrorist organizations and their supporters. The proposed definition, as noted, draws a distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare at both the conceptual and moral levels. If properly applied, it could challenge organizations that are presently involved in terrorism to abandon it so as to engage exclusively in guerrilla warfare. As noted, most organizations active today in the national and international arena engage in both terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare; after all, international convention makes no distinction between the two. Hence, there are no rules defining what is forbidden and what is allowed in non-conventional war, and equal punishments are imposed on both terrorists and guerrilla fighters. People perpetrating terrorist attacks or engaging in guerrilla warfare know they can expect the same punishment, whether they attack a military installation or take over a kindergarten. The terrorist attack may be more heavily censored because it involves children, but the legitimacy of these actions will be inferred from their political aims. In these circumstances, why not prefer a terrorist attack that will have far more impact, and will be easier to accomplish, with much less risk? The international adoption of the proposed definition, with its distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare—and its concomitant separation from political aims—could motivate the perpetrators to reconsider their intentions, choosing military targets over civilian targets—guerrilla warfare over terrorism–both because of moral considerations and because of “cost-benefit” considerations. The moral consideration – many terrorist organizations are troubled by the moral question bearing on their right to harm civilians, and this concern is reflected in their literature and in interviews with terrorists. Thus, for instance, an activist of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Walid Salam, argued in December 1996 that “among activists of the Popular Front, more and more are opposed to military activities against civilians, as the one near Ramallah on Wednesday. They do not say so publicly because of internal discipline and to preserve unity.”[27] We can also see something of this moral dilemma in Sheik Ahmad Yassin, the leader of Hamas: “According to our religion it is forbidden to kill a woman, a baby, or an old man, but when you kill my sister, and my daughter, and my son, it is my right to defend them.”[28] This concern might explain why, after attacks on civilian targets, organizations such as Hamas often make public statements proclaiming that they have attacked military targets. The moral dilemma does exist, and the opponents of terrorism must intensify it. When countries acknowledge the principle of relying on guerrilla warfare to attain legitimate political aims, and unite in their moral condemnation of terrorism, they increase the moral dilemma that is already prevalent in terrorist organizations. The utilitarian consideration – If the perpetrators know that attacking a kindergarten or other civilian target will never be acceptable; that these attacks will turn them into wanted and extraditable terrorists and will undermine the legitimacy of their political goals—and that, when apprehended, they will be punished much more harshly than would guerrilla fighters—they may think twice before choosing terrorism as their modus operandi. Adopting the proposed definition of terrorism, formulating rules of behavior, and setting appropriate punishments in line with the proposed definition will sharpen the “cost-benefit” considerations of terrorist organizations. One way of encouraging this trend among terrorist organizations is, as noted, to agree on different punishments for those convicted of terrorism and those convicted of guerrilla warfare. Thus, for instance, the possibility should be considered of bringing to criminal trial, under specific charges of terrorism, individuals involved in terrorist activities, while allotting prisoner of war status to those accused of involvement in guerrilla activities. The proposed definition of terrorism may indeed help in the struggle against terrorism at many and varied operative levels. An accepted definition, capable of serving as a basis for international counter-terrorist activity, could above all, bring terrorist organizations to reconsider their actions. They must face the question of whether they will persist in terrorist attacks and risk all that such persistence entails—loosing legitimacy, incurring harsh and specific punishments, facing a coordinated international opposition (including military activity), and suffering harm to sources of support and revenue. The international community must encourage the moral and utilitarian dilemmas of terrorist organizations, and establish a clear policy accompanied by adequate means of punishment on the basis of an accepted definition. Summary We face an essential need to reach a definition of terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement, thus enabling international operations against terrorist organizations. A definition of this type must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars (betweean organization and a state). The definition of terrorism will be the basis and the operational tool for expanding the international community’s ability to combat terrorism. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in, or supporting terrorism, and will allow the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerrilla activities). Finally, the operative use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral or utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims, thus reducing the scope of international terrorism. The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself. The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as the “politically correct” one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible goal, and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition. The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better

#### Ideology MUST factor into the explanation of terrorism, background itself can’t. Only military solutions solve.

Epstein 5 (Alex, analyst at the Ayn Rand Institute, BA in Philosophy from Duke University, “Fight the Root of Terrorism With Bombs, Not Bread”, San Fransisco Chronicle, 8/14)

In light of the recent suicide bombings in London, and the general inability of the West to prevent terrorist attacks, there is much talk about fighting the "root cause" of terrorism. The most popular argument is that terrorism is caused by poverty. The United Nations and our European and Arab "allies" repeatedly tell us to minimize our military operations and instead dole out more foreign aid to poor countries--to put down our guns and pick up our checkbook. Only by fighting poverty, the refrain goes, can we address the "root cause" of terrorism. The pernicious idea that poverty causes terrorism has been a popular claim since the attacks of September 11. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has repeatedly asked wealthy nations to double their foreign aid, naming as a cause of terrorism "that far too many people are condemned to lives of extreme poverty and degradation." Former Secretary of State Colin Powell agrees: "We have to put hope back in the hearts of people. We have to show people who might move in the direction of terrorism that there is a better way." Businessman Ted Turner also concurs: "The reason that the World Trade Center got hit is because there are a lot of people living in abject poverty out there who don't have any hope for a better life."   Indeed, the argument that poverty causes terrorism has been central to America’s botched war in Iraq--which has focused, not on quickly ending any threat the country posed and moving on to other crucial targets, but on bringing the good life to the Iraqi people.   Eliminating the root of terrorism is indeed a valid goal--but properly targeted military action, not welfare handouts, is the means of doing so. Terrorism is not caused by poverty. The terrorists of September 11 did not attack America in order to make the Middle East richer. To the contrary, their stated goal was to repel any penetration of the prosperous culture of the industrialized "infidels" into their world. The wealthy Osama bin Laden was not using his millions to build electric power plants or irrigation canals. If he and his terrorist minions wanted prosperity, they would seek to emulate the United States--not to destroy it.   More fundamental, poverty as such cannot determine anyone's code of morality. It is the ideas that individuals choose to adopt which make them pursue certain goals and values. A desire to destroy wealth and to slaughter innocent, productive human beings cannot be explained by a lack of money or a poor quality of life--only by anti-wealth, anti-life ideas. These terrorists are motivated by the ideology of Islamic Fundamentalism. This other-worldly, authoritarian doctrine views America's freedom, prosperity, and pursuit of worldly pleasures as the height of depravity. Its adherents resent America's success, along with the appeal its culture has to many Middle Eastern youths. To the fundamentalists, Americans are "infidels" who should be killed. As a former Taliban official said, "The Americans are fighting so they can live and enjoy the material things in life. But we are fighting so we can die in the cause of God."   The terrorists hate us because of their ideology--a fact that filling up the coffers of Third World governments will do nothing to change.

### A2 ISIS link

#### ISIS really is messed up – the idea of “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” simply doesn’t apply here

Linker 15 [(Damon, senior correspondent at TheWeek.com and a consulting editor at the University of Pennsylvania Press) “How Liberals Missed the True Threat of ISIS” The Week Feb 18] AT

But really: Is this even remotely controversial? Of course not. Virtually every single American believes that killing is wrong, and that killing someone over religious differences is indefensible, beyond the pale of civilization, an act of madness, insanity, and the purest barbarism. There are no protests supporting Hicks. No organizations forming to encourage others to gun down Muslims. Now let’s think about ISIS. The Islamic State is an organization devoted to instituting the most literalistic, draconian form of Muslim fundamentalism imaginable. It not only permits but positively insists on imposing severe punishments for a long list of moral and theological crimes; the punishments include slavery, lashes for drunkenness and fornication, stoning for adultery, and amputation for theft. It considers crucifixion a fitting punishment for those deemed enemies of Islam. Homosexuals are regularly hurled to their deaths from the roofs of buildings, with the executions filmed and promoted online. As the world knows all too well, the group also delights in beheading, on video, any infidel or apostate who fails to show adequate level of “submission” to the Islamic State. (This would include the 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians who were beheaded on a Libyan beach this past weekend.) As Wood explains, all of this grows out of ISIS’s goal of establishing a caliphate modeled on the military conquests of Islam’s founding 1,400 years ago. It is a vision of politics as a brutal theocracy in a state of constant war. It even denies the legitimacy of fixed borders and views both its victories and defeats, including a forthcoming bloody battle between the caliphate and the “army of Rome,” as hastening the end of the world. ISIS, in sum, is an apocalyptic death cult, “the realization of a dystopian alternative reality,” as Wood aptly puts it, “in which David Koresh or Jim Jones survived to wield absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but some 8 million.” That’s pretty chilling. But here’s something even worse: Tens of thousands of foreign Muslims are thought to have immigrated to the Islamic State. Recruits hail from France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Holland, Australia, Indonesia, the United States, and many other places. Many have come to fight, and many intend to die. [The Atlantic] Think about that: tens of thousands living in countries spread across the globe, many of them in free societies, have heard about this group, its aims, and its actions, and they have responded not with horror but with an enthusiasm so intense that it has motivated them to leave their homes to join the battle. In the context of America today, where most people (even those who consider themselves religious) devote their lives to the preeminently liberal goals of making money, winning social approval, entertaining themselves with technological toys, and avoiding death at all costs, such behavior sounds an awful lot like mass psychosis. But is it? On the contrary, it is the behavior of people who are eager to devote their lives to a very different set of profoundly illiberal ideals. Ideals like honor. Like fighting and dying for a noble cause. Like severely punishing and killing those who offend the One True God (Allah) and his Prophet (Mohammed). Like submitting oneself to a divinely sanctioned way of life. Like playing a leading role in the sacred drama of the Last Days. Obama was right: this is not entirely unlike the motives behind the Crusades (which of course were known in their day as Christian Holy Wars). But of course the First Crusade was launched over 900 years ago. The European Wars of Religion came to an end over 350 years ago. The intervening centuries have seen real if halting progress in the effort to create a less savage, less cruel, more civilized, more peaceful, more humane world. Which isn’t to say there haven’t been setbacks and rearguard actions to revive older, harsher ways of life and synthesize them with the modern state. Fascism, especially in its German (National Socialist) variant, may have been the most potent. Wood is wise to conclude his article by quoting Orwell on its appeal: Whereas Socialism, and even capitalism in a more grudging way, have said to people, “I offer you a good time,” Hitler has said to them, “I offer you struggle, danger, and death,” and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet. We ought not to underrate its emotional appeal. [The Atlantic] Nor should we deny the yawning moral gap that separates such an outlook from the way the vast run of contemporary Americans view themselves and the meaning of their lives. Recognizing that gap doesn’t have to become cause for the self-congratulation of which Americans are so inordinately fond and which the president and many liberals seem so eager to short-circuit, with their keen focus on exposing double standards and highlighting the dangers of rendering harsh judgments. It merely requires that we acknowledge the truth about ourselves and the profoundly different character of our Islamist enemies.

### A2 De-naturalize the state

#### De-naturalizing makes social studies impossible – the state being contingent doesn’t refute the fact that they are a primary actor and they’re conceptually useful

Jones 11 (David Jones, Martin Smith, Senior Lecturer, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, M.L.R., Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, London, United Kingdom, “Terrorology and Methodology: A Reply to Dixit and Stump,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 34, issue 6)

In this context, Dixit and Stump's proposal to advance critical inquiry by “de-naturalizing the state” is less than helpful, not least because it merely reinforces the obsessive suspicion of the state that defines critical terrorology's worldview. In particular, Dixit and Stump's suggestion is based on the reductionist claim by Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall that the whole field of “security studies” (an ill-defined subject area at the best of times) is predicated on immutable state threats. Consequently: Actors and their insecurities are naturalized in the sense that they are treated as facts that, because they are given by the nature of the interstate system, can be taken for granted. Taken as natural facts, states and other organized actors become the foundational objects the taken-for-granted of which serves to ground security studies.3 The proposed “de-naturalizing” of the state rests on this flimsy criticism of security studies, which raises more questions than it answers. What, we might ask, does “de-naturalizing” the state really mean? Taken to its logical conclusion it implies that we cannot discuss states as social facts. Nor can a de-naturalized perspective accept that the international system is primarily composed of states that express themselves through collective identities and interests and give material form to these through institutions and symbols that range from flags and anthems to national airlines and armed forces. From the constructivist ontology that Dixit and Stump embrace it appears that because there are no social facts that are not socially constituted there can be no such thing as facts at all. But if states cannot at a minimum be construed as social facts with histories and interests then how, we might wonder, can we begin to study their actions? In their subsequent discussion of terrorism as practice, the world Dixit and Stump inhabit is comprised purely of discourses and practices. Even a state's terror strategy, from this perspective, erroneously assumes an “objectively existing phenomenon.”4 Extending the process of de-naturalization, moreover, leads to some bizarre and nihilistic conclusions. The logic of constructivism would entail “de-naturalizing” not just the state, but all social arrangements, and any human organization, from nationalities, governments, and sub-state actors, to universities, academic journals, language and the constitution of the self itself. Ultimately, such “de-naturalization” undermines the foundations of social inquiry. All human institutions, from the state downwards, rest on assumptions and practices that are socially and historically constituted. All institutions and social structures can therefore be deconstructed.5 Fundamentally, there is nothing particularly novel about this insight that in fact began with the ancient Greek distinction between nomos and physis.6 Yet, if a program of inquiry simply regards constitutive processes as the only thing worth studying, then all phenomena collapse back into language, which robs everything, including constructivism itself, of meaning. As the Australian philosopher John Anderson observed of this style of thinking, it functions “as a substitute at once for philosophy and for a real theory of language.”7 The point is, as we argued in our review, that to achieve a genuine understanding we must either investigate the facts that are talked about or study the fact that they are talked about in a certain way. If we concentrate on the uses of language we are in danger of taking our discoveries about manners of speaking as answers to questions about what is there. This path leads not to any meaningful insight, but to the paradoxes of idealism Jorge Luis Borges explored in his Ficciones. In Borges's short story “Tln, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” the metaphysicians of the imaginary world of Tln (or the world conceived by constructivism) do not seek “for the truth, or even for verisimilitude,”8 which they consider devoid of interest, but instead pursue a “kind of amazement.”9 For, ultimately, if human agents are themselves, as Dale Copeland notes, merely “puppets of the ideational system in which they find themselves” then “each would exist as a socially conditioned 'Me', without the free-willed 'I' capable of resisting the socialization process.”10 Such a condition of linguistic mutability, in fact, undermines any transformative possibility for the international system, or indeed anything else. Yet, ironically, this is the very thing constructivists and critical theorists want to show is possible. Furthermore, if Dixit and Stump do not accept the logic of their constructivism, which abandons academic engagement for the path of Tlnist astonishment, then they must assert, somewhat arbitrarily, that we should de-naturalize the state, yet leave all other social institutions in their “natural” state. Such a method only frames the debate in a way that favors a set of ideological preferences, which inevitably prejudices the outcome of any inquiry by determining that all problems are the fault of the state and its insidious systems of exclusion. Dixit and Stump's proposed de-naturalization of the state, therefore, fails any adequate standard of hypothesis testing. Put simply, you cannot “de-naturalize” the one thing you might object to in the current political system, but leave all other practices and social arrangements, including the constitutive positions you occupy, naturalized as if you existed in Olympian detachment. As we pointed out in our review, at best this position is intellectually incoherent, and at worst hypocritical. We exemplified this point in our initial review with reference to Ken Booth's contradictory assertion that critical theorists must recognize that they inhabit a world constituted by powerful ideological systems, yet must themselves “stand outside” those systems.11 Such schemes repeat the Marxian fallacy of false consciousness, asserting that everyone, apart from the critically initiated, has their understanding distorted by the ideology in dominance. Critical theory apparently endows its disciples with the unique capacity to “stand outside” these systems of dominance and see through the othering processes of the state. Meanwhile, those trapped in the quotidian reality of the state have no access to this higher insight. Booth's article in Critical Studies on Terrorism shows where this style of thinking leads: to the conviction that the followers of critical theory alone can transcend the mundane and the political.

## Cap

### TL Cap

#### Rights to migrant workers empowers spills over in the Middle East and directly challenges capitalism – prefer specific evidence

Wearing 14 [David Wearing, PhD candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, researching British foreign policy in the Middle East, "The fate of Gulf migrant workers is deeply connected to the fate of the Arab uprisings", Open Democracy, May 6, 2014]

Such misery, abuse and exploitation is virtually intrinsic to the ‘kafala’ system, where the precarious situation of the migrants makes collective action in the workplace all but impossible. Unions are banned outright in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and severely restricted elsewhere in the Gulf . To stop the flow of horrifying stories that have proven so embarrassing to the Gulf regimes internationally, the ‘kafala’ system itself would have to be abolished and fundamental workplace rights introduced. But to do this would be to tug at a loose thread that could unravel the class hierarchies in the region. And as Hanieh argues, “[t]he emergence of a strong and militant labour movement in the Gulf – the likelihood of which would be greatly increased upon the extension of equal rights to all workers regardless of origin – could profoundly challenge the position of the Gulf rulers”. Such a challenge need not result in outright revolution to have significant effect. Historically, organised labour has played a leading role in changing political and class relations in the states of the global north, even where emasculated constitutional monarchs have remained in place. Powerful unions have also had a major impact on the course of events during the Arab uprisings in both Egypt and Tunisia. If such forces were to enter the scene in the Gulf, and have a real impact, the knock-on effects could be felt right across the Arab world. The Gulf states now comprise the hub of a regional system of economic exploitation and political oppression. Hanieh documents the ways in which, over recent decades, the economies of the Middle East were opened up to foreign capital through neoliberal programmes of ‘structural adjustment’ presided over by the IMF and the World Bank. Gulf capital has flooded into regional economies over the last ten years in particular, taking advantage of financial deregulation and privatisation of state industries. In the period immediately preceding the uprisings, the Gulf was the leading source of foreign direct investment for Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine and Tunisia, and second in Morocco and Syria. The neoliberal reforms of which Gulf elites were a principal beneficiary served, in the now familiar manner, to restructure class relations within the affected countries. Economic elites filled their pockets, state decision-making became less accountable and the apparatus of repression was strengthened. On the other side of the coin, the population experienced a frontal assault on its labour rights and living standards. Cheap labour was deemed to be the ‘competitive advantage’ of the Arab peoples; their attraction for global capital being the ease with which they could be exploited. Real wages were therefore driven down sharply which, along with deep cuts to social spending, had predictable effects on human welfare. By the eve of the revolution in Tunisia, 23.8 per cent lived below the poverty line, while the figure for Egypt and Morocco was around 40 per cent. In those latter two countries, one in five children demonstrated stunted growth as a result of malnutrition. And all the while, Gulf investors and their national counterparts raked in their winnings. Overall growth was often robust, but the average person saw little or none of it. This was neoliberalism as grand larceny, but more than that, as Hanieh puts it, the period of structural adjustment “needs to be understood as a project of class power that strengthened the position of national elites while simultaneously consolidating the Gulf’s influence over the region”. So it was no surprise that, when these conditions helped to ignite the Arab world at the turn of 2010 and 2011, the Gulf states would be at the forefront of efforts to co-opt or crush the uprisings in order to protect their political and economic interests. In addition to the assistance given to the Bahraini regime as it put down a peaceful, broad based pro-democracy movement with brute force in the spring of 2011, the Gulf states also inserted themselves into uprisings in Libya and Syria, managed a transition in Yemen that removed the president while protecting the body of the state, and bankrolled a coup regime in Egypt which has killed and imprisoned thousands of its opponents. Over the last three years, the Gulf monarchies have established themselves as the major regional counter-revolutionary force, which brings us back to the issue of migrant workers and the potential impact their emancipation could have. In Hanieh’s words, “[t]he weight of the Gulf in the Middle East political economy points to the fact that any reversal of the patterns of neoliberal development in the Middle East requires challenging capitalism in the Gulf itself. For this reason, political struggles in the Gulf…are immensely significant, and form a direct continuity with those elsewhere in the Middle East. …Moreover, a vital element to challenging capital and state in the Gulf must be a defence of the region’s migrant workers. The exploitation of these workers is an integral part of how working classes have formed in the Middle East and is essential to the ways that Gulf capitalism continues to project its power”. Simply put, the end of the ‘kafala’ system and the empowerment of migrant workers would strike directly at the core of autocracy, exploitation and counter-revolution in the Arab world. The relevance of these observations to western audiences is plain to see. For example, if football fans make clear that they have no intention of turning on their televisions to watch a World Cup built on the backs of forced labour and the corpses of thousands of south Asian migrants, then the ‘kafala’ system in Qatar may start to become untenable. Similarly, the more the Gulf states pay a reputational cost in the west for maintaining this system of exploitation - negating the millions those same regimes pay on PR firms to polish their image abroad - the harder it will be for them to resist demands for serious reform. The long-standing alliances between the Gulf monarchies and western states (not least the UK) offer a series of pressure points that can be used by campaigners wishing to show solidarity with the Gulf migrant labour force. The west, no less than the Gulf states, is implicated in the structures of oppression in the Middle East. But by understanding the way in which those structures work, what the connections are, and where we ourselves fit into the system, we can gain a sense of how we can best contribute to the wider effort to dismantle it.

#### Try or die for the link turn – no class consciousness now means we need specific issues to build agendas

Castree 04 [Noel Castree, Neil M. Coe, Kevin Ward and Michael Samers. “Spaces of Work: Global Capitalism and the Geographies of Labour.” SAGE Publications 2004] AJ

What all this emphasizes is that attempts by workers to develop transnational solidarities require a major ideological and organiza- tional effort on their part. A wider inter-place worker consciousness does not automatically spring forth simply because wage workers share a common class position within the structure of global capital- ism. Rather, it has to be actively constructed in both thought and practice. One the one side, workers need an idea, an issue or an identity that they can rally-around en masse (the subject of the chapter’s next main section). On the other side, as Chapter 8 showed, workers need the organizational means to make such an idea, issue or identity flesh. Without such organizational capacities, noble thoughts about transnational worker cooperation will remain just that: thoughts that have no real world impact. Even when this combination of issues/ideas/identities and organizational means is achieved, it is important to recognize that reconciling local worker agendas with transnational ones will rarely be a smooth process. Compromises must usually be made. This is what Jonas (1998: 325) calls the ‘local-global￼THE GEOGRAPHICAL DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE 239 paradox’. This paradox arises because what is ‘good’ for one set of workers at one geographical scale may not be good for other workers at other geographical scales. The balance of gain and loss is very much case specific, but is the essence of translocal worker struggles to con- front this difficult balancing act, willingly or not.

#### Keeping migrant workers from leaving ensures they can mobilize class struggle together

Lewis 11 [(Ed, New Left Project; interview with Adam Hanieh, lecturer in development studies at SOAS, and is an editorial board member of Historical Materialism) “Class and Capitalism in the Gulf The Political Economy of the Gulf Cooperation Council” New Left Project 5 December 2011] AT

Contrary to the generally accepted picture of these societies, relative poverty does exist among the citizen population in countries such as Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere in the Gulf). But the absence of a local, citizen working class means that political struggles lack an effective social base. Political conflict in these states (with the exception of Bahrain which I will discuss below) thus generally originates in inter-elite discord (such as between different branches of the ruling family, and the conflict between religious scholars and the monarchy) or Islamist movements – not from any widespread class struggle. This relative political calm can be contrasted with the situation in two oil-rich neighbouring countries, Iraq and Iran, where the working class has a long history of mobilization and persistent opposition to Western policies in the Gulf and wider Middle East. The implications of this could be seen in the reaction to the 2008 economic crisis. In the immediate wake of the crisis, the Gulf states saw little popular protest or anger. It is certainly true that many high-profile projects were halted, consumer demand plummeted and businesses shut their doors – but the citizen population emerged relatively unscathed. Instead, there was a slowdown in hires of migrant workers and – in places such as Dubai – thousands were sent home. This meant that the real pain of the crisis was felt by the swelling numbers of unemployed across the Gulf’s surrounding regions.

#### This is key to wider change in the GCC

Ajami 08 [Kshetri, Nir and Riad Ajami (2008) ―Institutional Reforms in the Gulf Cooperation Council Economies: A Conceptual Framework,‖ Journal of International Management, 14(3), 300-318] AJ

It is an accepted axiom that losses are felt more deeply than gains. Pro-reform constituents tend to be ―generally unorganized, silent, and nearly invisible politically whereas anti-reform actors are ―frequently organized and vocal‖ (Kikeri and Nellis, 2004). Most obviously, the political process is likely to respond to those with voice (Kikeri and Nellis, 2004). In GCC, pro-reform actors such as political parties, interest groups and unions need to be more organized and vocal. 5.7. Implication 7: substantiveness of reform measures Based on the discussion above, gradual progressive institutional change can be expected. For instance, reform has been at least a stated goal of GCC regimes (Carothers, 1998). Although measures on this front are symbolic for most GCC regimes, they may produce results over time. Theorists have discussed how symbolic changes at one point of time may lead to substantive changes over time (Campbell, 2004; Edelman, 1990; Guthrie, 1999; Oakes et al., 1998). Future research based on the present framework can be extended to other cultural settings. For instance, what are the similarities and differences in terms of changes in institutions and market orientation between the GCC, Eastern Europe and Asian economies? For instance, Political and elite entrepreneurs are prevalent in the GCC region, Eastern Europe and China. The sources of legitimacy of these entrepreneurs, however, may differ across countries. In future research scholars should also attempt to conduct research that provides insights into GCC regimes' cognitive assessment of the powers of various institutional actors. For instance, from the standpoint of GCC regimes, what are the perceived relative powers of ordinary citizens, religious leaders, merchant families, international institutions, etc? How does the power of an institutional actor change over time?

#### A living wage builds movements and short-term reform is good

Shalom 14 [Stephen R. Shalom, professor of political science at William Paterson University, “One State or Two States: Prospects, Possibilities, and Politics,” Logos Journal] **AZ**

Let me begin with an analogy that I hope will illuminate a way to approach these kinds of political questions. Consider the example of the living wage campaigns that are being pursued around the country, demanding that low-paid workers receive enough to provide for their basic needs. Typically these campaigns, supported by leftists, call for local ordinances or policies that set some minimum compensation level, well above the existing minimum wage, for all employees. Now imagine if a labor solidarity activist opposed the living wage campaign, arguing that “The problem is with capitalism and the whole wage system, not the low wages paid by some employers.” I assume we would reply, “Yes, the problem is capitalism, but we’re not going to be able to solve that overnight. People who are hungry today can’t afford to wait until we have brought capitalism down. Unlike total system transformation, a living wage can be won in the near term — not that we will win, but we can win in the near term; ending capitalism, on the other hand, we have no chance of winning for many years. A victory in a living wage campaign would do two things: first, it would provide an immediate improvement in the lives of people who are suffering; and, second, it would show people that change is possible and that there is an alternative to hopeless resignation.” Yes, there are limits to what can be accomplished under capitalism, contrary to the claims of liberal critics of the status quo — and we should always make these limits clear while we participate in struggles to achieve reforms. But it would be thoroughly wrongheaded to refuse to support a living wage campaign in the United States today because it’s not perfectly just or to denounce those who support it as engaged in morally unacceptable behavior. And it would be especially inappropriate for those of us who are not low-paid workers to tell low-paid workers not to accept $15 an hour because they ought to hold out for the end of capitalism. The same logic holds even if one doesn’t support socialism. That is, imagine another hypothetical critic of living wage campaigns who says $15 an hour is a morally repugnant wage and nothing less than $25 per hour ought to be accepted. I assume we would reply, “Yes, merely guaranteeing everyone a living wage is unjust, as indeed any improvement in anyone’s life situation that falls short of our ideal of justice, whatever that happens to be, will be unjust. But our refraining from achieving reforms while we wish for a perfectly just outcome doesn’t bring that outcome any closer. On the other hand, a living wage campaign both improves people’s lives, which is important, and can give the workers and their supporters the sort of victory that helps build a movement that can push for further improvements.” The same logic holds as well for all sorts of political campaigns. On the environment, on women’s rights, and on a whole host of other issues we will often support efforts to achieve some reform that is less than our ideal. We do this because we realize that we can’t yet win our maximum demands, but we want to improve things in the meantime, while building movements that can achieve more.¶ This doesn’t mean that it’s always right to go for limited reforms. One needs to make a serious judgment about what’s possible under the particular circumstances prevailing at each time and place. So in 1968, for example, it was right to criticize the Communist-led unions in France for being bought off by some moderate improvements when the whole capitalist system might have been successfully challenged. Sometimes transformative change is possible. But when your considered judgment tells you that the best you can do is win $15 an hour, then one needs to support that campaign and not refrain from doing so because it falls short of one’s ideal. Does thinking about what seems achievable or realistic make one a counterrevolutionary naysayer? Shouldn’t leftists have faith in people’s potential to change the world? Gramsci’s advice is relevant here: we want to have optimism of the will, but pessimism of the intellect. We believe in people’s abilities to rise above their circumstances and fight to create a better world. But we’d be crazy to lay siege to the White House tomorrow because we think it’s possible that 100 million Americans will rise up and support us. We welcome and hope for unexpected inspirational moments; we don’t count on them.

#### A. Turns their impacts – a living wage temporarily buffers the impact of cap by reducing poverty; the alt alone can’t gain critical mass fast enough to solve their impacts. A direct and significant decrease in poverty outweighs the slight decrease in perm solvency.

#### B. their epistemology is wrong – it comes from the isolated position of wealthy intellectuals and ignore workers’ real struggles so it’s less true

#### C. Withdrawing from capital immediately is impossible since everyone requires capitalist institutions – buying food and shelter, earning money – to survive; only after a living wage meets basic needs, the alt becomes possible.

#### Strong GCC middle class spurs change – key to their impacts

Ajami 08 [Kshetri, Nir and Riad Ajami (2008) ―Institutional Reforms in the Gulf Cooperation Council Economies: A Conceptual Framework,‖ Journal of International Management, 14(3), 300-318] AJ

GCC economies are also characterized by a symbiosis of political and economic elites (Sabri, 2001; Schlumberger, 2000). Experts argue that a genuinely entrepreneurial class, which is lacking in the region, would be the single most important force for change in the Middle East, pulling along all others in its wake‖ (Zakaria, 2004). GCC economies' reform arguably ―will have far-reaching implications for not only their own populations but also the entire global economy‖ (De Boer and Turner, 2007). Concepts and theory building are lacking on the nature of institutions and institutional changes in the GCC region. To more fully understand institutional reforms in the region, we draw upon institutional theory. The underlying notion in this paper is that a free enterprise economy with a strong rule of law and property rights is likely to benefit not only the GCC society but also the global economy. We make two contributions to the literature in this article. First, we extend institutional theory to the context and limit of the GCC region. Second, we provide insights into the pattern of institutional changes, which has been an important but under-examined issue (Campbell, 2004). Note that institutions arguably have a higher propensity to change when they are characterized by contradictions which ―create conflicting and irreconcilable incentives and motivations‖ (Campbell, 2004, p. 186). Nowhere is this characteristic more evident than in the GCC region. In addition to the theoretical contribution, policy makers and managers can gain in multiple ways by a deeper and richer understanding of GCC region's institutions. An understanding of the formative dynamics of the attitudes and priorities of GCC leaders could help Western policy makers devise strategies to bring desired institutional changes. Second, a deeper understanding of the functioning of GCC decision makers, as they mediate institutional reforms in the region through their attitudes and priorities, both economic and political, is of profound interests to managers.

### Movements Turn

#### Organized opposition in the GCC is weak now – aff spurs opposition around a common goal, which ensures the movement succeeds.

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It is an accepted axiom that losses are felt more deeply than gains. Pro-reform constituents tend to be ―generally unorganized, silent, and nearly invisible politically whereas anti-reform actors are ―frequently organized and vocal‖ (Kikeri and Nellis, 2004). Most obviously, the political process is likely to respond to those with ―voice (Kikeri and Nellis, 2004). In GCC, pro-reform actors such as political parties, interest groups and unions need to be more organized and vocal. 5.7. Implication 7: substantiveness of reform measures Based on the discussion above, gradual progressive institutional change can be expected. For instance, reform has been at least a stated goal of GCC regimes (Carothers, 1998). Although measures on this front are symbolic for most GCC regimes, they may produce results over time. Theorists have discussed how symbolic changes at one point of time may lead to substantive changes over time (Campbell, 2004; Edelman, 1990; Guthrie, 1999; Oakes et al., 1998). Future research based on the present framework can be extended to other cultural settings. For instance, what are the similarities and differences in terms of changes in institutions and market orientation between the GCC, Eastern Europe and Asian economies? For instance, Political and elite entrepreneurs are prevalent in the GCC region, Eastern Europe and China. The sources of legitimacy of these entrepreneurs, however, may differ across countries. In future research scholars should also attempt to conduct research that provides insights into GCC regimes' cognitive assessment of the powers of various institutional actors. For instance, from the standpoint of GCC regimes, what are the perceived relative powers of ordinary citizens, religious leaders, merchant families, international institutions, etc? How does the power of an institutional actor change over time?

#### Empirically the aff spurs change

Devinatz 13 [Victor G. Devinatz (Department of Management and Quantitative Methods, Illinois State University). “The Significance of the Living Wage for US Workers in the Early Twenty-First Century.” Employ Respons Rights J (2013) 25:125–134. 24 March 2013] AJ

Furthermore, the fight for living wages has contributed to the development of labor- community coalitions which promote broad progressive political agendas, including labor rights, in cities and communities throughout the nation. Examples of concrete gains from such coalitions include playing a major role in the rejuvenation of a vibrant labor movement in Los Angeles; the creation of a Workers Rights Board as a vehicle for promoting workplace justice for nonunion workers in Tucson; and the development of an intimate relationship between the city’s central labor council and ACORN in Boston (Luce 2004, pp. 200–202, 204–205).

#### Try or die for the link turn – no class consciousness now means we need specific issues to build agendas

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What all this emphasizes is that attempts by workers to develop transnational solidarities require a major ideological and organiza- tional effort on their part. A wider inter-place worker consciousness does not automatically spring forth simply because wage workers share a common class position within the structure of global capital- ism. Rather, it has to be actively constructed in both thought and practice. One the one side, workers need an idea, an issue or an identity that they can rally-around en masse (the subject of the chapter’s next main section). On the other side, as Chapter 8 showed, workers need the organizational means to make such an idea, issue or identity flesh. Without such organizational capacities, noble thoughts about transnational worker cooperation will remain just that: thoughts that have no real world impact. Even when this combination of issues/ideas/identities and organizational means is achieved, it is important to recognize that reconciling local worker agendas with transnational ones will rarely be a smooth process. Compromises must usually be made. This is what Jonas (1998: 325) calls the ‘local-global￼THE GEOGRAPHICAL DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE 239 paradox’. This paradox arises because what is ‘good’ for one set of workers at one geographical scale may not be good for other workers at other geographical scales. The balance of gain and loss is very much case specific, but is the essence of translocal worker struggles to con- front this difficult balancing act, willingly or not.

#### Specifically true for the GCC – keeping migrant workers from moving means they can mobilize class struggle together

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#### Prefer on specificity – none of their evidence is specific to the plan

### Socialism Turn

#### The living wage provides abundance and is compatible with their alt which also proves no link

Jones 07 [Shane Jones. “A Minimum Wage Versus a Living Wage.” Socialist Appeal. 30 January, 2007.] AJ

A living wage differs from a minimum wage in that a minimum wage is simply a set level or dollar figure i.e. 25 cents, $5.15, $7.25 etc. On the other hand, a living wage is a positive right to a decent standard of living. It is nothing more than a legally set real wage, tied to inflation. That is, the purchasing power of wages are tied to the real prices of other commodities. For example, as food prices rise, so do wages. A living wage maintains the standard of living and provides economic stability for working people. It is impossible to simply reform capitalism to make it more “fair”. At its core, capitalism is a system of exploitation of labor for profit. This makes a living wage for all an impossibility, as it would bring out all the contradictions of capitalism. So while Marxists support every material and social gain won by workers under capitalism, at the same time we realize that these limited gains are not an end in and of themselves, but function within the limited bounds of capitalism. Under pressure from below, the ruling class offers a crumb here and there in order to keep order. We think working people deserve more than crumbs. Yes to a minimum wage increase! Yes to a thousand and one of them! But the story cannot end there. We need a living wage - one where workers do not have to wait in economic limbo for decades. Working people don’t need periodic token rewards tailored to placate and win votes. Rather, we deserve stability, dignity and access to all the requirements of social life: a real living wage.

#### That’s key to communism – bringing down cap now means their alt doesn’t solve; including a living wage equalizes wealth which moves to communism

Eagleton 11 [TERRY EAGLETON (prominent British literary theorist, critic and public intellectual. He is currently Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, Professor of Cultural Theory at the National University of Ireland and Distinguished Visiting Professor of English Literature at The University of Notre Dame). “Why Marx Was Right.” 2011 by Yale University. New Haven & London] AJ

This raises some thorny moral problems. Just as some Christians accept evil as somehow necessary to God’s plan for humanity, so you can read Marx as claiming that capitalism, however rapacious and unjust, has to be endured for the sake of the socialist future it will inevitably bring in its wake. Not only endured, in fact, but actively encouraged. There are points in Marx’s work where he cheers on the growth of capitalism, since only thus will the path to socialism be thrown open. In a lecture of 1847, for example, he defends free trade as hastening the advent of socialism. He also wanted to see German unification on the grounds that it would promote German capitalism. There are several places in his work where this revolutionary socialist betrays rather too much relish at the prospect of a progressive capitalist class putting paid to ‘‘barbarism.’’ The morality of this appears distinctly dubious. How is it different from Stalin’s or Mao’s murderous pogroms, ex- ecuted in the name of the socialist future? How far does the end justify the means? And given that few today believe that socialism is inevitable, is this not even more reason for re- nouncing such a brutal sacrifice of the present on the altar of a future that might never arrive? If capitalism is essential for socialism, and if capitalism is unjust, does this not suggest that injustice is morally acceptable? If there is to be justice in the future, must there have been injustice in the past? Marx writes in Theories of Surplus Value that ‘‘the development of the capacities of the human species takes place at the cost of the majority of individuals and even classes.’’∞≤ He means that the good of the species will finally triumph in the shape of communism, but that this involves a great deal of ineluctable suffering and injustice en route. The material prosperity that in the end will fund freedom is the fruit of un-freedom. There is a difference between doing evil in the hope that good may come of it, and seeking to turn someone else’s evil to good use. Socialists did not perpetrate capitalism, and are innocent of its crimes; but granted that it exists, it seems rational to make the best of it. This is possible because capitalism is not of course simply evil. To think so is to be drastically one-sided, a fault by which Marx himself was rarely afflicted. As we have seen, the system breeds freedom as well as barba- rism, emancipation along with enslavement. Capitalist society generates enormous wealth, but in a way that cannot help putting it beyond the reach of most of its citizens. Even so, that wealth can always be brought within reach. It can be disentangled from the acquisitive, individualist forms which bred it, invested in the community as a whole, and used to restrict disagreeable work to the minimum. It can thus release men and women from the chains of economic necessity into a life where they are free to realize their creative poten- tial. This is Marx’s vision of communism.

### Fem/Cap K---Migrant Workers 1st

#### Action to resist the oppression of migrant workers is a crucial focal point for fighting capitalism – starting point for analysis

IMA 13 [INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS ALLIANCE (IMA), “FIGHT FOR A BETTER NOW! RISE AND RESIST CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE!” 3/07/2013, https://ima2008.wordpress.com/2013/03/07/fight-for-a-better-now-rise-and-resist-capitalist-exploitation-and-abuse/] AZ

Years after the eruption of the global economic crisis, the conditions of local and migrant workers did not change for the better. Rather, these conditions have worsened with the further imposition by States of neoliberal policies that downgrade, depress and violate migrants’ rights and dignity. We witness the depression of wages in many labor-receiving countries. The meager salaries by which we are made thankful for despite the long hours of backbreaking work they are made to do in the households, factories and construction sites. We witness the subhuman working conditions in labor camps and workplaces that they are made to live in and tolerate. We witness how they are forced to surrender their passports and documents to their employers rendering them vulnerable to becoming undocumented. We witness the many State-imposed policies, circulars and practices that literally erase all rights and freedoms supposedly accorded to them. The Kafala system in many Gulf countries, the employment permit system (EPS) in South Korea, and the many cases of labor trafficking that the IMA and its member organizations have documented that only make strong the conditions many women migrants are in – that of modern-day slavery. Social exclusion intensifies as the global economic crisis worsens. Migrants become scapegoats for governments stating the former as stealers of jobs or sucking the social services dry. They become easy targets of racism and discrimination. We have witnessed how the Roma and other ethnic minorities in Europe have been marginalized while migrants in many countries like Malaysia, the Gulf and the USA are seen as second-class citizens and deserving of such treatment. Women migrants suffer double discrimination and exploitation. As women, they are vulnerable and prone to sexual and physical assault and abuse. Many of them become victims of prostitution and rape. Women marriage migrants endure marital rape and domestic violence with the hopes of gaining permanent residency or citizenship. The many undocumented women migrants suffer more without benefit of reprieve or seeking justice because the judiciary system in many of these countries see them as illegals and therefore criminals. Worse, their children are subject to the same harsh and inhuman treatment. Yet the women migrants and refugees of the world will not take this exploitation and abuse sitting down. The International Migrants’ Tribunal on the GFMD made clear our stance and action against labor export and modern-day slavery. The testimonies of the women witnesses there, Eni Lestari, Luz Miriam Jaramillo and Viviana Medina, speak not only of the conditions faced by women migrants and refugees but also of their defiance and collective resistance. The Hong Kong government’s recent decision to junk the levy on employers of foreign domestic workers was a sure victory of the women migrant workers, who comprise 99% of the migrants in the territory. The establishment of organizations of women marriage migrants in many countries like Japan and Korea is a telling sign that women migrants are learning to organize and empower themselves. The strong support and contribution that the IMA has made in the formation of the International Women’s Alliance or IWA. The onslaught of capitalism through neoliberal policies and other oppressive measures by states against migrants will not win in the long run as long as women migrants join the international migrants’ movement in resisting this system of abuse and exploitation. Democracy, equality, rights and just peace – these are the causes that push the militant women migrants in joining the international movement resisting imperialist exploitation and abuse. The victories and the struggles of the many women in the past shall be the light and fire of inspiration for those of us who struggle on. There is victory in struggle – and in it are women who defy, fight and struggle.

### A2 Palliative

#### This relies on an effect of the plan – if the link is true, I get to leverage case and that outweighs

#### Non-Unique: Alema proves no revolution now, so only the aff has a risk of spurring change

### A2 Wage Labor

#### Perm double-bind: If alt can overcome wage labor in the status quo, so can the aff

#### The logic of living wage isn’t an affirmation of wage labor, but an affirmation of worker’s rights – this resists a much larger part of capitalist ideology

#### Making temporary concessions to capitalism doesn’t preclude resistance later

Castree 04 [Noel Castree, Neil M. Coe, Kevin Ward and Michael Samers. “Spaces of Work: Global Capitalism and the Geographies of Labour.” SAGE Publications 2004] AJ

Knowledgeable readers will have noticed that we’ve made no men- tion of the classic Marxist idea that wage-workers need to instigate a revolution to topple capitalism. Though in Chapter 8 we consider cases where workers are organizing internationally and globally against capital, the possibilities of replacing global capitalism – and thus wage labour along with related un- and underemployment – strike us as immensely slim. This is partly because of the scale of dilemmas confronting workers, which we explore in Chapter 9. David Harvey, one of the most uncompromising Marxist critics writing today, has recently pleaded for an ‘optimism of the intellect’ (2000: 17), even when circumstances seem unpropitious for progressive change. Though sympathetic to Harvey’s injunction not to cave in to reformism, we feel that many workers have considerable ‘wiggle room’ within the confines of capitalism to improve their situation. Using this wiggle room to an advantage is a fundamentally geographical project. In Chapters 6–8 we pinpoint the different elements of this wiggle room and argue that agitating within – rather than against – global capitalism does not mean that wage-workers have somehow ‘sold out to the enemy’. Even Marx, capitalism’s most penetrating critic, didn’t see this now dominant system as an unmitigated evil. For millions of workers a more just post-capitalist future might be preferable to a fre- quently unjust capitalist present. But in the meantime, it’s important to locate opportunities for progressive change within the existing system. There is simply too much misery and injustice in this world (as we show in Chapter 5) for labour to pin its hopes on some utopian global project to slay capitalism. Much can be done in the here-and- now.

#### Perm do both – affirmative demands for a living wage are a form of resistance to capital valorization that deconstructs the notion of jobs as the centrality of production

Barchiesi 12 [Franco Barchiesi. “Liberation of, through, or from w ork? Postcolonial Africa and the problem w ith “job creation” in the global crisis.” Interface, Volume4 (2): 230 – 253 (November 2012)] AJ

Moving, instead, from a normative terrain to one of critical analysis would require one to recognize that at stake is not only (or not necessarily) whether “decent” work is preferable to “indecent” jobs, or whether a reduction in the rate of unemployment can constrain capital’s options, or whether having a job can make the difference between extreme, paralyzing, despairing and tolerable, resilient, and self-activating poverty. In fact, contrary to normative rationality, critical analysis has to recognize the complexities of emancipative, progressive discourse as characterized by the indissoluble knot of liberation and subjection and the simultaneous enabling and foreclosing of possibilities. Then demands for “job creation” can be tackled from a different angle: as they strive to negotiate capitalist relations of production they miss how capital valorizes itself not only by directly employing people but by turning into property, profit, and rent the social cooperation of living labors that capital does not “create” but nonetheless continuously appropriate. Defining this as a “job creation” issue would mean that social cooperation is relevant and politically visible only once it has been incorporated in the creation of capital-reproducing value. The result would be to subordinate imaginations and practices of liberation to the capitalist dream of freezing the social into the production of commodities while rendering all exceeding autonomy of living labor invisible and speechless. As a condition of political possibility that problematizes work-centered normativity and productivist views of emancipation, precarity discloses instead radically alternative terrains of imagination and claims. It allows us, for example, to think decommodification and redistribution, including forms of non-work related universal income, neither as incentives to work, as neoliberalism and part of the left celebrate, nor as “handouts”, as they deprecate. They would rather constitute a reappropriation at a society-wide level of livelihoods that otherwise capital appropriates at no cost. At stake would thus be a shift from “welfare” to “commonfare” as a horizon of contestation to reopen across the social fabric the battle deferred (when not lost) at the point of production (Fumagalli 2007). As Mario Tronti (1980) once argued, the old factory working class effectively challenged capital when it struggled to abolish itself as a producer and deliverer of capital, not when it allowed to be idealized under the keywords of work ethic, occupational pride, citizenship, and productivity. Demands for a “living wage” were about refusing the compatibilities of capital as a regulatory principle of life. Those who fought for the eight-hour working day did so as a response to what was then called “wage slavery”, not for the sake of orderly industrial relations and collective bargaining. As the subjugation of living labor worldwide is reverting to the extremes of that age, social struggles are thus coalescing around the question of what the “living wage” of precarious multitudes would look like today.

#### Framing determines the direction of the link – the aff is a critique of capitalism that advocates a living wage since it’s good for workers.

# Wip

## WIP

### To cut

http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/India%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20Biblio.pdf

### WIP human rights

#### Human rights standards

Heddaya 14 [(Mostafa Heddaya, journalist) “90 Human Rights Groups Call for Migrant Labor Reform in Gulf States” Hyper Allergic November 24, 2014] AT

Ahead of a meeting of labor ministers from Gulf and Asian states later this week, Human Rights Watch released a call for the reform of laws protecting migrant workers co-signed by 90 human rights organizations and unions worldwide. Of particular concern to the coalition of organizations are the debts shouldered in the recruitment process and restrictive visa and passport withholding practices affecting laborers working in the Gulf Cooperation Council, which comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. “The GCC should work in closer coordination with — not separately from — countries of origin to develop labor migration policies that fully respect the human and labor rights of migrants,” Sharan Burrow of the International Labor Organization, a United Nations body, said in the November 23 statement from Human Rights Watch. The calls echo those made recently by the Gulf Labor group, a coalition of artists and activists pressuring the Guggenheim on workers rights issues surrounding the construction of the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi on the Emirate’s Saadiyat Island. In comments to Hyperallergic earlier this month, Gulf Labor’s Walid Raad specifically called on the Guggenheim to “publicly recommend that the UAE Ministry of Labor seek and follow the advice of experts from, for example, the International Labor Organization, to help the Ministry fine-tune the implementation and enforcement of existing laws, close loopholes in the law, and develop and implement new laws to protect workers (with regards to, for example, recruitment fees paid by workers).” The 90 organizations issuing the call to the GCC states — a group comprising unions, like the United States’s AFL-CIO, and NGOs and advocacy groups from India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Phillippines, and other labor exporters — issued the following list of recommendations: Establish and enforce comprehensive labor law protections for migrant workers, including domestic workers; Reform the kafala (sponsorship) visa system to ensure that workers can change employers without being required to first obtain their consent; Remove the “exit permit” requirement in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; Strengthen regulation and monitoring of labor recruitment agencies, including eliminating recruitment fees for workers; Ensure that migrants have access to justice and support services; and Expand the Abu Dhabi Dialogue to include labor-origin countries from Africa, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, and participation by nongovernmental groups. The joint statement follows the release of a report last week from Amnesty International on the treatment of political dissenters in the United Arab Emirates. That 80-page document, titled “There is no freedom here”: Silencing dissent in the UAE, highlights individual cases demonstrating that “activists [are] routinely persecuted and subjected to enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment.”

#### Human rights - qatar

Dorsey 12/29 [(James, reporter) “Gulf human rights declaration increases heat on Qatar to act on migrant workers’ rights” Hurriyet daily news dec 29, 2014] AT

The adoption of a human rights declaration by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that was designed to shield wealthy Gulf monarchies, including 2022 World Cup host Qatar, from criticism by human rights and trade union activists is likely to increase pressure on the sports-focused Gulf state to significantly alter its controversial migrant labor system. The declaration by the GCC, which groups Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman, was adopted earlier this month at a summit of Gulf leaders in the Qatari capital of Doha. The declaration signaled the GCC’s refusal to recognize its citizen’s political rights, including the right to freedom of thought and expression. It did, however, acknowledge that “people are equal in dignity and humanity, in rights and freedoms, and equal before the law” with “no distinction between them for reasons of origin, gender, religion, language, color, or any other form of distinction.” That acknowledgement strengthens demands by human rights and trade union activists that Qatar embrace the principle of collective bargaining that would eliminate its system of setting wages for migrant workers according to nationality. Proponents of a radical reform of Qatar’s sponsorship, or kafala system, that puts workers at the mercy of their employers have argued that Qatar needs to introduce a uniform minimum wage and authorize collective bargaining – a key demand of the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICTU), one of Qatar’s toughest critics. Standards for the working and living conditions of migrant workers issued by the Qatar Foundation (QF), one of two government institutions alongside the 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy at the forefront of a push for change, insist that “workers shall receive equal pay for equal work irrespective of their nationality, gender, ethnic origin, race, religion or legal status.”

### \*Mideast stuff

#### ME war = extinction

Terrill 9 [(W. Andrew, U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership) “ESCALATION AND INTRAWAR DETERRENCE DURING LIMITED WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST” Strategic Studies Institute September 2009] AT

The case studies of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War provide valuable examples of the processes of escalation and intrawar deterrence that can occur in a regional conflict environment. It is important to understand how events unfolded during these conflicts to consider ways in which intrawar deterrent strategies might go well or poorly in future conflicts. It is also especially important to realize that any case study is limited in value by the special circumstances under which it occurred. Actions that occurred during these wars are important because they display a range of problems that can develop under similar circumstances or conflicts. Sweeping generalizations cannot be drawn from case studies such as these, although ways to think about future conflicts may be informed by these studies. It might also be noted that these cases must be understood in all their depth and nuance. Any effort to draw simple conclusions from a shallow understanding of these wars or to apply their lessons mechanistically is likely to lead to some flawed conclusions and results. Analogies have been consistently overused in the formation of U.S. policy often to the deep regret of the policymakers.217 In both of the conflicts under examination, the combatants did not use WMD, but in neither conflict 86 was this restraint an inevitable result and some luck was involved in the outcomes. If the various journal- istic and academic accounts can be believed, Israel may have come close to using nuclear weapons, but pulled back from this option because of the solid judgment of most of the Israeli top leadership and also because of the vast improvement of Israel’s battlefield situation after October 14. Conversely, Saddam Hussein may have shown restraint because he had faith in his strategy to achieve his strategic objectives by conventional means. Saddam was deterred by U.S. threats and the probable belief that the United States was likely to follow through on those threats, but a more desperate leader may have responded in a different way. Thus, Saddam was prevented from using CBW by coalition threats but also by his own confidence in Iraq’s conventional capabilities and a belief that the United States could not accept the type of prolonged ground war that he saw as required to oust the Iraqi regime. Saddam thus feared that the use of chemical or biological weapons would become a way to escalate the conflict from a level where he could remain in power to a new level where he could not. In the future, it is at least possible that the United States will find itself in armed conflict against weaker nations that nevertheless possess WMD, perhaps including nuclear weapons. It is also possible that regional states using WMD will wage war against each other (for example, in South Asia). Some such conflicts may have a greater bearing on U.S. interests than others, but any nuclear exchange anywhere is of concern to global security. The use of biological weapons in combat would present its own special kind of nightmare should such actions serve as an example for other countries, and perhaps open a new and more 87 hideous chapter in the history of warfare. Under these circumstances, wars involving vital U.S. interests (such as the 1991 Gulf War) may include an effort to engage in intrawar deterrence, but the confidence in this approach will have to be limited by the knowledge that escalation may become uncontrollable. Iran is not a case study in this work, and Iran has not participated in a war similar to those discussed above. During the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran could not have responded to Iraqi actions with nuclear weapons which were not available. At that time, the only unconventional weapons that Iran possessed were limited stocks of chemical weapons which it employed in response to Iraqi chemical attacks. Throughout the war, Iran consistently lagged behind Iraq in CW capabilities. The experience of being on the losing end of the escalation ladder in its dealings with Iraq is nevertheless something that Tehran is unlikely to ignore in its future considerations about its national security. Moreover, the Tehran regime must have been shocked to the core by the post-1991 activities of the UN inspection teams in Iraq. Layer after layer of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile infrastructure were rooted out by the UN, with the world, including Tehran, as spectators. Iran might have been particularly stunned by the knowledge that many of the fruits of these programs would have been directed at them had the Iraqi confrontation with the United States never occurred. Future Iranian behavior in a time of crisis is difficult to predict, but aspects of both case studies may be worth considering in an Iranian context. Iran is neither a political democracy like Israel, nor is it a neo-Stalinist dictatorship under the iron rule of one individual such as existed in Saddam’s Iraq. Still, some 88 of the pathologies of Hussein’s regime, including vastly distorted intelligence and insulated decision-making, could at least find a faint echo in Iranian crisis decision- making. The Iranians also have the potential to engage in a serious debate among decision-makers, but it is uncertain that they would do so in a way that headed off a catastrophic decision. It is also unclear if the factionalization of the Iranian political system would help or hurt such a debate. A serious debate on options such as apparently occurred in Israel in 1973 would be a challenging goal for Iran. Moreover, in a conflict with the United States or Israel, the Iranian leadership may feel the pressure to make almost instant decisions on WMD use. The North Korean cultural and historical inputs to decision-making are profoundly different from those of Iraq but the political, intelligence-gathering, and governmental structure supporting decision-making appear to be quite similar to Iraq. Kim Jong-il sits atop the only contemporary regime that rivaled Saddam Hussein’s government for the magnitude of the cult of personality. The ability of the North Korean system to generate rational decisions in an international crisis has most of the flaws of Saddam’s decision-making process, and may perhaps involve greater degrees of recklessness than found in the Iraqi system. It is possible that Saddam was both smarter and less deluded than Kim Jong-il, but it is also likely that the North Koreans have deadlier weapons and more military options than Iraq did in 1991. These include nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, possible biological weapons, and conventional strikes across the border with South Korea. Saddam’s strategy in the struggle with the United States was flawed but based on a serious effort to deter a U.S. attack and then at least save the regime 89 if the United States was undeterable. It is unclear that the North Koreans can manage a strategy that is even this coherent. This situation suggests that any future confrontation with North Korea will be much more difficult to manage than the Iraqis were in 1991. A surgical strike against North Korea may meet a wholly unexpected response that an American strategist would never consider realistic for Pyongyang. The following recommendations are offered regarding the above issues. Some of these recommendations can be seen to draw more heavily from one of the case studies than the other. This is to be expected since the two case studies were chosen not only for their relevance, but for the profound differences between them. All of these recommendations are meant to apply most directly to limited war situations where intrawar deterrence is an issue. Additionally, these recommendations do not always assume that the United States is a party to the conflict. In many cases, the United States will need to consider the actions that various states may take against each other (say India and Pakistan) in order to understand if the conflict is likely to escalate or recede. In some cases, U.S. diplomacy may be informed by a solid understanding of the potential variation in the escalatory process as U.S. leaders work with the UN to try to establish cease- fires prior to WMD use. 1. U.S. policymakers need to remain cognizant that limited military attacks may not appear limited to those nations under attack. In 1973, some intelligent and experienced Israeli leaders believed that they faced an existential threat, although most Israeli and other historians with the benefit of time and study no longer support this view. In contemporary times, large-scale attacks can start to look like an effort at regime change. 90 The temptation for foreign nations to respond to perceived regime changing attacks with every resource available will be serious. While escalation was avoided in the 1973 and 1991 wars, reasons for this restraint might not always be present. The Israeli government, drawing upon its democratic principles, engaged in an open and rigorous debate on escalation issues in which a moderate majority swayed the Prime Minister into a better understanding of the military situation and helped to neutralize the unrelenting pessimism attributed to Defense Minister Dayan. As noted, count- ries such as Iran also have a tradition of governmental debate, but it does not rise to the Israeli standard. A limited U.S. attack against Iran or North Korea could be viewed as the beginnings of an existential challenge to these regimes, although this interpretation may be more likely with Pyongyang than Tehran since that regime is by far the most insulated and paranoid of the two. Nevertheless, even an Israeli attack against Iran could be viewed as the beginning of a U.S.-Israeli campaign to destroy the Islamic Republic, and it could provoke an overwhelming response. 2. U.S. policymakers need to remain aware that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. One power engaged in the conflict may engage in “signaling,” only to have that signal completely misunderstood by the other party or parties to the conflict. The problem with sending one set of signals to multiple audiences, including adversaries and allies, might also cause a tendency toward vagueness which may be understood in completely wrongheaded ways by adversaries. The United States military leadership should consequently not allow itself to become too comfortable with the concept of intrawar 91 deterrence in the military planning process. It must be fully understood that it is an approach which may or may not work depending on a variety of factors that occur throughout a crisis and war. The temptation for adversary states to strike back with some or all of their weapons to arrest a declining conventional situation will always have to be considered. 3. Military planners must remain cognizant that issues regarding the “fog of war” remain continuously relevant throughout contemporary conflicts. In the 1973 war, the Israelis had to cope with both failed military doctrine and serious military setbacks at the same time. They had to adapt to alarmingly new conditions as they were experiencing massive military losses. Dayan’s reported statement that he was wrong about everything may or may not have actually been spoken, but it reflected a serious mindset among Israeli decision-makers that could become a problem for future wartime leaders. What do you do when you find out that you were wrong about everything? What decisions will you make when you fall into a valley of unrelenting pessimism? 4. All those involved with U.S. national strategy must remain aware that perceptions will remain the core of most intrawar deterrence situations. Different individuals will clearly see “reality” with different levels of accuracy. Even bright and experienced people may take some time before they achieve a reasonable level of situational awareness during a crisis. When looking at the military situation on the Suez Canal, Ariel Sharon immediately understood that the Egyptians were not capable of a ground war that moved beyond the protection of their air defense systems over the western Sinai. Less gifted commanders such as Goren did not understand that 92 and made severe operational mistakes, including a hasty and inadequately resourced counterattack as a result. Moreover, less gifted generals report their activities and progress upwards in ways that distort the perceptions of their superiors. The United States must recognize, as the Egyptians did not in 1973, that actions that are self-evident to one party in a conflict may or may not be self-evident to other parties in that conflict. U.S. leaders also need to be aware that emerging nuclear weapons states may be developing their nuclear weapons doctrine “on the fly” during future conflicts. 5. Military planners may need to be particularly aware that deterrence during wartime situations is an ongoing and evolving process that may need to be adjusted as the war continues and the military circumstances of various conventional forces change. States that fully plan and expect to fight wars on a conventional level can find themselves scrambling for options once pre-war assumptions fail. In some cases, WMD options could be used in ways that have not been addressed by doctrine or strategic analysis and the consequences of which have not always been scrutinized with the depth that they deserve. The rapidly changing natures of the WMD threats in both case studies underscore how rapidly new situations develop in wartime situations, and how threats of WMD use go from minimal to serious in a short period of time. The Israelis may not have thought very seriously about the circumstances under which they would use nuclear weapons until they were in the middle of a new and particularly challenging war. 6. U.S. leaders involved in or viewing a conflict must understand the communications can be awkward and blundering in situations of intrawar deterrence. Signaling in general is not a highly nuanced 93 or inherently accurate form of communications. Some communications will probably be misunderstood, downplayed, or assumed away if they are not continuously reinforced and emphasized. The U.S. decision to emphasize the dire consequences of Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons use may not have been the only major factor preventing an Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons, but it certainly was a worthwhile exercise. 7. U.S. leadership cannot take the good judgment of foreign leaders for granted. In times of war, individuals with a lifetime of experience in security matters can still make fundamental mistakes about the nature of the conflict with which they have become involved. In the 1973 October War, the Israelis had an especially difficult challenge in showing the flexibility to overcome the tendency to fall back on the experience of the victorious 1967 war. They also had to discern Arab intensions within their own psychological framework which emphasized the searing memory of the most tragic episodes in the history of the Jewish people and their more recent experiences, including a great deal of inflammatory Arab propaganda. In Saddam Hussein’s case, the problem was much more acute since he sat on top of a dictatorial system that indulged his delusions and shielded him from potentially unpleasant truth. 8. U.S. analysts looking at actual or potential military conflict must guard against the tendency to view wartime behavior in ways that minimize the linkage of wartime behavior and regime survival. This approach is, of course, difficult since regimes have different survival strategies. Some wartime adver- saries will attempt to make decisions that are both in the interests of their country and in the interests 94 of their own regime. Some leaderships such that of North Korea may see little value in the national survival of their country unless the regime survives as well. Wartime efforts to encourage a military coup may be useful, but the example of the 1991 Gulf War illustrates both the difficulty of such an action and the likelihood that unexpected variables may come into play. In general, it may be a bad idea to assume that the massive military defeat of most countries will lead to an automatic coup against the ruling regime in a limited war scenario. 9. U.S. planners must remain aware of the ways in which information is obtained, processed, and presented to foreign leaders. The intelligence services of foreign nations may not be providing a foreign leadership with accurate intelligence on which its leadership can base a reasonable cost-benefit decision on whether or not to use unconventional weapons. Foreign intelligence services may be giving a foreign leadership a completely wrongheaded view of how a conflict is evolving. In some cases, such as in 1991 Iraq, intelligence services can be unprofessional, corrupt, and incompetent. This certainly was the case with Saddam’s intelligence service which catered to his prejudices and personality problems. While the logic of intrawar deterrence is transnational, effective communications requires an understanding of the audience or audiences that one is seeking to influence.

#### Lol a card from the Cold War

MERIP [(Middle East Research and Information Project) “Nuclear Shadow Over the Middle East”] AT

In the summer of 1984, Newsweek published the results of a Gallup poll of hundreds of top-ranking American military officers. Among the questions was this: where did they see the greatest threat of a conflict situation which might escalate to nuclear war? The majority responded clearly: the Middle East. [1] (#1) They might have had in mind those times that leaders of the two superpowers have threatened to use nuclear weapons in a Middle East showdown. According to former Senator Henry Jackson, Harry Truman invoked their presence in the US arsenal when he demanded that the Soviet Union withdraw from Iran after World War II. Nikita Khrushchev brandished nuclear-tipped missiles when Britain, France and Israel teamed up to invade Egypt in 1956. Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin felt compelled to use the Washington/Moscow hotline for the first time in June 1967, as Israel launched a preemptive attack that devastated Egypt, Syria and Jordan. In late October 1973, as Israel and Egypt slugged it out again in the Sinai and Richard Nixon fought off the Watergate prosecutor, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger decided that the best way to convince Moscow that American war-making capacity remained unimpaired was to call a quick DefCon 3 alert -- sort of a nuclear fire drill. Then there was the scene in the middle of August 1980. In response to “clear but ambiguous” indications of a Soviet military buildup along the border north of Iran, American war planners debated the first use of tactical nuclear weapons;; the Joint Chiefs told Defense Secretary Harold Brown that the US had “no other” military option to prevent the Soviets from moving south. [2] (#2) In 1984, when Gallup posed his questions, Congress was debating a Pentagon budget that would increase spending for Third World intervention (“power projection” is the budget rubric) by 34 percent, against 13 percent for the military as a whole. [3] (#3) The officers quizzed by Gallup knew that some of the “power projection” weapons systems were “dual capable” -- able to fire nuclear as well as conventional warheads. The big guns on the USS New Jersey that shelled Lebanon a few months earlier, for instance. The difference between “conventional” weapons and tactical nukes -- the “nuclear firebreak” -- was fast eroding. The newest conventional shells combined firepower and accuracy to a degree that made them as devastating as nuclear shells, while from the other end of the “conflict spectrum” nuclear warheads had been miniaturized for battlefield use. [4] (#4) Responding to developments such as these, the US Army had formulated a new battle doctrine -- the first since World War II. Once the president approves the use of nuclear weapons, operational questions -- when and how? are delegated to field commanders. AirLand Battle Operations Manual FM100-5 foresees that: “A relatively small rapidly deployable force with nuclear weapons may be assigned a contingency mission. This force might succeed as a deterrent while a larger, conventional force might deploy too late.” [5] (#5) Oil War? Too late for what? We’ve all seen the Time magazine cover showing an enormous bear, hammer-and-sickle medallion on his chest, reaching down across the Caucasus to menace a dozen miniature oil derricks in the Persian Gulf. Phrases like “oil jugular” trip off the tongues of news anchormen. Buried in the op-ed rejects is the fact that the Soviet Union has for a long while been the world’s largest oil producer. Ten years ago, Washington “leaked” a report that showed the USSR becoming a net oil importer by the mid-1980s, with an insatiable lust for “our” oil. The figures, it turned out, had been cooked in the kitchen where William Casey is now head chef. Suppose the CIA had been right. The Soviet Union needs to import lots of wheat, year after year. Yet the Russians have not taken over Argentina or Canada, never mind Kansas. There are branches of Bank Novostni throughout the Arab world. Moscow has plenty of experience buying or bartering for what it needs on the world market. The Soviet Union knows very well, because the United States has made it very clear, that any effort to seize the oil of Arabia and the Gulf would lead to war. The Kremlin has demonstrated a very cautious attitude toward any steps that might lead to war with the US -- much more cautious than their counterparts on the Potomac. The only situation in which the Soviet Union might move militarily against the Persian Gulf would be if a general war had already started or was truly imminent, to interdict supplies vital to the US war machine. The national security advisors with their illuminated maps in the White House basement know this better than the rest of us. If we read their “guidance documents” closely, we see that what they fear most are political changes in the Middle East that might affect Western access to the region’s resources and markets. [6] (#6) Decisions about how much oil to produce, and the price at which it will be available, might be made in Tehran, in Baghdad and in Jeddah rather than in New York or London. To some extent, the locus of such decision-making has shifted over the last two decades. True, the giant oil companies are still major players (six of these companies are still in the top 10 of Fortune’s famous 500, and their profits account for a steady one-seventh of total profits of the 500). The world market has resiliently protected industrial societies against the aberrant behavior of people of color. This is largely because those exercising power in the oil-exporting states are people who see their future linked to the interests of the capitalist West. Shaikh Zaki Yamani, until recently oil minister of Saudi Arabia, is a case in point. The exceptions -- Qaddafi in Libya, Khomeini in Iran -- highlight the rule. The enemy in the Gulf, in Alexander Haig’s 1981 phrase, is “a change in the status quo.” It would be met, he informed a Senate committee and the world, “with the full range of [US] power assets.” [7] (#7) This was a bit like saying the US would use its “full range of power assets” to stop the tides. Throughout the region, most regimes are tied politically to Washington. But they are not firmly grounded in their own societies. Here is a world that has undergone radical and wrenching social and economic changes in the last decades, resulting in new social forces, new internal class alliances and new links with the global market. These enormous changes in the structures of society have not received political expression. Arrangements from earlier eras have been petrified in place. It is as if the oil revenues which fueled these social changes at the same time embalmed the presiding regimes. We now have the political equivalent of geological pressures that build up beneath the surface and erupt as earthquakes. We have seen one in Iran, another in Lebanon. Tremors have struck in Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and Morocco. Nuclear Options Washington’s cold war perspective invests any change anywhere in the world with tremendous significance for the global contest with the Soviet Union, no matter what its local origins. The Middle East would be exceedingly important to Washington by virtue of its proximity to the Soviet Union, along its southern border, even if there were not a single drop of oil there. This global aspect of US policy engages the nuclear factor in its most dangerous dimension. For nuclear war planning is geared precisely to maintaining and extending influence in a world that can only be partially controlled, a world where Washington’s weight has diminished. Though the Soviets have not correspondingly gained, the erosion of control compels American strategists to pin responsibility for unwanted change on the USSR, and emphasize US nuclear leverage. Henry Kissinger complained after the Black September 1970 crisis in Jordan that if he could not threaten to use nuclear weapons in such cases, “We weren’t getting our money’s worth out of them." Kissinger, whose first book was Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, ordered a new study of nuclear “options” in 1972 “to be sure that America’s strategic forces really did cast a shadow on peripheral situations.” [8] (#8) Today the enormous US military buildup in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, largely accomplished under the cover of the Iran-Iraq war, has made Southwest Asia a key strategic theater equipped with numbers and quality of aircraft, radar and nuclear blast-hardened command posts more advanced than those of NATO. And Kissinger, in more recent pronouncements, would have the rulers of the Gulf “understand that we are prepared to protect both their domestic structure and their frontiers, and they need to be given confidence in the means which we will use.” [9] (#9) In other words, Washington must wire nuclear weapons to the tottering thrones of the Gulf. Washington’s Mutt, Israel’s Jeff US policy in the Middle East, on first glance, presents a paradox. Western material interests are centered in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula. So why has Israel, the adversary state, counted for the greatest share of US military and economic aid in the region? Through 1967, Washington did not display this favoritism. The key “intervention assets” in the region were neither Arab nor Israeli but the so-called “northern tier”: Turkey, Iran, Pakistan. Arab states like Jordan played specific gendarme roles vis-à-vis the Palestinians, but Israel was kept at arms length. The June War of 1967 marks a watershed in the balance of military and political forces in the region. Israel’s smashing victory led to a new strategic calculation in Washington, expressed by the 1968 sale of state-of-the-art F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers. Set against the US predicament in Vietnam. Israel’s impressive performance gave great weight to those in the White House and the Pentagon who argued that a generous military supply relationship with Israel (and Iran) represented the most cost-effective approach to advancing US interests in the region. Nixon and Kissinger continued to describe US policy as “even-handed,” but “protection racket” would be the more appropriate phrase. Yitzhak Rabin, then Israel’s ambassador in Washington, boasts in his published diary of his direct access to Kissinger. “Some sources inform me,” he wrote coyly on one occasion, “that our military operations are the most encouraging breath of fresh air the American administration has enjoyed recently.... There is a growing likelihood that the US would be interested in an escalation of our military activity with the aim of undermining Nasser’s standing.... Thus the willingness to supply us with additional arms depends more on stepping up our military activity against Egypt than on reducing it.” Nixon’s esteem for Israel was not based on sentiment or electoral considerations, but on its policy of provocation and brutal reprisal against Palestinians and other Arabs. Israel was doing in the Middle East what Nixon wished he could do more freely in Indochina. “Every time I hear of you penetrating into their territory and hitting them hard, I get a feeling of satisfaction,” Nixon told Rabin. [10] (#10) The virtues of this approach seemed to be confirmed by Israel’s high-profile preparation to intervene in the September 1970 war between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian resistance. The PLO and Syria, in Washington’s eyes, were significant only because they received political and material support from the Soviet Union. The new US-Israeli relationship, in the words of National Security Council staffer William Quandt, was now “seen as key to combatting Soviet influence in the Arab world and attaining stability.” [11] (#11) This new vision quickly became operational reality. Key policy decisions in 1971 significantly restructured the military ties between the US and Israel. First, the dollar value of US weapons shipped to Israel jumped nearly ten times: from $140 million in 1968-70 to $1.2 billion in 1971-73. Second, the sophistication of weapons followed the Phantom precedent. Third, weapons sales to Israel had previously been on a cash basis;; now Washington extended generous credits and grants. Finally, a little-noted agreement of November 1971 provided American technical support and licenses for Israeli manufacture of sophisticated weapons systems, laying the groundwork for Israel's own military-industrial complex and making it possible for Israel to join the ranks of the world’s leading arms exporters. [12] (#12) It is essentially the globalist perspective of the cold war which lends Israel its significance in the formulation of US policy. Regional developments and local conflicts are important only for the impact they are assumed to have on the balance of power between the US and the USSR. This coincides with a greater centralization of policy-making within the national security apparatus. Regional experts (“Arabists”) who do not ratify the prevailing geostrategic priorities and prefer to emphasize local dynamics are banished from the corridors of power. This cold war perspective also lends a certain relativity to terms like “peace.” Even people who would not accept for a minute the proposition that peace is the highest priority of the Reagan administration in Central America or Southern Africa do not blink when Reagan talks about “the peace process” in the Arab-Israeli conflict. People assume that the failure to achieve a political settlement owes to incompetence or irresolution, or to the pernicious influence of the Zionist lobby. But the “peace process” is no more about peace than the “peacekeeping force” sent to Beirut or the “peacekeeper” label that Reagan put on the MX missile. The pattern, rather, has been to reward and encourage the most belligerent political forces in Israel. Washington lavishly endows that country’s military establishment and avidly tolerates its most aggressive behavior. Then Washington can turn around and extract concessions and cooperation from the Arab states as the price for restraints on Israel. This “good cop/bad cop” routine has in fact been rather productive, if we recognize that Washington’s priority has been to “expel” the Soviet Union rather than bring about a political settlement. Israel is valued precisely for its antagonistic relations with key states in a region of strategic proximity to the Soviet Union. Armageddon’s Shortest Fuse The wars and feuds that tear the Middle East apart, with terrible consequences for tens of millions of people, chiefly grow out of local and regional struggles and dynamics. Rather than try to resolve the most outstanding political contradictions in the region, Washington has exploited them to build up its military forces in the region, directly and through arms deliveries to key allies and clients. The result is devastation for many and a pervasive insecurity for the rest, as the conflicts continue and the weapons to fight them grow in number and destructive power. The Middle East is both a potential trigger and target for a war between the US and USSR. The US president and many of his fervent evangelical supporters have varnished the prospect of nuclear conflict in the Middle East with the biblical sanction of Armageddon. Here is where American troops and warplanes have gone into battle under Reagan, against Libya and against Lebanon. This administration tacitly supported Israel’s assaults against Lebanon, Iraq and Tunisia, and tried to instigate Egypt to invade Libya. Washington’s chief client in the region, Israel, evidently has developed the world’s sixth largest nuclear arsenal. Another key US client, Pakistan, is on the verge of joining the nuclear club. Both politically and technologically, the Middle East has breached the “nuclear firebreak.” So far, the unfolding scandal in Washington over arms sales to Iran has been limited to the contradictions this poses for official policy in the Gulf War and the ritual rants against terrorism. The extensive media attention reflects serious conflicts within the administration and the larger establishment to the scheme itself and to the White House attempt to implement it unilaterally. The important roles of Israel and Saudi Arabia in supporting Reagan’s contra war against Nicaragua over many years risk becoming footnotes to this Washington power struggle. In all of this, the real scandal has been ignored and overlooked again. This is the phony “peace process,” the set of policies that has backed Israeli military solutions towards the Palestinians and towards Lebanon and prompted the hostage situation in the first place. It is the intersection of this policy with the course of superpower relations which today darkens the nuclear shadow over the Middle East.

#### ME War – about Israel crisis in the summer

Mullen 14 [(Jethro Mullen, CNN) “Has the Middle East crisis reached a tipping” CNN July 9, 2014] AT

The violent cycle of retribution and retaliation only seems to be worsening. As militants fire volleys of rockets from Gaza, Israel is responding with waves of airstrikes. As Hamas vows to make its enemy pay the price, Israel is calling up hundreds of recruits and strengthening its positions around Gaza. Tensions between Palestinians and Israelis have always simmered in plain view, erupting periodically into deadly spasms. Could it be happening again? "I do not want to over-dramatize, but the last few hours may have been, God forbid, the tipping point," Ari Shavit, a prominent Israeli author and journalist, told CNN's Christiane Amanpour on Monday night. "What we see is different sides who do not want escalation ... they are dragged into something that is becoming very violent, very dangerous." Israel prepared to expand operation against Hamas in Gaza 'The blood is up' Long-standing resentments have boiled over in recent weeks following the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank, which Israel blamed on Hamas. The militant group praised the abductions but denied responsibility. Israel responded by cracking down on Hamas operations in the West Bank, arresting hundreds of activists and conducting widespread searches of homes. When the three teenagers' bodies were found last week in a field in the West Bank, anger erupted in Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed that Hamas would pay. The mood darkened further when a Palestinian teenager was abducted and killed in Jerusalem in what police say could be a revenge killing. The news sparked clashes between protesting Palestinian youths and Israeli security forces in Jerusalem. Throughout that grim week, Israel and Hamas continued to trade fire across the Gaza border. Both sides are sinking into a confrontation they don't necessarily want, analysts say ￼￼"You have got politics. The blood is up. You have got retaliation," said Aaron David Miller, a Middle East expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 'Clouds are getting dark' The region has many depressing precedents when it comes to violence. In recent decades, Palestinians launched two armed uprisings against Israel, known as Intifadas, that each went on for years. In late 2008 and early 2009, Israel carried out airstrikes and then a ground offensive against Hamas in Gaza that killed hundreds of Palestinians. In November 2012, the two sides fought a bloody eight-day conflict that ended in a cease-fire. The region appears to be careering toward another confrontation. "It's difficult to see how this stops. At what point does one of the sides say, 'You know what? Let's have a moment where we make a preemptive concession, we do some kind of peace talks,'" said CNN's Fareed Zakaria. The Israeli military is nonetheless gathering its forces near the border with Gaza. ￼￼"They are talking about an escalation," said CNN's Ben Wedeman. "Perhaps not on the scale of November 2012 or the war at the end of 2008, beginning of 2009, but definitely there's a feeling that the clouds are getting dark over Gaza and things could get much worse." On Tuesday, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon said the security operation against Hamas "will probably not end within several days." And the Israeli military was gathering its forces near the border with Gaza. 'No angels here' Shavit said that since the collapse of U.S.-sponsored peace talks earlier this year, Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas have failed to halt the descent into crisis. "What we see in recent months is that the extremists on both sides are taking the agenda and are actually cornering these two leaders and actually dragging us into conflict," he said. He faulted Netanyahu for failing to control hardliners in his government and not acting in time against violent Jewish nationalists. But Shavit also criticized Abbas for agreeing to a pact with Hamas after years of divisions between the two factions. "There are no angels here," Shavit said. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry also has to face tough questions about the unraveling situation. "Some of us here warned a few months ago ... that the moment you try to have peace in this land, the way Secretary Kerry did in a courageous way, you cannot step back," Shavit said. "And from the moment that negotiations collapsed in late March, this illusion that you can go back to Washington, deal with China and Ukraine and ignore the Middle East, was a dangerous illusion." Role for U.S.? Now, it appears tricky for the United States to play a role in calming the situation. "I'm not sure, frankly, that the Secretary of State wants or should put himself in a situation right now of trying to negotiate a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas," Miller said. The U.S. government lists Hamas as a terrorist organization. During the 2012 conflict in Gaza, Egypt brokered the cease-fire. But that was under Islamist-backed former President Mohamed Morsy, who has since been ousted and replaced by the country's former military chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The new Egyptian president has "very poor" relations with Hamas, according to Zakaria. And in the current climate, "I don't think an outside mediator is going to help," he said. Even Hamas has been losing support to more radical elements in recent years, Zakaria said, which has put the movement under pressure to act. "On both sides, there is an internal compulsion, an internal dynamic which is pushing them to a confrontation that maybe they don't rationally want," he said. And those who will pay the price for the unwanted conflict are likely to be the civilians of Gaza and southern Israel.

#### The EU coop card

Foradari 7 [(Paolo, Former Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, September 2011–2014; Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, April–August 2011, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, University of Trento, Trento, Italy) “Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy: The EU in International Affairs” Google Books] AT

￼The greater Middle East, including what is now often termed "West Asia/' is a grey zone for the EU. It is not part of the immediate neighbor- hood, but it might become such in the next two decades if enlargement con- tinues to proceed. Furthermore there is a long tradition of European involvement (by some) in such diverse countries as Lebanon and Oman, to say nothing of the Israel-Palestine dispute, at the center of EPC/CFSP since its onset. In this sprawling and dangerous region, the EU arguably has no choice but to be involved given its existing commitments, and the weight of the past. The spillover of terrorism into European civil society since 1970 means that Middle Eastern politics will involve the EU and its member states whether they like it or not. Indeed, some carefully calibrated initiatives have proved possible even in difficult circumstances. Despite many setbacks in the Middle East Peace Process it is still possible to imagine cir- cumstances in which the EU could play an invaluable role in underwriting an eventual settlement. Further afield we have witnessed the persistent at- tempts of European diplomacy to persuade Iran not to acquire nuclear weapons, motivated as much by the fear of a widening international crisis as by concern over the weapons themselves. The diplomacy was initiated by, and has been conducted through, the big EU-3 of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, but the rest of the 25 have willingly come on board. The episode demonstrates both the ever-widening extent of the EU's neigh- borhood (by contrast Europeans had been very reluctant to get involved in the U.S./Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981) and the way in which the Middle East inherently bridges the regional and the global. Indeed it is the cockpit of the current "world crisis" (to use Churchill's term about 1914-1918) to which no state or group of states can be indifferent.

### Indo-pak impact wip

#### Abstract

Bhatnagar 10 [(Zahid Shahab Ahmed, University of New England (Australia) and the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, Costa Rica) Stuti Bhatnagar, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India)) “Gulf States and the Conflict between India and Pakistan” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 2, 259-291] AT

Traditional cultural and economic ties between the Indian sub-continent and the Gulf region have existed for several centuries now. Strengthened further, both India and Pakistan continue to have important economic and strategic ties with the countries of the Gulf. While the Gulf region offers substantial economic advantages to both, they also have the potential to make positive interventions in the bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan. The following chapter analyses the role and position of the Gulf Arab States - in particular the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and their potential in acting as a buffer for the Indo-Pak conflict. It will evaluate the official positions of the Gulf region towards various aspects of the Indo-Pak conflict. The Gulf countries have often voiced their positions at regional and international forums. An additional aspect of this relationship is that the Gulf States are also members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), a pan-Islamic body which has often addressed issues of contention between India and Pakistan, particularly with respect to Kashmir. Through an academic understanding of the issues and incorporating viewpoints of experts in the area, the chapter seeks to provide fresh insights into an aspect which has the possibility of becoming a crucial incentive for peace between India and Pakistan.

#### India and Saudi Arabia

Bhatnagar 10 [(Zahid Shahab Ahmed, University of New England (Australia) and the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, Costa Rica) Stuti Bhatnagar, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India)) “Gulf States and the Conflict between India and Pakistan” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 2, 259-291] AT

The fourth largest trading partner of India, during the last few years, a number of trade and industry delegations have visited Saudi Arabia to explore opportunities for long-term partnerships and cooperation, including joint ventures. Soon after new investment laws came into force in Saudi Arabia in mid-2000, a number of Indian firms have taken advantage of the new Saudi laws providing for 100% foreign ownership of projects in the Kingdom. Since then, Indian companies have established 108 joint ventures in Saudi Arabia in different sectors. In January 2006, during his trip to India, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia signed four accords significant among which were the agreement on avoidance of double taxation and the bilateral investment protection agreement.

#### India and UAE

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The relationship between India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has evolved into a significant partnership in the economic and commercial sphere with UAE emerging as the second largest market globally for Indian products. At the same time Indians have emerged as important investors within the UAE and India as an important export destination for the UAE manufactured goods. Many Indian companies have contributed to the growth of a number of sectors in the region, like power generation and transmission, highways, telecommunication, water and other infrastructure development. The presence of warehouses of the different Indian companies in UAE has also resulted in an increase in the trade not only with UAE but also India’s trade with other Gulf countries.1

#### India and Oman

Bhatnagar 10 [(Zahid Shahab Ahmed, University of New England (Australia) and the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, Costa Rica) Stuti Bhatnagar, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India)) “Gulf States and the Conflict between India and Pakistan” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 2, 259-291] AT

Economic and commercial exchanges between India and Oman go back centuries with a merchant community from India in Oman for several generations. This interaction has helped in laying the foundation for a multi- dimensional economic relationship between the two countries in recent years as Oman embarked on its process of development and oil revenues started flowing into the country in the 1970s. In June 1993, an Agreement for Economic Trade & Technical Cooperation was signed between India and Oman. India-Oman trade has been growing and India is the fifth largest source for imports (about 4.5%) into Oman. India and Oman have also finalized a Bilateral Investment Promotion & Protection Agreement (BIPA) and Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA).

#### India and Kuwait

Bhatnagar 10 [(Zahid Shahab Ahmed, University of New England (Australia) and the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, Costa Rica) Stuti Bhatnagar, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India)) “Gulf States and the Conflict between India and Pakistan” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 2, 259-291] AT

The statement by former Indian ambassador to Kuwait is indicative of the strengthening economic relations between India and Kuwait - “I’d say that the political relationship between our two countries has been and is excellent. Our economic relations have been progressing exceptionally well, and our cultural cooperation is moving at a steady pace.”1 The first ever meeting of the Indo-Kuwait Joint Ministerial Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation took place in Kuwait in November 2006. The second meeting of the commission was held in July 2008, in New Delhi. From the point of view of the labour sector, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Labour, Employment and Manpower Development was also signed in Kuwait in April 2007. The most important encouragement in terms of economic, trade and investment cooperation is the agreement for Mutual Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (BIPA) and also a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and Kuwait. Thus, while there has been investment in marketable securities and investment through third countries, the BIPA and DTAA should provide an opportunity and comfort for direct investments.

#### India and Qatar

Bhatnagar 10 [(Zahid Shahab Ahmed, University of New England (Australia) and the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, Costa Rica) Stuti Bhatnagar, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India)) “Gulf States and the Conflict between India and Pakistan” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 2, 259-291] AT

There is a growing synergy between India and Qatar in the hydrocarbon and other sectors. Indeed, the two countries are natural economic partners, with their strengths and potentialities complementing each other. Qatar has made significant progress in the development of its natural gas reserves in the North Dome Field. India is a large and expanding market for export of LNG from Qatar and the geographical proximity of the two countries virtually ensures mutually beneficial interaction in a long-term perspective. In addition, there are enormous opportunities for expanding bilateral trade and other economic linkages, considering the geographical proximity and historical ties between the peoples of both the countries.1 India is the tenth biggest source for Qatar’s imports and the third biggest market for Qatar’s exports. However, bilateral trade constitutes only a part, though an important part, of the potential for economic cooperation between India and Qatar. The Government of Qatar has made large investments in the development of its two LNG projects and port at Ras Laffan. With its large, expanding and long term requirements of natural gas, India is naturally keen to take advantage of the existence of a reliable and virtually inexhaustible source of natural gas situated so close to its own consuming centres. In pursuance of these complementarities, the two sides signed an MOU in January 1998 for cooperation in the gas, oil and industrial sectors. The MOU envisaged a number of steps to exploit the potential in these areas, with the purchase of LNG from Qatar as its primary component. In July 1998, H.E. Abdullah Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, Minister of Energy and Industry led a high-level delegation to India at the invitation of his counterpart and continued the on-going dialogue for bilateral cooperation in the hydrocarbons sector. India has also signed an agreement to purchase 7.5 million tons of LNG every year from Qatar and the first shipment took place in 2004. Some of the agreements signed between India and Qatar are; • Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement • Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement • MOU on Foreign Office Consultations • Agreement on Cultural Cooperation • Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation • Agreement on Organisation of Manpower Employment

#### India and Bahrain

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India and Bahrain signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement in April 1981 during the visit of H.H the Amir to New Delhi, following which Instruments of Ratification were exchanged in 1983. The first meeting of the Indo-Bahrain Joint Economic and Technical Committee (JETC) was held in New Delhi in 1986 and the second in Bahrain in 1991. Most recently, the Fourth Meeting of the India - Bahrain Joint Committee on Economic and Technical Cooperation (JCETC) was held in Bahrain on 14-15 November, 2007. The Indian delegation was led by Shri E. Ahamed, Minister of State for External Affairs. The delegation included Joint Secretary (Gulf & Haj), 266 Zahid Shahab Ahmed, University of New England (Australia) and Stuti Bhatnagar, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India) Ministry of External affairs, representatives from the Ministries of Commerce, Overseas Indian Affairs, Petroleum and Natural Gas as well as Public Sector Undertakings like National Small Industries Corporation and Education Consultants India Ltd. The two sides looked at the possibility of cooperation in areas of petroleum, aluminium, chemicals, shipping, finance and hospitality. The issues of cooperation in financial sector including Avoidance of Double Taxation, health, IT, civil aviation, manpower, education, information and culture and youth and sports were also discussed. It was agreed to carry forward the process of Mumbai Declaration adopted at the Third Indo-GCC Industrial Forum held in Mumbai in May 2007 for economic engagement in areas like energy, petro-chemicals, construction etc. Both the sides wanted closer cooperation in the areas concerning, inter alia, World Trade Organization related matters and technical cooperation in areas of standardization and intellectual property rights. A Joint Business Council (JBC) between India and Bahrain was set up on 12th October, 1994.

#### Political and Strategic Cooperation

Bhatnagar 10 [(Zahid Shahab Ahmed, University of New England (Australia) and the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, Costa Rica) Stuti Bhatnagar, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India)) “Gulf States and the Conflict between India and Pakistan” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 2, 259-291] AT

While the economic relationship between India and the Arab Gulf states goes back several centuries, the nature of the political relationship has changed significantly over the years. When it came to regional politics, Muslim Pakistan was consistently favoured over India. Gulf States sympathized with Islamabad in wars with India and backed Pakistan’s claims in Kashmir. Pakistan has traditionally supplied the Gulf countries with soldiers, pilots and police. Gulf unease with India was also compounded by New Delhi’s policy of aligning itself with the erstwhile Soviet Union and its concept of a socialist state. This put India at odds with the pro-American policies of the Gulf States. In particular, India’s relations with the Gulf States have been symptomatic of its political partnership with Saudi Arabia. There was a significant cooling off of relations between India and Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s due to several reasons from the destruction of the Babri Masjid in India to the Indian sympathy for the Iraqi regime during the first Gulf war. The Saudis saw Indian overtures to the newly independent Central Asian Republics as being more in tune with Iran and the Indian side saw Saudi Arabia as more closely aligned with Pakistan. The landmark visit of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to New Delhi in January 2006 was the first visit by a Saudi head of state in 51 years. As chief guest at the Indian Republic Day ceremony, the visit was evidence of a shift in attitudes in India and the GCC. Since then the political relationship has improved. India’s growing closeness to the United States in the post cold war era has also contributed to this changing relationship. Visits between heads of states from the GCC and India are now a regular feature. To further political cooperation, the landmark ‘GCC-India Political Dialogue’ involving the External Affairs Minister of India with the GCC Chairman, the Secretary General and Ambassadors/representatives from GCC countries was held, for the first time, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly on September 26, 2003. India is keen on cooperation with the GCC to ensure safety and security of sea lanes and of communication safety and freedom of navigation in the shipping lanes and trade routes, counter religious extremism and transnational terrorism, narcotics trafficking and proliferation of weapons in the region and achieve peace in the sub-continent given Pakistan’s bond with the region.1 India has over the years made notable developments in its defence capabilities. To capitalize on this, over the years, India and some of the GCC states have also taken significant steps to further cooperation in the field of defence. India and UAE entered into a Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in June 2003 in New Delhi which provides for cooperation between the two countries in matters related to security and defence and for annual meetings of 'Strategic Dialogue'. India has been training UAE defence personnel in various disciplines at its specialized institutions. The two countries resolved to examine the possibility of import and export of arms, interact on various aspects of defence policy and security and exchange information on scientific research, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.1 The subsequent meeting of the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee was held in April 2006 in New Delhi. Interaction between the Coast Guards of both the countries has enabled identifying possibilities of cooperation in this area as well. UAE defence personnel have also been undergoing defence training in India under Self Financing Schemes. Considered the closest to India among the GCC countries, Oman is being offered training cooperation of its officers and men in Indian military training institutions. In December 2006, An MoU on Defence Cooperation was signed between India and Oman. The areas of cooperation envisaged in the MoU include exchange of expertise in military training and information technology, utilization of military and educational courses and programs, exchange of observers attending military exercises and exchange of formal visits. The MoU is expected to further enhance constructive interaction between the two countries and facilitate strengthening bilateral defence relations, including the supply of Indian equipment to Oman.2 In November 2008, India and Oman agreed to step up defence cooperation by upgrading their joint naval exercises. The issue of stepping up defence cooperation was discussed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s three-day visit to the Gulf countries.1 Singh’s visit also led to a defence agreement with Qatar which includes the possibilities of stationing Indian troops in the Arab country, sources in the Indian Defence Ministry said. The two countries have also joined in a maritime security arrangement, which will be extended to other countries. Earlier in June 2007, the two countries had agreed to jointly produce weapons and equipment. Indian Defence Ministry sources said Qatar is keen to collaborate with Indian private and state-owned defence companies, which in turn have entered into some sort of a tie-up with American companies for weapon and equipment production.2 India is also keen to establish defence ties with other Gulf States and is in dialogue with some of them towards this end.

#### Expats

Bhatnagar 10 [(Zahid Shahab Ahmed, University of New England (Australia) and the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, Costa Rica) Stuti Bhatnagar, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India)) “Gulf States and the Conflict between India and Pakistan” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 2, 259-291] AT

Perhaps the most significant element of India’s relationship with the Gulf States is the presence of a sizeable expatriate population in these states. The expats in the Gulf contribute considerably to the bilateral relations between India and the Gulf. Statistics collected by the ministry of External Affairs reveal that the ‘socio-economic profile’ of Indian migrants to the Gulf has been shifting in a positive direction since the late 1980s. There has been an upward flow of professionals and white collar workers. Others are engaged in the gold, electronics, motor spare parts or textiles trade, in the construction industry or in managing hotels and restaurants. Each year India receives significant amount of foreign remittance from its nationals in the Gulf – a sum which contributes to India’s financial reserves and is reinvested in development in India. According to a World Bank report in 2007, India is the highest receiver of remittances from abroad. Around 5.7 million Indians from across the world sent $27 billion as remittances in 2007 and the Gulf accounted for a large chunk of it.

#### Pakistan

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Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: Owing to its significance of being the holiest place for Muslims around the world, Saudi Arabia occupies a very sacred place in the hearts of millions in Pakistan. This relationship gets further strengthened every year with about 160,000 Pakistani pilgrims going to Saudi Arabia to perform the Haj, and the number is much greater for Umra. Over the decades, Saudi Arabia has also been providing support for Islamic education in Pakistan and has welcomed thousands of Pakistani workers into its labour force. The value of Pakistan-Saudi Arabia relationship is evident through frequent high-level talks between state officials. During his visit to Saudi Arabia in 2006, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shaukat Aziz, emphasized Pakistan’s closeness to the Kingdom, “Pakistan will make any sacrifice for the safety, integrity and sovereignty of Saudi Arabia”.1 In the recent past, the Gulf region has been active in domestic politics in Pakistan, for instance in the form of hosting former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif in Saudi Arabia and Benazir Bhutto in the UAE. The recent case of Saudi Arabia putting pressure on Nawaz Sharif to value his deal and live in exile in Saudi Arabia is unique because it was probably the first time the Kingdom got involved in the internal politics of any other country. There are about 1 million Pakistani expatriates in Saudi Arabia, which is home to overall 4.5 million expatriates.1 In 2005, in a bilateral exchange both countries explored possibilities of increasing the Pakistani workforce in Saudi Arabia. In 2006, five key MoUs were signed between the officials of two countries in the areas of politics, economic, education, scientific and technical cooperation, during the visit of King Abdullah to Pakistan. Saudi Arabia’s assistance to Pakistan had already exceeded $1 billion when it pledged another $673 million to the relief and rehabilitation of Pakistani areas devastated by the 2005 earthquake. With 110,000 barrels a day, Saudi Arabia is the largest supplier of oil to Pakistan. The decision of the Saudi Fund for Development to provide Pakistan with 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day and 70,000 bpd of furnace oil for five years beginning 1998 on the basis of deferred payment was crucial in Pakistan’s recovery from the economic crisis it faced in the aftermath of the sanctions following the nuclear tests.2 The Kingdom is amongst the top 20 major importers of Pakistani goods, including raw cotton, cotton cloth, garments, carpets, furniture, footwear, sports and surgical goods, and food items. In 2005-06, Pakistan’s exports to Saudi Arabia were $330 million and imports were $2994. The business community from both countries has initiated joint projects in industrial and construction sectors. Presently, there are more than 300 Pakistani investors in Saudi Arabia authorized by the Saudi Foreign Investment Authority (SAGIA). To enhance collaboration between the business communities, both countries have set up the Pak- Saudi Joint Business Council (JBC). The JBC has already organized two meetings in 2003 and 2005. In the year 2005- 06, $272 million came to Pakistan as a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Saudi Arabia.1 Pakistan and UAE: Pakistan was the first country to formally recognize UAE as an independent state in 1971. Continuing the legacy of close relations, the top leadership in the two countries maintains close and frequent contacts. The friendship has been enhanced by UAE’s support to Pakistan in troubled times. In 2005, the UAE contributed $100 million towards Pakistan’s earthquake relief fund. Recently, at a very crucial time of economic downfall in the history of Pakistan, Abu Dhabi (UAE) hosted the ‘Friends of Pakistan’2 meeting on November 17, 2008. During the meeting donor countries discussed possibilities of assisting Pakistan in times of economic recession. This historic meeting was followed by President Asif Ai Zardari’s visit to UAE to meet President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed. At the meeting the possibilities of UAE public and private investment in Pakistan were discussed, specifically in the areas of energy, agriculture, construction and infrastructural development. Over the years, UAE has become home to skilled labour and professionals from Pakistan, particularly from Karachi. It is estimated that around 700,000 Pakistani expatriates live in UAE, and 166,451 Pakistani skilled persons moved to UAE in 2006-07.3 There is a MOU between the two countries in the field of manpower, which enables Pakistan to increase its manpower presence in UAE. Ministerial level meetings between the UAE and Pakistan have enhanced bilateral trade between the two partners. The UAE is one of Pakistan’s top three trade partners with a trade volume over $4 billion (2005-06) and it was estimated to reach $5 billion by the end of 2007.1 With the aim of promoting bilateral trade and economic relations, the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Federation of UAE Chambers of Commerce and Industry reached an agreement to setup Pakistan-UAE Join Business Council. The agreement came as an outcome of 9th session of Pakistan-UAE Joint Ministerial meeting in Islamabad in 2007. In June 1994, Pakistan and UAE established a Defence Consultative Group to plan cooperation in a number of fields including joint defence production and intelligence-sharing. In April 2006, the two countries signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement to step up their collaborations.2 Pakistan and Oman: Geographical proximity is an asset for both Pakistan and Oman because it increases viability of several bilateral projects. In 2005, the two countries signed a MoU to establish a Political Consultation Mechanism between the Foreign Ministries of Pakistan and Oman. Both countries have also reached the following crucial agreements: Organizing Air Service Agreement in 1976; Promotion of Protection and Investment Agreement in 1997; Cultural and Educational Agreement in 1984; Economic, Technical and Commercial Cooperation Agreement in 1986; and Maritime Boundaries Agreement in 2000. Oman has donated $100 for infrastructural development in the marginalized province of Baluchistan in Pakistan, out of which a significant portion will be invested in expanding the runway at the Gwadar Airport. This funding was committed by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos during his visit to Pakistan in 2001. Later in 2005, Oman donated $5 million towards earthquake reconstruction work in Pakistan.1 In March 2005, the visiting prime minister of Pakistan proposed a Free Trade Agreement between Pakistan and Oman, later reiterated in 2006. The Pakistan-Oman Investment Company was setup in 2002, which is an important milestone achieved by the Oman-Pakistan Joint Investment Commission. The significance of the Pakistan-Oman Investment Company is manifested through the fact that the Pakistan-Oman microfinance Bank was inaugurated by the President of Pakistan in May 2006. It is important to mention that the Oman International Bank now operates in Gwadar, Karachi and Lahore, and recently Bank Muscat has also invested in Pakistan. Hopefully, these investments from Oman will lead to more investments from other countries. Pakistan and Kuwait: The presence of about 125,000 Pakistanis in Kuwait shows the strength of bilateral ties. Kuwait is Pakistan’s third largest partner in the GCC. The $250 million balance of payment support it provided after the nuclear tests of 1998 supplemented the effort of Saudi Arabia and UAE to stabilize Pakistan’s economy. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has invested more than $200 million since 1976 in 10 projects which are now complete.2 The Kuwait Fund has provided $245 million towards infrastructural development in Pakistan, especially roads, power, water and social sectors.3 In 2004, at a very important meeting of the Pak-Kuwait Joint Ministerial Commission, representatives from both sides agreed to enhance bilateral trade from $800 million to 41 billion by encouraging private sector investment.1 Pakistan and Qatar: Since Qatar’s independence in 1971, Pakistan has maintained cordial relations with Qatar. Relationships between the two were initiated through HH Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani’s visits to Pakistan in 1970s and 1980s followed by exchange visits by the Pakistani leadership. There have been frequent high-level meetings between the two countries, specifically on economic cooperation. Bilateral trade has increased since President Musharraf’s visit to Qatar in 2005. In 2005-06, bilateral trade between Pakistan and Qatar reached $529.06 million.2 In the aftermath of the earthquake in Pakistan, Qatar sent relief goods of about $20 million and also operated several medical camps in the earthquake affected areas.3 In June 2007, the Qatari finance minister signed several agreements plus a MoU in Islamabad. With a total value of $2 billion, these agreements envisaged among other things industrial zones and power projects. Pakistan expects a spurt in Qatari investment in the years ahead. Apart from a joint Ministerial Commission to oversee cooperation, a Joint Business Council has also been formed. Both countries are also in the process of reaching an agreement to implement the Qatar-Pakistan gas pipeline project. For this project, the Pakistani Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources has signed a MoU with Crescent Petroleum Company International Limited of Sharjah in 2000. The project is envisaged to also provide natural gas to India. At a state-level meeting in 2005, officials of both ￼ countries agreed for investment in the oil and gas sector. Pakistan and Qatar have signed a MoU to enhance Air Traffic and facilitate the travelling in 2004. Pakistan and Bahrain: Recently Prime Minster of Pakistan, Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, in a meeting with a visiting official from Bahrain, emphasized that stronger bonds of close friendship and cooperation between the two countries are deeply rooted in common faith and cultural values.1 In 2006, Shaikh Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa visited Pakistan and met the Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz to cooperate in the areas of economic, defence and security, as well as both countries explored possibilities of a bilateral FTA. Trade turnover is relatively small but it has a growth potential, as in 2007 the bilateral trade reached to $250 million. 2 Therefore, a bilateral FTA would be an ideal move to uplift the scope of trade between the two countries. Drafts from both sides on proposed FTA agreement have been exchanged and a formal agreement is expected in the near future. Number of direct transport routs between two countries could be a measurement of the extent of bilateral relations. In this regard, a landmark Air Services Agreement (2004) was reached between the Gulf Air and Pakistan International Airlines to operate weekly flights from Bahrain to Lahore and Peshawar.

#### Pakistani expats

Pakistani Expatriate Community in the Gulf No exact data is available to exactly measure the number of Indo-Pak expatriates in the GCC, but the figure is estimated around 6 million Indians and 3 million Pakistanis in the Gulf.1 Remittances coming from Pakistani workers in the Gulf States are a significant contribution to the home economy. In times of economic recession, struggling Pakistani governments have been relying on foreign exchange through remittances. According to the State Bank of Pakistan, Pakistan received a record amount of $5.493 billion as workers’ remittances during the fiscal year 2006- 2007. Saudi Arabia was the outstanding source with $1,024 million with UAE close behind with $866.49 million while Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman accounted for $757.33 million.2 Governments in both India and Pakistan have also been seriously concerned about the abuse of and discrimination against their citizens in the Gulf countries. In late 2007, Dubai experienced demonstrations from South Asian construction workers demanding better pay and working conditions. This demonstration was the first of its kind and ending up being violent with attacks on police. As a result of this many protesting workers were immediately deported and jailed. Earlier in 2008, a court in Dubai sentenced 45 Indian construction workers to six months imprisonment for their involvement in the demonstrations. Labour unrest is an ongoing phenomenon with inflation hitting most of the Gulf States and this is mainly due to discrimination against workers from South Asia e.g. low wage and worse working conditions. Recently, policymakers in the Gulf countries, specifically in the UAE and Bahrain, have taken some steps to respond to the demands from the migrant workers in their countries. It is essential as there are approximately 13 million foreign workers in the GCC states, making up about 37 percent of the population.1 For the Gulf countries to play a significant role towards peace, development and stability in South Asia, it is of utmost importance that migrant workers from the region get better and equitable treatment in the Gulf.

#### Card

Bhatnagar 10 [(Zahid Shahab Ahmed, University of New England (Australia) and the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, Costa Rica) Stuti Bhatnagar, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India)) “Gulf States and the Conflict between India and Pakistan” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 2, 259-291] AT

Also this initiative will offer another forum, a CBM, for India and Pakistan to cooperate, which will hopefully lead to further economic development in India and Pakistan. As a result of ongoing development and rapid population growth rate, energy requirements both in India and Pakistan are on constant rise. Considering the rich oil and natural gas reserves in the Gulf States, they are capable of fulfilling the demands of India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan have been taking steps to ensure a steady supply of oil and gas from the Gulf. In this regard, one gas pipeline project has been discussed, which will bring gas from Qatar to Pakistan and then India. The proposed pipeline is 1,186 km long, will go undersea from Qatar to the UAE with a short overland section in Oman, and then again undersea to Pakistan. Later on the extended pipeline will provide gas to India, as Qatar is more interested in reaching out to the Indian market by proposing Pakistan for transit facilities. Energy cooperation between the Gulf and India and Pakistan will in the short-run fulfil energy demands of the latter but will have greater regional implications by enhancing interdependence between the South Asian rivals, and hopefully this in the long-run will result in further enriching regional cooperation in South Asia. The desire to protect the Gulf and Indian Ocean region from becoming a part of superpower competition led to India and Sri Lanka coming up with the principle called the “zone of peace”. In December 1971, the United Nations General Assembly resolved to declare the Indian Ocean “for all time as a zone of peace”. It is evident that the maritime security in the Indian Ocean has been of great concern. And there have been threats to particular countries to protect its Indian Ocean territories from illicit acts. Therefore in May 2008, at a conference on “Partnering for Safer Seas” of the Indian Ocean nations in Maldives, the countries collectively decided to launch the South Asian Regional Port Security Cooperative (SARPSCO).1 It is an important initiative to implement collective security in the Indian Ocean to ensure extra level of protection to trade through this route, and not to let it become a target for criminals, terrorists, pirates and weapons’ trade. Therefore, it is considered to be the time for the revival of the principle of the “zone of peace” in the South Asian and West Asian context, as most of the security concerns are mutual, e.g. terrorism, drug and human trafficking etc. So probably, it is the right time in the 21st century to focus on inter-regional security cooperation. Arab Gulf states and India have also sought to enter into maritime cooperation agreements. India and Oman are founding members of the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), of which the UAE is also a member. It is an international organization with 18 member states and was first established in Mauritius on March 1995 and formally launched on 6-7 March 1997. The Association disseminates information on trade and investment regimes, with a view to helping the region's business community better understand the impediments to trade and investment within the region. These information exchanges have been intended to serve as a base to expand intra-regional trade. Conclusion For centuries, there have been close ties between the countries in the Gulf and South Asia. The relationship that began with trade links was further enriched with the advent of Islam and the influence of the Arab and Persian civilizations could be seen in South Asian communities. In the most recent past, the two regions have been cooperating at a much bigger scale through joint ventures mainly in trade, politics, defence and most recently in agriculture. Countries in South Asia see the GCC bloc as an economic partner and this is evident through both India and Pakistan desiring a FTA with the GCC. Also it is clear that to either sustain or grow at the rate of development in South Asia the countries are depending on precious natural resources (oil and gas) mainly from the Gulf region. Closely linked to food exports from India and Pakistan, it is predicted that the Gulf region could go through serious food shortages. In 2007-08, Pakistan struggled to provide enough wheat and sugar to its people, due to inaccurate government projections on per annum wheat production and smuggling of wheat primarily to Afghanistan. However, both India and Pakistan are looking forward to benefit from the energy resources in the Gulf countries, and therefore it will be a win-win situation if the issue of food insecurity in the Gulf could be resolved through compensating energy imports from India and Pakistan. Recently, during a visit to the UAE, the Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee stated, “I see India’s requirement for energy security and that of the Gulf countries for food security as opportunities that can be leveraged to mutual advantage”.1 The Gulf countries are keen to invest in farmlands abroad so to address its food insecurity, and recently through an aid of $6 billion to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has managed to get thousands of acres of agriculture land in Pakistan. Also it was reported that the government of the UAE and its private companies have already acquired approximately 324 thousand hectares of farmland in Pakistan2. In the long run, investment in the agriculture sector in countries like Pakistan is supposed to fulfil the growing food demands in the Gulf countries, which will be cost-effective too. Inter-regional cooperation has to catch up in response to growing inter-regional dependence and mutual areas of interests, therefore a stable and secure South Asia is very much in the interest of the Gulf region. A consolidated GCC would provide the core around which there would be a second group of friendly nations that derive significant benefits from their interaction with this core. Pakistan as a trusted friendly neighbour and virtual extension of the GCC coastal belt with Gwadar fitting into a chain of fraternal ports, and India, an emerging military and economic power, can contribute significantly to a new balance of power. If an effective mechanism for their association with GCC is created, India and Pakistan may find it to be a factor in their present movement towards a broad South Asian entente. It has been internationally noted that Gulf Arabs would be favourably disposed to this rapprochement and that the economics of energy is one of the principal sources of strength for sustaining it. In this analysis, Pakistan's special ties with the Muslim world become an incentive for good relations with India.1

### exploitation

#### Exploitation exists

Picot 14 [Maria, Graduate Student of Social Sciences at the Universidad de Buenos Aires, “Advancing the Rights of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Reforming the Kafala System,” http://www.academia.edu/7700760/Advancing\_the\_Rights\_of\_Migrant\_Workers\_in\_the\_Gulf\_Cooperation\_Council\_Reforming\_the\_Kafala\_System]

Once the workers arrived in any of the six countries that they have obtained a job or a visa for, the first thing they do is go through very long queues at the airport, where their documentation is checked and they have to undergo a retina exam for purposes of identification. Later they are met outside the airport by a representative of their company and are transported to their accommodation in the labour camps that are either owned or rented by the company. At this stage is where they receive the first shock and they realized that the accommodation that appeared to be so appropriate when talking to the recruiter, in reality it is not. Labour camps, or labour accommodations, “are typically relegated to industrial zones or other marginal locations backstage to the city” 37 that have none, or few, public transportation connections that forbids the worker to freely move around the city in the little spare time he has. In order to arrive and depart their working site, they are transported by the company-arranged transportation. Moreover, the living conditions are of poor-quality, cramped with several people living in a small space (in some of the camps 10-15 people can be found sharing the same room), 38 that sometimes lacks running water and/or electricity and with unhygienic toilets and showers. The kitchens that the workers have at their disposal are equipped, in some cases, with kerosene burners, which are a hazard and have been banned in several of the GCC countries. These poor accommodation standards clearly denote a lack of enforcement of the government's prescribed living standards, both at a national and at an international level. After they are settled in the accommodation, they meet with their sponsor or its representative, who in return for issuing the working visa, withholds the workers’ passport, as a way to ensure that the worker will not try to escape the employer, leaving the worker completely dependant on his kafeel . The worker is also required to sign a working contract 39 (usually in Arabic, a language the worker is not familiar with) for a period of two years time that can be renewed or extended. However, during those two years the workers is not allowed to change jobs during those two years, even in cases of force majeure. Once the contract has expired and either of the parties do not wish to renew it, the sponsor is “financially responsible for repatriating the worker” 40 back to his country of origin by providing the worker with the flight ticket home. Once all the formalities have been dealt with, the labourer starts working but, in some cases, it is there that the workers realize that the position they had been hired for was different than what they are actually supposed to do. 41 This not only implies a demoralizing factor for the worker but it also means that he will be paid less than he was promised and, as a result, he will be able to send less money back to his family.

#### Exploitation

HRW 14 [Human Rights Watch “Gulf Countries: Increase Migrant Worker Protection” NOVEMBER 23, 2014] AT

(Kuwait) – Labor ministers from Gulf and Asian countries meeting on November 26 and 27, 2014, should improve labor law protection, reform abusive immigration policies, and increase dialogue with trade unions and nongovernmental groups, 90 human rights organizations and unions said today. Millions of contract workers from Asia and Africa, including an estimated 2.4 million domestic workers in the Gulf, are subject to a wide range of abuses, including unpaid wages, confiscation of passports, physical abuse, and forced labor. “Whether it’s the scale of abuse of domestic workers hidden from public view or the shocking death toll among construction workers, the plight of migrants in the Gulf demands urgent and profound reform,” said Rothna Begum, Middle East women’s rights researcher at Human Rights Watch. “This should include a thorough overhaul of the abusive kafala visa sponsorship system.” The ministers will meet in the third round of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, an inter-regional forum on labor migration between Asian countries of origin and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of destination. Nongovernmental groups participated in the first two rounds but were not invited to this year’s gathering. Labor ministers from the GCC states are to meet separately on November 23 to discuss a draft domestic workers contract and the proposed formation of a cross-GCC body to oversee migrant domestic work. The kafala system, used to varying extents across the Gulf, restricts most workers from moving to a new job before their contracts end unless they obtain their employer’s consent, trapping many workers in abusive situations. Many migrant workers feel intense financial pressure not only to support their families at home but also to pay off huge debts incurred during recruitment. Poorly monitored labor recruitment agencies, in both the migrants’ countries of origin and in the destination Gulf states, often overcharge migrant workers, deceive them about their working conditions, or fail to assist them if they encounter workplace abuse. In Saudi Arabia and Qatar, migrant workers cannot leave the country without obtaining their employer’s consent for an “exit permit” from the authorities. Some employers have refused to pay wages, return passports, or provide permission for “exit permits” in order to exact work from workers involuntarily. A November analysis by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), “Facilitating Exploitation,” highlighted how gaps in national labor laws in GCC countries either partially or completely exclude domestic workers. An October Human Rights Watch report, “I Already Bought You,” and an April Amnesty International report, “My Sleep is My Break,” found common patterns of abuse against domestic workers in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar respectively, including unpaid wages, no rest periods, excessive workloads, food deprivation, and confinement in the workplace. In several cases, domestic workers reported physical or sexual abuse and had been in situations of forced labor, including trafficking.

### Cap cuts

#### Low oil prices cause unrest

Lewis 11 [(Ed, New Left Project; interview with Adam Hanieh, lecturer in development studies at SOAS, and is an editorial board member of Historical Materialism) “Class and Capitalism in the Gulf The Political Economy of the Gulf Cooperation Council” New Left Project 5 December 2011] AT

High prices of oil are strongly correlated with recessionary periods and, as the 1970s showed, those countries that are reliant upon oil imports can be badly hit by high prices. Indeed, this was a major factor (partly facilitated through the recycling of Gulf petrodollars) in the explosion of Southern debt from the 1970s onwards. The further trend of rising food prices in the current period (partially linked to the price of hydrocarbons) means that the impact of high oil prices can be devastating in multiple ways. The other side to this, however, is the interest of the Gulf states (and, of course, oil companies) in a higher price. There are various estimates of the ‘break even’ points for the GCC states – the necessary price of oil for these states to meet their fiscal requirements. The IMF estimated in 2008 that Saudi Arabia needed oil at $49/barrel to balance its fiscal account for the year. The lower range of the IMF estimates for the GCC was the UAE ($23) and Kuwait ($33) and the highest were found in Bahrain ($75) and Oman ($77). The GCC as a whole averaged $47/barrel. However, these estimates are probably too low. We need to remember that the GCC states have launched a massive program of government spending in the wake of the uprisings to undercut any dissent within their countries. The Institute of International Finance, a peak-body association of the world’s largest banks, estimated in March 2011 that Saudi Arabia would need oil to sell at an average of $88/barrel in 2011 for government spending to break even. Saudi Arabia is a key producer because it is one of the few states with the ability to increase supply to the world market and thus lower the price of oil (although some industry analysts question to what extent this is really possible and claim that Saudi reserves have been overstated). In short, there are many different factors that are complexly inter-related here. But I think the likely scenario in the near future is a continued high price and persistent growth in the surpluses of the GCC states.

#### Protests collapse Middle Eastern capitalism

Lewis 11 [(Ed, New Left Project; interview with Adam Hanieh, lecturer in development studies at SOAS, and is an editorial board member of Historical Materialism) “Class and Capitalism in the Gulf The Political Economy of the Gulf Cooperation Council” New Left Project 5 December 2011] AT

Could the ‘Arab Spring’ serve to threaten the regional balance of power as well as the balance of class forces that prevail within the Gulf states? AH: This is absolutely the real potential of the uprisings through 2011. The two processes I’ve described above – the increasing weight of the regional economy and the differentiated impact of the global crisis – mean that it is impossible to treat the national and regional scales as two distinct political spheres. What appear on the surface to be ‘national’ struggles that are contained within individual nation-states, inevitably grow to confront the construction of these broader regional hierarchies. This is the context in which the Arab uprisings have unfolded. There are different aspects to this. On the one hand we can see the role of the U.S. and other foreign powers in the region and, very importantly, the position of Israel. The uprisings (particularly that of Egypt) confront all of these features because the regimes that are being challenged were central to how this regional order was constructed. It is thus wrong to see the uprisings as solely a question of ‘democracy’ – as if the ‘political’ can be separated from the ‘economic’ or the ‘national’ from the ‘regional.’ Likewise with the role that the GCC states play in the regional political economy. I am not claiming that the slogans and demands of the uprisings explicitly target the GCC states in this manner (or, indeed, Israel or the U.S.), but contained within their logic is an implicit challenge to the regional order as it has developed over the last two decades. The social structures that characterized political rule in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere are themselves part of how the GCC – linked to the domination of foreign powers and the position of Israel – established its place atop the hierarchies of the regional market. The struggles against dictatorship that the uprisings represent are, simultaneously, intertwined with the way that capitalism has developed across the region and, in this sense, are also struggles against the Gulf. This explains the furious attempts by the GCC states to hold back and derail these uprisings – they are absolute central to the counter-revolutionary wave that is being unleashed today in the region. I think a convincing case can be made that imperialism in the region is articulated with – and largely works through – the GCC states. The NATO-led invasion of Libya is a clear example of this, with Qatar and the UAE, in particular, playing a very important role in this invasion. The Gulf states sent troops, money and equipment and – perhaps most importantly – provided the political legitimacy for this attack. There are many other examples – we can see it in the billions of dollars that are being promised by the Gulf states to the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia; the military intervention in Bahrain; the offer made to Jordan and Morocco to join the GCC (thereby bringing together all the reactionary monarchies in the region within a single bloc); and the centrality of the GCC to attempting to mediate and steer the uprisings in Syria and Yemen. And, perhaps most significantly, the rising threats that are being made against Iran. Indeed, the question of Iran is just as much a question of the GCC as it is of Israel. So yes, the uprisings present a real possibility of shifting the regional order. Egypt, with its large, better organized working class and much stronger Left organizations is the key point of struggle. But to return to the themes above, in the long-run there are no ‘national’ solutions to the broader problems of uneven development facing the Middle East and North Africa. These require a pan-regional solution and, centrally, that means confronting the position of the GCC states as the core of capitalism in the region.

#### Plan keeps migrant workers in the GCC which allows contradictions in capitalism – creates preconditions for a revolution

Thier 11 [(Hadas Thier, ) “Hothouse capitalism in the Gulf Arab states” Issue #82: Reviews] AT

Lastly, Hanieh offers an incredibly useful analysis of the region’s working class and the “spatial fix,” as he dubs it, which enabled the ruling elites of the Gulf to “construct a powerful system of control over the vast majority of the resident population.” Brutal repression has been one obvious aspect of maintaining this control. But another is a reliance on a temporary, migrant workforce—made up largely of Arabs from other Middle Eastern countries, but, increasingly, also of workers drawn from countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, and the Philippines. Migrants make up the vast majority of workers in the Gulf but are afforded no citizenship rights. The “class itself is constantly being remade anew,” and this transience hinders the development of class consciousness and organization. At the same time, large oil revenues are used to draw layers of native-born citizens into state apparatuses, with guaranteed job security and added benefits. When times are “good,” the temporary workers face substandard conditions and greater rates of exploitation—greasing the wheels of increased profit rates for Gulf capitalists. When the economy hits troubled waters, they’re easily deported and become the “problem” of their countries of origin, thereby displacing the crisis. As one analyst for the Saudi National Commercial Bank euphemistically put it, this approach is “a positive externality of labor market flexibility.” Indeed, when the financial crisis broke out in 2008, thousands of workers in the Gulf states were deported. Those who remained faced desperate conditions. Thousands were stranded in the UAE as companies fled the country without paying workers or returning confiscated passports. Suicides among migrant workers increased dramatically. In Kuwait in 2010, migrant workers were committing suicide at a rate of one every two days. But, as one social worker commented, “They think if they kill themselves the loan sharks will leave their families at home alone. But they don’t. They still go after them.” As much as this “spatial fix” forestalls the development of class organization for the time being, it only deepens the contradictions in the long run. Some of these contradictions, along with American and Chinese capital jockeying for influence in the region and the GCC’s growing role in the international financial markets, are sketched out briefly in some interesting concluding observations.

#### Tradeoffs between business and citizens in the Gulf are zero sum – the plan is not a compromise with capital but a demand that it bow down to us

Hertog 13 [(Steven, Prof of Government at London School of Economics, Middle East Center) “The private sector and reform in the Gulf Cooperation Council” Jul 8, 2013] AT

In a more theoretical sub-section, the paper will argue that the tensions with the general population and the closeness to the regime are structurally embedded in the political economies of the GCC, for reasons that have not been discussed in the literature and which go beyond customary arguments of “cronyism” and “rentier bourgeoisie”. Departing from existing fiscal sociology arguments, the paper will propose that the absence of taxation is important not only in the “representation vs. taxation” context. It also gives business a peculiar position vis-à-vis the rest of society: Without taxes, private sector growth does not lead to an increase in state resources and hence does not benefit the general population qua more public services. Conversely, however, much of business growth in the GCC remains financed through state spending, which hence becomes unavailable for other forms of broader distribution. This situation creates an unusually harsh zero-sum game between business owners and citizens who are not businesspeople (or senior management). The tension is further deepened by the fact that business growth hardly contributes to national employment, as most, or at least most of the attractive jobs for nationals are still found in the public sector. The predominantly foreign employees of the private sector tend to remit a large share of their incomes to their home countries, contributing to a resource drain that bypasses citizens. The overall situation is such that a rational national voter is likely to demand populist economic policies from the government, even if they destroy business, as the cost of the latter are only borne by the business class itself. The scope for a European-style “historical compromise” between capitalists and national employees is thin. This structural tension between business and population is partially counteracted by the community roots, notable and merchant traditions of at least the smaller GCC societies. Even there, however, it creates a fundamental cleavage that ceteris paribus makes economic policy-making as well as further democratization more difficult than in non-rentier states. The section will end with a brief discussion of potential “grand bargains” that could bring business and (significant parts of) society together in a reform coalition, focusing in particular on policies to increase national employment, which in political as well as fiscal terms would function as a quasi-tax.

### Labor relations

#### Labor relations tied India and UAE

Pradhan 9 [(Samir, economics specialist based in the UAE. Previously, he served as a senior consultant, macroeconomics research at Tanween,a leading consultancy in Doha, Qatar. Before that, he was senior researcher, GCC economics and Gulf-Asia programmes at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai/ UAE, the leading think tank of the Gulf region) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

The major economic thrust came after the discovery of oil in the region and the subsequent economic development of the desert economies propelling imports of goods, services and manpower from the neighboring Asian region. As large numbers of people from India migrated to the Gulf in their quest for wealth and prosperity, so did the business communities in their effort to serve these expatriate consumers as well as the wealthy import dependent Arabs. The succeeding periods witnessed phenomenal migration of labor from India as the oil-fueled development process in the Gulf gathered momentum. Simultaneously, individual business houses from the subcontinent started to expand their base through partnership with Gulf business communities. And the legacy continued, although the pattern of economic engagement has transformed considerably over the years. In essence, the Indian community has played a pivotal role in the transformation of the Gulf economic scenario from primeval commercial exchanges to high-tech based corporate practices and innovative consumer services. The changed economic and geopolitical environment in the aftermath of 9/11 and the constrained business environment for the Gulf countries in the Western world intensified the Gulf ’s economic engagement with Asia in general and India in particular. Asia’s emergence as a global economic power and India’s increasing global economic clout also considerably changed the business patterns of the Gulf countries. While the Gulf ’s economic engagement with India has grown to the current stage of intensive interaction, India’s political presence in the Gulf remains subdued. This has been primarily due to mutual negligence, domestic constraints, international power relations and inward looking policies of past eras. However, with a changed global geopolitical environment and increasing geoeconomic interdependence, the Gulf region considers India not only a strategic economic ally, but also a potential ‘bridging power’ that can play a constructive role for regional peace and stability.

#### Oil adva

Pradhan 9 [(Samir, economics specialist based in the UAE. Previously, he served as a senior consultant, macroeconomics research at Tanween,a leading consultancy in Doha, Qatar. Before that, he was senior researcher, GCC economics and Gulf-Asia programmes at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai/ UAE, the leading think tank of the Gulf region) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

In 1936, large numbers of Indian traders were present in Kuwait and the Shaikh of Kuwait even expressed the desire to keep them out because of the apprehension that Indians are able and capable of living more cheaply than his own people and their business acumen may drive many Kuwaiti merchants out of business. Consequently, they proposed to limit the number of Indians entering Kuwait and decreed that no Indian could carry on business without an equal Kuwaiti partner. However, such steps were soon overlooked when the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) increased its employees from 1,900 in January 1947 to 18,000 by January 1949, of whom 4,053 were Indians. The majority of Indian workers (3,269) were skilled and semi-skilled, paid at rates of Rs. 190 per month plus a further Rs. 95 as living allowances. In Bahrain, Indian and Pakistani labor remained the largest component of the expatriate labor force – over 60 per cent – in 1977. In Kuwait, Indian and Pakistani labor represented only 10.4 per cent of immigrant workers in 1975. Thus, the predominance of employees from the Indian sub-continent in skilled and unskilled occupations from the 1930s and their prominent role as unskilled workers filled the vacuum in supply left by shortages of local Gulf labor. As the oil-led development process gathered momentum into the modern era, the flow of Indian laborers increased. Simultaneously, Indian business establishments also increased in the Gulf region. Currently, around 4.5 million Indians live in the GCC, making them the largest expatriate community in the region (Figure 1). The majority of the Indian population in the GCC is from the Southern Indian States, including Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The rest belong to Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan. The original settlers were mostly Sindhis and have been the integral part of the business community in the Gulf (especially the UAE). The Indian expatriate community can be categorized into four broad groups, viz., (a) unskilled workers, employed in construction companies, municipalities, agricultural farms and as domestic workers; (b) skilled and semi- skilled workers; (c) professionals, such as doctors, engineers, accountants, employed in government and private sectors; and (d) businessmen. Around 1.5 million Indians live in the UAE, about a million of whom live in Dubai and the Northern Emirates and the remainder of about 0.5 million in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. It is estimated that about 33 percent of the total population and over 42.5 percent of the work force in the UAE are Indians. Indians have been playing a major role in the economic development of the UAE over the last 35 years. Professionals and technically qualified Indians are engaged in huge numbers in the knowledge-based economic sectors such as information technology, Dubai Internet City, Dubai Media City, free zones, etc.

#### remittances

Pradhan 9 [(Samir, economics specialist based in the UAE. Previously, he served as a senior consultant, macroeconomics research at Tanween,a leading consultancy in Doha, Qatar. Before that, he was senior researcher, GCC economics and Gulf-Asia programmes at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai/ UAE, the leading think tank of the Gulf region) “India’s Growing Role in the Gulf: Implications for the Region and the United States” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

Unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, when nearly 90 percent of Indians in the Gulf were blue-collar workers, today over 35 percent of the Indian expatriate workforce are white-collar professionals specializing in fast moving fields such as the service industry. Unlike in other regions, Indian expatriates in the Gulf have a higher propensity to remit back the money they earn. Since more than 65 percent are low- skilled laborers, their families back home depend solely on these remittances as a source of living. With the change in legal procedures regarding owning property in the UAE, expatriates, especially the skilled workforce, are also increasingly investing in UAE’s booming real estate sector. According to the latest data, the Gulf countries together account for nearly 27 percent of total remittances flowing to India (see Figure 2). Remittances from the Gulf are typically linked to the fluctuations in exchange rate between the rupee and the dollar as all Gulf currencies, except the Kuwaiti Dinar, are pegged to the dollar. A sharp decline in the value of the Indian rupee against the dollar and GCC currencies triggered a sudden jump of 40 per cent in the volume of remittances from the Gulf in May 2008.

#### India-iran relations are useless

Pant 9 [(Harsh, professor specializing in International Relations Theory, Security Studies, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Asia-Pacific Security, South Asian Politics at King’s college in London) “Looking Beyond Tehran: India’s Rising Stakes in the Gulf” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

Ever since India and the US embarked on the journey to transform their ties by changing the global nuclear order to accommodate India, Iran has emerged as a litmus test that India has to pass, from time to time, to the satisfaction of the US policy-makers. India’s traditionally close ties with Iran have become a major factor influencing how certain sections of the US policy-makers evaluate a US- India partnership. India-Iran ties have been termed everything from an “axis” to a “strategic partnership” and even an “alliance.” Some in the US strategic community have suggested that a “Tehran-New Delhi Axis” has been emerging over the last few years that could have an immense significance for the United States because of its potentially damaging impact upon US interests in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.

Given the obsession of the US policy-makers with Iran in the last few years, India has been asked to prove its loyalty to the US by lining up behind Washington on the question of Iran’s nuclear program at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Bush administration stated clearly that if India voted against the US motion on Iran at the IAEA, the Congress would likely not approve the US-India nuclear agreement. Congressman Tom Lantos threatened that India “will pay a heavy price for a disregard of US concerns vis-à-vis Iran.” India finally voted in February 2006 with 26 other nations to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. This was the second time India voted with the West on the issue of the Iranian nuclear program. Despite this, many members of Congress continued to demand that Washington make the nuclear deal conditional on New Delhi’s ending all military relations with Tehran by pointing to a visit by Iranian naval vessels to the Indian port of Kochi in June 2006 for five days of joint exercises that included training for Iranian cadets.

The Bush administration insisted that it would oppose any amendment to the nuclear pact that would condition cooperation with India upon India’s policies towards Iran.However,the US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (also known as the Hyde Act) that was signed by the President Bush in December 2006 contained a “Statement of Policy” section which explicated a few riders ensuring India’s support for US policies toward the Iranian nuclear issue, in particular “to

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dissuade, isolate, and if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.”While this section of the Act generated considerable domestic opposition in India, President Bush, while signing the Act, emphasized that his administration would interpret this provision as merely “advisory.”

While the Bush administration itself, from time to time, expressed its concerns about India-Iran ties, it refused to make them central to the negotiations over the nuclear pact. Given the US Congress’ growing opposition to India-Iran ties and its public expression of their views, the Bush administration’s more considered response, however, was not enough to assuage the critics in India.

The American focus on India-Iran ties has been highly disproportionate to the substantive realities that underpin this relationship, a result more of a response to the exigencies of domestic politics than to the regional political realities. Interestingly, the Indian Left has also made Iran an issue emblematic of India’s “strategic autonomy” and has used this stick to coerce the Indian government into a following an ideological foreign policy. A close examination of the India-Iran relationship, however, reveals an underdeveloped relationship despite all the spin being put on it by both sides.

On the crucial issue of energy, Iran is merely responsible for about 8 percent of Indian oil imports. Moreover, both the major energy deals signed with great fanfare by the two sides are in limbo as of now. India’s 25-year, $22 billion worth agreement with Iran for the supply of LNG has not moved an inch since signed in 2005 as it requires India to build a LNG plant in Iran which would need American components and this might end up violating the US Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The other project involving the construction of a 1700-mile, $7 billion pipeline to carry natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan is also stuck for a number of reasons. The present government initially viewed the pipeline project as a confidence-building measure between India and Pakistan, but when pressure started mounting the Indian Prime Minister went so far as saying that he did not know if any international consortium of bankers would underwrite the project given the uncertainties in Iran. The Indian strategic community has never been in favor of this proposal because in their opinion it ends up giving Pakistan too great a leverage over India’s energy security. Without reliable security guarantees from Pakistan, the project is not going anywhere and given the present uncertainty in Pakistan, it is unlikely that this project will take off in the near future even if India and Pakistan can agree on the transit fees.

Both these projects have also brought home to Indians the unreliability of Iran

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as a trade partner. There are differences between the national oil companies of Iran and India over the legal interpretation of the contract for the export of LNG to India. This deal was signed before Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected President of Iran and was tied to a relatively low market price for crude oil. India considers the deal final and binding while Iran has argued that it is not binding because it has not been ratified. The Iranian Supreme Economic Council has refused to ratify the 2005 agreement and has demanded an upward revision in price. Both India and Pakistan have contended that Tehran offer a price for gas in line with global practices for long-term contracts and have rejected Iran’s gas pricing formula wherein the gas price is linked to Brent crude oil with a fixed escalating cost component. The three states have now decided to get a realistic appraisal of gas prices through an independent consultant, although Iran maintains that the consultant’s opinion would not be binding. Amid the growing global isolation of Iran, sections of the Indian government have suggested that India’s participation in the gas pipeline deal might not give any strategic advantage to India, given the very low quantity (30 million standard cubic meters per day) of gas involved. Buying gas at the Pakistan- India border is being advocated as a better alternative. Moreover, it appears that the Iranian gas is not the lowest priced option at the current price structure for India. There is little evidence, so far, that Iran would be a reliable partner for India in its search for energy security. A number of important projects have either been rejected by Iran or have yet to be finalized due to its changing of terms and conditions.

There is bewilderment in India in so far as the US insistence on India not to move forward with this project is concerned. Given the geographical realities, the India section of the pipeline will only materialize after Iran and Pakistan have completed their part. If the US allows Pakistan to go ahead, then it implies that it has no objections to the deal per se. However, if the US puts pressure on Pakistan which then drags its feet on the project, there is no issue as far as India is concerned. It is not India but Pakistan that is central to the finalization of the deal, and so pressure on India to pull back from the pact seems unwarranted. In the latest move, India has made it clear that while it remains interested in the pipeline project it would pay for the gas only after it is received at the Pakistan-India border, would not pay penalty in case of a delay, and was opposed to Iran’s demand for revision in gas prices every three years2. The conclusion of the US-India nuclear agreement and plunging prices of crude oil seems to have given India the diplomatic leverage it did not have before.

The nuclear issue is equally complex. India and Iran have long held significantly different perceptions of the global nuclear order. Iran was not supportive of the

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Indian nuclear tests in 1998 and backed the UN Security Council Resolution that asked India and Pakistan to cap their nuclear capabilities by signing the NPT and the CTBT. Iran repeatedly has called for a universal acceptance of the NPT, much to India’s discomfiture. Though Iran has claimed that this was directed at Israel, the implications of such a move are also far-reaching for India. Iran’s position on several other issues crucial to India has been against Indian interests. India’s position on the Iranian nuclear question is relatively straightforward. While India believes that Iran has a right to pursue civilian nuclear energy, it has insisted that it should clarify the doubts raised by the IAEA in so far as Iran’s compliance with the NPT is concerned. India has long maintained that it does not see any further nuclear proliferation as being in its own interests. This position has as much to do with India’s desire to project itself as a responsible nuclear state as with the very real dangers that further proliferation in its extended neighborhood would pose to its own security. It was with this mind that India not only voted against Iran at the IAEA in 2005 and 2006 but also went ahead and imposed a ban on the export of any material and technology to Iran that could be used in developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as demanded by the Security Council. The conclusion of US-India nuclear deal saw Iran warning that the pact had endangered the NPT and would trigger new “crises” for the international community3.

Much commentary has been written on growing defense ties between India and Iran but India has more substantive defense ties with the Arab world. With Iran, the defense relationship remains not only sporadic and tentative but also circumscribed by India’s growing linkages with Israel, India’s second-largest defense partner4. India-Iran ties are also diverging on Afghanistan where recent indications that certain sections of the Iranian military, especially the Revolutionary Guards, may be arming the Taliban so as to weaken the US military in Afghanistan are troubling for India. The underlying reality is that India has far more significant interests to preserve in the Arab Gulf, and as tensions rise between the Sunni Arab regimes and Iran, India’s larger stakes in the Arab Gulf might propel it further in a direction not very conducive for healthy India-Iran ties.

India has been accused of following a heavily ideological foreign policy throughout the Cold War years, especially in the Gulf. But in the last decade and a half, India has changed the trajectory of its foreign policy towards the Middle East and three states around which Indian foreign policy in the region revolves today are Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Iran is one of the pivots, not the sole or even the most important one, and there is hardly anything “strategic” in India’s relationship with Iran.

#### India-GCC relations are strategic

Pant 9 [(Harsh, professor specializing in International Relations Theory, Security Studies, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Asia-Pacific Security, South Asian Politics at King’s college in London) “Looking Beyond Tehran: India’s Rising Stakes in the Gulf” Gulf Research Center, 2009] AT

India’s engagements with the GCC states have gathered far greater momentum in the last few years even as Iran continued to hog all the limelight5. India’s desire to secure energy supplies as well as to consolidate economic and trade relations and the ‘Look East’ policy of the Gulf States has allowed the two to carve a much more substantive relationship than in the past.

In January 2006, Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud visited India (along with China), a trip some commentators labeled “a strategic shift” in Saudi foreign policy and reflective of “a new era” for the Kingdom6. It was King Abdullah’s first trip outside the Middle East since taking the throne in August 2005 and so was viewed as highly significant. It was the first visit of a Saudi monarch to India since King Saud’s brief visit to the subcontinent in 1955. Relations subsequently froze, as Riyadh sided with Washington during the Cold War, and New Delhi drifted closer to Moscow. Saudi-Indian ties strained further after the Indian government failed to condemn the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while the Saudi government helped bankroll the opposition Afghan mujahideen. India’s Gulf policy became a casualty of the Cold War structural realities. However, with the Cold War over, such impediments to Saudi-Indian and more broadly Gulf-Indian relations evaporated.

The Saudi king’s visit to India was also a signal to the broader GCC community to build a stronger partnership with India. And so, in an attempt to have a structured exchange on bilateral and collective security issues, it has been decided that the India-GCC dialogue that was held annually on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly will now be held in a GCC country or in New Delhi annually. India’s stakes in the GCC states are substantive and rising.

Trade Ties: The economic dimension of India’s Gulf policy has become more pronounced in recent years. As a group, the GCC is India’s second largest trading partner. It is the largest single origin of imports into India and the second largest destination for exports from India. Bilateral trade between India and the GCC is expected to rise above $25 billion by 2010. The UAE by itself is among India’s five largest trading partners and India’s top trading partner in the entire Middle East, accounting for 75 percent of India’s exports to the GCC countries and 6 percent of India’s global exports7. Bilateral trade between India and the UAE is valued at $14 billion, having tripled over the last five years8. The global financial meltdown and the specter of recession in the US and Europe is further prompting India to turn to Gulf States sitting on huge resources looking for investment opportunities.

The GCC countries remain a major destination for Indian investments even as India is making a concerted attempt to encourage GCC investment in India. India

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is hoping that major GCC states such as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman would participate in India’s planned expansion of infrastructure. With a rising demand for infrastructure development, India is looking for large investments from the Gulf, which is flush with funds due to the recent surge in oil prices. The Gulf States meanwhile are interested in human resources from India to develop sectors as varied as information technology, construction, transportation and services. As with Saudi Arabia and China, energy infrastructure investment is a major component in the development of Saudi-Indian relations. During the state visit, King Abdullah and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an Indo-Saudi “Delhi Declaration” calling for a wide-ranging strategic partnership, putting energy and economic cooperation on overdrive, and committing to cooperate against terrorism9. According to some reports, the King waived off Saudi bureaucratic concerns about precedents the declaration might create with regard to its relations with India’s neighbors, especially Pakistan by calling India a “special case.”10

One of the largest Indian joint ventures abroad is the Oman-India Fertilizer Project at Sur in Oman that aims to produce 1.6 million tons of urea and 250,000 tons of ammonia annually. There are more than 100 Indian joint ventures in Saudi Arabia and about half that number of Saudi joint ventures in India. As King Abdullah visited New Delhi, close to 80 top Saudi businessmen participated in the first “Saudi Arabia in India” business exhibition. A new Saudi-India Joint Business Council will provide an institutional framework to expand bilateral economic ties. Saudi authorities hope that such a channel can tap Indian expertise and help it diversify its economy in fields ranging from information technology and biotechnology to education and small business development. Saudi Arabia is also planning to establish an India investment fund that would be primarily for Indian infrastructure projects. Similar institutional arrangements are being evolved with other Gulf States as well. India has signed a pact on a joint investment fund with Oman, with a contribution of $50 million from each side, which is expected to channelize investments from Oman to India.

Energy Ties: With an economy that is projected to grow at a rate of 7-8 percent over the next two decades, meeting its rapidly increasing demand for energy is one the biggest challenges facing India. Burgeoning population, coupled with rapid economic growth and industrialization has propelled India into becoming the sixth largest energy consumer in the world, with the prospect of emerging as the fourth largest consumer in the next 4-5 years11. Energy is clearly the driving force in Gulf- India relations. Riyadh is the chief supplier of oil to India’s booming economy, and India is now the fourth largest recipient of Saudi oil after China, the United States,

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and Japan12. India’s crude oil imports from the Saudi kingdom will likely double in the next 20 years.

The GCC countries supply 45 percent of India’s petroleum requirements, Along with the Saudis who are responsible for a quarter, other major suppliers are Kuwait and the UAE. Qatar is an annual supplier of 5 million tons of LNG to India and it is expected that Qatari gas exports to India will rise to 7.5 million tons from 2009. Qatar remains India’s exclusive supplier of natural gas while Oman is India’s largest crude supplier. The Iranian government’s decision to renege on some oil supply commitments in the aftermath of India’s vote against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also spurred New Delhi to diversify suppliers.

During his visit to India, the Saudi king emphasized his country’s commitment to uninterrupted supplies to a friendly country such as India regardless of global price trends. The private Indian energy firm Reliance will invest in a refinery and petrochemicals project in Saudi Arabia, and India’s state-owned energy firm, Oil and Energy Gas Corporation, will also engage Saudi Arabia as its equity partner for a refinery project in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.

Defense Cooperation: India’s trade and energy security is inextricably linked to the security of the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. With this in mind, Indian Navy is regularly visiting Gulf ports and training with regional states. In August 2007, the Indian Navy undertook a series of naval exercises with a number of Gulf States thereby lending its hand to Indian diplomacy in expanding India’s reach in the region. It made port calls and conducted exercises with the navies of Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Djibouti when it embarked on a 48 day tour of the Gulf region. It also used this opportunity to engage with the navies of other major powers in the region such as the US, the UK, and France. The Indian naval warships have also been deployed in the Gulf of Aden to carry out anti-piracy patrols on the route followed usually by Indian commercial vessels between Salalah (Oman) and Aden (Yemen). Gulf of Aden is a strategic choke point in the Indian Ocean and provides access to the Suez Canal through which a sizeable portion of India’s trade flows.

India has cultivated close security ties with major GCC countries such as the UAE, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. The defense cooperation agreements that India has with these states are similar to the ones India has with states like the US, the UK, France, Germany, Australia and Japan. India and the UAE have decided to streamline their defense relationship which has been largely dominated by naval ship visits and training exchange programs. Now, the focus is shifting to possible

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joint development and manufacture of sophisticated military hardware. The UAE authorities have captured and swiftly extradited to India a number of high-profile terror suspects. Though India and the UAE do have an extradition treaty in place, several deportations have taken place without invoking the treaty, showing high level of mutual understanding between the two states13. Defense cooperation between India and Qatar is also extensive involving training of military personnel, joint exercises and service-to-service information sharing. Consultations are underway between India and Oman regarding the possibility of the Sultanate providing berthing facilities for the Indian warships deployed in the region.

Security ties between New Delhi and Riyadh are also developing though only gradually. The Indian military has been fighting separatist groups in its northern state of Kashmir for several years now. Thousands of lives have been lost because of Islamist terrorism or the associated crackdown. Saudi financiers bankroll many of the Pakistani and Kashmiri groups that conduct the terrorism14. The Indian government would like its Saudi counterparts to manage the funds transferred to India better, a substantial portion of which ends in Islamist pockets. The Indian prime minister and Saudi king used their New Delhi meeting to sign a memorandum of understanding dealing with terrorism, transnational crime, and underworld operations. Both governments agreed to cooperate toward the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism before the UN General Assembly and to establish an international counterterrorism center as called for by the International Conference on Counter-Terrorism held in Riyadh in February 2005. Riyadh, for its part, has agreed to support New Delhi’s petition for observer status in the Organization of Islamic Conference. It has also been supportive of Indian moves to reduce tension in Kashmir and has tried to move beyond its traditional approach of looking at India through a Pakistani prism.

The Iran Factor: New Delhi has also cultivated Riyadh for strategic reasons. To Indian strategists, any ally that can act as a counterweight to Pakistan in the Islamic world is significant. Initially, New Delhi sought to cultivate Tehran, but such efforts stumbled in recent years as the Islamic Republic has adopted an increasingly aggressive anti-Western posture15. India hopes Saudi Arabia might fill that gap. Indeed, Iranian nuclear ambitions have helped draw New Delhi and Riyadh closer.

The Saudi government has its own reasons for cultivating Indian ties. Saudi Arabia and Iran have long competed for power and influence in the Gulf16.The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran added a new edge to the rivalry, as Iranian ayatollahs increasingly sought to challenge the Saudi officials on religious matters, such as the rules and regulations surrounding the hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca. The fact that about 40 percent of Saudi Arabia’s oil-producing eastern province is Shi‘ite and resents Wahhabi rule worries Riyadh17. The anxiety is mutual. In 1994, the Iranian intelligence ministry designated Salafi terrorism as the primary threat to Iranian national security18. Tehran’s nuclear drive, Iranian interference in neighboring Iraq, and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s aggressive rhetoric further raises Saudi anxiety of a resurgent Iran, and were subjects of discussion during King Abdullah’s meeting with the Indian prime minister. The security consequences of a rising Iran are equally significant for other Arab Gulf states. It is interesting to note that during the visit of the Indian External Affairs Minister to Abu Dhabi earlier this year, the two states discussed Iran’s occupation of the three UAE islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa).19

The Indian Diaspora: While India is not a Muslim-majority country, it still hosts the second-largest Muslim population in the world, a constituency that remains interested in Saudi Arabia as the site of the holy shrines at Mecca and Medina. There is already significant cultural interchange. The approximately 1.5 million Indian workers constitute the largest expatriate community in the Kingdom.20

Indians are the largest expatriate community in the GCC states, numbering around 4 to 5 million. Indian expatriate labor constitutes around 30 percent of the total population of the UAE and they have significant presence in Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. India earns foreign exchange worth around $6 billion annually from its Gulf expatriates. The remittances of expatriate Indian workers in the Gulf have contributed significantly to India’s economic resurgence even as there have been growing concerns in recent years about their living and working conditions in the host countries. Towards this end, India is pursuing manpower and labor agreements with Gulf States intended to help Indian workers in the region.

In essence, Indian interests in the Arab Gulf are significant, they are evolving and India is carefully nurturing these ties. This is largely a consequence of the changing salience of factors that have shaped India’s Gulf policy.

### Random useless cards

#### The plan is enforceable and equalizes bargaining power, avoiding a downward pressure on wages

ITUC 14 [INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION “Gulf Countries: Increase Migrant Worker Protection” 23 November 2014] AT

Migrants in the Gulf make an important contribution both to the economies of their own countries and those of the countries where they work. In 2011, migrant workers in GCC countries sent home more than US$60 billion in remittances. Competition for jobs among the workers’ countries of origin, combined with their relative lack of bargaining power in relation to the labor-destination countries, means that the pressure they exert for better labor protections is weak. “The meetings over the next few days provide a key opportunity to promote regional minimum standards that would avoid a counterproductive race to the bottom in labor conditions,” said William Gois of Migrant Forum Asia. “The governments should develop a concrete action plan, in consultation with migrant workers themselves and the organizations that represent them, with benchmarks to monitor its progress.” Kuwait University Law School will host an event on November 23, 2014, at which panelists from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, IDWF, the ITUC, and Migrant Forum Asia will discuss the rights of migrant domestic workers. The groups recommend that the governments: - Establish and enforce comprehensive labor law protections for migrant workers, including domestic workers; - Reform the kafala (sponsorship) visa system to ensure that workers can change employers without being required to first obtain their consent; - Remove the “exit permit” requirement in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; - Strengthen regulation and monitoring of labor recruitment agencies, including eliminating recruitment fees for workers; - Ensure that migrants have access to justice and support services; and - Expand the Abu Dhabi Dialogue to include labor-origin countries from Africa, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, and participation by nongovernmental groups. Governments should ratify and implement international labor and human rights standards, the groups said. These include the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, the ILO Forced Labor Protocol, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

#### Impact to remittances too old

Wickramasekara 93 [(Piyasiri, senior specialist with the International Labour Organization, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka) The Gulf Crisis and South Asia: Studies on the Economic Impact] AT

A general equilibrium analysis of the impact of migration has so far not yet been undertaken in the absence of the required inputl output framework and relevant coefficients for the regional economy. However, micro level studies on migration from Kerala provide important insights into the possible macro economic consequences of remittance inﬂow for regional development. After all, the decisions regarding the utilisation of the domestic money resource counterpart of foreign remittances are individually taken by the migrant families themselves. But there are two caveats that have to be bome in mind. Firstly, the macro level impact on development will not merely be a summation of the first round impact of spending or saving decisions reached by the migrant households. Equally important are successive rounds of expenditure and saving from remittance income. The beneﬁts of remittance inflows are not confined to migrant households alone, given the strong redistributive mechanisms in operation, especially the traditions of collective bargaining in the region and the nearly universal practice of gifts that the migrant has to give hisl her kith and kin. It is unlikely that migration has led to a worsening of the income distribution in the state. The Lorentz ratio of consumer expenditure was virtually the same in both 1973-74 and 1986-87 at 0.305 and 0.307 respectively. The fact that a majority of the Gulf migrants belonged to the relatively lower income groups, even if not the lowest, also contributed to the above outcome. Secondly, even the micro data that have been generated with respect to household level income, expenditure and saving have to be taken with caution. The income estimates are universally underestimated, partly due to deliberate underreporting by the respondents, or due to the lack of knowledge of the savings directly deposited or personally brought back by the migrant workers. Consequently, there is a tendency to overstate the marginal propensity to consume out of the remittance income. Further, the reluctance to divulge information regarding financial savings also tends to exaggerate the proportion of savings devoted to the formation of non-productive assets. An evidence of such a possibility of understating productive utilisation of assets is indicated in a large survey of Gulf returnees which reveals that the majority of migrant retumees enjoyed improvement in their current income over that prior to migration (PRC Nair, 1986). Higher current income flows is not consistent with the picture of unproductive utilisation of remittances during the period of migration. Even though the micro level studies conducted so far are not useful for drawing definite ratios of marginal or average propensity to consume from remittance income, the universal conclusion reached regarding substantial improvement in consumption levels of the migrant households is an eminently acceptable one. It is only understandable, why, for most of the Gulf migrants, who are drawn from relatively poorer strata of society, consumption expenditure should be the first claimant on increased income. Improvement in consumption has been the most visible economic impact of migration. The above observation is justified by the available data on the trends in per capita consumption expenditure given in Table 3.12. The per capita consmner expenditure in Kerala was lower than the national average till the early seventies. Since then, the relative consumer expenditure level in Kerala has improved rapidly and is seen to be signiﬁcantly above the national average for 1983-84 and 1986-87 to 1988-89, the years in the Gulf boom phase for which data are available. The rank order of Kerala among the major states in India in terms of per capita expenditure improved from 10 in 1970-71 to 4 in the 1980s. Even more impressively, as can be seen from Table 3.12, the ratio of consumer expenditure to SDI’ has tended to rise in the eighties exceeding unity in 1986-87. Migration, which caused remarkable increase in per capita consumption expenditure. seems to have also effected signiﬁcant changes in the composition of consumption. The food basket of the state has been transformed from one dominated by cheap carbohydrate substitutes like tapioca and relatively cheap protein sources like sea ﬁsh, to one predominantly consisting of costlier cereals, milk, meat, imported vegetables and processed foods (Duvvury, 1990). The share of non-food items in consumption expenditure has increased from 26 per cent to 38 per cent in rural areas and from 29 per cent to 41 per cent in urban areas of Kerala between 1967 and 1983. The share of consumption of durable goods is 6.0 and 3.7 per cent in rural and urban areas of Kerala against an all India average of 2.3 per cent (K. P. Sunny, 1988). Another important point that may be noted in this context is the escalation of the import content of the consumer expenditure in the state. The food dependency of the state has expanded from grain imports to even items such as meat, eggs, fruits and vegetables. The import of manufactured consumables and intermediate products such as construction materials have also phenomenally expanded. The import of cement increased from 7 lakh tonnes to 17 lakh tonnes between 1975-76 and 1980-81. Similarly, there was an eight fold increase in the value of imports of sanitarywares (Thomas Isaac and Reddy, 1992).

#### Spending boosts growth in the GCC

ICN 12/16 [(gateway to the financial and business world covering markets and businesses across the board) “Do GCC states have to cut spending in 2015?” 12/16/2014] AT

Amidst the ongoing fall in global oil prices, GCC countries may be set for a challenging fiscal situation, which could weigh on their real GDP growth, therefore analysts raise a key question: Do GCC governments have to announce tighter 2015 budget to avoid fiscal deficit? Brent crude resumed its downside trend to collapse below $60 a barrel on Tuesday, compared to June’s high of $115.68. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) stood pat in November regarding its production ceiling of 30 million barrels per day, pushing oil prices down by nearly 20 percent since the meeting. Now, the price is far below the break-even prices set by GCC governments, which would put countries heavily dependent on oil windfalls in a difficult fiscal situation. This week, the International Energy Agency slashed its demand forecast for the fourth time in five months. The equity market in GCC states have has lost nearly $150 billion since the end of October on the back of the sustained fall in global oil prices. “In recent years, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states maintained high levels of government spending in order to ensure the survival and recovery of economic activity. Gulf states now realize that in the medium-term they must make a course correction in order to avoid pressure on their budget,” IMF Deputy Director in the Middle East Adnan Mazarei told Asharq Al-Awsat. The fall in oil prices constitute a real threat to the GCC nations, especially in those countries oil proceeds exceeds 90 percent of total revenues, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The highest pressure will be on GCC countries with the lowest oil reserves, Bahrain and Oman, where Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Kuwait are in a better position, the report said. Oil prices at $80 next year, without extra revenues generated from the non-oil sector, would push Oman’s budget surplus into a deficit of 3.05 billion riyals, state news agency ONA reported. OPEC will not intervene by cutting oil production, and will not call for an emergency meeting even if prices plunged to $40 a barrel, United Arab Emirates’ Energy Minister Suhail Al-Mazrouei said. Saudi oil minister Ali Al-Naimi also expressed his confidence that the market will soon correct itself after the recent sharp fall in oil prices. No need for significant spending cuts Other analysts claims there will be no need for strong spending cuts by GCC government as the huge reserves that have been built over the previous couple of years would give support to budget. Harald Finger, the IMF`s head of mission for the United Arab Emirates, said GCC governments should begin from next year to rein in state spending, but they should do it in a gradual manner to avert hurting economic growth. Saudi Arabia may use its reserves which exceed $750 billion, while Abu Dhabi may tap its biggest sovereign wealth fund to finance any shortage in the budget. UAE economy minister said his country will use the reserves, which are nearly twice the UAE`s entire annual gross domestic product, to spend on developing projects in the coming years. The highest pressure will be on GCC countries with the lowest oil reserves, Bahrain and Oman, where Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Kuwait are in a better position, a report by ICAEW said. The huge government spending by GCC governments on investments and infrastructure should stimulate growth over both short- and long-term.